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INTRODUCTION
MIHAELA POP
Contemporary knowledge is centered on the research on human
dimensions. Philosophy should particularly appeal to values in the process
of understanding the human nature. The valuable “becoming” of each
human person requires growing ever more aware of his/her personal
identity and of his/her role in this lifetime. In ethics, especially, values
suppose moral choices or criteria on which a moral behavior is based. Max
Scheler based his ethical theory on the distinction between goods and
values. The “goods” are things to which we attach some physical worth,
and the “values” are the object of emotional perception, of the “sentiment of
value” and of the place they have in the hierarchy of values. Even if the
human being attributes a certain worth to individual things, he/she is always
searching for a universal value, which should exceed the contingency of
that thing. This universal validity is a kind of ideal measure of the value of
all empiric realities and it is articulated by a normative rationality. It forms
a system of universal norms that contribute to the foundation of critical
axiological judgments.
Heinrich Rickert was a philosopher who considered that the entire
human existence should be divided into three areas: reality, values, and
meaning. The reality is the object of science; the knowing subject belongs
to the area of meanings, and he is the connecting element between reality
and values. These do not physically exist, but they make valorization
possible. Within the concrete process of valorization the human being as
assessing subject succeeds in connecting the two other areas.
Friedrich Nietzsche was among the most revolutionary philosophers.
He used an applied critique to the traditional morality, having the intention
to reconsider all values. There are voices who claim that, even today, the
echoes of his critical thinking are still heard. The phenomenon of
globalization has stirred up an entire process of challenges and changes, not
only within the technological and industrial universe, but also, and more
importantly, within the world of spiritual and cultural achievements.
What values are the most enhanced by our post-modern society? Are
they the same as during the modern period? What would distinguish them
from the values of other cultural periods of humankind? How do we react to
the new challenges generated by technological progress and the media?
How do the classical disciplines such as philosophy, religion, anthropology,
and art respond to these new challenges? And how could they help us to
better adapt the writings of certain significant personalities to the modern
and contemporary culture? These are only a few questions this volume will
address. It contains a large number of articles by authors from various
countries and continents: philosophers, and theologians, as well as
researchers in medicine, anthropology, and new scientific technologies.
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They convened in Bucharest, Romania an international conference entitled
“Values of the Human Person: Contemporary Challenges.”
As the variety of topics is impressive, we tried to organize them into
three thematic parts: “Part I: Fundamental Human Values. Contemporary
Challenging Globalization,” “Part II: New Axiological Challenges in
Technologies and Scientific Thinking,” and “Part III: Cultural and Spiritual
Personalities: Possible Answers to Our Contemporary Changes.” In the
following pages, we shall make a short presentation of each article in order
to facilitate a quick familiarization with the entire volume.
Part I. Fundamental Human Values Challenging Contemporary
Globalization
Chapter 1, “Value Differentiation and the Ideal of Mankind”, by Marin
Aiftincă, identifies and discusses some fundamental theoretical aspects of
the concept of value and its meanings. The relationship between personal
values and common values in a strict connection with the ideal of humanity
is the main topic of the article. The author starts from the thesis that the
human being is essentially determined by his spirit, and he identifies
himself through a set of values which he freely appropriates in connection
with his own tradition, cognition, and aspirations. The distinction between
personal and common values is considered to be significant. It takes various
forms of expression due to the development of human knowledge and under
the pressure of socio-political events. There is another significant
distinction to be made: between the pure value and the embodied one. The
latter shows itself together with its bearer and at the level of experience.
Hence a person is, according to Aiftinca, the bearer of values. As a
consequence, personal values embody themselves in a person without
exausting their content and their universality.
But a person is also a member of a community, and he becomes a
responsible person by being educated within a certain axiological universe
– that belonging to his community. There is, however, at this level a
conflict of values that explains the crisis of the contemporary culture. The
author considers that at present, the globalization process promotes and
imposes the utilitarian values that feed the conflict between values, which is
detrimental to the spiritual nature of the individual and collective person.
Instead of the personal values that belong to the local or national cultural
tradition, there are other ideas and values which are gradually brought
under the pressure of globalization, such as liberty, equality, democracy,
justice, market economy, and environmental protection.
Those who criticize globalization accuse it of having dangerous effects
on both individual and community. Being a source of different discontents
and conflicts, globalization is experienced in everyday life as uncertainty
and anxiety, making people vulnerable to various tyrannies and cults. It also
implies migration of capital and job loss, the distress of local wars and
religious collisions, the split of societies into groups involved in ruinous
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struggles. All of these have a negative influence on the structure of
individual and collective values, giving way to the temptation of embracing
non-values. Finally, the author pleads in favor of the preservation of the
balance between personal and common values; the universal culture must
be led by the ideal of the individual person’s self-improvement.
Chapter 2, “The Values of the New Civilization,” by Bogdana
Todorova, remarks that our times, characterized by new forms of
democracy, demand new solutions to contemporary challenges. The author
explores the possibility of a synthesis of values belonging to different
cultures, social groups, and types of intellectual praxis, and how an
interaction between science and religion could be possible and useful in
achieving this synthesis. This relationship has been changeable during
history. An extremely unclear opposition between West and East was
characteristic for Europe in the past and this pattern seems to extend today
into the entire world. Making a historical review, the author establishes
three main periods of the development of this relationship between religion
and science: first, the traditional one, based on the Christian religious
understanding of nature; second, the technological period, where nature is
seen as a specific field of human manifestations; and third, the new
civilizational and “post-neoclassical type of rationality related to complex
developing systems possessing synergetic features.” This new type can be
considered a medium for the development of new values. In the author’s
opinion, it is evident that this general course of civilizational changes could
influence the axiological system of various cultures, though she has doubts
about the possibility of such changes within the Christian religion.
In her effort to discover new aspects of cultural universals that could
assure a desired synthesis, the author mentions the global ecologism – “a
good example of how new cultural universals emerge.” The thought
combines Buddhism, Jainism, and Hinduism, and the neo-Darwinist
synthesis in the twentieth century becomes its secular variant. Another
fundamental perspective is the anthropic one which is associated with
Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. It was secularized, especially during the
nineteenth century, identifying social sciences as humanistic religions.
Believing that these two ways of thinking should not be opposed, but
should be reunited by a philosophical synthesis, Todorova pleads for the
contribution of philosophy to adopt a critical analysis and also apply the
principle of complementarity.
Chapter 3 is an effort to identify the cultural coordinates of the human
being in contemporary society. Leon Dyczewski, in his article “Man in
Contemporary Culture,” starts from the idea that the development of any
society depends on creative individuals. Hence, the more such individuals
there are, the more they are open to new problems, and the more quickly
they enter new fields of life, the better. Contemporary society is marked by
an increasing pluralism and differentiation in all fields of life, and by a
rapid absorption of modern technologies. Mass culture is driven out by
popular culture that abolishes the division into high and low culture,
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forming a great mosaic of cultural groups. The author supports the idea that
in our contemporary society a new social class or layer is slowly formed:
the creative layer. In the future, it is this class that will shape our world.
Thus, the author discusses some of the main characteristics of this creative
class. It may be called technical-economical-managerial intelligentsia and
differs significantly from the Renaissance model promoted by what was
usually called the intelligentsia in Poland and Russia. It focused on values
significant for the whole individual and social life, and generally its
members were very well educated.
To the contrary, the technical-economical-managerial intelligentsia is
formed by those who can easily shape the sphere of possessions, who can
recognize human needs and satisfy them with new products, ideas, and
behavior patterns. Unfortunately, this new class promotes a certain culture
that could become dangerous, not only for individuals or small groups, but
also for entire nations or even the whole world. Despite the ever greater
knowledge of oneself and of the surrounding world, fascination of new
inventions leads to forgetfulness about man himself and leads to a deep crisis
of culture. The technical-economical-managerial intelligentsia is not able to
think about the human being as a spiritual-bodily whole, nor about man’s
ultimate aims or the meaning of his life. Hence, Dyczewski thinks that the
time has come for a new shaping of European society. Holistic theories are
quite popular today and there is a growing demand for spiritual life and for
deep personal ties. The supporters of this movement may be called the
intelligentsia of life. The two categories of intelligentsia are not necessarily
opposed. Both are necessary and form the creative class of our contemporary
society.
Chapter 4 has a wide range of theoretical debates trying to get general
characteristics of a contemporary axiological perspective. Dan Chiţoiu in his
article “Person and Personal Reality: The Actuality of the Eastern Christian
Understanding of Man,” proposes a special religious perspective.
Contemporary science has succeeded in explaining many biological or
physical processes so that we begin to have a consistent understanding of
subtle interactions between body and mind. After Descartes, philosophers
preferred the concept of mind, the human dimension understood as
possessing self-reflexivity and intentionality. The old notion of soul was
replaced by mind and starting from the assertion that thinking is an act of
mind, a new domain of philosophy appeared during the twentieth century,
the philosophy of mind. Man is described in a double sense: first, mind
could not be understood as an intangible or incorporeal nature; second,
mind can not have other support than body; experiments in neuroscience
provided strong evidence of the material support of the mind.
Psychology, in its turn, affirms that the soul cannot be an object of
study in any way – even indirectly; instead it deals with the description of
cognitive processes, the nature of emotions, etc. These developments bring,
inevitably, a crisis in the process of understanding the nature of man.
During the last half of the twentieth century, some other theories proposed
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to respond to this need. French phenomenology abandoned the search for a
human essence in favor of a radical phenomenality. What characterizes the
life of man is not the biological instinct, but his power to test himself. This
is based on a distinction between body (corps) and flesh (chair). Similar
explanatory insight can be found in the texts of authors involved in the
neoPatristic movement: Gheorghi Florovsky, Justin Popovici, and Dumitru
Stăniloae. They promoted a re-interpretation of the Gospel, as well as some
texts of the Church Fathers to revive thereby the spirit of the first Christian
textual sources. Since the Renaissance, the Christian anthropological
perspective was considered to have been under influences not related to the
tradition of the Fathers. This was valid not only for the Christian West, but
even for Eastern Christianity. Some notions, such as persona, prosopon,
and hypostasis, had slightly different meanings for the Church Fathers of
the fourth century, and those meanings should now be reactivated.
Chapter 5, “Modern Society and Its Ethical Dilemmas,” by Cornelia
Găşpărel, suggests that society does not look perfect, but it has its
dilemmas. The author tries to find solutions to these dilemmas. The starting
point of the article is the present situation in Romania. Despite the
emergence of new human rights after the end of the communist system,
codes of conduct within the Romanian society seem to remain unchanged.
Institutions that are supposed to create and apply the new rights are still
tributary to traditional interpretations. As a consequence, the notion of
ethics is often misunderstood, due to limitations on action and
interpretation. While contextuality can be a solution to some of the ethical
dilemmas, it is not satisfactory for a logical system of analysis. On the other
hand, such modes of philosophical analysis as utilitarianism,
consequentialism, or professional ethics are only a descriptive level. In
conclusion, the author proposes setting a new direction of research built on
psycho-philosophical coordinates focusing on the philosophical, hereditary,
and neurological unconscious. She pleads in favor of repositioning and
analysing the theories concerning the fact that the unconscious level has an
incipient conscient life considered as a starting point (in terms of moral and
spiritual virtues). Then, the following aspect would be the role of memory,
which may or may not indicate the resources of will. In other words,
Gasparel wants to point out a different perspective on scientific and applied
ethics. Choosing this way of thinking, the author intends to enhance
morality by reconsidering the ontological structure (conscience) which may
or may not justify the equity in human relations.
Chapter 6, “Aspirations and Anticipations of Universalism: The
Global Village in Ancient Rome,” by Iulian-Gabriel Hruşcă, attempts to
find solutions to today’s crises and proposes that looking back in history
could help to a better understanding. Hruşcă points out that the
phenomenon of globalization is not just a modern one; it can be seen in the
Roman tradition. There is one huge difference: the expansion of technology
and communications, greatly enlarging the scale at which the contemporary
globalization takes place. On the level of community moral attitudes, the
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author points out some of today’s main notions that seem to be inherited
from the ancient Rome.
The modern notion of global village/globalization can be attributed to
the Roman tradition, claims Hruşcă, even if the twentieth century seems to
have invented it through Marshal McLuhan’s theory. The author mentions
that the ancient Greek civilization invented terms such as philanthropia,
which meant “goodwill toward all men,” and promoted a moral obligation
owed by every human being to every other one. The Roman equivalent of
the Greek philanthropia was the concept of humanitas Romana. Despite the
adverse impact that Rome must have had on other ethnic groups, it
remained to posterity as the great exponent of multiculturalism. Other
Roman notions analyzed by the author are civitas, anticivitas, transcivitas,
and imperium. Hruşcă suggests that a deeper analysis of the Roman
civilization could be helpful for a better understanding of today’s process of
globalization.
Chapter 7, “Was the Modern Cosmopolis Transformed into a Post-
Modern Global Village?,” by Constantin Stoenescu, develops, in a different
way, the concept of global village. The author argues that the shift from
Modernity to Post-Modernity was accompanied by a deep change of some
presuppositions. He reveals that post-modernity replaces the so-called
project of Cosmopolis with that of a global village. Stoenescu thinks that
globalization should be considered the end of modernity, but not of history
itself. This means in the author’s opinion, that the old Kantian ideal about a
common peaceful world was already fulfilled. This historical project was
the basis of the modern society with the national state as a unit of global
order. But the technological evolution and the market economy changed the
society and the national state became something old-fashioned. The new
aim is a global order based on transnational processes, and the brave new
world looks like a village, a global village in which every person can know
almost everything, if she or he wants, about everybody and everything. The
author remarks that post-modernism, in its first phase, was a particular
movement and had the main purpose of stopping and overcoming the
modernism in architecture; it wasn’t its aim to replace modernity with
something like post- modernity. Later on, post-modernism undermined the
authority of modern tradition and institutions. The idea of universality was
under attack, as the new preferred approaches were deconstruction and the
analysis of little fragments. All the strong modern claims for objectivity and
universalism were put into question by post-modernism. The author
remarks that surprisingly, a difference between what we wanted to build
and what we have in fact built began to manifest itself. The main reason for
this surprising result is the invasion of a new kind of subjectivity in all areas
of social life, thinks Stoenescu. And he mentions that there is a new agenda
in which some trends, philosophically supported, could be seen as a revival
of culture, such as the return to the oral tradition or to the particular and to
the local community. In the author’s opinion, there is a way to unify and
save all these revivals: to rediscover nature and to overcome the modern
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dichotomy between nature and culture. The global village could be
redesigned starting from the natural dimensions of our life on our planet.
Chapter 8, “Hermeneutic Dialogue as Social Value: An Inquiry into
the ‘Unfindable Objects of Thought’,” by Adrian Costache, notes that
another characteristic of the new society should be the hermeneutic
dialogue. Costache identifies some meaningful areas of dialogue: in
institutions of education and the sciences of education, where dialogue is
seen as the prominent means for passing on knowledge and for the
development of a harmonious personality, and in international relations and
cultural studies, where dialogue, as cross-cultural conversation, is taken as
the only means for facing and avoiding the perils confronting humanity as a
whole in our times. The author supposes that dialogue is as old as human
society itself; there is no society but through dialogue, nor can there be
dialogue outside a certain sociality. The “dynamic genesis” of dialogue
understood simply as an exchange of ideas or views about a matter at hand
between an “I” and a “Thou” allows that dialogue is not only a value in and
for our society, but the social value par excellence.
A dialogue presupposes the existence of a third person. It involves a
third for only with the appearance of the third and through the third is the
other seen as another “I,” and thus as a “Thou.” The third brings about and
embodies the law that institutes and governs all possible and acceptable
relations between human beings.
It is suggested that we must give up our obsession with the question of
being, and renounce any philosophy of being altogether, in favor of a
philosophy of multiplicity, of the “and.” We have to learn how to think not
in terms of what “is” this or that, and not out of the wonder that there “is”
something rather than nothing, but in terms of this and that and that
and…Such metaphysics of the “and” will lead us to realize that the
speaking subject and the “I” that engages a “Thou” in dialogue (just like the
“Thou”) is not the substratum of the world or a transcendental condition of
possibility. Rather, the speaking subject is a collective assemblage for
enunciation through whose speech a multiplicity of order-words is
expressed.
Hence also we will have to stop attributing to language and discourse
(either written or spoken) any privilege. Instead, we will have finally to
understand that although the flow of words is the only one to have meaning,
it has just as much or as little sense as any other flow.
Chapter 9, “Rationality as a Human Value,” by Lavinia Marin, proves
another fundamental value of today’s society rationality to be. Living today
in big cities induces people to interact with other people belonging to
different cultures. Problems arise when there are differences of education,
generating misunderstandings and difficulties of communication. Marin
thinks that this situation can also cause a philosophical problem as it
expresses the need to reevaluate one’s own values and attitudes toward the
others. In fact, each one should understand that his own values are for him
as valuable as are the values of some other people for them. The author
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wants to find an answer to some questions, such as: “How are we supposed
to talk in public about our own values? How are we to negotiate our values
in a multicultural society?” The author establishes that there are two kinds
of values: communitarian and individual. There are also intrinsic values and
instrumental ones. Two main attitudes of defending values can be
mentioned: being irrational when choosing values but defending them in a
rational way, and being rational about our values yet being fanatical about
them and refusing any type of dialogue. The author goes on analyzing
various solutions in order to adopt a rational attitude when defending a
value. A solution with which the author seems to sympathize is the
Contractualism version promoted by T.M. Scanlon. Finally, in order to put
to work the theories already mentioned, Marin chooses two cases: the
smoking ban imposed by the state on the citizens and the recent controversy
regarding the wearing of the Islamic veil in France – l'affaire du voile.
Chapter 10, “Spiritual Cognition of a Person and Culture,” by Sergey
Nizhnikov, thinks that not only rationality should be considered a
fundamental value of our days, but also spiritual cognition. In today’s
society, people seem to lose some of the spiritual values of the cultural
tradition. Spiritual knowledge is considered as the essence of an individual,
enabling him to use and display the human spiritual archetypes. The author
stresses the fact that these archetypes become manifest in individual lives
only when each person becomes aware of this heritage and makes it his
own. Nizhnikov wants to achieve an extended image of the spiritual
problematic not only from the individual side but also from a socio-cultural
and historical point of view. Thus, the author uses not only European
philosophy, but also spiritual theories belonging to various cultures and
traditions of the world. He treats spirituality in connection with culture,
knowledge, morals, and mysticism. The spiritual person is anxious for
moral purification in order to reach the perfection of his nature. The author
remarks that a person should be aware of the fact that he is in an on-going
process of becoming from the spiritual point of view. Being a spiritual
person is not a static dimension but a dynamic one, based on a self-knowing
process. The purpose would be a deification of the human being as a
consequence of this lifelong process of spiritual becoming. The hesychastic
theological movement theorized by Gregory Palamas during the fourteenth
century is one of the ways to reach this desired condition. Christ, Buddha,
and Plato managed to understand the spiritual essence of a person in the
world and to express it in symbols and concepts. As spiritual knowledge
concerns what the person is in his essence, spiritual truth is he himself.
When this essence of a person is completely developed, the spiritual
archetype of humankind reveals itself in an individual appearance, says the
author.
Chapter 11, “The Ends of Philosophy in the Context of Contemporary
Biopolitics,” by Cristian Iftode, points out the role of philosophical thinking
as extremely necessary in our contemporary society. Today, philosophy
tends to revive the ancient formula of philosophy as “a way of life” or “care
Introduction 9
of the self,” says the author. He wants to debate the ends of philosophy in
the context of today’s culture and thinks that the radical critique of modern
subjectivity could be a guiding thread for the understanding of all the
relevant issues in contemporary (post-Nietzschean) philosophy. The author
notices an important philosophical and cultural phenomenon in the West
since the beginning of the 80s: the death of the “death of the subject” and
the practical turn in contemporary philosophy. This return of the subject as
an action subject could be considered at the same time a principle of
practical reflexivity and the result of a process of subjectivation. The author
points out three levels of resistance to the idea of philosophy as a practice
aimed to perform an effective transformation of its subject: the prevailing
socio-cultural context, so favorable to the idea of self-acceptance; the
tradition of modern moral philosophy, bracketing the very meaning of
ethics as an “ascetic” work whose goal is the self-fashioning of the
individual; and some of the influential trends in the field of contemporary
moral psychology. Iftode presents then three aporias that illustrate
philosophy as a “form of life” and define the “condition” of any
philosopher: (a) disinterested contemplation vs. existential practice; (b)
Socratic-Nietzschean unsettlement vs. full embrace of a philosophy of life;
(c) self-creation vs. self-discovery. In the end, the author emphasizes the
present ethical and political relevance of the practice of philosophy, both on
a personal, or rather interpersonal, level, with the goal of self-
transformation, and on a public level, with the task of a consistently critical
approach to all forms of disciplinary power.
Chapter 12, “The Human Value of Civil Disobedience in Democratic
Societies,” by Dorina Pătrunsu, points out that there are not only positive
values which characterize our society but also negative ones that could be
positively re-used. Pătrunsu starts from the assertion that the role played by
an individual within a democratic society depends on the limits within
which the individual may freely interact with the other members of the
society. Democratization supposes a social space where institutional
structures provide individuals equality in opportunities and the same degree
of liberty. Nevertheless, in real life, democratic societies have to face cases
where certain rules fail to impose the same constraints to each individual,
acting systematically to the disadvantage of some of them. In such cases,
the people against whom the discrimination occurs are frustrated. This is
one of the reasons that civil protests are supposed to play a crucial role in
the process of self-regulation and self-correcting of the institutional
structure. Civil disobedience becomes consequently a means for the
improvement of the institutional system. This means that in a case where
some group of citizens is systematically oppressed, that is, where some of
their basic liberties are denied by some of the existing laws, the civil
majority, if well-informed about the injustice, would be ready to put
pressure on their political representatives to amend the system of laws.
Pătrunsu develops some well-known theories and analyzes some cases of
civil disobedience. She mentions the fundamental steps in the development
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of a disobedient civic movement. Her purpose is to justify the civil
disobedience.
Chapter 13, “Beauty as an Aesthetic Value: Contemporary
Challenges,” by Mihaela Pop, suggests the aesthetic values as a side of the
contemporary human person and fundamental inquiries. Pop pleads a subtle
continuity of classical aesthetic values “dressed” in new appearances. The
avant-gardes and especially the Dada movement generated a real revolution
in the artistic world, not only at the theoretical level, but also in the manner
of making artistic works. Aesthetic thought was called to answer to
extremely courageous and shocking questions as the artists were exploring
new ways of artistic expression. Theoretical principles, themes, methods of
artistic work, materials – all were reconsidered. Was it “the end of art”
already prophesized by Hegel? And what was going to happen after the end
of art? And artistic beauty – was it yet a value for the new kind of art that
Duchamp initiated? These are questions to which the author of this article
tries to give some coherent answers. After a short presentation of the avant-
garde movements and their main characteristics, Pop uses some significant
aesthetic theories and their arguments in order to prove the fact that beauty
is not only a historical aesthetic value, it is a fundamental human value that
always finds its expression in accordance with the cultural context of the
moment. In order to be more pertinent in her analysis, the author chose two
artists whose works could illustrate this position.
Chapter 14, “What Kitsch Tells Us about Our Time,” by Ulrich
Steinvorth, analyzes the negative aspect of kitsch and its various ways of
manifestation. Steinvorth develops some significant ideas, pointing
especially to some non-aesthetic meanings of the term. Modern kitsch is the
new opium, disabling the reality contact necessary for rational action. There
were two main meanings the twentieth century attributed to this term: an
intellectual one and a political one, thinks the author. While the first half of
the century criticized especially the intellectual dimension, during the
Second World War and the second half of the century the political aspects
were preponderant. In either of these, the kitsch phenomenon overlooked
the aesthetic dimension. The author starts from one of the well-known
definitions of kitsch as “bad taste” and “reality sweetener,” a definition that
proves to be unsatisfactory, in his opinion. Thus, he explores an alternative.
The author thinks that “bad taste is not a lack of knowledge or morality, but
a lack of sense,” or its “misplacement.” Kitsch would suppose a kind of
second emotion by which we think we have the same feelings as the entire
world, and this emotion, which is not, in fact, a very profound and personal
one, would be responsible for kitsch behavior. Indulging kitsch feelings
supposes indulging our conformity to others. The author points out that
kitsch obliterates the need for deliberation, or in other words, for any
assessing judgment. Thus, people’s will is annihilated and they have only a
false impression of giving their consent by argument. Kitsch becomes,
therefore, a powerful tool in politics, advertisement, religion, and rhetoric.
The conclusion would be that kitsch should not be reduced to “bad taste”
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and “reality sweetener.” It blocks rational deliberation, which should assure
freedom of thinking and autonomy; it prevents differentiated responses to
stimuli. In art, a work turns into kitsch “not if it moves or pleases, but if it
does so by preventing differentiation.”
Chapter 15, “Globalization, Modern Myth or Ideological Project?,” by
Iulia Anghel, suggests differentiation another fundamental characteristic.
Anghel intends to explore the real limits of globalization and to show some
hidden aspects of it. Its fundamental characteristic would be the fact that it
is defined by a core of values that tend to minimize other solutions. Even if
globalization is usually considered a progressive and legitimate evolution of
a universal project, there is still the possibility of the intervention of an
ideological frame. In this situation, globalization becomes an expression of
a quiet dominance of a pattern against diversity, not an “open model.” The
author analyzes some other historical projects of globalization: Christianity,
the Medieval Ages, the Enlightment, and communist theory and its regimes.
The general characteristic present in any of these historical periods is the
fact that the unification trends are supporting a dissolving element.
In another chapter of her article, Anghel wonders whether the
globalization process should be understood as a liberalization movement or
as a totalitarian model. She mentions that there is a core of “good” values
that are replacing some “dark paradigms” such as totalitarianism or archaic
structures. But the real problem remains. She tries to highlight that there is
the non-legitimate tendency of selection of interest spheres that must melt
in the project. Finally, the author expresses a critical and not very optimistic
attitude: “Maybe the Western cultural pattern is a good one and its
extension is a sign of evolution, but the lack of permeability of this model
and its monopolizing tendencies are proofs of a profound internal crisis.
Maybe the border will continue to extend, but its eliminatory vocation
remains constant.”
Part II. New Axiological Challenges in Technologies and Scientific
Thinking
Chapter 16, “Human Being: from Spiritual Values to Technological
Progress,” by Cristian Berţi, debates the meaning of the human being today,
his role and his expectations within the progress of knowledge. Berţi
presents the opinions of three philosophers of the twentieth century:
Constantin Noica, Werner Jaeger, and José Ortega y Gasset. The common
characteristic of these three philosophers is the fact that they discussed the
problems of the human being through history and tried to articulate a profile
of the human being of the twenty-first century. In the author’s opinion, this
profile is very close to our contemporary image. In order to understand the
future of the human being, the author thinks that a deep understanding of
the past is strictly necessary. The three philosophers mentioned above
adopted the same attitude. Noica thought that modern man is focused on
finding the truth, but forgets about the moral attitude and the struggle for
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the common good of the community. A return to the Christian
commandments that make people more oriented toward the Other would be,
in Noica’s opinion, a good attitude for the future. Jaeger brings another,
complementary idea: the education of contemporary man should be inspired
from the Greek paideia, which was capable of building a humanist human
being. Ortega y Gasset thought that the human being should look toward
the future. This is what is lacking in contemporary man. Ortega y Gasset
pleads in favor of an industrious and active man. Berti adds some ideas of
Ernst Cassirer, pointing out that the essence of the human being doesn’t
consist in the search for his unity, but rather in the discovery of new sides,
of new ways of being. The author is convinced that the greatest quality of
the human being is the fact that he is able to adapt to the changes in his life.
This ability will help him even during this epoch of great technological
changes; he will be able to reshape his values.
Chatper 17, “The Worth of Man on the Threshold of his Technological
Transformation,” by Ana Bazac, discusses an important contemporary
theme: are the new technologies already functioning in medicine and
medical engineering capable of modifying the biological functions of the
human being in order to ameliorate him, not only biologically, but also
qualitatively? The author is much more interested in other kinds of changes,
those specific to the human mind. The consequences would be that the
“new” human being, the technological one, would transform his specific
meanings. The author wants to find out whether these new values are or not
human at all. Bazac thinks that the new mind – natural plus AI – will
generate a new kind of sapiens sapiens, who would also be named post-
human or trans-human.
Wondering on what level human society now is, the author mentions
the predominance of capital as the unique manager of the right to existence,
and even of whatever is the possible future. The author mentions that the
article is based on the theory of engineered singularity and its ideological
significance: as technophile optimism, transfiguring a deep social
pessimism concerning the possible solving of the global problems by the
present “natural” human being.
Thus the ontological view developed by Bazac concerns a twofold
problematic: the presumable consequences of AI technology on the human
being, and the social use of the present revolutionary science and
engineering. The results of these two kinds of situations reveal a
contradictory state of man: on one side is the fact that he is a rational being,
and on the other, it shows the weakness of human reason and the social
translation of this weakness, which generates a waste of human capabilities
and lives.
Chapter 18, “Social Network Sites: A Microanalysis of the
Involvement of Young Europeans,” by Sebastian Chirimbu, focuses on a
highly specific domain of our society, the internet. Chirimbu points out that
the development of the internet depended, obviously, on technology. It is
the most outstanding process of development of the end of the twentieth
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century. Since its beginnings, the internet has been generating continuous
new consequences for our contemporary society. One of them is the process
of globalization. The internet is the result of the process of collaboration
among people, institutions, groups, and states. As the author points out, the
internet produced the most interesting phenomenon of the twentieth
century: communication in real time all over the world. Practically
speaking, the social networks hosted by the internet represent a global way
of communication. Social networks appear to be interaction structures
among users in an exchange relationship, with the nature of the network
being given by the nature of the relationship. There are many channels of
communication via internet. Chirimbu chooses Facebook as an example.
Besides being anything else, Facebook is an agent of globalization, and due
to it the global village we live in becomes virtually coherent in the
infosphere. It is well known that Facebook was initially a system of
communication among students. This makes the author question the
situation of the young generations in today’s society. European youth have
witnessed and have been living in a fast-changing, fast-developing
environment. It is a generation whose thinking patterns are fundamentally
different from those of previous generations, mostly due to the different
way of processing information in a time of technological boom. The author
thinks that the young generation does not have enough access to the leading
positions within the EU and this could cause social tensions.
Chapter 19, “Philosophical Reflection as to the Ethics of Network
Information,” by Gong Qun, manifests his interest for the same domain of
network information considered from the ethics perspective. The author
starts with the assertion that our contemporary life is based on information
and especially on network facilities. This has already changed man’s living
and communication styles. We can see that this fact has also changed the
characteristics of human ethical life, as it grows more evident that “net
crimes” are a new section of human behavior. This article presents some
theoretical philosophical premises and relevant principles of the ethics of
network information. The change of identity of the network user is the
ontological premise of this ethical discussion.
“Without any constraint mechanism, all those presumed to be seeking
for maximum self-interest are just like the natural men in natural state
mentioned by Hobbes. In such an anonymous space, every one is free and
equal, and will never balk at hurting others for the maximization of his self-
interest,” says Gong Qun. Thus, in the author’s opinion, the
contractarianism of Hobbes and Gauthier can be considered the
philosophical premise for the ethics of network information. This supposes
that all participants in the network are of identical purpose of self-interest
when partaking in the activities and construction of this world. The author
thinks that the construction of a network ethic on the basis of restrictive
pursuit of self-interest conceives a social contract among “Netizens.” He is
perfectly aware of the fact that there are people who care for others, even
sacrifice themselves for others. They have the capacity for better realizing
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self-restraint. However, people mostly pursue only their self-interest. Thus,
the premise of the new ethic should be based on the expectation that people
have the idea of justice by nature as it was mentioned by Rawls. That is,
having a reasonable conception of self-good, people may accept an ethical
behavior in the net world as the product of man’s pursuit for a better life.
Chapter 20, “The Disunity of Anthropology: Reflections from a
Philosophy of Science Perspective” by Richard David-Rus, notes another
scientific perspective on our society and its challenges developed by
anthropological research. The author tries to apply a philosophical enquiry
to raise the issues of the relation between the biological and the social
approaches to human nature and intends to address these problems from the
perspective of philosophy and methodology of science. The subject of the
unity of the sciences was a major topic in the classical neopositivist
conception of science. O. Neurath and R. Carnap were behind the project of
an encyclopedia of unified science. After presenting the traditional view
and assessing its inadequacy for the question of unity of anthropology, the
author explores some recent modalities of approaching the issue. The first
one places it in a Hempelian frame regarding anthropology as a homothetic
science. The second one takes into account the historicist reaction to the DN
model, and sees anthropology as mainly dealing with particular sorts of
statements, without aiming at discovering general laws. The third
orientation draws on the ideas that understanding in social sciences is
different from that in natural sciences. The task of the anthropologist is to
make sense of the behavior of an individual people by contextualizing the
behavior in the frame of the purposes, motives, beliefs, and norms of
behavior of that people. Starting with the last two decades of the twentieth
century, a new move can be detected. It was described as “localism,” with
reference to the positions articulated in the realism-antirealism debate.
Regarding the anthropological investigation, David-Rus thinks that the
actual situation does not imply that questions regarding human nature
should no longer be asked. It is quite right to raise them, the obsession for a
unique answer might not be justified. Instead, science offers us a patchwork
of solutions from which one can choose.
Chapter 21, “The Concept of Dignity in the Capability Approach: A
Personalist Perspective,” by Asya Markova, focuses on the medical
scientific domains and develops a conceptual account of human dignity
including persons with mental disabilities. She does not accept the
rationalistic reductionism of the dominant concept of dignity, sharing
Martha Nussbaum’s critique. The exclusion of persons with mental
disabilities is one of the three central problems of justice, generated by
rationalistic reductionism. However, Markova cannot agree with
Nussbaum, who thinks that it is enough to use our intuitive understanding
of what human dignity means. Markova starts with a short analysis of the
implicit and explicit uses of the concept of dignity in Nussbaum’s version
of the capability approach. The author tries to elaborate further on the
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concept of dignity using the personalist philosophy, especially Gabriel
Marcel’s concept of dignity.
When analyzing Marcel’s concept of dignity, Markova links the
distinctive interrelation between love and dignity to the situation of persons
with mental disabilities. She points to the importance of resisting the
ideological treatment of other people as a “thing,” a treatment that stands in
contradiction to the ways one has learned to know and value himself by his
relations of love with the others. Human dignity, in Markova’s discussion,
consists in this basic capability to resist to one’s own stigmatization and
reification by others as well as to the struggle for one’s own recognition as
a valuable particular person.
Chapter 22, “Understanding Mental Health: Existential Situation and
Social Attitude,” by three researchers, Tebeanu Ana-Voichiţa, Macarie
George-Florian and Manea Teodora, studies mental health. The authors
start from the idea that mental health should not be considered only a
specific field of medicine, but that it also supposes a cultural understanding.
This would be the reason for keeping up the normal human condition in
opposition to the abnormal one. Taking into consideration these aspects, the
authors’ interest leans toward the social attitudes generated by people with
mental disorders, attitudes that may differ significantly from stigmatization
to acceptance and even excessive praise or respect. The research is based on
direct interviews with Romanian mental health professionals. The purpose
is to discover how these doctors conceptualize mental health today.
The authors consider that philosophy could be very helpful in
understanding cultural aspects of mental illnesses. They start from the
observation that persons experiencing mental illnesses are confronted with a
significant situation: they do not belong to the community any longer, as
they no longer share with the others the quality of “being rational.” This is
in accordance with the Heideggerian meaning of ek-sistance. Next, a
definition of what is normality and abnormality in mental condition reveals
that being in accordance with the world and being consistent with others
would be a classical definition of normality, while an ill person is
“dysthimic and brings a fracture between the object of knowledge and the
knowing intellect.” After interviewing nine mental health professionals, the
authors come to some conclusions, especially to the fact that being mentally
healthy means not only the lack of symptoms and clinical signs, but also a
general well being, which means that the human being should be considered
in his totality and implicitly in his being integrated in the community to
which he belongs.
Chapter 23, “Changes and Challenges in the Statement on the Quality
of Dying,” by Gabriel Roman, continues the medical research by stressing
new contemporary meanings of the quality of dying. The author aims at
revealing some meanings of a good death as it was thought by Romanian
folkloric tradition and in today’s communities. The article focuses on the
values of the human person considered under the changes of globalization.
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In old communities, the good death had a psychological and spiritual
character, a time and a spatial aspect. Thus, the author finds five main
aspects of this concept in the traditional ritual of good death: a social, a
psychological, and a spiritual character, combined with a chronological and
a spatial aspect. Today, and especially in urban communities, what is
significant is the quality of dying in the context of the palliative care
system. There are six aspects considered to express basically what people
understand by a good enough death. The most important, in the author’s
opinion is “the affirmation of the whole person.” A special interest goes
toward the “death-denying society.” The author mentions the increasing
number of deaths in hospitals and also a more and more widespread interest
for the transhumanist movement, or antiaging. The study provides
discussions of the extent to which medical and scientific decisions erode
traditional religious consolations for the problems involved in dying and
bereavement.
Part III. Cultural and Spiritual Personalities: Possible Answers to our
Contemporary Changes.
Each of the articles of this part refers to a significant personality
whose theoretical contribution or personal experience of life could help us
in the process of a better understanding of our contemporary society and its
needs and challenges. We chose a chronological series of cultural portraits.
Chapter 24, “Rousseau’s “Civil Religion” Reconsidered,” by John
Farina, presents some aspects of Rousseau’s understanding and supposes
that Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s understanding of religion and civil society
was more nuanced than was usually acknowledged. Reading again the
writings of this French thinker may lay hints for the reformulation of
theories of citizenship and religious identity in the twenty-first century.
Farina wants to reconsider the role which religion might play in post-
secular liberal Western societies. He mentions that Europe has never been
post-Christian except for the fact that the church has been removed from a
privileged place in the political structure. This is obvious by the manner in
which the most liberal thinkers wrote their texts. Rousseau insisted that
religion plays a crucial role in the new societies. Unfortunately, his
interpreters took only the negative part of what he said about religion and
forgot about the positive part. Farina wants to find out “whether an
accommodation of religion is essential for the health of liberal societies in
the new Europe and indeed in the global twenty-first century and what
Rousseau’s insights might contribute to such a new accommodation.”
Rousseau shows a great religious sensibility when speaking of a kind of
fundamental religious sentiment basic to human nature, which he calls “the
religion of nature,” “true religion,” or “the religion of man.” He never
denounces religion. Rather, his work consistently shows a spiritual
sensitivity that blends easily with his artistic and moralizing bent. He
defends religion against its naturalist critics, the skeptics, and atheists like
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Voltaire. He also insists on the role of religion in civil society. Making
distinctions among the religions of Man, of Citizen, and of the Priest,
Rousseau points to the first one, who, in Farina’s opinion, is in fact the
Christianity of the Gospels. The religion of Citizen has become the official
religion of the State usually named “civil religion,” and the religion of the
Priest supposes the strict control of its institution, the Church. Neither of
these is oriented toward understanding the meanings of the Other.
Rousseau’s Religion of Man, by contrast, provides a basis for
acknowledging in the Other what we experience in ourselves, as Farina
states in his article.
Chapter 25, “The Authenticity of the Human Being in Christian
Existentialism and Phenomenology: S. Kierkegaard and J. Tischner,” by
Marek Jan Pytko, develops a few fundamental aspects in order to reveal
some main characteristics of Authenticity as a human value. The author
wonders if it is still worthwhile to be an authentic person in our
contemporary society, in the era of mass communication and globalization.
In order to answer to his question, Pytko refers to some fundamental
concepts of Soren Kierkegaard’s philosophy as well as to those expressed
by a Polish contemporary thinker, Jozef Tischner. Authenticity is a
fundamental challenge of the human existence in Kierkegaard’s thought.
There are three main elements that help the human being to reach
authenticity: decision, repetition, and passion. From the lowest level of his
existence (the aesthetic one), through the ethic one, toward the highest level
(the Christian way of living), man experiences challenges which make him
live more and more authentically. Real authenticity is reached only when
man’s spirituality is fully open to the constant relationship with eternity,
with God-Man. Who is man? What reveals the authenticity, or
inauthenticity of his existence? These are some questions that Tischner tries
to answer. Under Hegel’s influence, Tischner thinks that man has a task for
himself: he can be “for himself,” per se in order to speak about authentic
freedom and to achieve authentic freedom. Summarizing Tischner’s ideas,
Pytko thinks that the proper expression of freedom is no longer choosing
automatically values transmitted by others. Man has the moral duty to make
these values “his own values,” to become aware of them. This is exactly
what is not encouraged by our contemporary mass pop-culture and global
sale of ideas, where the lack of authenticity is promoted. In this situation, as
Pytko suggests, trying to make efforts to live authentically would be the
necessary attitude for each person.
Chapter 26, “The Value of the Human Person: Rabindranath Tagore’s
Relevance to the Challenges of Today’s World,” by Seema Bose, brings to
the reader’s attention the contribution of another valuable personality of the
twentieth century: Rabindranath Tagore. The author points out his spiritual
heritage and the fact that it can be reactivated today. Rabindranath Tagore
was a Bengali poet, and the first Asian to receive the Nobel Prize for
literature. ‘Man’ occupies a vital position in Tagore’s thinking. Creation
through art, poetry, music, dance, and philosophy all stem from what he
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calls “the surplus in man.” Mentioning Tagore’s thought, Bose thinks that
creativity elevates man from a mere physical being to a complete man. In
his creative capacity, man is similar to the divine. Another characteristic
that Bose stresses is Tagore’s love of nature, and the fact that natural beauty
cannot be overlooked. According to him, human personality cannot develop
if there is a division between the human individual and nature or the world
in general. In the human person nature becomes articulated. Love is the root
of all relationships and is superior to knowledge. Fulfillment is achieved
within interpersonal relationships in spite of pain, suffering, and death. At a
time when violence plagues our world and when human beings are so often
treated as tools in a world of objects, it is good to be reminded by Tagore
that in reality our being is concrete, that is, not to be reduced to any kind of
abstraction. Though people belong to different cultures, no one should be
exploited at the cost of another. Tagore’s great emphasis on the dignity of
the human person needs to be remembered in the midst of our tendency to
think in terms of globalizing powers.
Chapter 27, “The Acting Person and the Vertical Experience of
Transcendence in Karol Wojtyla’s Writings,” by Wilhelm Dancă, intends to
undertake a critical consideration of the merits and limitations of the
phenomenological analysis of the acting person, based on philosopher
Karol Wojtyla’s chef-d'oeuvre, The Acting Person. In a short introduction,
Dancă articulates Wojtyla’s methodology and anthropology, and points out
the peculiarity of his philosophical endeavor which starts not from the
ontological structure of person, but from human action as such. The deep
basic idea consists in the intuition that the person is revealed in and through
action. Wojtyla had the conviction that the phenomenology of experience
can shed light on the divine roots of man’s mystery and the fact that he can
find fulfillment only in the transformation resulting from the interpersonal
love of communion with God as Person. By adopting this interpretation,
Wojtyla saw humans as persons, that is, beings created in the image and
likeness of God, intelligent beings endowed with spirituality, freedom, and
subjective feelings – an “imago Dei.” In his analysis, the author shows that
the phenomenology of the experience of human acts requires a perspective
capable of taking it beyond simple morphological description. Such
perspective becomes manifest at the level of conscience. Dancă examines
only the free acts of man, his decisions, and choices, as related to the
analysis of the fundamental experience of the I can, but am not constrained
to do this and to the presentation of the person as the effective cause of its
own actions. Following Wojtyla’s example, the author attempts to bring
together phenomenology and metaphysics and, to this end, he mentions the
experience of the vertical transcendence of person, with a focus on the
spiritual nature of person. As a conclusion, the unity of the person’s being
relies on the spiritual being. The spirit constitutes the person’s wealth and
that of its acts.
Chapter 28, “Defining Human Dignity: Landmarks in the Thought of
Pope Benedict XVI,” by Şerban Tarciziu, tries to point out his contribution
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to the definition of various human values of the twenty-first century. The
author begins his article by mentioning some negative aspects of the
globalization process, especially in Eastern Europe. In ex-communist
countries, many of the social institutions “meant to serve the common good
and the human person seem more inclined to use the human person as an
instrument, instead of serving his basic needs in keeping with the human
person’s God-given dignity.” Tarciziu remarks that this trend is mostly
visible in the process of globalization. The author discusses human dignity
from the contemporary philosophical perspective as it results from certain
works of T. De Koninck and Gilbert Larochelle, E. Levinas, or George
Steiner. Thus he finds that there are many “areas in which human dignity is
being denied or trampled nowadays.” In order to propose another
perspective, a positive one, the author analyzes some important aspects of
human dignity as it is defined in the pronouncements of Vatican II,
especially in the pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes. To prove the idea
that these pronouncements are functional in Catholic Church activity,
Tarciziu mentions some significant documents, such as the Encyclical
Letters of Pope Benedict XVI – Deus caritas est, Spe salvi, and Caritas in
veritate, or in messages broadcast on various occasions.
Chapter 29, “Anthony de Mello’s Lifelong Spiritual Pedagogy –
Awakening and Awareness,” by Magdalena Dumitrana, points out the fact
that this Indian Jesuit priest and philosopher (1931-1987) wrote very
sensible texts with spiritual and philosophical meanings but which are not
completely in accordance with the Christian dogmas. In fact, as it is shown
in the Notification of the Catholic Church, attached by Dumitrana, his
philosophy combines in an interesting unity Christian ideas with Buddhist
and Taoist thoughts. De Mello tries to enable the reader to understand in a
deep way his place in the world and to act accordingly. He wants to break
the barriers of the spiritual sleep, compelling people to understand, together
with their own essence, the source of evil in everybody’s life and the way of
changing this. He thought that philosophy and religion are useful as they
help the human person to become aware of himself. Dumitrana analyzes
some of de Mello’s fundamental ideas: people are used to living under
rules, norms, and regulations, forgetting the sense of freedom; this gives
them the illusion of living a protective life which is in fact, in de Mello’s
thought, a life similar to a dream and to the oneiric utopia. Among other
characteristics of the life-sleep, the author mentions egoism as a need to
seek well-being and happiness for oneself. Awakening is the fundamental
act of simultaneous understanding of the present condition as well as of the
atemporal human nature; Awareness would be the leap from the artificial
sleepy world to the Reality. Dumitrana also tries to find how de Mello’s
texts could be classified. She remarks they cannot be assimilated to any
present philosophical trend. There could be a possible affiliation with a
certain pedagogical ray, still functional. During the seventeenth century, Jan
Amos Comenius built a theological doctrine which supported an
educational theory and practice that changed the world in the field of
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pedagogy. This spirit was developed by some European pedagogues, and in
India, Sri Aurobindo has delineated a type of integral education aiming to
facilitate spiritual growth. De Mello was also a mystic, “a mystic who
teaches, not preaches.” His spiritual philosophy is based on negative truths;
in other words, an apophatic philosophical search.
Chapter 30, “The Human Person Between Transcendence and Fault: a
Philosophical Perspective,” by Cătălin Bobb, is centered on Paul Ricoeur’s
theory on the analysis of fault and transcendence. This theory generates a
philosophical anthropology of the negative. In the author’s opinion, this
could settle the fundamental issues for an axiological theory. In Ricoeur’s
own words, fault is understood as absolute deficiency of the human being
and transcendence as absolute origin of subjectivity. Following Ricoeur,
Bobb articulates his arguments against the possibility of a strictly
philosophical theory about the fundamental deficiencies of the human being
without any help from mythological, theological, or religious contributions.
In his Philosophy of Will, Ricouer discusses the impossibility of building a
phenomenology of transcendence and fault. The two concepts are denied a
phenomenological analysis as they are the absolute marginal points either
due to the fact that fault alters man’s intelligibility or, respectively,
transcendence hides in it the origin of subjectivity. In this way,
phenomenology seems to be incapable of discussing the “things in
themselves.” Ricoeur “does not exclude from the field of
phenomenological analysis transcendence and fault, but excludes, in the
end, human subjectivity with its two extremes: origin and alteration,” says
the author. These concepts are the extreme margins that frame the entire
philosophy of will. But will remains entrapped in a perpetual road that can
not surpass its own limits (within a phenomenological analysis) given by
transcendence and fault. To go beyond, to aim beyond intentionality, means
to go outside the phenomenology area; to be able to bring into discussion
exactly what phenomenology can not talk about. The author elaborates on
the following idea: pure will tells us nothing of morality; understanding
morality and fundamentally human values originates within human
passions; understanding passions and a possible solution regarding them
surpasses the possibilities of philosophy.
Chapter 31, “Foucault’s Case Against Humanism,” by Maria Gioga,
summarizes some of Foucault’s arguments against humanism. She is
interested in placing them into the contemporary debate about the human
essence. Gioga argues that Foucault’s anti-humanism has a pragmatic
approach to the human rights problem. He wants human rights to be
historically and pragmatically determined. Thus, in Gioga’s opinion,
Foucault’s antihumanism is in fact against the modernist notion of subject
and not at all for the core of humanist values. The author distinguishes
among three categories of rejections of humansim: 1) conceptual or
philosophical (humanism as too entangled in Western subject-focused
metaphysics); 2) strategic (the appeal to humanist values as covering up
strategies of domination); 3) normative (humanism as being intrinsically
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objectionable on the grounds that subjection is per se a form of
subjugation). These three possibilities are supposed to correspond to three
main stages of Foucault’s philosophical development (archaeology,
genealogy, and the history of subjectivity). Gioga thinks that Foucault has
adopted a pragmatic approach to the human rights problem. Foucault seems
to have denied a metaphysical ground for human rights as, in his opinion,
there is no human essence; however, rights are good as they help us to fight
against the political power of governments.
In sum, this study is a proof of the interest that researchers from
various countries and cultures pay to the contemporary challenges. At the
same time, it illustrates the need for extensive collaboration in order to find
the best solutions for the next decades of our century. These articles plead
for the need to promote the spiritual and cultural values humankind has
already created and consolidated during its long existence. The new
challenges do not suppose the annihilation of traditional values; on the
contrary, their demand is to assure the best combination between tradition
and novelty.
We are grateful to the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy
(RVP) for announcing our conference on their online platform, thus
drawing together the wide international interest essential for this study. Our
thanks go to all the authors who sent their articles, making possible this
volume. We are grateful to Professors George McLean and John Farina for
their generous efforts for the academic quality and the English version of
this volume.
We are also grateful to the publishers, the University of Bucharest and
the RVP, who have made this volume an accomplished fact.

PART I
FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN VALUES
CHALLENGING CONTEMPORARY
GLOBALIZATION

CHAPTER I
VALUE DIFFERENTIATION AND
THE IDEAL OF MANKIND
MARIN AIFTINCĂ
Abstract: This paper aims to approach the problem of relationship between
personal values and common values, in connection to an ideal of humanity.
We start from the thesis that the human being, essentially determined by
spirit, identifies itself through a set of values freely appropriated on the
grounds of its own cultural tradition, cognition, and aspirations. Personal
and common values permanently diversify as a result of the development of
knowledge and increasing spreading of information, as well as under the
pressure of the changes produced in the historical-social environment. This
process is accompanied by a conflict of values that explains the crisis of the
contemporary culture.
In each of its moments, culture cultivates certain values proper to its
specific period or stage. At present, the globalization process promotes and
imposes the utilitarian values that feed the conflict between values, which is
detrimental to the spiritual nature of the individual and collective person.
Finally, I consider that the person, as a human being, is part of
humanity, identifying itself through its own values. In this position, it has to
be open to those common values that lead humankind, such as: peace,
freedom, justice, truth, beauty, good, equality, sacred, etc. Preserving a
balance between personal and common values, the universal culture must
be lead by the ideal of the person’s self-improvement. The education and
the norms derived from personal and collective values have to be
subordinated to achieving this ideal.
Keywords: Differentiation, Person, Personal values, Common values,
Culture, Ideal.
Among the major phenomena of the contemporary world, one should
take into consideration the tension between the increasing of globalization
and the highlighting of diversity: two opposite factors that deeply affect the
existence of mankind nowadays. To the tendency toward cultural
homogeneity and annihilation of cultural particularity, which is specific to
the first factor, the second factor opposes differentiation and heterogeneity.
Being placed at the crossroads of the two opposite directions, the human
person, in both its individual and collective (common) aspects, engenders
contradictory effects while trying through action and creation to preserve
and assert its identity, to understand itself, and to decipher the meaning of
the world.
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We obviously speak here of a human person as understood from a
philosophical viewpoint, namely, in Scheler’s terms, as a center of action
from whose finite inner existence the spirit emerges;1 or, according to
another perspective, as a relational identity of human existence which is
distinct due to its singularity and position in the world.2
The facts outlined above bring about at least two critical questions: in
which way does the person react3 to the value differentiation, and, on the
other hand, what kind of relation is established between personal
(individual) and common (collective) values? To answer these questions,
our investigation starts from the opinion according to which person, as far
as its spirit is an essential determinative factor, lives in an unlimited value
universe. Precisely on this presence of spirit the human person grounds its
conscience of value, which guides it to freely choose the personal values
that it joins and transforms into landmarks of its own life. The idea just
stated compels us to remember that the being of value in its ideal state is
different from its actual being, namely the reality in which value is
embodied. That is to say, at the level of experience, value presents itself as
a definite modality of the real, which is not the case for the “pure value.”
Accordingly, the embodied value shows itself together with its bearer,
which could be a person, a utilitarian object, a work of art, etc. Hence the
person is only a bearer of values and, as such, it represents only the
conditions of value embodiment.4 As a consequence, personal values such
as dignity, friendship, love, bravery, humility, faithfulness, prudence, piety,
etc., embody themselves in a person without exhausting their content or
affecting their universality. Anybody that respected these values could
engender or “realize” them through attitude or behavior. This is a very
significant aspect that, on one hand, certifies the difference and, at the same
time, the unity between the transcendental and the empirical being of value,
and, on the other hand, validates the extraordinary power of the value to
join people together.
It is necessary to add that the choice of personal values is not a mere
functional exercise. In the first place, it implies the ability to grasp the
axiological universe and to perceive the plurality of values. As acts of
1 See: Max Scheler, Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos (The Human
Place in the Cosmos), translated into Romanian by Vasile Muscă (Bucharest:
Paralela 45 Publishing House, 2001), p. 40.
2 L’Enciclopedia della Filosofia e delle Scienze Umane (Encyclopaedia of
Philosophy and Human Sciences), translated into Romanian (Bucharest: All
Educational Publishing House, 2004), p. 814.
3 We make a distinction between individual and person. By individual we
mean human being taken separately, while person stands for human being in
relation with others.
4 Nicolai Hartmann, Vechea şi noua ontologie şi alte scrieri, translated
into Romanian by Alexandru Boboc (Bucharest: Paideia Publishing House,
1997), p. 104.
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consciousness, they are inherently limited and cannot combine
simultaneously all the values. For this phenomenon, Scheler employed the
concept of “value blindness,” and N. Hartmann used to refer to it more
properly as “narrowness of the value consciousness.” Naturally,
consciousness does not repel any value that apprehends, yet its capacity of
comprising values is also determined, besides the mentioned limitations, by
its ability to open itself to them.5
No matter how large the opening of the axiological consciousness
might be, the person’s choice of and commitment to certain values involve
the act of preference that proves the difference between values and their
arrangement in a hierarchical system. He/She who prefers a certain value
doesn’t deny the other subordinated values, and does not exclude the
possibility for their being preferred by other consciousnesses, which are not
always compatible with his/hers. In such conditions, preference entails,
according to Scheler, the intentional aiming at a plurality of values,
employing only the individuality of the person, which is determined by its
own vocation and place in the world.6 Therefore, the preference facing the
plurality and differentiation of values exercises itself according to a series
of criteria such as: cultural tradition, the development stage of the feeling of
value, the historical change of life conditions, and most important, perhaps,
the vocation and aspirations of the axiological subject. As a result, the
preference, depending on its refinement, has a decisive influence on the
choice of personal values and significantly prompts the will to realize or
embody them in cultural goods, thus maintaining movement in the horizon
of humanity and giving meaning to life.
While stating its own values according to the mentioned criteria, the
human person acquires a constant, unitary style of thinking and acting,
which is expressed in a peculiar place in the world, providing it with self-
identity in relation to others. That is to say, as Housset put it, the person
asserts itself as an “ontological unity of a subject which moulds itself within
the unity of a specific history and biography.”7 It easily follows from the
above considerations that persons distinguish themselves according to the
values they freely assume, and, at the same time, according to the way in
which they realize those values in their individual and social life.
There is no doubt that the value set assumed by the human person
(either individual or collective) does not always remain identical with itself.
Naturally, values are subjected to an uninterrupted process of differentiation
which is produced and maintained by several factors. First of all, it is
5 See: ibid., pp. 109-110.
6 See: Louis Lavelle, Traité des valeurs, Tome Premier, Théorie générale
de la valeur (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1951), p. 601.
7 Emmanuel Housset, Personne et sujet selon Husserl (Paris : P.U.F.,
1997), p. 84.
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necessary to mention that values themselves have a differential nature.8
Although they enjoy common features as autonomy and irreducibility,
values distinguish themselves by specific traits that allow their grouping in
distinct classes (economical, political, moral, theoretical, aesthetic, etc. But
even inside one and the same class there are precise differences between
values. Within the class of aesthetic values for instance, beauty – which is
marked by harmony, proportion, and measure – is clearly distinguished as
tragic, sublime, or comic.
As it is known, values are closely related to the real world. This fact
explains another extremely important aspect that determines the
differentiation of values, at least from the point of view of the approach
being discussed. Depending on the real object to which they apply and on
the soul’s aspirations fulfilled by their embodiment, values present
themselves to us in specific modalities of the real. Further, Vianu conceived
a theory concerning the volume of value9 which asserts that values,
including the personal ones, are being gradually differentiated by the acts of
desire that comprise them: permanent or intermittent, more or less intense.10
The volume variations of values are also to be tracked within the individual
consciousnesses,”11 or the consciousness of certain historical ages. There
are persons to whom certain values might be more or less important
depending on the associated desiderative acts, which might occur often or
less frequently. This is also the case with the cultural consciousness of an
era. As a result, the consciousness acts mentioned before, such as desire and
preference, are closely related to the flexibility of life relations. Therefore,
personal and common values depend on the action of determinative factors,
such as: education, the extent and depth of the knowledge, tradition, the
rapid diffusion of information, socio-historical changes, participation in the
creation of culture, etc. These factors bring about an unceasing
diversification and differentiation of values. The spirit itself is in search of
increasingly new values as “the values themselves exist independently of
it.”12
The differentiation of value phenomenon that came through ages from
the depths of the history of culture brings about contradictory
consequences. The philosophical critique points out the advantages and, at
the same time, the difficulties of this phenomenon that had been grounded
on the Kant’s principle of irreductibility of values. According to this
8 Cf. Tudor Vianu, Filosofia culturii (Philosophy of Culture), in “Opere”
(Works), vol. 8 (Bucharest: Minerva Publishing House, 1979), pp. 164–165.
9 The volume of value lies in “the psychological relation between the
empiric constitution of desiderative consciousness and its object.” Tudor Vianu,
Introducere în teoria valorilor (Introduction to the Theory of Values), in
“Opere” (Works), vol. 8 (Bucharest: Minerva Publishing House, 1979), p. 83.
10 See: Tudor Vianu, op. cit., p. 83.
11 Ibid., p. 84.
12 Nicolai Hartmann, op. cit., p. 110.
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principle, value has no other genus proximum than the totality of values, as
the end of any value is an intrinsic one. Hence, the autonomy of value, since
it cannot be subordinated in order to define another value(s).13
From the viewpoint of the afore-mentioned thesis, Vianu’s analysis
stressed that the modern differentiation of values was a necessary condition
for cultural progress and personal freedom, and, at the same time, for social
tolerance. But he also considered that the mentioned phenomenon gave rise
to a series of inconveniences that led to the “disorganization of society” and
instilled into the modern man “the depressing feeling of not having a central
life theme.” The modern differentiation of values made man unable to
encompass life entirely, thus contributing to its breakup. The damaging
consequences of the differentiation of values affect the destiny of modern
man and of the entire society. Such arguments are frequently invoked, and
not without reason, to support the thesis according to which the
differentiation of values is the essential source of the conflict of values and
thus of the crisis of modern culture. It is required to specify here that by
crisis of culture we don’t necessarily mean destruction, but rather creation
and particularly rearrangement of values according to different criteria.14
We will not dwell here on the advantages and disadvantages of the
modern differentiation of values, although they are worthy of attention, but
rather on the conflict of values, whose disturbing effects are more visible
nowadays. Of course, this is not a conflict between values themselves,
although, being autonomous, they are involved in a true competition for
their realization. This conflict affects in the first place the bearers of the
values, whose process of evaluation sustains the embodiment of certain
values and rejects the others. Only in this sense are we allowed to talk about
values as being in conflict with one another. For example, a person, either
individual or collective, can embrace a certain value, such as a religious
one, and organize his life in terms of the adopted value, being indifferent to,
or even intolerant of, all the others. This attitude might result in religious
fanaticism, a behavior that devastates our historical era as well as others.
Similar examples of axiological exclusiveness might be also encountered
by those people who live according to the viewpoint of a single value,
which can be the one related to their profession, or other values such as the
economic, political, or aesthetic ones. Such an attitude proves to be a
distortion of the axiological consciousness and has a negative impact on
other people and on the entire culture.
In referring to this issue, Jiang Chang notes that different communities
evolved throughout history under a variety of value systems, which
configured the different cultural patterns, some of them being unchanged
13 See: Tudor Vianu, op. cit., pp. 162–164.
14 See: Marin Aiftincă, Filosofia culturii (Philosophy of Culture)
(Bucharest: The Romanian Academy Publishing House, 2008), p. 10.
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even in the present day.15 This is beyond doubt the source of the existing
conflict between Eastern and Western values, a conflict that was amplified
rather than diminished by ever-increasing intercultural communication. To
the same effect, the cited author asserted that “This is the chief feature of
value conflicts in the present world. This kind of value conflict is much
different from those that occurred before the twentieth century, especially
before modern time.”16 Therefore, it is undeniable that today, one of the
consequences of value differentiation and conflict, at both individual and
collective levels of the person, consists in the fact that humanity is marked
not by isolation, but rather by a tendency of fusing and merging values, at
least with respect to the fundamental ones. Instead of the personal values
that belong to the local or national cultural tradition, there are gradually
embraced under the pressure of globalization ideas and values such as:
liberty, equality, democracy, justice, market economy, environmental
protection, etc. These values acquired universal validity and became, in
Jiang Chang’s terms, goals of the entire world.17
The modern differentiation of values, accompanied by the conflict it
engenders, is related, inter alia, to the phenomenon of globalization that is,
as it is well known, one of the most serious challenges of the contemporary
world. Judging by its consequences, globalization does not confine itself to
universalizing some personal values and exterminating others. On the
contrary, the critics of globalization accuse it of having dangerous effects
on both individual and community. Being a source of different discontents
and conflicts, globalization is experienced in everyday life as uncertainty
and anxiety, making people vulnerable to various tyrannies and cults. It also
implies migration of capital and job loss, the distress of local wars and
religious collisions, the split of societies in groups involved in weird
ruinous struggles. All of these have a negative influence on the structure of
individual and collective values, giving way to the temptation of embracing
non-values. Supported by several defining factors as information, trade,
finances, industry, and technology, globalization is the agent of a single
civilization, that is, of a so-called “global culture” that is detached from any
cultural tradition.18 The products of this culture, which are composed by
goods and symbols made in one or two centers of technological and
financial power that are stimulated by an expanding market, are destined to
be fully consumed. At the same time, they make up a stunningly less
dogmatic but more persuasive ideology that modifies the axiological scale
by overthrowing spiritual values and instead placing utilitarian values on
15 Jiang Chang, Value Conflict and Identifying in the Background of
Globalization. Paper presented at the 21st Philosophy World Congress
(Istanbul, August 2003).
16 Ibid., p. 1.
17 Ibid., p. 2.
18 For further reading on this matter, see: Marin Aiftincă, op. cit., pp. 127–
149.
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the highest level. Owing to their easy, hedonist, shallow nature, the latter
possess an unusual force of persuasion by which they take hold of those
minds that are turned especially to the outer world. Utilitarian values
always lead us toward an easier, enticing, but perverse way, as it lures
human beings into a cheap life, while spiritual values that guide the person
toward self-knowledge and self-improvement call for serious efforts,
abnegation, and sacrifice. Thus it is easy to understand why utilitarian
values are so seductive. This lack of balance inside a person’s pattern of
values conceals the inner emptiness of man as both individual and member
of a community, fascinated by outer world, by the shallow multicolored
variety of a reality which is beyond his own self. The destruction of the
relationship between spiritual and utilitarian values, ensuring the prevalence
of the latter, explains the present crisis of culture that announces another
kind of barbarism, whose signs are visible today in the entire realm of
culture, especially in what constitutes moral behavior.
In the context of current approaches to the destiny of humanity, the
critical reflection, concerned with the changes that are assaulting human
societies – a rapid pace of change that defies perception and adaptation –
emphasized an opposing tendency to globalization that leads to an
atomization of society by dividing mankind in groups and regions. The
fragmentation of community goes to the confused individual in search of
identity and meaning. No matter how much we appreciate the widespread
global technological revolution we are witnessing, we must not neglect the
accompanying cultural revolution. Under the lasting influence of
postmodern nihilism, the latter draws attention to the deconstruction of
institutions and mentalities, and to the denying and overthrowing of the old
cultural patterns and values, accused of falsity and hypocrisy. In an
obstinate search for authenticity that transgresses the classic pattern, truth,
universality, tradition, value, objective reality, and any other general
concepts that played a part in the evolution of culture and human society are
prosecuted and condemned. The blamed concepts were replaced by a series
of notions as relativism, diversity, particularism, emotionalism, and
multiculturalism. They support an emotionalist and extremist individualism
that became an easy-to-manipulate constituent of a homogenizing global
world, ruled by consumption.
Leaving out the undeniable advantages brought by knowledge,
communication, and the convergence of some general interests at the global
level, contemporary civilization seriously affects the human being by its
offensive position against the classical life models, now being replaced by
behaviors and values grounded on extreme liberalism, consumptionism, and
striving after the sensational. The unadjusted human person is thus placed
in an unstable, fragmented realm governed by extreme individualism.
Therefore, the bearers of the new values are unable to encompass life in its
entirety. This is also one of the consequences of value differentiation that
places a person’s values, either individual or common, in a dramatic
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conflict with those promoted by actual changes, mostly sustained by money
and economic profit.
Even though the mentioned phenomena and facts nourish the conflict
of values and, therefore, the crisis of contemporary culture, they do not
represent a sufficient reason to lay the entire blame on the differentiation of
values, which is a process that accompanies the evolution of life. On the
contrary, some philosophers have strong arguments to assert that “the
differentiation of values is a modern achievement which cannot be unmade
as far as it is the essential condition for that ‘promethean’ theme undertaken
by modern man, which consists in an as-extensive-as-possible conquering
of nature and spirit.”19 It is thus an important ingredient for the functioning
of personal and common values. The teleological structure of soul is not
one-sided; it is hierarchized and, at the same time, able to perceive and
understand all other values. Therefore, we have the ability to organize our
lives in accordance with a super-ordinate value without expelling all others;
they can be subordinated to the principle value that guides the personal life,
and can be grouped around it. Taking this chance, which is available to
anyone, means to live in accordance with a single value and to be, at the
same time, open-minded to the universe of all values, thus encompassing
world in its entirety. Such a possibility is generally confirmed by the
particular experience and, at the same time, by the entire experience of
historical cultures.20
As a human being, the person, which is identifiable by its own values,
is part of the community at all its structural levels (i.e., family, nation, or
world community), and, at the same time, of humankind in its entirety. As
such, the person is united and can interact with all those who believe in the
same values and organize their lives according to them. At the same time, a
person can and must be open to the common values that guide the structures
of community and the entire humankind. Such values as peace, liberty,
welfare, justice, right, equality, dignity, beauty, truth, sacredness, etc., make
up the sphere of personal values.
Preserving our individuality as a creative source and potential, we
have to rationally correlate individual and common values so as to respect
the values of community that ensure the dignified coexistence of all human
beings and of cultures on the whole. Therefore, the answer is not to
emphasize as absolute our personal values against the values of the
community or vice versa, but to create a natural balance between them,
preserving, at the same time, our plenary attachment to that one value
which we raised to the rank of a life ideal. There is no perfect human being,
but we can find instead an idea of moral self-improvement; Husserl
expressed it in the following terms: “I wish from now on to live my whole
19 Cf. Ibid., pp. 172–179.
20 Ibid.
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life, with all its acts and contents, as the best of the possible lives.”21 We are
dealing here with a husserlian categorical imperative that synthesises an
infinite ideal of morality, and this is precisely why it appears to us as being
limitative. We think there is a more complex and adequate ideal: the one
that consists in the self-improvement of the human being, as it employs
thinking, creation, and action under a moral form. To this infinite ideal
should be subordinated the personal and common values, and all cultural
forces should be dedicated to it. The education and the norms derived from
personal and common values have to be correlated to achieving this ideal
which remains an eternal calling toward the absolute over time and cultures.
Romanian Academy
Bucharest, Romania
aiftinca@acad.ro
21 E. Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920
und 1924, Husserliana XXXVII, hrsg. Von Henning Puecker (Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 2004).

CHAPTER II
THE VALUES OF THE NEW CIVILIZATION
BOGDANA TODOROVA
Abstract: The new period of challenges to democracy demands new
intellectual efforts to find the way of the future. The philosopher’s role is to
analyze and criticize worldview systems in order to achieve a future value
synthesis. Contemporary cultural resources (philosophy, religion and myth,
moral and everyday consciousness) rooted in different social experience
should be critically analyzed in terms of transition from the so-called
technogenetic civilization to a new desirable social and intellectual order. Is
the synthesis of values belonging to different cultures, social groups, and
types of intellectual praxis possible at all? How do science and religion
interact in these terms?
Keywords: values, identity, dialogue, religion.
The axiological discourse in science and religion is associated with the
real historical experience of the relation of religion to church to society.
This experience is in turn the subject of endless discussions between the
representatives of various axiological systems – conservative, liberal and
radical, secular and religious. A dialogue is required to minimize the
possible proneness to conflict of this state. Science is centered in relation to
examining the objective-substantive structure of the world, while religion
puts an accent on the subject-subjective relation, the human effort to
communicate, which regulates the fundamental values of culture. The
relationship of science to religion varied through the historical course of
civilization. Religion and myth have a dominating role in the culture of
traditional societies. Tradition takes a central place among axiological
priorities. In traditional cultures, religion and myth are what form the
human worldview, and they set a unique mental framework, to which
scientific research must correspond. The situation radically changed with
the formation of the new type of civilizational development related to the
Reformation and the Enlightenment in the European region. It is often
defined by the extremely unclear concept of the West opposed to the
traditional East. Today, this type of development comprises the whole
world. We can define it as the technological civilization that develops when
inventions, innovations, and the introduction of new technologies lead to
accelerated changes of social life. Here, science gradually turns into one of
the dominating values of civilization. However, this cult of scientific
rationality also has its own historical roots.
In antiquity, the rational understanding of world was considered a
condition for legitimate human behavior. Not only the ancient tradition, but
also the Christian worldview played an enormous role in this rational
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concept. Representing the imitation of Divine reason, human reason was
seen as able to reach the Divine plan realized on Earth. There are two
approaches for the religious understanding of Nature in the Christian
tradition, with the better knowledge of God as the ultimate purpose (a
natural theology). The approach characteristic to the early Church and
which is preserved in Greek-Byzantine theology saw Nature as the
symbolic system by which God speaks to men. The approach that was
established in the Latin West from the early eighteenth century developed
the aspiration to read the Book of Nature written by God in order to
understand how its creation is formed and acts, and to reveal the logic of
this process and its inner law. Similar concepts lead to the occurrence of a
new type of rationality that developed further in modern European science.
The Christian cultural tradition was a prerequisite to the new concept of
Nature. It presented the bonding link between the ancient and modern
European cultures. Medieval Christianity preserved the characteristics for
the ancient cultural opposition between natural and factitious, but it
included also the possibility for a transition to different, new levels of
understanding, since Man was viewed as God’s creature, created through
His image and likeness.
The interpretation of experimental activity as the main method to
examine Nature is the key factor for the formation of the new type of
rationality. No such interpretation is present in ancient culture, since Nature
is viewed as a living body, with any single part having its own feature and
being subordinated to the harmony of the whole. The idea of experimenting
with any single part is viewed as the violation of wholeness. The artificial
(techne) is opposed to the natural (physis). Understanding the Cosmos is
possible only notionally, so ancient science is ultimately philosophy and
mathematics.
In a technological type of culture, Nature is seen as a specific field of
human manifestations. The ancient concept of physis and Cosmos here
opposes Nature, being the symbiosis of qualitatively different entities,
which, however, possess the aspect of homogeneity, following common
laws that are universal for the various classes of individual objects.
The values of the artificial and the natural are aligned in the New Age
and the rational change in the nature of human activity does not contradict
it, but is rather adjusted to its natural constitution. This new attitude toward
Nature is visualized in the concept of Nature that serves as the prerequisite
of the development of a fundamentally new notion of the understanding of
the world. In the history of modern European culture, science comes into a
serious contradiction to religion, starting to form its own opinion about the
world and pretending that has its own worldview. There is no need to adapt
some scientific picture of the world to the religious notions of a culture in
order to include it in this culture. Moreover, the Christian tradition has an
aspiration to coordinate the principles of the Christian concept of the world
with scientific advances. Western culture, at the stage of a technological
type of civilization, preserves Christian tradition in a reformed
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configuration, combining it to the scientific values. Along with that,
however, this new civilizational type also provoked global crises
endangering human existence itself. We have good reason to doubt the
ability of modern civilization to find the solution to the crisis without
changing the strategy for development and the basal values of technological
culture.
Thereafter, we can speak about a new civilizational type, a third one,
comparing the traditionalistic and technological. Some researchers define it
as a post-neoclassical type of rationality related to complex developing
systems possessing synergetic features. Biological and social systems,
nanotechnologies, and computer sets belong to this type of systems. If we
must change the basal values of modern civilization, how this will affect the
relationship of science and religion? The new trends in this relationship can
be viewed as the growth of new values; for example, the construction of
new situations for the dialogue between science and religion. It is not only
national rationality that can be interpreted as the growth of new values
occurs in the frameworks of the modern type of technological culture.
Changes also take place in religion itself, and they can be assessed from the
position of searching for new values.
IDENTITY AND DIALOGUE IN THE CONTEXT OF AN
AXIOLOGICAL DISCOURSE
The concept of value is the central category of philosophical axiology.
For believers and theologians, religious and corresponding theological
values do not represent the features of culture but they are objectively
present and are defined by the features of being; or at least this is the
interpretation of Christianity.
For theologians, God is the basis of reality as a benefit, being the
completeness of perfection. This is not a value, but the power that created
the world and allowed us to live, and that gives us the chance of
immortality and salvation. Christ is the personification of the soul-winning
origin, the incarnation of eternal life; He is real, more real than anything
real. He is the root of the empirical world and the Way to Paradise. In this
regard, He is the mouthpiece of the other hypostases, the divine-existing
features of reality as Truth, Good, Beauty, and Justice. The entire religious
reality is penetrated by values that exist in various religions.
One of the reasons for the increase of religiosity in the modern world
is the need for stable conceptual beliefs and opinions, in which science can
participate, even in the best case, only indirectly. Unlike science, religion,
with its tradition, is oriented to conceptually important questions and has
the power of an authority and a historical being. The world of Christian
culture, with its spiritual wealth, assimilated into itself metaphysical,
ethical, artistic, and socio-economic thought that masks pure religious
perspectives.
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The main problem is this: is the general course of civilizational
changes able to influence the axiological systems of autonomous cultures,
involving them in the process of an inevitable inner change and testifying,
in this manner, to its own cultural, but not transcendental, nature?
While positive answers in relation to a cultural system such as science
is generally acknowledged, things differ in relation to religion. The
existence of the Christian myth in itself is categorically withdrawn from the
power resource of the time and culture. It is not acknowledged as the
exclusive fruit of the activity of the human beings and human creativity.
The truth can be dependent on time and culture of those who believe, but
not against its own existence and dogmas. This difference is not devoid of
doubts, but even so, it has to be taken into account. When European
integration is at issue, one must not forget that any nation has different
features proceeding from its national character, history, and culture.
Modern global society needs more than ever to make adequate
decisions on the problems such as ecology, demography, and terrorism.
Two scenarios can be developed regarding the needed decisions. The first
relies on the dominating values or priorities of modernity: technological
progress versus ecology, scientific rationality versus tradition,
maximization of production and consumption at the expense of resources, a
formal legality in relation to the person – the scenario that will lead to the
aggravation of the crisis and later to cataclysm. The second scenario
reckons on the radical change in axiological priorities. This requires the
analysis of the two types of an axiological discourse, in science, on one
hand, and in theology on the other. The ‘logic’ in the development of
culture has to be also taken into account. Models for the development of
knowledge that are borrowed from philosophy are established as its
objective regularities – accumulation, proliferation, and the change of a
paradigm.
The cumulative principle of replenishment proceeds from the past – an
abstract philosophical norm, in which the accent is put on identity and the
leading role of a dialogue. In the same way as the accumulated theoretical
generalizations and facts in science, this model of a cultural development
itself is the collection of advances based on the abstract philosophical
norms of excellence. Being considered in this manner, culture keeps a
human identity but alienates the person from the other persons in the
cultural dialogue. This form of a cultural choice is determined by the
rational logic supposing the regularities, which are characteristic of social
sciences.
The model of the change of a paradigm is the revolutionary
phenomenology that proceeds from the present. The emphasis here is put on
the change of identity and the change of the positions in a dialogue. It
focuses on the concrete sociological norm of human behavior that supposes
both the partial and complete replacement. That is to say that culture is
viewed as a field for free choice where any norm is completely
incommensurable with the other. The same applies also to human identity
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and cultural dialogue. According to this model, the history of culture is the
complex of various cultural types that are not liable to a mutual
comparison; the choice between them is controlled emotionally and not
logically.
A third type – proliferation – is based on the principle of the
relativistic democratism that relies on the future (the emphasis here is on
the loss of identity and the arbitrary positions in a dialogue). The
formulated purpose is practically inaccessible and often has nothing in
common with real human behaviors. For this reason, the future is
unpredictable but, simultaneously, only it allows a choice between different
cultural systems to be made. According to this model, there is no sense in
speaking about a definite identity and the self-sufficient position in a
dialogue. The motto in this model is: “a purpose is nothing, movement is
everything.”
All the three cultural scenarios can be traced in history and the logic of
a culture is largely a projecting intentional strategy for the invasion in
cultural creation and its theoretical understanding.
RATIONALITY AS THE REGULATIVE VALUE OF CULTURE
Our attitude toward culture as a comprehended reality presupposes
rationality as a cultural value. The main problem is to combine our values
with the values of others. Are different cultures incompatible in general? To
what extent is a cultural synthesis possible by means of rational ways?
Which forecasts and analyses are possible in this sphere? Can we measure
the success of our cultural projects practically?
Jurgen Habermas speaks about such a project – the project for a
communicative rationality, in which people participating in social
discussions are engaged. His project assumes that people accept the rules of
a rational discourse, which is in contradiction to the current situation of the
radicalization of controversies. The opposition between the Western
Christian, or the so-called rational, culture and the Eastern Islamic, or
traditional, culture is strongly expressed. The majority of people,
independent of their cultural affiliation, suffer at the time of an economic
crisis, a war, or terroristic outrages but no one could preliminarily find the
rational solution of such situations until now. The solutions are measured as
rational post factum and they are taken by the victor. In fact, a cultural
sense plays an important and real role only in two areas: our own cultural
area and that of the other, which differs from ours. We exist in the first, but
the second is only an emotional and conceptual construction for us. The
culture to which we belong determines our knowledge. According to
Schutz, we can examine objectively and scientifically only a foreign
culture. If we aim at a rational and conscious effort searching a cultural
synthesis, we have to leave the limits of local cultures and act neutrally
regarding standards, values, and ideals. This is absolutely impossible due to
the adherence to the ideal of a scientific objectiveness, which is adopted by
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the paradigm of classical science. We are all foreigners today and we live
everywhere, due to global communications.
Trying to understand various cultural determinants creating conditions
for the rational discourse of culture, we can classify three levels:
- The level of direct life impressions – examining the native language,
long-term relations in family, relatives, school, birth-place. At this level, we
have the practical, unconscious emotional acquisition of a culture.
- The level of the acquisition of knowledge – an experience, contact
with a foreign culture (travels, learning foreign languages, communication
with foreigners). This level problematizes common sense and gives the
possibility of increasing the sphere of cultural knowledge; the individual
can form his own picture of a foreign culture, even a total misunderstanding
or fear. Due to the separation of an indirect cultural basis, cognition appears
correct at this level.
- The level of the philosophical and scientific research of the culture.
Here, various cultures are examined as the equal parts of the third world, in
the spirit of Popper. This sphere of an objective knowledge demonstrates
the pluralism of cultural universals. Right here is the place of the rational
dialogue of cultures.
THE MAIN DILEMMA: ANTHROPOLOGISM VERSUS
ECOLOGISM
A dialogue does not occur in an intercultural space but within the
frameworks of a definite culture, based on the resources characteristic of
that culture. One of the modern myths that proceeds from sociobiology,
along with the common disappointment of Western intellectuals and the
boom of Eastern religious schools, is global ecologism – a good example of
how new cultural universals emerge. The Anglo-American sociologist of
science, Fuller, calls it a ‘karmic Darwinism.’ Its consequences are as
follows: the elimination of a subject and the refusal of the anthropomorphic
bases of culture; the refusal of science and technological progress; the
refusal of rationality as the foundation of knowledge, communication, and
social regulation. Fuller suggests that in the twenty-first century Western
science will ally itself with the Biblical religions, which will lead to an
‘anthropic perspective’ as opposed to the karmic determinism. The
anthropic perspective is associated with Christianity, Judaism, and Islam,
and is secularized as positivism in the nineteenth century, identifying social
sciences as humanistic religions. The second combines Buddhism, Jainism,
and Hinduism, along with Western Epicureism. The neo-Darwinist
synthesis in the twentieth century becomes its secular variant establishing a
normative framework for the world. In their works, Dockins, Wilson, and
Singer defend the idea for the refusal of normative privileges for man using
naturalistic arguments. This idea received the enviable support of post-
modernism. Fuller proposes that monotheists should combine themselves
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with positivists to rehabilitate the collective humanistic project. The
understanding of the participation in science as a civil obligation or even in
the sense of Boyle, Newton, and Cont as a religious service has a decisive
significance for this project. According to Fuller, the twenty-first century
will witness the collision between the anthropic and karmic perspectives,
and the main questions that will be asked are as follows: Is Man the image
and likeness of God, and does he has the right of a privileged position in
Nature because of this? The Western monotheistic religions come to an
agreement on this point, while the pantheistic and polytheistic religions of
the East do not. In metaphysical concepts, this sounds like the opposition
between universum (the unity of hierarchies and regularities) and
polyuniversum (the chaotic interaction of powers and substances). The key
concepts of the karmic ideology are as follows: the equality of humans and
animals, a moral-political and religious tolerance, the predominance of the
elemental forces of social development, the negation of categories such as
‘progress’ and ‘decay,’ the predetermination of a natural (biological or
cosmological) determinant over the cultural determinant, holism instead of
individualism. Yet in the past (1960), similar ideas for a karmic ideology
were criticized. Jorge Luis Borges and Roland Barthes with their theses
about the 'death of the author' are the first, and later, their thesis is
continued by the thesis of the death of the subject, in which Nietzsche’s
‘God’s death' is introduced. Any minimization of the role of Man in Nature
at the background of modern global cataclysms would be fatal. However,
one positive thing in the idea of Fuller is the term 'anthropia.’ In its essence,
it is a new type of humanism. Ginsburg develops the idea for a secular
humanism as the alternative to religion. This new humanism combines in
itself the values of religion and philosophy. It is destined to define the new
position of Man in the rational world. The old classicism is closely related
to anthropocentrism, culture-centrism (the central place of the culture in
relation to economics and politics), and interdisciplinarism (involvement
with science as the source of a critical philosophical reflection). A dialogue
between science and Christian theology is possible in it, as there is a place
in it also for modernization. From a theological point of view, Man is
similar to God and this places him at a forward position above all. The
aspiration for an interdisciplinary synthesis is strongly expressed in the
modern ‘natural theology.’ Religion as a cultural form separates from
policy and economics, turning to the development of a person in its
axiological dimensions. Religion has to be the ally of science, but not vice-
versa. Hence, the place of a philosopher in the dialogue for values is
significant.
THE PHILOSOPHER – CENTRIST OR MARGINAL?
The critical position of the humanist is at the crossroads of cultures.
The position of the philosopher, at the intersecting point of cultural epochs.
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The discussed anthropic perspective is a reference to the epoch of the
Renaissance, when Man is given the status of a hero. The person is in a
competition with God, creating societies and cultures, dominating Nature
technologically, and showing the abilities of demiurge. If we look closer at
current political and religious extremism and fanaticism, we will recognize
new trends toward heroism. These are the new political leaders, anti-
globalists, terroristic leaders who consider themselves new ‘crusaders,’
struggling against world evil. This heroism is a bad advisor regarding a
dialogue for values, because compromise and synthesis as the goals of a
rational discussion are alien to it. Such heroism cannot be the form of an
axiological discourse. Only a philosophical analysis is able to show the
false nature of an axiological polarization. If we return to the delineated
three levels of cultural dynamics, we see that the opposition between the
karmic and anthropic principles is possible only at the first two levels. Their
limitation and syncretism can be seen at the third level of cultural dynamics,
where the analysis is based on rationality. Therefore, the mass conscience
constructs social values without being interested in their critical analysis.
The ideological strategy is to justify your own values and to criticize the
values of the other. Only the philosopher is able to exit from the
frameworks of any axiological system trying to preserve political and
axiological neutrality. Certainly, being at the first and second levels of
cultural dynamics, representing an empirical subject, the philosopher can
prefer and form a definite axiological significance, using the cumulative
method and the method of a paradigmatic jump. However, according to his
underlying essence, in Wittgenstein’s vision, action, and not just
knowledge, is important for him  he knows that he does not know
anything. The only position that he can take directly in a dialogue is to
create the ways of achieving the dialogue leading to consensus. His
neutrality is a guarantee of distance. The philosopher is able to build critical
analytic values in the broader context of an intellectual culture. This
distance allows him to see a horizon and to act in compliance with the
principle of complementarity. Aligning the anthropic project with a
philosophical discourse suggests a diversion from scientific to theological
positions and vice versa as an effort to reach common axiological
foundations.
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CHAPTER III
MAN IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURE
LEON DYCZEWSKI
Abstract: Modern (popular) culture creates a technical-economic-
managerial man. He is professionally well-educated, operative, and exploits
the development of natural sciences, information, and technique. He is a
perfect consumer too. But he needs the spiritual sphere, higher (non-
material) values, moral revival, the link between freedom and
responsibility, and renunciation of uncritical consumerism. This new
attitude is initiated by social groups and can be called “intelligence of life.”
It warns against the instrumentalization of the human person, and is seeking
a more profound sense of life.
Keywords: culture, society, social groups, creativity.
I. It is generally accepted that the development of any society depends
on creative individuals. Hence, the more such individuals there are, the
more they are open to new problems, and the more quickly these
individuals enter new fields of life, the better. Their quantity and quality are
a peculiar characteristic of modern society in relation to so-called mass
society, and even more so to the old, traditional one. Passing from the mass
society to the modern one is first of all marked by an increasing pluralism
and differentiation in all fields of life, and in fast absorption of modern
technologies to production, services, and everyday life. Hence, more and
more professions appear, and mass production and standardized services are
replaced by a variety of forms and qualities. Mass culture is driven out by a
popular culture that abolishes the division into high and low culture,
forming a great mosaic of cultural groups. Everyone may choose a culture
that suits his tastes and his level. Individualized consumption competes
perfectly well with mass consumption. Education that up to now has been
to a large degree standardized becomes ever more specialized, and its levels
are more varied. Creative work becomes more democratic and ever more
frequently forming one’s identity as self-reliant. These processes are caused
by creative individuals, and many researchers notice an increase in their
number in modern societies. Richard Florida, – like Peter Drucker, Dean
Simonton, and in Poland Edward Nęcka, Józef Kozielecki, – advances the
thesis that in the modern society a new social class (in Polish the term
“layer” sounds better) is slowly formed; that is, the creative class (layer),
and in the future it is this class that will shape the image of society. Florida
includes in it “scientists, engineers, architects, designers, writers, artists,
musicians, or those who use their creative work as the most important
factor in their jobs: in business, education, health service, law, or other
ones” (Florida: IX). Florida justifies his thesis on the example of American
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society, in which the expenditure on research and development is increasing
(from five million dollars in 1953 to two hundred and fifty million in 2000),
the number of scientists and engineers is increasing (in 1950 their number
was 400 in every 100 thousand inhabitants, and in 1999 it grew to 1800),
the number of people who make a living of cultural and artistic work is
growing (in 1950 there were 350 such individuals in every 1 million
inhabitants, and in 1999 the number grew to 900), the number of patents is
growing (in the years from 1954 to 1999, it was tripled), and so is the
percentage of those who in their professional jobs ever more clearly look
for satisfaction and take it on for other reasons than the pay; this also
concerns those who often change their job (Florida: 100-105).
Formation of the creative class has been assuming the character of a
conscious action, which is manifested by the meeting of 100 delegates from
the USA, Canada, and Puerto Rico in 2003 in Memphis, Tennessee. At the
end of the debate about the creative class in the modern society, the so-
called Memphis Manifesto was created. In the Introduction its authors state
that “Creativity has a fundamental significance for individuals and groups
of people, and is an inalienable trait of every person” (Kozielecki (1): 18).
Here are a few practical rules; to keep to them is to favor the development
of the creative class:
- argue that every human being, especially every child, has the right to
be creative;
- build a creative ecosystem – it may include artists, innovators, and
designers;
- remove barriers that hinder creativity, like mediocrity, intolerance,
social chaos, poverty, bad schools, and degradation of the environment
(Kozielecki (1): 18).
Researchers give different estimates of the sizes of the creative class in
particular societies. Bogdan Cichomski assesses that in Poland now it may
amount to 11-13 percent, which is about 20 percentage points less than in
developed countries (Kozielecki (1): 18).
Now the questions appear: what features does today’s creative class
have, what makes it stand out from other classes? Is it homogeneous or
diverse, and to what degree? What are and what may be the further results
of its activities? General statements saying that it is the opposite of
passivity, the reverse of consumerism, unification, materialistic attitude, rat
race, and comfort are not sufficient.
II. Modern society has chosen knowledge, technology, informatics,
and economy as the solution. Knowledge that has been continuously
broadened allows man to learn ever more about the objective world and to
understand it better. Technology, continuously perfected, gives man power
over the world. Knowing the world ever better and having ever better tools,
man may more and more effectively intervene in nature and adjust it to his
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needs. Economy and informatics, as particularly important branches of
modern knowledge, help to quickly achieve the aims man has set, and to do
it with smaller and smaller financial outlays.
Man, fascinated by the perpetual advancing of new achievements in
the surrounding world, has forgotten about himself to a certain degree.
Although he knows more about himself than even a dozen years ago, it
seems to him that he understands himself ever less, that he feels more and
more lost. In the past, when man’s contribution to the appearance of the
world was only slight, he occupied a definite place in it and felt surer of
himself. Today, when he is able to change nearly everything in the world
and to arrange it in his own way, it would seem that he should feel a lot
better in it, since he knows it very well. However, he gets lost in it; often he
cannot find the proper way.
Modern society, having taken the way of arranging the outer world
and of accumulating possessions, not intending to decrease its dynamics of
development while heading in this direction, favors individuals who are
able to think in a business-like and systematic manner, who easily
recognize and analyze the processes occurring in the objective world, who
know how its particular elements and forces work, and who can compare
and combine them in order to obtain new qualities. Modern society favors
individuals with organizational talents who achieve their aims with the
smallest possible outlays, who can recognize human needs and satisfy the
needs with new products. Individuals searching for new technologies and
working out models of development are especially privileged, as are the
managers who implement their achievements. It is for their work that
modern society allocates great sums of money, and it is they who are
relatively well rewarded. In recent years those individuals who can collect,
process and propagate information have clearly been gaining importance.
They have such importance in the democratic societies guaranteeing
freedom of speech and free transfer of information that they make mediocre
politicians popular ones, and those politicians who are talented or valuable
for the society, but inconvenient for them, they doom to “non-existence” in
social awareness; they make a disease that is not very dangerous a
pandemic (an example here may be bird flu – 2010); they threaten
politicians that nobody can win if he opposes writers, radio journalists,
film-makers, people writing on the Internet or working in public relations.
In fact, this is what journalists said at the end of February 2006 to Jarosław
Kaczyński, who proclaimed effecting changes in the world of the Polish
media, and they have achieved their aim.
In modern society, the individuals that have been described above
form the creative class, which, because of the features that are peculiar to it,
may be called technical-economical-managerial intelligentsia. In the past, in
Polish or Russian society, the intelligentsia as a specific social category was
formed by individuals who best interpreted the values that were significant
for the whole of individual and social life, who defended those values, and
who propagated and consolidated them. At the same time, they generally
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were well educated, which was exemplified by Erasmus of Rotterdam.
Now, in our modern society, the technical-economical-managerial
intelligentsia is formed by those who can easily shape the sphere of
possessing, who can recognize human needs and satisfy them with new
products, ideas, and behavior patterns. Owing to the technical-economical-
managerial intelligentsia everyday life has become easier, more convenient
and more pleasant; we move and communicate more quickly, we build
nicer and safer houses, we furnish our flats in a better and nicer way, and
we adjust our surroundings to our needs in a more functional way.
Wherever this type of intelligentsia has developed earlier, the objective
world is better organized and cleaner, more colorful and convenient, better-
off and safer; the power of human muscles is ever more often replaced with
robots, and tiring intellectual work by electronic devices. Infant mortality
has decreased and life expectancy has increased; the life of animals is also
protected. In the most developed countries the natural environment
becomes more and more subjected to man. The yearly industrial emission
of sulfur dioxide into the atmosphere has fallen in the USA from 1970 to
1995 by half; the degree of air contamination with lead compounds has
decreased by more than 90%. At the end of the twentieth century Western
Europe’s afforestation rate was 30% greater than 50 years earlier. (cf.
Bielecki: 72).
Seeing the achievements of the technical-economical-managerial
intelligentsia and making use of them, Karl Popper had good reasons to
state in his speech on the occasion of being awarded an honorary doctorate
by the Eichstätt University in July 1991, “I am living in the happiest world
we have yet had.” This world is happy also for us. But is it happy in all its
fields and for everybody?
Surveys conducted in many countries show that the number of
suicides, of people feeling lonely, and of people with drug addiction has
increased; also, the number of serious violations of accepted moral norms,
assaults, and murders has increased, which has resulted in overcrowded
prisons. Unemployment and poverty are lasting phenomena even in the
wealthiest societies. The number of homeless people grows (at present in
Poland it is estimated that there are about 300,000 such people); they beg
for any meal, so that they will not die. There are more and more people and
families who do not participate in public life even in the most democratic
societies. About two thirds of the children in Polish schools are
undernourished. A great number of children are sexually abused, which
means that something noble and magnificent is poisoned and killed in them
by those who have power over them, who have money and an unrestrained
lust for pleasure. When in all the modern world there is talk about human
rights, about cooperation, peace, and unity, on the borderlands of young
African countries, on the Israeli-Arab borderland, in the countries of North
Africa, the wars continue. In all European countries with a Christian
tradition that is many centuries old and that defends life with the
commandment “thou shall not kill” that admits no exceptions, the killing of
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unborn babies has been legalized. After the introduction of the abortion law,
first in the socialist countries, and then from 1967 gradually in the countries
of Western Europe, the principle of absolute protection of human life from
its conception to a natural death has been violated. Man’s fundamental
value, which is human life, has been gradually relativized, only ensuring
possibly the best conditions for killing unborn babies at the wish of their
mothers, or for killing people who are already grown up, at their own wish.
The facts that have been quoted here as examples indicate that not all
people living in this affluent world are happy. There are still “the equal”
and “the more equal.” It is just that the “more equal” wear other colors and
have their clothes sewn in a new way, not as in the past. Moreover, because
of new techniques of manipulation and propaganda, many of them are
elected to posts giving them power by the poor and by those who are not
well aware of what the situation actually is. Many enlightened Europeans
have forgotten that Europe, having experienced the death of more than 167
million people during the two world wars through Nazi crimes of genocide
and Stalinist purges, not so long ago defended human life in a determined
and devoted way. The progress of knowledge, technology, organization,
moral liberalism, and freedom of speech has weakened the tough pro-life
position in Europeans’ awareness and conscience. In this way, the poet
Bolesław Leśmian’s statement that “one never dies sufficiently” has
become true in the last three decades. Now people die in large numbers not
only biologically, but spiritually as well, for many of them lose the meaning
of life. Also, nature dies on a large scale. American scientists warn that the
exploitation of the natural environment will cause extinction in the current
century of half of the 30 million species living now. Many people do not
ask themselves the questions about what nature is for, what ties connect
them with it, how they should live in harmony with it, or in what condition
they will leave nature to the next generations.
We do not mean to depict a bleak picture of our times here. Death has
always been an inevitable phenomenon: throughout history, children have
been dying, complete cities and whole tribes have died out, numerous
species of plants and animals have become extinct. But the proportions the
phenomenon of death has reached are greater today and they have peculiar
features. Here are some of them:
1. Owing to the development of knowledge of the processes of life and
death, as well as to new technologies, it is possible today to put someone to
death causing less pain; the necessity of precipitating or delaying it may be
justified by many reasons, even humanitarian ones, which in effect may
weaken the opposition to killing even whole categories of people and of social
groups, if somebody wants to do so because of economic, political, religious,
racist, or other reasons.
2. Admittedly, in the past people were killed, but the act of killing was
opposed by the general public, and those who did it were not welcome even in
their own circles. This is why the names of executioners were not revealed,
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and why they were often brought from other towns, or even from foreign
countries, and why during the execution their faces were often hidden. Today,
putting people to death is legalized, and those who do it belong to the ones
who are well paid and the public opinion does not stigmatize them. At present
“death-mongers” often have very good posts in the society. From a very early
age, for many hours a day, we are being acclimated to killing and to not
reacting to it, by programs of almost all television channels and by many
“favorite” films. We have become so used to this that the owners of TV
channels and cinemas state that they just give what people want.
3. Scientists, acknowledged experts working on inventing and
producing lethal weapons as well as businessmen trading them, belong to the
groups in modern societies that earn the most money; and so what they do –
their job – is desired by many young people who do not fully realize what the
results of such work may be.
Considering all these and also other phenomena Carl Friedrich von
Weizsäcker stated during the meeting of intellectuals in August 1985 in Castel
Gandolfo: “We are living at the threshold of a global crisis, perhaps the most
horrifying one in the history of the human race.” And it is horrifying first of all
because it does not only concern “individuals, but societies, or even the whole
of humanity. In the coming crisis the whole of humanity may die out”
(Weizsäcker: 13), because the crisis has seized man himself, which is not
understood by many people. And what is not understood is also not respected.
Death casts a shadow over human life and the life of all nature, and hence the
term used by Blessed John Paul II “civilization of death” with respect to our
times, our culture, is well justified.
Summing up the twentieth century, Józef Kozielecki writes sadly: “in the
colors of the past I can notice more grey and black colors than fair and white
ones” (Kozielecki (2): 7). This may be why modern man, despite so many
achievements, “cannot be pleased,” as Antoni Kępiński states. And the poet
Bolesław Leśmian says and asks: “This is the way the world is! It is a bad
world! Why isn’t there another world?” (1936).
Despite the magnificent achievements in many branches of life,
phenomena can also be seen that signal a crisis of modern European culture.
But do they signify its fall? What attitude should we assume toward them?
Surely not the one that is manifested in excluding oneself from public life and
escaping into the safe retreat of one’s own mind, one’s flat, or one’s warm
circle of friends. This is what, for instance, Martin Heidegger did; at the
beginning of the Nazi rule in Germany he became actively involved in shaping
the new reality (he was a member of the NSDAP, and his speeches made in
those years even today cause hot disputes and controversies). However, he
soon backed out of public work and took shelter in the charming Schwarzwald
to wait there “until everything that has been done, finally will be undone” (Cz.
Miłosz). Waiting for a better time for oneself is a sign of opportunism.
The current social-cultural life of Europe reminds one of the Biblical text
that is often read during prayers for a deceased person: “Human life changes,
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but it does not end.” This is also the case with culture, which changes, as long
as a man is alive, and is an effect of “human” cognition and desire, of our
human experiences, yearnings, and actions that are ever richer. It is not the
first time that Europeans have experienced a crisis of culture. But their
characteristic feature is also that they always want to overcome these crises
and they do not surrender to depressive moods. The question keeps returning:
“Why isn’t there another world?” (Bolesław Leśmian), and Europeans search
for that other world, and define its features. The shaping of a new world by
Europeans is connected with noticing the shortcomings of the existing one,
with its detailed analysis and with noticing new values. What threats do
Europeans perceive in the world in which they live; what do they want to
change and what are they aiming at; who is the leader in the way to a revival?
Looking for an answer to these questions may help overcome the crises of
culture.
III. The world built by the technical-economical-managerial
intelligentsia proves to be full of shortcomings and insufficient. It lacks
philosophical, ethical, and religious reflection. It has first gotten rid of God,
and now it is getting rid of man. As Thomas Merton remarks, the motto saying
that “science can do anything; it should do whatever it wants to; science is
infallible and impeccable; anything science does is just. Hence a deed,
however monstrous or criminal it is, cannot be undermined if it is justified by
science” (Merton: 110) has become a credo of the modern man. Progress,
usefulness, functionality, competence, cost-effectiveness, efficiency, and the
recently emphasized profit and pleasure are the criteria of the value of what
science and technology give. So for the sake of these criteria, experiments are
continually done in order to come up with new inventions, to work out new
technologies, to formulate new rules of management, to create new forms of
life, without looking at the costs and consequences for the life of individuals or
societies, without looking at what is happening to the inner life of man, with
his spiritual life, with his family, to his neighborly and social ties.
Although the technical-economical-managerial intelligentsia has recently
turned their interest to man himself, this has not happened in order to enrich
him inwardly. They want to find out about the properties of the human
organism and its body, to its needs and the ways it responds to stimuli, as well
as to the techniques of affecting a man, in order to be able to impose some
contents on others and to shape their consciousness, to control the processes of
their development, to shape their needs and to more efficiently make them
pursue defined objectives (e.g., to buy completely unnecessary things) in order
to efficiently limit, when it is necessary, their freedom through various forms
of organization and control. Representatives of the technical-economical-
managerial intelligentsia today may quite easily manipulate people like
objects, and this fact is at present recognized as the most dangerous one. The
conviction appears that a man can heal, make happy, or save himself – all he
needs to do is to learn proper technologies and the methods of their use; and if
he is not able to learn and use them for himself he should trust those who have
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already mastered them. So a variety of therapeutic offices are opened that
efficiently drive out man’s more serious reflection on himself.
Individual and social life based on science, technology, organization, and
information has started being very pragmatic, expecting efficiency and profit,
ever richer consumption and pleasure. Personalities with a narcissistic attitude
have become common, ones idolizing themselves, focusing on pleasure, and
being pleasure-seekers, with a kaleidoscope attitude having no system of
values and norms. A constantly growing number of people are unable to
control their own development or that of their dear ones, to solve tensions
between themselves and their dear ones, to thoroughly understand and solve
local and global conflicts. Even those who, because of their post or function
are responsible for others, for the whole of social life, seek the popularity of
their own person rather than the common good. Man has gained better living
conditions, but questions about what he should and should not do have been
weakened, or even completely silenced in him. Hence Józef Kozielecki thinks
that contemporary man is infected by irresponsibility (Kozielecki (2): 8). He
has become a personality without any property. Individuals with such a
personality feel that they may do anything and they are able to do anything –
including really heroic acts and mean deeds. Anybody may grab or bribe them.
These are the consequences of the domination of the technical-
economical-managerial intelligentsia in modern societies, as it knows perfectly
well how to achieve particular effects, but they cannot give satisfactory
answers to the questions: what value do the consequences of their work have?
What do they ultimately serve? What does the idea of man as a spiritual-bodily
whole mean for them? Who is man and what are his ultimate aims; what is the
meaning of his life? The technical-economical-managerial intelligentsia is not
able to answer these questions at all because it relies on the “instrumental
reason,” as Max Horkheimer defines it. The instrumental reason develops
necessary and wonderful instruments; but to what aim they may be used, what
they can serve – these questions remain unanswered. They exceed the
competencies of the technical-economical-managerial intelligentsia and they
cannot be solved by this intelligentsia (Habermas). They have to be helped by
another kind of intelligentsia.
IV. In modern society there is a growing demand for people who
holistically interpret themselves and the world. Many purportedly holistic
theories are extremely popular today. A demand is also growing for spiritual
life and for deep personal ties. Ever more distinctly, the so-called extra-
material values come into prominence. According to some sociologists, the
“silent revolution” in modern societies shows that these values are becoming
widespread; the revolution has started the formation of new life styles,
fundamentally different from the ones that, characterized by a strong emphasis
on possessing, passiveness, mediocrity, and sensuality, dominate at present. In
modern societies ever more people, looking for extra-material values, wanting
to move away from the consumerist life model and to overcome spiritual
inertia, spend their holidays in monasteries or in religious groups with new
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forms of religiosity. Instead of the term “progress” – the motto of modernism
– increasingly often the word “limitation” (Bell: 222) appears: limitation of
economic growth, limitation of the destruction of the natural environment,
disarmament or limitation of military forces, consumption limitation,
limitation of treating a man at work and in political life as an object, limitation
of willfulness of those who threaten social peace. The trend of the new culture
developing under the banner of “limitation” is strengthened by various groups
of the alternative culture. Many of them add to the limitations that have
already been mentioned: the limitation of all stimulants for the benefit of
freedom of decision and responsibility for one’s behavior; the limitation of
entertainment for the benefit of fun; the limitation of passive television and
video watching for the benefit of talking to other people and of reflexive
reading; limiting oneself to things that are really necessary in everyday life and
not allowing the habit of buying kindled by aggressive advertising; limiting
the use of the car, so as to use it only when it is indispensable, etc. People of
the new culture aspire to develop spiritual values in themselves and in others;
they form more human relations in social life. The limitations they undertake
are only one of the ways to realize such an attitude in their lives.
Artists, writers, journalists, professors of various specialties, health
service workers, farmers, engineers, clergymen who criticize the ideals
promoted by the technical-economic-managerial intelligentsia, and who assert
the right to have respect for life and who stand up for the nature that is being
destroyed, for axiology, and who sympathize with the weakest groups in
society, are becoming increasingly popular. Their appeals defending human
life and the natural environment that is being destroyed stir millions of people.
Many of them head social movements and political parties. The significance of
this type of people is great and seems to be increasing, because:
1. They treat a man as a whole, noticing his fundamental and
developmental needs, his need to have ever better living conditions and his
need for a meaning of life, his worldly needs and transcendent ones, his need
to be himself and to creatively co-exist with others.
2. They interpret social life as a whole. In the process of innovation,
especially technological, they perceive a man – a human person – as the
subject and target of these changes. They strongly oppose all the signs of
treating a man as an object.
3. They closely connect their personal life with social and state-building
life. From these connections the sense of responsibility for the society and its
future arises in them. Hence, they try to realize their own development in
connection with the development of the holistically understood society.
4. They do not directly take part in the process of technological
modernization and the rapid raising of living standards, and this allows them
to keep a distance from these processes, to analyze and assess them more
objectively. They are also outside the group of technocrats, managers,
politicians, nouveau riches, and decision-makers of various types who, first of
all, constitute the driving force of mainstream modern society. Thanks to this
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they are free and critical of the society in which they live. They observe the
processes that take place in it and analyze their effects, assessing them and
opposing them if they go in the wrong direction or their pace is wrong; in
other words – they oppose them if they threaten a man’s individual and social
life, or, in fact, not only a man’s life, but life in general.
5. They think globally and they act locally. Hence, they have much
insight into their society as a whole and into the problems of the world; they
feel ties with all people, they do not exclude any countries, any races, nations,
or social groups from the field of their concern. Working in their local
communities, they continually shape areas of human life. They do something
for human ecology, not only conducting armchair-conference talks and
discussions.
6. They stand up for observing the rules of ethics in all the domains of
individual and social life; also – and this is now stressed especially strongly –
for particularly observing the rules of ethics in economy and politics which, it
seems, have broken away from the norms of ethics, accepting the rules of
economic and efficient action.
7. They are sensitive to the transcendent world, to values, to religious
figures and events. Even if they do not accept Christianity as the foundation of
their lives, they increasinly and willingly reach for the Gospel, looking for
indications for themselves there; they perceive Christianity better and more
fully as a creative factor of European culture (Habermas, Ratzinger).
All those who represent this kind of attitude form a peculiar category of
people that conventionally may be called the “intelligentsia of life”
(Dyczewski). It holistically interprets man and the world; it defends life and
consolidates it in all its forms and developmental stages. It is exactly this
intelligentsia that most often opposes plans formulated by the technical-
economic-managerial intelligentsia and its actions, as well as the effects of
those plans and actions. The activity of many groups aiming at limiting the
development of nuclear energy and of experimenting in the field of genetics is
a perfect example here. Genetic engineering opens great possibilities to
people, but it also carries the greatest threats for them. These possibilities are
noticed by those who still have a living and versatile imagination, who apart
from the flesh and blood see something more in man, who very well realize
that the spiritual development of man most fully happens in the most natural
conditions. No laboratory, even a perfect one, can replace the mother’s and
father’s warm care, as it is the parents who give life to a new human being and
care about his development. More and more people are convinced that “such
features of man as the skill of giving and taking, responsibility, the ability to
make sacrifices and to give help, may only be shaped in the family”
(Gatterburg). Many abandon the slogans promoted by Rainer Langhans and
Fritz Teufel in the 1960s: “never more family, never more Germany.”
Although divorces often happen, the advantages of a lasting marriage and
family for the development of an adult person and a child are ever more
strongly emphasized: “Children coming from divorced families have more
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troubles with learning and with establishing contacts; they show the tendency
to take drugs and to commit crimes. And since they most often grow without
fathers, they look for personal models in the street” (Gatterburg).
Those who belong to the intelligentsia of life are present in every country
today. They protest against destroying the natural environment. They struggle
for the life of every individual starting from conception to his/her natural
death, and they actively join those who try to ensure adequate conditions for
this development. They oppose legalization of euthanasia and experimenting
with human embryos. They seek safer, more hygienic, and esthetic work
conditions. They popularize a reflexive type of thinking and a creative
lifestyle, opposing the consumerist style and passiveness.
The consequences of the explosion of the nuclear power plant in
Chernobyl and the catastrophe of the nuclear power plant in Japan, the
experiments in the field of genetics, the pollution of the natural environment,
all these show that the technological-economic-organizational development
must have its limits. If they are exceeded they could threaten the health of
mankind; they can cause the relativization of the fundamental principles of
life, death, or even destruction of a part of humanity and of the cultural
heritage. The intelligentsia of life demands respecting the old principle: man
should not do everything he can do.
In order to remind modern man about exactly this principle, to show man
more holistically, to protect him from various kinds of abuses that come from
science, technology, and organization, all sorts of institutions, associations,
and organizations have come into being. Among others, on March 11, 1996 in
Delaware, USA, the Institute for Frontier Science was established. As its
objectives it sets: 1. Demanding that research, education, and information
exchange in all key branches of science and health take into consideration bio-
electromagnetic determinants, various forms of energy, and holistically
healthful aspects; 2. Studying connections between the body, psyche, and soul,
as well as between various states of awareness; 3. Building communication
and cooperation between researchers, scientists, doctors, politicians, and those
who understand the need of limitation of research fields and can do something
in this domain; 4. Facilitating the use of new achievements in order to improve
the holistically understood health of man, as well as to integrate medicine in its
different branches, conventional and scientific medicine. Soon after the
Institute was established, more than 3000 researchers, intellectuals, and
doctors joined it (Neues).
Even though the intelligentsia of life is not as wealthy as the technical-
economic-managerial intelligentsia, and it is not in power now, its significance
is great and it is going to increase. It forms a sort of alternative culture with
respect to the one that today is formed by technicians, economists, managers,
and politicians. It formulates ideas for social revival and restoration of the
proper place for the human person in the world of things and institutions, in
which it is easy to get lost. It is also a significant pressure group that influences
the technical-economic-managerial intelligentsia; and it is not the latter, as it
was thought in the 1960s and even in the 1970s, but the intelligentsia of life
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that is going to have the final word in the modern society, so that it will be
more and more numerous and conscious of its tasks.
V. The technical-economic-managerial intelligentsia and the
intelligentsia of life need not form an antagonistic arrangement in modern
society. Both these categories of people are necessary and they both form the
creative class in it. The former one shapes the living conditions, and the latter
one creates an order in them, evaluates them, and makes a point of a man not
becoming the tool of his own products, so that he could live in all the spheres
of his personality and develop it in a versatile manner. The intelligentsia of life
has a peculiar mission in the modern society: to propagate the love of life, its
protection, to guard the inviolability of life-guiding principles, and to organize
the best possible conditions for its development. So if the technical-economic-
managerial intelligentsia first of all creates a world of things that is rather cold
and impersonal, the intelligentsia of life complements it with the warmth of
interpersonal and inter-group relations, ones based on respect for every man,
for justice, peace, and love. A perfect symbiosis of these two social groups
will be realized by a citizen of modern society, if on his desk he will have a
computer – the symbol of the technical-economic-managerial intelligentsia –
and the Decalogue complemented with Jesus Christ’s Eight Blessings – the
symbol of the intelligentsia of life. Then one will be able to be sure that man
and culture will develop in the proper way, which means that man will know
what to do and how to do it; he will use the goods he has in order “to be more
humane.” Combining science and technology harmoniously with religious
postulates, so that people could be moderate in gathering material goods and
could be open to others, so that they could sympathize with others, cry and be
happy with others, so that they observe the principles of justice, and be people
of pure heart and patience, so that they introduce peace into the life of others –
this behavior is that which will determine the prosperity and well-being of
society.
The intelligentsia of life complements the technical-economic-
managerial intelligentsia with the world that escapes the research done by
empirical sciences on which the latter is based. The norms contained in the
Decalogue and the supernatural world are not the field of studies of empirical
sciences, but this does not mean that they do not exist and that they should not
be recognized, for it is them, these norms that contain the sense of truth and
falsehood and of good and evil, that give man the feeling of certainty when
choosing the right way, that give him the sense of community with others, that
develop in him the longing for something more noble and more magnificent,
that give human life its ultimate meaning. Then man knows and feels that he
may not do anything that does not agree with this meaning. If people of this
type of thinking organize social development, we may be confident of its
direction, forms, and pace. Man will be its center and one would find such
fundamental values as truth, good, and beauty (the old-Greek triad of values),
faith, hope, and love (the Christian triad of values), freedom, equality, and
brotherhood (the triad of values of the modern societies), the dignity of the
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human person, pluralism, and solidarity (the contemporary triad of values) in
the proper places. Only then, instead of the “civilization of death,” the
“civilization of love” will be developed.
There is a variety of ways of educating both kinds of the creative class in
modern society. The following ways seem to be the most certain:
1. Promoting education of the university type in the society, containing
the science of man, the social sciences, and ethics, so that in the education
process the university graduates could internalize the fundamental human
values, human rights, and the rules of peaceful coexistence.
2. Forming hobbies, developing esthetic sensibility, so that life could be
more interesting, cheerful, and pleasant.
3. Securing the possibility of continuing education and propagating a
style of life that would integrate it as a fundamental element.
4. Shaping the identity (of sex and age as well as the local and national
identity; the identity concerning the world view and religion) so that there
would be as few dull individuals as possible. A man who has a distinct
individual and collective identity is characterized by a sense of his own value
and openness to others. He is able to have a dialogue with others. He has the
sense of responsibility for the effects of his actions.
5. Teaching how to skillfully combine one’s own cultural heritage with
modernity and other societies’ cultures.
6. Shaping the skill of finding peaceful solutions to difficult, critical, and
conflictual situations.
7. Making possible the widespread availability of aids for those who
have problems; making people look for solutions to complicated problems.
Such situations facilitate a better acquaintance among people and an increase
of the sense of responsibility.
8. Shaping the attitude of altruism and of willingness to collectively aid
those who cannot cope with their lives and need help.
9. Shaping an open attitude toward spiritual values, toward the
supernatural world, and toward God.
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CHAPTER IV
PERSON AND PERSONAL REALITY:
THE ACTUALITY OF THE EASTERN
CHRISTIAN UNDERSTANDING OF MAN1
DAN CHIŢOIU
Abstract: This article aims at assessing the vision of man that the Eastern
Christian tradition proposes, by understanding man as person. This notion is
the result of the need the authors from the Patristic period had in describing
the Christian perspective on man. The Patristic notion of person, first stated
by Gregory of Nyssa and Basil the Great, received subsequent nuances and
explanations with Byzantine authors, starting with Maxim the Confessor
through Gregory Palamas’ period. Modernity took over the notion of person
and used it, answering some needs especially present in psychology and
social sciences. But the significance of the notion of person in the modern
context is different from the one in the Eastern Christian environment. The
actuality of this Eastern understanding of man is revealed when there
appeared explanatory needs which can no longer be satisfied by the
anthropological modern paradigms. The recovery of a whole vision on man
may find its sources in the Patristic and Byzantine description of man as
person: this description affirms the person not as a psychological aspect but
as a notion through which a reality is described, the sum of everything that
man means and more. From this perspective, the person must be understood
as a form of reality, nothing less than the physical reality, but which
additionally has the possibility of freedom. It is, therefore, a reality that
changes itself.
Keywords: Eastern Christian tradition, person, spiritual freedom.
Nowadays, the current progress of experimental research leads to the
formation of a much wider vision of the physical universe, and also to a
deeper understanding of the human being. We can better understand the
extraordinarily complex processes present in the human body, and we have
begun to have a consistent understanding of the subtle interactions between
body and mind. The experimental results provided in research in
neuroscience have as a consequence the abandonment of the paradigm
explaining the human being present both in science and philosophy in the
last two centuries. It is, in the first place, about leaving behind a famous
1 Aknowledgment: This paper was written within The Knowledge Based
Society Project supported by the Sectorial Operational Program Human
Resources Development (SOP HRD), financed by the European Social Fund,
and by the Romanian Government under the contract no. POSDRU ID 56815.
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duality of modern philosophy: the body-soul. After Descartes (in
Meditationes de Prima Philosophia in 1641, where he talked about a total
and absolute distinction between mental and material substance),
philosophy began to deal even less with the body-soul distinction. This was
due to the use of the soul concept, which was no longer held to be
consistent with philosophical discourse. Immanuel Kant, for example,
accepts only a weak use of the soul notion as an element of philosophical
discourse. For the German philosopher, the soul is not demonstrable on the
path of reason, although he considers that the mind must inevitably reach
the conclusion that it exists: it is a prerequisite for the development of
ethics and religion. Subsequently, William James sees the soul as a mere
collection of mental phenomena: there is no consistency of the soul
concept. After Descartes, there was a preference for the mind concept, the
human dimension understood as possessing self-reflexivity and
intentionality.
For philosophy, the question of the relationship between body, organs,
and mind meant a revision of several dichotomies that described man with a
double meaning: first, the mind could not be described as an intangible or
of an incorporeal nature, and second, the mind may not have any other
support than the body; the experiments in neuroscience have provided
strong evidence of the material support of the mind. The soul concept
started to be used only in spirituality, and this fact is due mainly to the
direction taken by science since the seventeenth century, when the
description of reality starts to be made by reducing it to what is measurable.
The soul cannot be investigated by the Galilean type of science, the one that
understands reality as schematic by way of mathematical devices. Such a
direction imposed the use of a generic concept of matter as the universal
constituent of reality (plus the energy related concept, later). Today there is
a giving up of the search for evidence of the soul’s existence by science:
that happened during the time since Descartes.
In other words, it was not a denial of the soul’s existence, but the
suspension of the discussion about it in terms of science. In modern times,
the place of discussions on the soul is taken by science and by psychology.
But it is another approach and content: psychology affirms that that the soul
cannot be an object of study in any way, even indirectly; instead, it deals
with the description of cognitive processes, the nature of emotions, etc.
These developments inevitably bring a crisis in the understanding of man,
not a crisis in the description of its functionality, but in terms of
understanding its nature. Giving up the vision of the soul-body dualism is a
plus in terms of explaining the data obtained by experimental investigation,
but retains a degree of impairment in formulating an anthropological vision,
as is required in philosophy.
There have been other perspectives coming from philosophy in the last
half century, proposing an answer to this need, albeit sometimes indirectly.
This is the case in French phenomenology which, through its
representatives, Michel Henry, Jean-Luc Marion, and Jean-Yves Lacoste,
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takes a direction that leaves the search for a human essence in favor of a
radical phenomenology. Henry, referring to the Gospel of John, says that
man should not be understood as a body possessing a soul, but as an
embodied being. What should characterize the man’s life is not the
biological instinct, but the power to try himself. Such an assertion is based
on a distinction between the body (corps) and flesh (chair). The body is the
inert body of universe, which does not try and does not feel anything, a
composition of physical chemical elements of our material dimension. The
flesh is trying to, suffering, and enjoying, is able to feel that it is outside the
body, to touch it and be touched. The incarnation of the Logos in the
Gospel announcement indicates, according to Henry, a definition of man as
embodied. The statement “The Logos became flesh” is opposed to the
definition of the human being in the classical Greek conception, where the
body was associated with animality. The French phenomenologist thinks
that the Gospel message contains an entirely new definition, different from
the Greek and Modern descriptions: a definition of the man as invisible, yet
earthy, invisible as a flash.2
A similar definition can be found in the texts of authors who have
been involved in what is called the neo-Patristic movement: George
Florovsky, Justin Popovici, and Dumitru Stăniloae. There is a similarity
with the French phenomenological approach: there is provided an
anthropology exceeding the soul-body dualism, starting with a certain
reading of the Gospel, as well as texts of Patristic authors. The neo-Patristic
movement consists of the need to revive the authentic spirit of textual
sources belonging to the first Christian horizon. This is due to the finding
that, in the interval that followed the Renaissance, the Christian
anthropological perspective received influences not related to the Tradition
of the Fathers. This situation was seen as existing not only in Eastern
Christianity, but also in the Christian West.
The perspective offered by Stăniloae has a special significance,
indicating a radical solution in describing the notion of the human being.
Stăniloae offers an interpretation of the central concepts belonging to the
Patristic tradition, an interpretation which aims at responding to the recent
needs of understanding the human dimension of reality, an interpretation
that proves its timeliness and potential. The Romanian author expresses the
most coherent and consistent recovery of the Patristic meaning of person,
but with terms belonging to twentieth century philosophy, including Martin
Heidegger’s philosophy.
The term ‘person’ comes from the Latin persona, as a translation of
what the Greek Fathers understood as the true designation of man, by
linking two concepts formerly working in the Greek lexicon: hypostasis and
prosopon. The Patristic authors of the fourth century found themselves
needing to describe man as bearing the image of God and having additional
2 Michel Henry, Incarnation. Une Philosophie de la Chair (Paris: Seuil,
2000), p. 43.
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freedom. The Greek classicism did not know the idea of freedom, especially
regarding man, because it is dominated by the idea that the world is a
‘cosmos,’ an order that cannot miss anything. Man’s freedom came into
conflict with the harmony and order dictated by moira. Thus Gregory of
Nyssa and Basil took those two concepts frequently used at the time and
used them in a different way. The idea of hypostasis was used within
classical Greek philosophy and Hellenism as an equivalent to ousia, but had
a number of nuances that reinforced a particular understanding of the reality
essence. In the first centuries after Christ, the term received a more real and
concrete meaning, that of a real being as opposed to the apparent and
evanescent being. Gregory and Basil used this term in order to indicate a
difference in the acceptance of such essences, thus indicating a way of
being. The Cappadocian Fathers made a real and significant move in
understanding the signification of the term: reality can only have a
hypostatic dimension; there is no pure essence. However, the identification
between hypostasis and prosopon is very significant. The term prosopon
belonged to the old Greek vocabulary, and it signified the part of the head
right under the forehead – what we call today ‘face.’ It was especially used
to mean mask, as part of the props used by actors in the ancient Greek
theater. According to Zizioulas, theater, and especially tragedy, was the
meeting site for human freedom and the necessity under which the world
stood in the old Greek vision.3 It is known that, from the perspective of
Greek philosophy, one cannot find the grounds to argue about the real
essence of the free human act, because what obsessed the mentality of
Greek antiquity was the order and harmony of a world that was essentially
cosmos. For the Greeks who lived during that age, the world necessarily
obeyed the power of an order that was conceived from a logical perspective,
which allowed no deviance from the laws of the harmony of the whole.
Greek tragedy exploited the conflict between man’s attempts to act
according to his own will and to avoid his destiny, disregarding the gods’
will, although this attitude was ultimately doomed to failure; the closing
scene of an ancient tragedy always recorded the fulfillment of destiny. We
are concerned here with what could be termed limited freedom, a phrase
that represents, in fact, a logical contradiction. What matters is that the
tragedy actor feels the significations of the freedom state, and steers –
though in a limited and unsuccessful way – toward assuming the state of a
person, characterized by freedom, uniqueness, and non-repeatability. The
mask, in ancient tragedy, proves to be a superimposed element and not
something that pertains to his true being. However, this meaning of
prosopon was exploited by the Cappadocian Fathers in order to confer the
desired dimension to the understanding of the personal modality of the
existence of God in Trinity and of people. An identification of the two gives
an ontological dimension to “face”; to what was previously a mere mask. It
3 Ioannis Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the
Church (New York: St. Vladimir`s Seminary Press, 1985), p. 32.
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is here not just a transmutation of understanding; it is the use of the words
at another level: the movement from concept to sign.
Stăniloae considered as a central aspect of his speech the recovery of
the meaning of “person.” Modernity used the term with other
interpretations, often indistinct, and confused it with the individual (in the
experimental fields of humanities, especially in psychology, but also in
ethics). Modernity has given “person” a psychological or ethical meaning.
The understanding shown by Stăniloae recovers a parentage of Patristic
terms in an ontological dimension, intending to describe the person as a
matter of reality. Stăniloae disagrees with the opposition between nature
and person; by giving a negative valence to nature, it means that the
reference is made to the fallen nature, a disfigured state of nature, and he
quotes Saint Irenaeus, who says that a fallen man is not a true man. The
Romanian author insists that the person is nothing else but “the actual
existence of nature and people together comprised all of nature, giving it
and receiving it mutually.”4 “Nature really persists in several hypostases
endlessly rich and full in relationship between them.”5
According to the exegesis in the Patristic literature, the fall of man,
who had been nominated to rule over all Creation, brought about another
state of the world, of the cosmos, affecting its each and every last stone.
This conditioning that man with his thickened body starts to receive from
nature is, after all, an effect of his own deeds. Fallen man’s actual life on
the earth means suffering and the pursuit of deliverance. This state has
concrete consequences in man’s complex relationship with what is called
nature, and which includes his own corporeality. Christ’s embodiment
means the possibility to restore man’s humanity, but only as something
potential. This restoration becomes real in the concrete case of each man,
not identically, but in agreement with the characteristic features of the
uniqueness of each personal exercise of the freedom to be. Restoration must
not be understood as man’s return to what is proper to him, to his lost
existential state; this change leads to another relationship and another way
to exercise his influence on nature and on Creation. This change of
relationship must be understood as real and not symbolic, as one that
produces real and concrete effects in nature. The Patristic texts emphasize
the fact that this is how man opens endless possibilities to bring about
change and novelty in nature. This does not imply the flouting of nature’s
laws and rationality, but contributing to actualize the potencies that it
contains and that otherwise would never have become manifested. The
Patristic vision of the world was that it was created as a setting, as the site
of encounter between persons. The world does not have a meaning and a
purpose in itself; it exists with the purpose of creating deeper and more
4 Dumitru Stăniloae, Teologia Dogmatică Ortodoxă [Orthodox Dogmatic
Theology] , vol. I (București : Editura Institutului Biblic și de Misiune al 
B.O.R., 1996), p. 278.
5 Ibidem.
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effective possibilities for the encounter between persons – between the
Persons of the Holy Trinity and people, as well as between people. This is
due to the fact that the person is the reality of the highest existence degree,
because it is aware of its existence and of the existence of persons and
things. This is also due to the fact that the person exists as I, as you, or as
he/she, as a conscience aiming toward another conscience, as Father
Stăniloae stated.6 Thus, the determinism of nature, the existence of some
laws of physical reality, is not an eternal given; it was modified when Adam
fell, and it encounters continuous changes by the exercise of man’s act of
freedom, especially of the man who is on the restoration path.
It would be more appropriate to talk not so much about natural laws as
about the rationality of the world, or, to be more precise, the rationality of
creation. When we talk about the rationality of the world we give a more
adequate expression to the purposes for which the world received its
existence, a world which, for the Judeo-Christians, cannot have, under any
circumstances, a purpose and a meaning in itself, simply existing. If there
are limits in Creation, and if they are not due to man’s fall, then the
understanding of the limit must be positive: it is a limit that creates the
possibility of communion, of encounter, and that proves to engender an
infinity of possibilities. This would be the meaning of some reasons for
creation, of some logoi, as Maximus the Confessor calls them. Man’s aim is
definitely to overcome conditionings; this fact appears in the whole
historical behavior of humanity. Throughout his whole history on the Earth,
man has attempted by all means to go beyond his conditionings,
dependences, and limitations. The fact that he makes science pertains to this
need as well. According to Saint Maximus, man has a high calling: to
mediate and to unite. Man is called to consistently integrate the macrocosm
with the microcosm, the objective perspective with the subjective one, in a
common vision of spiritual transitus. The natural tension in the macrocosm
between sensitive and intelligible reality must be mediated in the human
microcosm via the spiritual vocation that is proper to the man of ascetic
practice and contemplation.7 This mediation and unification asks for an
actual change in reality, at all levels, for a subtle modification of a
constitutive element in each of the mediation terms.
These are reasons for Stăniloae to indicate the person as having a kind
of reality, even being the Reality. This centering of the person concept
fulfills many needs. First, this is an understanding of human and humane
meeting the explanatory requirements of recent philosophy. Second, it
provides a wider perspective on reality, as it is now described in advanced
scientific research, particularly in quantum physics. But it also offers a way
6 Dumitru Stăniloae, Studii de teologie dogmatică ortodoxă [Orthodox
Dogmatic Theology Studies], (Craiova: Ed. Mitropolia Craiovei, 1990), p. 225.
7 Paul M. Blowers, Exegesis and Spiritual Pedagogy in Maximus the
Confessor. An Investigation of the Quaestiones ad Thalassium (Notre Dame,
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), p. 131.
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of understanding the specifics of the cultural and spiritual area of the
Christian East, the way of life of the Eastern man. With this understanding
of the person can be justified the behavior the Eastern man, both at the
individual level and the community one. If, for example, sin is not seen in
this cultural area as a moral fact, but as having consequences at the
ontological level (man does not “stand,” but moves up and down
continuously), the consequences are diverse, complex, and sometimes
paradoxical. Traces of the Patristic and Byzantine traditions occur in this
type of assumption that clearly shows difference from other cultural areas.
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CHAPTER V
MODERN SOCIETY AND
ITS ETHICAL DILEMMAS1
CORNELIA GĂŞPĂREL
Abstract: The world today is faced with a lack of current moral models, so
moral principles are often used as weapons for labeling and balancing
certain social, political, and economic circumstances existing in society.
The presence in the social space of such problems leads to dilemmatic
interpretations, susceptible to overshadowing the discipline and the model
of social coexistence on which the entire legal system is based. The
deontological codes that exist in the diversity of academic and institutional
communities are just a brief insight into the meanings of the ethical
principles. We note, however, that despite the emergence of new human
rights, codes of conduct existing in Romanian space remain the same, and
the institutions that create and apply them remain tributary to limited and
time dependent interpretations. In this context, the notion of ethics is often
misunderstood, because there is an exaggeration of certain limitations of
actions and the interpretation can be guided by criteria that have no
connection with the internal standard, that is, the principles of the
Deontological Code.
Contextuality can be the solution to a part of the ethical dilemmas, but
it does not lead to logical indicators. One cannot bring too much criticism
upon contextuality and upon its relativity of interpretation, as long as reality
shows this can be the only viable solution. Human habit is for a person to
reduce novelty in what he/she knows, in the idea of assimilation, which
explains his/her aversion to everything that is new or requires the effort of
thinking. Once assimilated, the novelty becomes active, so ethical reform in
psychosocial research and practice consists in the removal of what is old
and needs recontextualized, because we face new problems – genetic
inventions, reordering of health insurance system, creation of new legal
codes, etc.
We therefore believe that “Martin Cohen’s 101 Ethical Dilemmas” and
Philip Zimbardo’s failed “Stanford Experiment,” joining one stream or
1 Acknowledgement: This paper was written within the Knowledge Based
Society Project supported by the Sectoral Operational Programme Human
Resources Development (SOP HRD), financed from the European Social Fund
and by the Romanian Government under the contract number POSDRU ID
56815.
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another, whether it is utilitarianism, consequentialism, or professional
ethics, configure only at a descriptive level the topics regarding the
understanding of the purpose and of the ethical interpretation in the
scientific society area which itself includes the contemporary one. The basis
of this scientific paper is built on a series of psycho-philosophical
coordinates which are focusing on the philosophical, hereditary, and
neurological unconscious. Repositioning and analyzing the theories
concerning unconscious have conscience as a starting point (in terms of
moral and spiritual virtues), followed by the importance and the role of
memory, which may or may not indicate the resources of will. In other
words, we are talking about a different perspective on scientific and applied
ethics, but the individuality of our current demarche brings the idea of
enhancing morality by reconsidering the ontological structure (conscience)
which may or may not justify equity in human relations.
Keywords: ethical dilemmas, contemporary society, contextuality,
moral and spiritual values, memory, will.
FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE – ETHICAL ASPECTS OF
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
In analyzing how ethics is developed and reflected in the sensible
world (in the Platonic meaning of the word) we must return to the issues of
the moral foundation of any action. Simple, everyday actions are usually
assigned value judgments based on common spirit, whose main attribute is
to be moral. What is the source of these judgments, how can we assume the
role of moral judges, and why do we consider the moral judgments of each
of us to be universal? These are just some of the questions to which we
should respond when we make a theoretical approach to morality.
We consider ethics a scientific synthesis of all regulations, approaches,
and attitudes based on moral sense. In most cases they have been theorized
and transferred into practical systems whose utility is found in everyday
life. Morality is the ability of a society, group, or person to assign value
judgments in relation to a certain attitude, idea, or behavior by which they
are accepted or rejected based on a contextual assessment scale.
Objectivity in ethical analysis, whether we are talking about
utilitarianism, legislative utilitarianism, multi-leveling actional
utilitarianism, motivational and of character, biographic utilitarianism, or
consequentialism (value – effect), more often focuses on the welfare and
benefit of the largest possible group of humans, but from our point of view,
this analysis should also focus on the value of the moral agent to determine
the balance of power in the analysis and interpretation of actions.
“If morality would not involve human passions and our life in
general,” Noica asserts, “then it could be as rigorous and safe as any other
Modern Society and its Ethical Dilemmas 67
deductive science.”2 To some extent, this explains the relativism of
interpretations from the social and scientific context, whether we refer to:
1. the legal system – the intentionality and the degree of social risk
(socio-historical context) that are indicators, on which the legal
classification of the action and of the perpetrator of the act is based;
2. the health system – the principle of liability that tends to create
prerequisites for reordering the criteria for granting health insurance or,
3. research and experiments which are carried out within scientific
communities and which may be questionable from an ethical point of view,
although they apparently follow a series of ethical guidelines or principles.
In this context of debate and analysis of contemporary society and its
ethical dilemmas existing in various scientific and institutional contexts, the
question should rather be “What is not ethics?” to deduce what it is.
To this question P. Singer identifies an answer and refers to a set of
benchmarks:
 “The first thing to say about ethics is that it is not a set of
prohibitions particularly concerned with sex.”
 “Second, ethics is not an ideal system that is noble in theory but no
good in practice.”
 “Third, ethics is not something intelligible only in the context of
religion. I shall treat ethics as entirely independent of religion.”
 “The fourth, and last, claim about ethics that I shall deny in this
opening chapter is that ethics is relative or subjective.”
By these statements Singer creates the conditions for a better
understanding of the role of the moral agent, whose profile is outlined by
John Stuart Mill.
Mill says every human action has three dimensions or aspects to be
pursued: “its moral aspect, or that of its right and wrong; its aesthetic
aspect or that of its beauty; and its sympathetic aspect, or that of its
lovableness. The first addresses itself to our reason and conscience, the
second to our imagination, the third to our human fellow feeling. According
to the first, we approve or disapprove, according to the second, we admire
or despise, according to the third, pity or dislike.”3
This new interpretation in which the importance falls on the person,
the intention, and the act, leads us to assessing the role and the importance
of the moral agent, which brings us closer to the question of what it means
to be moral. And so the myth of Gyges in Plato’s Republic is updated,
2 Constantin Noica, Mathesis sau bucuriile simple (București: Editura 
Humanitas, 1992), p. 89.
3 John Stuart Mill, “Bentham,” in The Collected Works, ed. J.M. Robson.,
Vol. 10 (London and New York, Routledge, 1974), p. 112.
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identifying the moral agent with the holder of the ring that makes you
invisible. In this context you can be free to judge good and evil and to act.
Therefore, to judge the morality of a person one must consider this
possibility of total freedom, for to be right, you must act morally under any
circumstances. In other words, the moral man is the righteous man whose
profile we otherwise find in Plato’s Republic. The difference between the
righteous man (good) and the one who is unjust (bad) would be that the
righteous man has to be right and not to seem right. “There must be no
seeming, for if he seem to be just he will be honored and rewarded, and
then we shall not know whether he is just for the sake of justice or for the
sake of honors and reward; therefore, let him be clothed in justice only, and
have no other covering; and he must be imagined in a state of life the
opposite of the former. Let him be the best of men, and let him be thought
the worst; then he will have been put to the proof; and we shall see whether
he will be affected by the fear of infamy and its consequences. And let him
continue thus to the hour of death; being just and seeming to be unjust.
When both have reached the uttermost extreme the one of justice and the
other of injustice, let judgment be given which of them is happier of the
two.”4 In a recent theoretical view of ethics, the righteous man is under the
veil of ignorance that allows him to be right because he chooses to be in
this way.
The Myth of Gyges conveys surprisingly well the case of the moral
agent and of his report to the world and his fundamental role. There is a
representation of the situation of the absolute freedom of choice between
what is right and what is wrong, between good deeds and bad deeds,
without any social constraints. But in this situation Gyges prefers to do
what is considered to be immoral, to deceive, to kill, and to steal, rather
than opposing such trends.
We may conclude that three main ideas are to be found here, namely:
man is prone to commit evil, injustice, rather than its opposite; committing
good deeds does not have a source in benevolence, but rather in constraints;
and, last but not least, a man performs a righteous act because he is unable
to do an injustice.
Morality is manifested in individual forms until the occurrence of an
external evaluation, when there is a certain inhibition and a deformation of
the social self from the desire of compliance and submission to social
norms and values. In other words man often shows an intended good
behavior from his desire not to be subjected to public opprobrium or of
social norms, but we have no guarantee that without censorship, his feelings
and reactions are moral.
The trial of Socrates remains a testimony to the fact that morality is
the basis for the harmony and communion between people, but it also can
be a primary source of legal fault. In his old age, Socrates was on trial on
4 Plato, The Republic of Plato 361 c-d translated by B. Jowett, (Oxford:
1888), pp. 40-41.
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grounds of immorality and was subsequently convicted. The accusations
against him were that: Socrates does not recognize the gods of the city;
Socrates brings new gods; Socrates corrupts the youth. A brief analysis of
these charges demonstrates the subjectivity of the accusers who are
dominated by passion (Meletius), envy (Lycon), ignorance (Anytos), and
the immorality which leads to a crime on the judges’ part. In this case we
can clearly see where the interpretation and the subjectivity of analysis of
some moral guilt in relation to the legal system – that is to the law – can
lead.
The philosophers of that time had a certain attitude toward the gods, so
Socrates was not the only one who could be accused of impiety. Moreover,
Socrates acknowledged the gods, but did not accept the traditional
anthropomorphic divine figures that outlined a profile of less morality. The
second accusation shows and justifies the Socratic argument in the sense
that by word, man can be corrupted and hence this can lead to a vice of
interpretation.
Introducing new gods leads to interpretations in a society like that of
Socrates, and that is because the daimon to which he calls in his demarches
is actually his conscience and thus the obvious manifestation of his respect
to the gods.
The last blame brought to Socrates refers to the fact that he corrupted
young people through his discourses and teachings, therefore he was a
danger to society. Against all these accusations Socrates defends himself
and reveals the substrates that stand behind them, but eventually accepts the
sentence to be poisoned.
But his conscience, his daimon, advises him, after a life in service of
teaching people about virtue, to choose death and to respect the laws.
Socrates knows that morality and dignity are most important and he is not
afraid of the crowd and of the trial to which he is subjected, because he
knows that the crowd is the least able to give an opinion. What is valuable
at the time of his conviction and after his death is his teaching, the human
mind and, by that, the consciousness of living “ according to goodness.”
ETHICAL DILEMMAS – SOCIETY-PERSON-MORAL AGENT
This triad of “society-person-moral agent” that we bring into question
in this analysis of contemporary society in terms of ethical dilemmas has its
justification in the degree of intentionality, in the responsibility of the
society, and of the individual that loses the status of person in a
consumption society that stands under the sign of globalization. Therefore a
repositioning of the human being to society is necessarily required to see to
what extent the existing ethical guidelines values and protects it or exposes
it to dissolution by the loss of the self-report which immediately contains
“other.” Man often judges emotionally and without empathy to others,
which is why there is a justification in part for the lack of logic in the
analysis of moral behaviors contained in social relations. Deontical logic is
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hardly accessible to the crowd, because we deal there with specific passions
and specific levels of understanding, for which the existence of ethical
dilemmas is justified. Orientations such as utilitarianism, consequentialism,
and professional ethics justify and cover psychosocial problems, but do not
confer determined ethical indicators of logic in the analysis of cause-effect,
intention-act, or consciousness-unconsciousness.
The bridge dilemma demonstrates, by successive crossings from
professional ethics to utilitarianism and consecintionalism, the fact that
there are problematic situations in current life in which, regardless of any
type of decision one might make, a human sacrifice takes place. Man is
suggestive and often provides emotional and less rational responses.
The bridge dilemma5 described by Cohen refers to the fact that a
wagon out of control is likely to kill more people. Fred sees that and is able
to report to the mechanic to avoid the accident. The problem here is: if the
wagon goes left five people are killed and if it goes to the right one person
is killed. The question here is that of stopping the wagon. What can be done
in such a situation?
The second part of the dilemma ignores the first part of it and
describes Fred as being in the position to warn the others, but having no
means by which to be seen and identified. The lack of an object to help him
draw the attention to himself leads him to think that he could push the
young man who was near him. And the dilemma ends with the response
that Cohen and others have tried to find as a middle solution to this
dilemma. Cohen’s answer is less relevant in this respect and what becomes
important is the perception of individuals about the situation itself. And the
people’s answer is surprising, because they claim that Fred should have
signaled, but should not have pushed the young man.
According to philosophers and psychologists, people’s judgment is
intuitive and emotional. They adopt the utilitarian principle, on one hand,
but refuse to push the young man in front of the wagon, invoking the idea
that it is immoral to take a human life. On the other hand, they can change
their point of view choosing the Kantian direction, thinking that the
categorical principle is inviolable. Therefore they are at first rational and
then emotional, but the final effect is the same – the disappearance of a man
in favor of the survival of five people. In terms of consequentialism, the
effects are arithmetically equivalent, hence the idea of the double effect
doctrine. The dilemma itself is perhaps one of the most difficult, because of
trying to pass through these three orientations: ethical, utilitarian, and
consequentialist.
The lack of transparency of some of the actions results in a
subjectivization of choices and in a certain mental relativism, which leads
to what philosophers call the double effect doctrine. According to the
double effect, one and the same action may be regarded as moral in one
5 Martin Cohen, 101 Ethical Dilemmas (London and New York:
Routledge, 2007), p. 12.
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sense and immoral in another. The consequences of the double effect can
lead to relativism and to that subjectivity which some ethicians are reluctant
to use in their analysis, but in practice are sometimes unable to avoid. For
example, bombing a restaurant where there are terrorists is considered
permissible and moral, but bombing a restaurant by terrorists who attack the
U.S. is seen as negative and is not allowed. Zigmunt Bauman6 thinks that
we are not moral because of the society (we are only ethical or obey the
laws because of the society); but rather, “we live in society” and also “we
are society,” thanks to the fact that we are moral. Still, above all there is a
balance of power between man’s moral sense and the requirements of the
social moral model.
The current approach in deontical logic requires a new interpretation,
which does not exclude or annihilate the previous one, but makes it more
accessible, in that it does not aim to facilitate the moral requirements or
reduce their number, but attempts to provide an opportunity to be more
moral. The current focus of professional ethics wants to be one that gives
importance to vocation, because in relation to human beings, what becomes
of great value is sympathy (love) for and understanding of the other in a
way that does not affect one’s moral self and much less one’s own life.
Peter Singer, in his attempt to show what ethics is not (based on the 10
sins according to the Christian perspective), concludes that ethics is not a
system of noble theories without application. For this he refers to the
meaning of lies in different contexts. He says that normally it is not right to
lie, but in a situation like wartime, telling Gestapo that you do not house a
Hebrew family is, rather, a moral action.
Compliance with professional ethics does not also ensure maximum
effectiveness of the intervention in the psyche and human condition. All
social institutions backed by coercive measures were based and rely on the
assumption that one cannot make good choices (whether good is interpreted
as good for the person or good for the community or both at the same time).
In the absence of a moral model, of clear ethical coordinates, and therefore
of a continuous change in what do we interpret as being good and moral, we
ask ourselves: what are the directions of orientation and the manners to
correct behavior in interpersonal dialogue and coexistence?
The answer always implies considering the context, which can be
defined by professional ethics, consequentialism, or utilitarianism. In a
community of specialists a series of rules and principles are working, while
in a society, professional ethics and, in this case, the code of ethics, lose
their utility, due to criteria that may depend on the utilitarian or
consequentialist analysis. This relativism created by the context or societies
is also found in Cohen’s collection of ethical dilemmas. Through his 101
ethical dilemmas, Cohen describes current society issues, which allows not
only a deontological analysis, but also an ethical analysis of context and of
6 Zigmunt Bauman, Etica postmodernă (Timişoara: Editura Amarcord,
2000), p. 68.
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situation, meaning the promotion of practical wisdom, which involves the
ability to predict effects and to make analogies to other situations, to be fair
in relation to the others, but not without affection. He draws attention to the
validity of the deontological analysis but subtly shows its effects, because
complying with the code of conduct leads to lack of action, to a certain
passivity with negative effects.
The usefulness and practicality of moral actions do not only make
ethics vulnerable, because their purpose is not to present the advantages and
disadvantages of actions, even if we are in an era of negotiations, but rather
to determine the awareness of the existence of morality as part of human
nature existing in the natural human fund. However, this is not enough,
because today’s society needs more to deliberate on what is/is not moral
and to assimilate morality as something vital in relation to self and others.
Pragmatism focuses more on numbers and less on debt criterion, because
most of the time the usefulness of action upon the most people is
considered, and the debt criterion becomes an adjacent aspect.
In the construction and the maintenance of social space as a
cognitive process, in its essence, feelings are either suppressed or
– when indicated – reduced to a secondary role. The trials and
misfortunes of the creation of space are primarily cognitive: the
most common and most relevant of its endemic sufferings is
cognitive confusion: the imprecision of rules, the weakness in the
ignorance of the ways to move forward.7
The metaphor according to which rich countries have no responsibility
for the situation of poor countries produces a cognitive dissonance which,
being brought to a broad sense, might cause a certain acceptance. In other
words, if the same situation would be considered in another context,
uncertainty would disappear. The saving from drowning8 of a larger number
of people against a smaller group of people could be seen as an ethical
action based on the principle of utility. According to this principle, I will
save as many people as I can afford to save without endangering others.
The risks which are produced, though, by such an analysis show that
utilitarianism is true only in certain situations, and that application where it
is not effective is more harmful than the lack of its implementation. This is
because ethics is not simply a system of noble theories whose practical
effectiveness is nonexistent, but a coherent system as far as considering the
context on the basis of the appropriate ethical principle. In society it is
difficult to analyze one situation or another from an ethical point of view
and to follow general rules that are not applicable in most practical
7 Ibid., p. 180.
8 Martin Cohen, 101 Ethical Dilemmas (London and New York:
Routledge, 2007), p. 2.
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situations. What you can see is the ease that people exhibit when passing by
opposition from good to bad under the impulse of power.
For the first time, Philip Zimbardo’s Stanford Experiment9 determined
the restriction of the experiments between some ethical limits imposed in an
effort to prevent the possibility of abuse that might spring from this feeling
of power. In 1971 Zimbardo conducted an experiment in which he
randomly chose two groups of student volunteers who would participate in
the experiment.
The first group consisted only of women and the second group was
mixed. Zimbardo describes only the experimental situation encountered in
the group of women, because there the abuse of power is identified. Both
groups are divided, and in the first part of the group of volunteers, students
are depersonalised by replacing their names with numbers and their uniform
with common prisoners’ clothing, and then being transferred to a special
prison. The other half of the group is also depersonalized because their
names are replaced with numbers and they receive uniforms, except that
theirs are the uniforms of the guards.
Th guards took control over the prisoners and the effect of the role
exchange made them become during those six days a kind of torturers.
During the night shift, they subjected those in the second part of the group
to abuses far exceeding the normal requirements of the experiment (e.g. by
forcing them to wash the toilets with their hands, using insults, calling them
names, etc.).
Zimbardo was compromised as experimenter and was forced to
discontinue the experiment due to the excesses of his volunteer students in
the role of guardians, and the experience itself seems to have led to a
change of the principles and rules by which experiments are conducted.
The question Zimbardo asked himself is: do good people really exist?
His response is as tough as it is realistic, and the retrospective he makes
clearly outlines the border between mercy and murder.
The conclusion is that the border between the good man and the
criminal is much easier to cross than philosophers might imagine, and he
makes an overview of events which justify his assumption (prisoners in
World War I, World War II camps, prisoners in Siberia, and the genocide in
Rwanda and Cambodia).
All these examples justify the conclusion that man is prone to evil
actions, so that the existence of clear ethical principles is necessarily
imposed. Ethics shows that this quantification is often the indicator of the
degree of morality of actions and therefore consequentialism would be
closer to utilitarianism, that is, to an assessment of the usefulness and
consequences upon majority.
“The crowd represents crushing, abolition, removing difference from
the Other. Moral responsibility feeds itself from difference. The crowd lives
9 Philip Zimbardo, Efectul lui Lucifer (București : Editura Nemira, 2009).
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in similarity.”10 Through interpretation and analysis, the human being,
whether it is in a therapeutic context, or in a social one, has access to a
disclosed reality, imposed or created, that can cause trouble (misfortune),
which leads to the following idea: “the fairness of the human act is judged
by it producing the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.” 11
Could this be enough?
John Broome conducted an analysis of medical situations that reminds
us in some degree of the principle of responsibility for the disease, by
which the medical services are distributed. Broome’s analysis and the
graphic below highlight the patient’s response to a palliative treatment
compared to the reaction to a second type of treatment that is more
aggressive.
Figure 1. Comparative analysis of welfare between the application of
a palliative or an aggressive treatment12
The real situation is that a person who has a form of terminal illness
has a choice between a palliative option, in which the pain is reduced and
life is prolonged, but prolonged for less time than with an aggressive form
of treatment that will cause pain. Broome’s conclusion is that the best
solution is the palliative but shorter version. Strictly from the medical point
of view, the analysis is pertinent, but from a moral point of view we ask
ourselves where this kind of analysis might lead?
10 Ibid., p. 143.
11Mihaela Miroiu, Gabriela Blebea Nicolae, Introducere în etica
profesională (București: Editura Trei, 2001), p. 32.
12 John Broome, Weighing Lives (Oxford University, 2004), p. 2.
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Society subjects us by its dilemmas to a variety of situations and to
solutions that may surprise us as in the solution found in the second
situation described by Broome. So, in a situation of choice, as one between
a young person and an old one, we would be surprised that the analysis for
such a situation is purely pragmatic, which leads us to think that the scale of
utilitarianism may have a long-term effect extending to and including a
wide range of current issues.
Figure 2. Assessment of welfare for young and elderly people13
Broome says the analysis carried out in such a situation refers to the
welfare potential posed by the person concerned, in this case the young and
elderly.
Rather, the concept of welfare has, in this context, a sense of
procreation. Hence, a pragmatic criterion is followed, because the young
will sooner be helped for future generations to survive and contribute to the
welfare of society while the elder, due to his age, does not represent such a
potential.
This situation of quantifying certain benefits leads our mind to a
consumer society where moral principles are secondary. In the scientific
context these benefits can lead to and support theories that were before
countered by arguments, by which they manage to maintain and produce
more or less positive effects. Maybe not in vain, the criticism on the
unconscious theory was not assimilated. Beliefs and new behaviors are
performed in time and by word. Therefore Richard Rorty thinks that “the
acquisition of new vocabularies of moral reflection”14 can influence and
trigger moral conscience or ethics, and, we believe, that this updated
linguistic load that would lead us to our true depth represented by character
13 Ibid., p. 6.
14 Ibid., p. 242.
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and reveals consciousness, memory, and will, understood and analyzed in a
context of freedom, is still missing.
REINTERPRETING THEORIES OF THE UNCONSCIOUS IN
TERMS OF ETHICS– MEMORY, WILL AND FREEDOM
With the orthodox psychoanalysis and especially with the theories of
the unconscious specifically promoted by Sigmund Freud, other approaches
to unconscious (hereditary neurological and philosophical unconscious)
have entered into obscurity and the epistemological foundation that we find
in the psychological and philosophical approaches show us that arguments
that stand behind this unconscious lost some of their value. To analyze the
value, potential, and motives of the unconscious is perhaps needed to clear
the space for analysis, definition, and interpretation of conscience, in the
ethical and social sense, that is, from the philosophical and psychological
perspective.
The human being lives his immediate present time and also his past, in
a community that is reported and subjected to two fundamental laws, the
social law of the community and the divine law, the first containing the law
with its meanings and legal effects and hence the problem of placing blame
easily. As Constantin Noica would say, “you can function only under a law,
and so your deed is guilty as partial and mutilating. You are guilty no
matter what you do.”15 Therefore it is important to see what it is meant by
consciousness, especially self-consciousness, which involves and brings
with it the Other’s awareness. We need to take away the guilt from the
human being without sacrificing his accountability in a moral, legal, and
social sense. The analysis of human interiority is rather a review and a
clarification of frameworks and concepts for ideational and practical
development.
As we believe that Noica’s perspective concerning the moments of
realization of consciousness have as models the steps cadence but also the
warm’s movement, because consciousness is the diverse One-himself, in
other words, consciousness is what comes through sensations and
perceptions – “if the course is that of the step, first you have, on the one
who moves, the undifferentiated unity of the body, then you have a division
that is the step itself, finally you have a unit which recovers, when you
withdraw your foot. If the movement is that of a creeping worm, first you
have an indefinite chain, then the tightening, the deflection, the bending of
the chain, and last its recovery and its moving forward. That is the case of
conscience. First you have indeterminacy, that of sensation, then
determinations of perception, and then you have a relaxation and an
annulment of determinations, in the laws of the intellect. First you have
something subjective, indistinctive, then something objective,
15 Constantin Noica, Povestiri despre om (București: Editura Cartea 
Românească, 1980), p. 187.
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differentiations, and eventually an absolute beyond differentiations.
Subjective-objective-absolute, this is our cadence.”16 That is no more or
less than self-consciousness, reason, and spirit, the perception of the
individual as Universal.
Consciousness contains and brings with it the epistemological
foundation that any analysis which has as referential the human interiority
contained or not in a social or historical community should start. But this
epistemological foundation leads us to the triad of philosophical-
hereditary-neurological unconscious proposed by Marcel Gauchet, namely
to return to the history of the person, which brings not only the appeal to
individual or collective consciousness, but especially reveals all those
experiences and feelings that lead us to the fragmented approaches of the
theory of the unconscious and of memory, will, and freedom. We can say in
this context of analysis, that we are interested in the human interiority and
in the way it was analyzed so far from this perspective of consciousness, of
the triad memory-will- freedom, because here we can reach a deeper
understanding of the triad memory-childhood-sexuality – the one that
Gauchet proposes to argue the importance and the role of the cerebral
unconscious in scientific approaches. This direction toward which Gauchet
leads us is significant, because on the basis of these theories of the
unconscious and consciousness, ethical, psychological, and legal theories
and interpretations were constructed, all of them aiming largely at human
empowerment and also at their inclusion in a socio-historical context.
In psychological terms the triad memory-liberty-will loses part of the
strength and value we find in the philosophical approaches and
interpretations, which value man and give responsibility to the social and
historical framework. If we are to consider only the question of freedom,
whose psychological reference could be identified in concepts such as
independence, self-esteem, or mental health, we find that we can actually, if
desired, refer to the concept of freedom as we find it in Arthur
Schopenhauer, namely: physical freedom, intellectual freedom, and moral
freedom.
We believe that at this stage of analysis the removal of the
epistemological foundation that philosophy as a science and ethics as
logical system of classification and development of humanity gave it,
through what we call the transition from the individual to the act, is under
the sign of uncertainty in terms of knowledge, understanding, and
interpretation. Human interiority brings with it a whole hereditary, social,
and psychological history that would constitute what Freud called the
unconscious. This simplistic reduction of the area of conscious acts to what
unconscious acts would imply and that would strictly represent the person’s
history, clearly shows a separation from the scientific philosophical
framework that would have given a full and comprehensive knowledge of
the immediacy and sensitivity in terms of sensation, perception, cognition,
16 Ibid., p. 31.
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and affectivity that is found in the triad of memory-childhood-sexuality.
Therefore, we adhere in this regard to the reference to the moral
foundations of psychology, proposed by Otto Weininger, who takes into
consideration precisely this aspect of the importance of memory on moral
and immoral acts, that consciously or unconsciously manifests through
states of consciousness. He believes that “although memory is not a logical
and ethical act, it is, however, a logical and ethical phenomena. Memory is
also moral, because it allows repentance by itself. Forgetting everything is
in itself immoral. Therefore piety is also a moral precept.”17 Simplifying the
role and the importance of memory in terms of selectivity justifies the
theory of unconscious but not the one of conscience.
“But what a man never forgets and what he cannot store best enables
the characterization of his identity, of his character,”18 Weininger believes,
which is not far from Noica’s perspective, who considers that “the man who
cannot forget cannot be lucid ever again.” The drama of the contemporary
man seems to be no other than this: he cannot forget.”19 In this view of the
memory, consciousness regains its primary position, the original one, that
of being moral. This ethical dimension of consciousness brings man into the
light of his given nature and subtly makes him responsible, without social
and historical but rather inherited constraints. And from here we would say
that we could also look toward the universal, which first would be the
responsibility of the other, in the sense of society, system, or person, to
recover the right to memory, freedom, and individual will, which would
include the right to self-defense.
For memory, understood in a broad sense, aims not only the strict
informational aspects, but an entire personal and social history, which lies
in the genetic and emotional code and to which we differently have access,
because of these differences of self-consciousness. It is necessary therefore
to see what would happen to man without memory, be it strictly
informational. The human genetic code is, if you want, his inherited
memory, without which he could not relate to others because through it, the
genetic code, the hereditary dowry, one can observe the difference and the
similarity; and the difference could be in the context of ethical review, what
Noica called moral genius, which is more than the consciousness of
fulfilled duty.
Repositioning and analysing the theories concerning the unconscious
in terms of innovations in science (genetics), of re-ordering the health
insurance systems, and of revising the legal codes brings with it a re-
contextualization of certain moral models, ethical principles that will lead to
17 Otto Weininger, Sex și caracter (București: Editura Anastasia, 2002), 
p. 251.
18 Ibid., p. 212.
19 Constantin Noica, Mathesis sau bucuriile simple (Bucureşti: Editura
Humanitas, 1992), p. 37.
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approaching the human being from particular to general , because from the
particular cases generality eventually forms, as in The Universal.
Through memory man regains his right to self defense, looking back
into the past with a degree of freedom and will he possesses in a society in
which constraints are justified or not. “When the moralist overlooks the
relationship of an act to a certain state of mind as its cause, and its
connection through that common cause with large classes and groups of
actions apparently very little resembling itself, his estimation even of the
consequences of the very act itself, is rendered imperfect.”20
In other words, the interpretations that take into consideration the
presence of a wellness state, having as landmark the number and less the
context (or the means of obtaining it), lose sight of the ethical analysis
component. Self-knowledge enhances knowledge of others, which may lead
to accountability and morality.
If we accept this view, then this implies that we should also subscribe
to Richard Rorty’s view that “far from what we have in common with other
members of our species, self-knowledge is precisely what distinguishes us
from them: our random idiosyncrasies, “irrational” components of our egos,
the ones that divide us into incompatible sets of beliefs and desires.”21 Self-
knowledge can lead to personal autonomy in the social context. Self-
knowledge does not exclude socialization, but rather it triggers and may
lead to moral behavior causing suffering, consciousness, and difference.
What could be more daring, more recent than the courage to announce
to physicists that the inert will be explained by the vivid; to biologists that
life can only be understood by thinking; to philosophers that generalities
are not philosophical; to teachers that they need to learn about the whole
before talking about elements; to students that they should start with
perfection; and to humans – more torn than ever by hatred and selfishness –
that their “natural impulse is their generosity.” 22
Romanian Academy
Iaşi, Romania
gasparelc@yahoo.com
20 John Stuart Mill, “Remarks on Bentham's Philosophy,” in The Collected
Works, ed. J.M. Robson, Volume 10 (London and New York: Routledge,
1974), p. 8.
21 Richard Rorty, Pragmatism şi filosfie post-nietzscheană (Bucureşti:
Editura Univers, 2000), p. 233.
22 Henri Bergson, Introducere în metafizică (Iași: Editura Institutului 
European, 1993), p. 220.

CHAPTER VI
ASPIRATIONS AND ANTICIPATIONS OF
UNIVERSALISM:
THE GLOBAL VILLAGE IN ANCIENT ROME1
IULIAN-GABRIEL HRUŞCĂ
Abstract: Globalization is not only a modern phenomenon. The modern
notion of global village is tributary to the Roman tradition. The main
differences between antiquity and modernism are the technological
progress, the far more sophisticated means of communication today, and the
larger scale at which the contemporary process of globalization takes place.
Ancient Greece anticipated some characteristics of any process of
globalization, but from the point of view of globalization, the Latin Miracle
is far and away more significant than the Greek Miracle. The Roman
Empire was the first significant global village and the ideal of universalism
derives from the concept of humanitas Romana.
Keywords: globalization, Roman globalization, ancient social
processes.
In our study we want to emphasize that globalization is not only a
modern phenomenon, because similar elements of the actual process of
globalization could be found also in the past, in the case of ancient Rome,
for example. At the same time, we wish to create the opportunity to reflect
on some aspects of Roman globalization, which was a model, in some
respects, for the way in which the modern world acts today in global
circumstances. Our study is intended to be also a mirror of some ancient
manifestations of the globalization process that were, sometimes, managed
in a more sophisticated manner by the Romans and could offer us new
subtleties of behavior.
The concept of globalization/global village2 existed also in antiquity,
having been formulated by Greek philosophers in theory and by Greek
politicians in practice. However, the Romans succeeded in finding a
1 Acknowledgement: This paper was written within The Knowledge
Based Society Project supported by the Sectorial Operational Program Human
Resources Development (SOP HRD), financed by the European Social Fund
and by the Romanian Government under the contract number
POSDRU/89/1.5/S/56815.
2 I am especially indebted to Richard A. Bauman, The Global Village in
Ancient Rome and in Modern Times, in Menschenrechte und europäische
Identität. Die antiken Grundlagen, by Klaus M. Girardet and Ulrich Nortmann,
(Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2005), pp. 38-48.
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practical solution for the ideas of universality only theoretically propagated
in the spheres of the Hellenistic civilization. Universal Rome was both a
concept and a practical reality.3
The modern notion of global village is tributary to the Roman
tradition. The main differences between antiquity and modernism are
technological progress, the far more sophisticated means of communication
nowadays, and the bigger scale at which the contemporary process of
globalization takes place. However, today the global village is considered a
unique manifestation of modernity. Especially from the twentieth century
till the present, the modern human being has considered himself the
inventor of globalization as of many other things, ignoring that the first true
process of globalization took place at a smaller scale in the entire
Mediterranean world and even on further lands, and had an impact on all
the people from this large geographical space.
Global village is a term that is associated with Marshall McLuhan,
who made famous the term especially in the books The Gutenberg Galaxy:
The Making of Typographic Man (1962) and Understanding Media (1964).
McLuhan described how the globe has been reduced to the manifestations
of a village by electric technology and the very fast flow of information.
Through the term global village, McLuhan understood a world “in which
the electronic media have radically reduced the distance and isolation of
people from each other, restoring to humans some of their original sense of
being part of a village or tribe”4. Today, the term global village is
commonly used to describe the effects of telecommunications at the society
level; it is an expression that identifies itself with the Internet and World
Wide Web, and this term also brings us to the idea of a vast and unified
global community.
McLuhan’s term – used mainly by Bauman5 – seems to have been
ignored by other specialists who rather preferred the word globalization6 or
even the word globalution.7 However, the specialists and writers8 who used
3 Ibid., p. 38.
4See Marshall McLuhan & Bruce R. Powers, The Global Village:
Transformations in World Life and Media in the Twenty-first Century (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1989).
5 Richard A. Bauman, op. cit., supra note 2, pp. 38-48.
6See for example Tony Ballantyne, Globalization in World History
(London: Pimlico, 2002) and Paul Dobrescu, Viclenia globalizării. Asaltul
asupra puterii americane [Cunning of Globalization. The Assault on American
Power] (Iași: The European Institute, 2010).
7 See Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (London: Harper
Collins, 1999).
8 This syntagm refers to personalities such as Marshall McLuhan, Thomas
Friedman, Paul Dobrescu, Paul M. Kennedy, Francis Fukuyama, Samuel P.
Huntington.
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the term in one form or another, theorizing about it, forget that the modern
notion of global village is tributary to classical antiquity.
If in modern times the notion of global village/globalization was put
into a theoretical shape by theorists and thinkers9, Bauman noticed that the
same notion – which in extension presumes universalism and the concept of
humanitas10 – took, in some respects, a practical form in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted by the United Nations in
1948.11
In the introduction, it is written that “the inherent dignity and … equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family [are] the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” This is not much
more than a reassertion of the doctrine of universalism that was brought to
Rome by Greeks as Crates, Polybius, Panaetius or his disciple, Hecato of
Rhodes, who, in their turns, were propagating the sociological and
cosmopolitan conception of Cleanthes, Chrysippus, or Zenon of Tarsus.
After this Hellenistic contribution to the development of Roman mentality,
Rome itself perpetuated these ideas and found a practical application for
them, giving birth to the concept of humanitas Romana, becoming a civitas
of the entire world and rethinking Greece. From that point, humanitas was,
for over two thousand years, the foundation of culture and knowledge.
The Declaration that is so similar with the postulations of ancient
universalism is grouped by Bauman in the following categories of rights:
1. The right to life, liberty, security of person, equality before the law,
fair trial, asylum, and freedom from torture and inhuman punishment;
2. The right to privacy, reputation, opinions, religion, mobility,
nationality;
3. The right to marry, own property, take part in government, choose
one’s occupation, receive an education.12
Some of these rights have Roman correspondents. The first group of
rights, which declares the struggle against acts of brutality on human beings
is the central problem of human rights and concerns both the modern scene
and the ancient scene. Despite the negative opinions circulating about the
Romans and their acts of violence, ancient Rome was not, as often as many
believe, a generator of brutal acts on others. In fact, the Roman state
emerged from a conflict zone where no one was angel and in a period of
time when the struggle of a community for survival was severe. Roman
imperialism – and in Eugen Cizek’s opinion, this term is not appropriate to
9 Ibid.
10 See I. Heinemann, Humanitas, RE Supp. 5 (1931), pp. 282-310.
11 Richard A. Bauman, op. cit., supra footnote 2, p. 39.
12 See Richard A. Bauman, Human Rights in Ancient Rome (London:
Routledge, 2000), pp. 2-3.
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define the massive and rapid Roman expansion13 – was, at least in the
beginning, based on defensive principles.14 And, when Rome was powerful
and vast enough, the Romans provided the Mediterranean populations with
a political unity which – as the Stoic philosophers predicted – generated
Roman universalism and a model of international order called Pax Romana.
Having the possibility to use force on others, Rome only occasionally
abused its power. We consider that there are empires that spread culture,
welfare, and a sort of universal unity among governed, and others that
remained in history only as conquerors and profiteers. Rome was an empire
that can be included in the first category as a state that benefited from their
subjects, but also dealt with the welfare of the conquered populations and
was a civilizing factor in a Europe too often brutal and savage. At the same
time, Rome managed to create a space where peace ruled for a very long
period during the Pax Romana, according to Polybius’ ideal of a state
where conflicts remain a manifestation of the past.15 How many other
empires can boast such a performance?
For a better understanding of the anticipation of globalization/global
village in ancient Rome, we should also refer to some aspects prior to the
Roman process of globalization. Ancient Greece anticipated some
characteristics of the process of globalization. Greek thinkers elaborated on
the principles of philanthropia,16 a term that had the meaning of “goodwill
toward all men,” and promoted the idea of a moral obligation owed by
every human being to every other human person. The concept of universal
unity of the human race, of universalism/cosmopolitanism, which is seen as
a derivative of philanthropia, was easy to draw out from such ideas.
However, such concepts remained in ancient Greece at a declarative level,
because the Greeks were also very elitist and independent persons, dividing
humanity into Hellenes and Barbarians. The dissociation between the ones
who are Greek and the ones who are not was even more emphasized when
it was about the practical application of the principles of philanthropia.
Those who were not Greek were always considered inferior and the Greeks
never really assimilated another culture or another population in a manner
similar to the Romans. In fact, the Greeks never achieved in practice a
universal unity of all human beings. The continuous wars between the
different poleis led to the defeat of Greece by Macedonia, then by Rome
and, in the end, by the Ottoman Empire. This gradual transition from one
conqueror to another is somehow reflected in the degradation of the heroic
13 Eugen Cizek, Istoria Romei [The History of Rome] (București: Paideia, 
2002), p. 106.
14 Specialists as Theodor Mommsen, E. Badian, Paul Veyne, or M.
Holleaux sustained such a point of view. Others, such as Montesquieu, Bossuet,
and W. V. Harris, declared that Roman imperialism was voluntary.
15 Gerardo Zampaglione, The Idea of Peace in Antiquity (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), p. 142.
16 Richard A. Bauman, op. cit., supra footnote 12, pp. 10-19.
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Greek to the stage of Graecus vir, then of Graeculus and, in the end, of a
sort of Balkan Graeculus. The Greeks used the term of bárbaros (in Latin
barbarus) in a way that indicated a contemptuous attitude. In the beginning,
the Greeks extended the term of bárbaros even to Romans, which caused
the anger of Cato the Elder (Marcus Porcius Cato Maior – 234 BC-149 BC)
when they said “nos dictitant barbaros [esse]”17. After the spiritual unity
between the Greeks and the Romans became more obvious, the Greeks
finally transformed the statement “pas me héllen bárbaros estí”/ “the one
who is not Greek is a Barbarian” into the statement “pas me héllen kaì
romaíos bárbaros estí”/ “the one who is not Greek or Roman is a
Barbarian.” Unlike the Greeks, the Romans tried to integrate others, the
Barbarians, into their community. The difference between the Greeks’
attitude of rejection and the Romans’ integration approach was clearly
emphasized by Emperor Claudius and by Tacitus (An., 11, 24, 2-5). Under
the Empire, the Romans showed curiosity and interest impregnated by the
taste of exotic for the other, for the Barbarian. 18
In Ancient Greece, however, the first move toward a sort of
cosmopolitanism was the Athenian empire of the fifth century BC. The
second move toward partial universalism was made in Central Greece by
the Achaean Confederacy. Finally, the empire of Alexander the Great
introduced some idea of universalism when it was about the Persians, but
this gentle treatment was based rather on the laws of conquest than on ius
gentium,19 as it will be known to the Romans. However, these forms of
empires were no more than a prelude to Rome’s achievements concerning
universalism. 20
From the point of view of globalization, the Latin Miracle is far more
significant than the Greek Miracle: “Rome anticipated the modern idea of
creating a world environment in which solutions become possible. The
Roman Empire was the first significant global village. It was the unique
place to give effect to the ideal of universalism.”21 The idea of Rome’s
universalism, planted in Italian soil by Greek thinkers and augmented by
the concept of humanitas Romana, crossed over time from the period of the
Scipionic Circle to the end of empire and even more. During Trajan, for
example, Rome was a communis patria of a great part of Europe and Asia
and included the entire Mediterranean world.
The multicultural aspect of the Roman state is described very
eloquently by Publius Aelius Aristides, a Greek-speaking Roman. In the
year 155, he praises the Emperor Antoninus in a panegyric. The conditions
17 Pliny the Elder (Natural History XXIX,14) has this passage from Cato:
“Nos quoque dictitant barbaros.”
18 See Eugen Cizek, [The History of Rome] (București: Paideia, 2002), p. 
13.
19 Rights common to all men.
20 Richard Bauman, op. cit., supra footnote 2, p. 41.
21 Richard Bauman, op. cit., supra footnote 12, p. 6.
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were totally opposed to the ones in which Ovid expressed his laudatio to
Augustus in Tomis, almost at the end of the world; now Aelius Aristides
glorifies Pax Romana and the emperor in the most wonderful city of the
time: Rome. However, Aelius Aristides praises not only the Emperor
Antoninus, but also the entire Roman elite and administration that govern
the vast space of the Roman Empire in the spirit of universalism. He
emphasizes that the Roman citizenship is not only referring to the people
living in a city but to a general race, one that balanced all the rest through
culture and behavior. This state is universal, because the ones who are not
Romans are treated not as foreigners, but as their own people by the
magistrates. Even the wars are now a manifestation of the past (Panegyric
to Rome, 59-60, 63-71, 102).22
Rome managed to put in practice the theoretical ideas promoted by the
Greeks and even more. The Romans shaped a concept in their particular
manner and applied the principles of humanitas in the space they created
and governed, influencing the way in which universalism functioned.
Humanitas Romana was not the copied Roman equivalent of the Greek
philanthropia or paideia, but a notion conceived in a Roman manner. The
Romans have dissociated in the semantic area of humanitas a psycho-moral
hemisphere, based on kindness, goodness, and mercy, but also a cultural
and philosophical hemisphere, based on training, education, and culture.
The concept was theorized by the treaties of Cicero and Seneca, was
reflected in literature by the works of Terentius, Virgil, or Ovid, and had a
practical side conferred by law and processes. Later, the concept also
influenced the development of humanism in literature. Humanitas Romana
was based on a multitude of values that were part of the conduct code of a
Roman citizen: mores, dignitas, gravitas, integritas, clementia, aequitas,
lenitas, mansuetudo, moderatio, indulgentia, iustitia, pietas, fides. This
made the universalism of Rome to be unique and different from the
cosmopolitanism of the Greeks that, as said before, never took a serious and
strong shape.
Bauman noticed some characteristics of Universal Rome that put it in
advantage over any other previous versions of universalism. The most
important, in our opinion, are the following three characteristics:
1. The creation of an imperial, multicultural citizenship that worked
together with the local citizenship. Patriotism is encouraged in the sense of
belonging to an exclusive club.
2. The powerful notion of permanence and universality.
3. The creation of a kind of ancient multinational corporations that
stand outside the reach of national governments.23
22 See also Laurent Pernot, Aelius Aristides and Rome, in Aelius Aristides
between Greece, Rome and the Gods, edited by W. V. Harris and Brooke
Holmes (Leiden: Brill, 2009), pp. 173-202.
23 Richard A. Bauman, op. cit., supra footnote 2, pp. 42-43.
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Although the modern notion is different from what natio was in the
eyes of the Romans, it seems that, in some respects, there is an interesting
equation between the term of natio, Roman citizenship, and the actual
perception of nation. The feeling of belonging to an exclusive club could be
associated with the feeling of an immigrant that in a new country wants to
rally to the same symbols as the others and wants to be a member of the
new community. The people from the entire space ruled by Romans had the
chance to rally to the same symbols, myths, welfare, and way of life. In
addition, they had the chance to come in the new club with their religions
and myths, a situation that is very similar with the actual one.
Of course, there are also some negative features of Ancient Rome,
such as genocide and slavery. But despite these negative sides of the
Roman rule, Rome is famous even today for its multicultural side. In a way,
for many moderns, even the process of Romanization is associated first
with the oppression and only secondly with a process of civilization,
omitting the universal, cosmopolitan, and multicultural aspects of the
phenomenon, all of these being connected with humanitas Romana and
deriving from it. We do not want to say that the Romans were a blessing to
a conquered people, but for the next generations, the Roman rule surely had
benefits, as well.
Now it is appropriate to tackle the issue of civitas and anticivitas.24
Civitas is significant for the period of Republican Rome. Civitas indicated
for a Roman that he is part of the city-state, the country, and the common
family of all citizens. Civitas was Rome and its colonies, the new cities of
Rome from Italy and from provinces. Even the military camps, castra,
represented fragments of civitas.
During the Roman Empire civitas ceased to function as a mental
structure, in the opinion of Claude Nicolet. Imperium had a geographical
and territorial connotation in that period. Even in the first century BC, we
can notice a new sort of Latin, new techniques of communication, that are
qualified by Nicolet as aspects of anticivitas. The citizens, in his opinion,
lost the feeling of solidarity with the city-state and they felt like part of a
population located on a vast territory, respectively, anticivitas. Indeed, they
felt like citizens of a very large state, but this aspect is not opposed to
civitas, we can say, but is a continuation. All the inhabitants of the Empire
were still glorifying Rome, caput-imperii. The mental structure indeed
changed, but as a following consequence of an extended civitas, in this case
the proper term being in our opinion transcivitas; that better summarizes
the multicultural aspect of the Roman Empire and the idea of Roman
universalism. Roman civilization did not disappear without leaving
significant traces. The idea of Eternal and Universal Rome survived many
24 See Claude Nicolet, The World of the Citizen in Republican Rome
(Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980) and Eugen
Cizek, Istoria Romei, op. cit., supra footnote 18, 19-21.
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centuries after the collapse of the Western Empire. Indeed, it was no longer
a geographical location, but a perpetual transcivitas.
In general, we are prone to label things. The specialists are no
exception to the rule. Ancient Rome was labeled with the term of
imperialism or with the term of universalism, among many others. We
believe that we approach quite enough ancient realities if we express a
preference for the universalism label. Universal Rome expresses a viable
idea.
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CHAPTER VII
WAS THE MODERN COSMOPOLIS
TRANSFORMED INTO A POST-MODERN
GLOBAL VILLAGE?
CONSTANTIN STOENESCU
Abstract: I argue in this paper that the shift from Modernity to post-
Modernity was accompanied by a deep change of some presuppositions
shared by all the people who belong to this tradition. Following Stephen
Toulmin’s idea about the age of modernity from his book Cosmopolis, The
Hidden Agenda of Modernity, I try to demonstrate that post-Modernity
replaces the so-called Project of Cosmopolis with that of a global village. In
other words, there is a difference between what we want to build and what
we have built in fact. The main reason for this process is the invasion of a
new kind of subjectivity in all areas of social life.
Keywords: modernity, post-modernity, cosmopolis, social life, change.
PROLOGUE: POST-MODERNITY AND POST-MODERNISM,
TWO IN ONE
When we think about the future, we do it within a framework of
expectations. Our beliefs and foresights are shaped by the limits of the
present, because we want to do and we want to decide to do only desirable
things. In this sense our capacity to forecast is limited and any imaginable
future will look like the present. Therefore, I don’t want to make a
prediction here about the course of events in the future, but only to describe
a trend and to explain on this basis what happened and, insofar as the future
looks like the past, to announce a possible future. Anyway, although we
take the past as an ally, the idea about the future must be viewed as a
product of speculative imagination, because, as we already know from
Hume, we don’t have any reliable epistemological reason to think that
things will be as they were in the past.
The question from the title of this study is put forward as a weak
commitment for an answer. As we know, a questions contains within itself
a selected answer; it is a constraint or a framework for uncertain
possibilities. The project of Modernity was equated by Toulmin to the
project of a Cosmopolis: starting with the seventeenth century, “Humanity
seemed to have set aside all doubts and ambiguities about its capacity to
achieve its goals here on Earth, and in historical time, rather than deferring
human fulfillment from an Afterlife in Eternity – that was what had made
the project of Modernity rational – and this optimism led to major advances
90 Constantin Stoenescu
not just in natural science but in moral, political, and social thought…” 1 If
the Cosmopolis was a philosophical or an ideological construct of
Modernity and we accept this idea as an unproblematic statement, then my
main aim here is to describe this state of fact and to offer an approach to the
so-called state of arts in the present, in times of a new cultural age, post-
modernity. And the new question is if the Cosmopolis is still available or if
it was demolished by the architects of post-modernity. I prefer to use the
expression post-modernity as a name for a process with at least two phases,
modernity and post-modernity, and to let slide the expression post-
modernism. The two, post-modernity and post-modernism, overlap and
have in common a hard core, but differ as types of succession: post –
modernity is a new form of modernity, post- modernism is another age, a
case of secession, even a clash with modernity, not just a simple succession.
Post- modernity is a new phase of modernity in the same tradition or an
effect of modernity, post-modernism is the destruction of modernity or of
the so-called weak modernity, if we may use Vattimo’s idea about weak
thought and his nihilistic reading of history.2
What relation is there, then, between the modern Cosmopolis and the
global village? First of all, I think that globalization is the end of modernity,
and only of modernity, not of history, as Fukuyama stated.3 This means that
the old Kantian ideal about a common peaceful world was fulfilled in this
manner, as a global world, even if somebody may not like this or may not
recognize in it a Kantian ideal. Kant wanted to change the world through
the forces of peace, rationality, and law, first of all. This historical project
was the basis of modern society with the national state as a cell of global
order. But the technological evolution and the market economy changed
society, and the national state became something old-fashioned. The new
aim is a global order based on transnational processes and the new brave
world looks like a village, like a global village in which every person can
know almost everything, if she or he wants, about everybody. We, the
citizens of the global village, have new values in common, and try to live
together, face to face, connected to mass-media, ready to take a job with the
benefits of our global community. Is this a real picture or just another
ideological movement?
1 Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis, The Hidden Agenda of Modernity
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. IX.
2 See Gianni Vattimo, The End of Modernity – Nihilism and Hermeneutics
in the Post-Modern Culture, translated by John P. Snyder (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 1991), for this nihilistic understanding of our history.
3 See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Illinois:
Free Press, 1992).
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SECESSION AND SUCCESSION: A TERMINOLOGICAL DEBATE
OR A REAL CHANGE IN THE WORLD?
The debate about the changing world began in architecture after the
First World War, regarding the new style proposed by Ludwig Mies van der
Rohe and then by some of his contemporaries, among them Walter Gropius
and Le Corbusier. Their minimal buildings, made from steel and glass,
guided by the principle that less means more, became a new pattern, the so-
called skin and bones design, for the architectural development of
cities/towns and for urban planning. This anonymous simplicity has as a
result a lack of specificity and a high similarity between public buildings,
especially those for offices. This style was named Modern, because it was
conceived as a style of Modern times, in opposition with the Classical style
of Antiquity and the Gothic style of the Medieval Age.
After 1970, a new generation of architects and designers appeared,
with Robert Venturi as a leader. They tried to give the imagination back to
architecture, especially the historical references and decorative elements.
Their criticism against modernity wasn’t in fact a critique of modernity as a
whole, but just this particular movement in architecture initialized by Mies
and named Modernism. Therefore, post-modernism in its first phase is a
particular movement and has as its aim only to stop and to surpass or
overcome modernism in architecture. It wasn’t its aim to finish with
modernity or to replace modernity with something like post- modernity.
On the other hand, understood as a critique of modernity, post-
modernism undermines the authority of modern tradition and that of
modern institutions. First of all, the idea of universality is under attack
because the new preferred approaches are deconstruction and the analysis
of little fragments. As a cultural movement, post- modernism is opposite to
modernity. In literature, post-modernism lead in the end to the break with
realism and chose to explore and to enter the inner space of conscience or
the virtual space of dreams. Writers like Joyce and Fowels ceased to
describe the facts objectively and used the subtle capacities of language to
express thoughts, actions, and attitudes.
The term post-modernism was used by Jean Francois Lyotard in the
year 1979 in his book La condition post-moderne. Is post-modernism
something new in philosophy, entirely different from modernity? Using the
Wittgesteinian model of language games, Lyotard has tried to describe the
new rules of the postmodern age. In the Stanford Encyclopedia
postmodernism is defined as a set of critical practices employing concepts
such as difference, repetition, the trace, the simulacrum, and hyperreality in
order to destabilize concepts such as presence, identity, historical progress,
epistemic reality, and the univocity of meaning. Did the postmodernists use
a new list of speech acts? Not even if we take into account the style of
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. The critique of philosophical systems built after
a Hegelian pattern is one of the common jobs of postmodern philosophers.
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At the same time, any subjective approach, like that used by Nietzsche in
his theory of values, is considered at least a sign of post-modernity.
Some philosophers think that there is a secession war between
modernity and post – modernity, a violent separation and a clash between
tradition and the new age of post – modernism. Two of them are E. M.
Cioran and Michel Henry. Both of them have described contemporary times
as an age of barbarians. Cioran wrote in terms of a deep gap between us and
modern tradition: “We no longer have a past, or rather, there is nothing left
of the past which is our own, no longer a chosen country, no longer
salvation, and no refuge in yore. Our prospects? Impossible to distinguish
them, we are barbarians without a future.” 4 Henry5 has described the
secession like a fight between good and evil. The ideal aims of modernity,
the universal and objective science, and the quest for truth led to the
elimination of subjectivity and sensibility from culture and society.
Although science isn’t bad in itself, it became a social and cultural monster
because it promoted a way of life without humanism, without the values of
subjectivity, and, therefore, without real life, namely, without art, religion,
and ethic. In fact, science and technology have no ethic because they are
objective.
Therefore, as a reaction against bad objectivity, some people think that
the first move on the way to post-modernism belongs to Kant and is related
to his “Copernican Revolution:” subjectivity was rediscovered, the knowing
subject put in the spotlight, and the object dependent on the subject.
Objectivity becomes, in Kantian terms, objectivity only in a weak sense,
namely, transcendental subjectivity. Remembering Vatimo’s idea about
weak thought, we could summarize that all the modern strong claims for
objectivity and universalism were put into question by post-modernism.
Briefly speaking, the term “modern” is asymmetrical. After Latour, it
is doubly asymmetrical because “it designates a break in the regular passage
of time, and it designates a combat in which there are victors and
vanquished.”6 I think we can also apply this idea to the word “post-
modernism.” This means that we could speak about a translation and
purification in the passage from modernity to post-modernism. But this
isn’t the place for such a discussion about humans, things, and hybrids.
Anyway, according to Latour, modernity is a double process, a translation
on one hand, and a purification on the other. By translation we create new
types of beings; by purification we create two distinct ontological zones:
nature and culture.
4 Emil M. Cioran, The Temptation to Exist ), transl. by Richard Howard
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 89.
5 See Michel Henry, La Barbarie (Paris: Grasset, 1987).
6 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, translated by Catherine
Porter (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1993), p.10.
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THE MODERN COSMOPOLIS
The general framework of understanding is given by the idea that right
from the beginning, the struggle for social and political stability interacts
with the quest for scientific and intellectual certainty and stability in the
modern Cosmopolis.7
But, first of all, the modern Cosmopolis was a social project. The idea
of a change in modern tradition, especially in society, politics, and economy
was taken into account by Stephen Toulmin in his book, Cosmopolis, The
Hidden Agenda of Modernity. His thesis is that at the beginning of
modernity, in Descartes’s times, the issues of certainty, rational consensus,
and necessity weren’t just some challenges for philosophy, but they were
also responses to practical and historical challenges, primarily the need for
a new social and political order after the Thirty Years War. The general
crises (economic and social, intellectual and spiritual) in the early
seventeenth century broke the public confidence in the older consensus and
the Age of Modernity was in fact an effect of several different attempts to
build a new one.
In the year 1965 Peter Drucker published the book Landmarks for
Tomorrow, in which he expressed the belief that we had to differentiate
between the sovereign national state in the age of modernity, understood as
a political and economic unity formed in the seventeenth century, and the
new type of transnational institutions who serve transnational aims. The
loyalty for the national state was replaced with transnational interests. The
national language as a sign of identity sometimes became an obstacle.
This social project has some deep philosophical roots. The Cartesian
program leads philosophy into a dead end. In a Cartesian world, which first
of all has its own intellectual goals, making clear our ideas and gaining
certainty step by step by rational proof, rhetoric was subordinated to formal
logic: “the validity and truth of rational arguments is independent of who
presents them, to whom or in what context – such rhetorical questions can
contribute nothing to the impartial establishment of human knowledge. For
the first time since Aristotle, logical analysis was separated from, and
elevated above, the study of rhetoric, discourse, and argumentation.”8 The
basic Cartesian distinction was the Mind-Body dichotomy, and its result
was the distinction between rational freedom and causal necessity, between
the world of human experience and the world of natural phenomena.
An interesting topic related to these changes in the world is the link
between science and modernity. Was science the most fruitful creation of
7 Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis, The Hidden Agenda of Modernity
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 92.
8 Ibid., p. 75. Similar ideas, as Toulmin himself has mentioned, may be
found in Dewey (1930), and Rorty (1979). Anyway, the question, “Why did
educated people find the quest for certainty so attractive?” becomes in the end a
Cartesian rhetorical statement.
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modernity? What could we say about the reciprocal relations between
science, technological development, and industrial revolution as a whole?
Most of the thinkers of those times thought that the development of science
was the sign of the new age of modernity. Few of them, like William Blake
and Friedrich Schiller, cautioned about the “inhuman” nature of Newtonian
science.
Regarding educational institutions it is important to mention that the
culture of modern Cosmopolis was socially divided in two parts or two
traditions. Therefore, the university training given to higher civil servants or
to the administrative group had as background literature Latin language and
philosophy, while the engineers were trained on the exact sciences.9
The Cartesian dichotomy interacted with the need for absolute claims.
The modern Cosmopolis was thereby built on the basis of some such
claims:
- the new European system of states was built on the absolute claims
to nationhood;
- the new political balance of power was built on the claims to
stability;
- the new system of social relations within each nation was built on the
basis of a new horizontal social class structure;
- the new science was built on the absolute claims to certainty.
And all these steps were the result of a rational conduct to the aim of
objectivity.
A NEW SUBJECTIVITY
The relationship between modernity and rationality seems to be
without any doubt the hard core of any approach. But this new order of
modern Cosmopolis based on rational control over nature and society, rules
and hierarchy, had some unexpected consequences at the levels of social
structure and personal subjectivity.
First of all, it is impossible to rationalize and control everything. For
example, in modern society some groups cannot be controlled and
administrated. The persons belonging to these groups are perceived as
strangers. Bauman understands the stranger as a person who is unfamiliar
and, because of this, he is seen as a threat. At the same time, another source
of uncertainty is globalization, because we are not able to direct events
while our affairs take place in a global market on a global scale.10 Secondly,
our society translated from a society of producers to a society of consumers.
9 See C.P. Snow, The Two Cultures (New York: Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1998).
10 See Zigmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence (New York: Cornell
University Press, Ithaca, 1991).
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This shift from modernity to post-modernity ensures more freedom for the
individuals, but as consumers, not as citizens. They have the freedom to
consume and to enjoy their lives. Thirdly, as I have mentioned above, the
social quest for certainty transformed scientific knowledge into a pattern for
all the other intellectual activities. The universal and objective truth became
the main goal of science and this process lead to a new type of subjectivity,
which we will call subjectivity without sensibility. According to Henry, in
our barbarian times, science tends to exclude or to minimize art, religion,
and ethics.
Therefore, the modern Cosmopolis was built on the values of
tolerance, reciprocity, and trust in a world of certainty and stability. But
how do we react against the different threats, for example, when we meet a
stranger or when we are the strangers? Individuals try to invent or to
discover new ways of life and new organizational frameworks in order to
reduce uncertainty and insecurity. In fact, we passed, in Bauman’s terms,
from a solid modernity to a liquid modernity.11 Social forms of life and
institutions don’t have enough time to solidify and individuals need to
switch from one choice to another. The result of this social metamorphosis
is described by Bauman: “Insecurity affects us all, immersed as we all are
in a fluid and unpredictable world of deregulation, flexibility,
competitiveness, and endemic uncertainty, but each one of us suffers
anxiety on our own, as a private problem, an outcome of personal failings
and a challenge to our savoir faire and agility. We are called, as Ulrich
Beck has acidly observed, to seek biographical solutions to more systematic
contradictions: we look for individual salvation from shared troubles.”12
On the other hand, as Antonio Gramsci has observed in a brilliant
remark, “the crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the
new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid
symptoms appear.”13 There are many levels of this crisis, but the most
important is that of Western culture as a totality. This interregnum, when
modernity collapsed and post-modernity was the newcomer still unborn,
was perceived and described by philosophers as a cultural crisis.
For example, Edmund Husserl, in his Vienna Lecture which was held
in May 1935, known under the title, “The Crisis of European Humanity and
Philosophy,” wrote about the cultural roots of the European crisis in terms
of the need for a humanistic reform after the fail of modern rationalistic
culture: “The European nations are sick: Europe itself, it is said, is in crisis.
We are by no means lacking something like nature doctors. Indeed, we are
11 See Zigmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2000).
12 Zigmunt Baumann, Seeking Safety in an Insecure World (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 2001), p. 144.
13 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, edited and
translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York:
International Publishers, 1971), p. 276.
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practically inundated by a flood of naïve and excessive suggestions for
reform. But why do the so richly developed humanistic disciplines fail to
perform the service here that is so admirably performed by the natural
sciences in their sphere?”14 For Husserl, the new cultural movement must
be a reiteration of the European spiritual shape under the supervision of
Humanities, because, without any doubt, “our surrounding world is a
spiritual structure in us and in our historical life.”15 We could also mention
the approach proposed by Oswald Spengler in his controversial book The
Decline of the West.16 Although I do not entirely share the content of
Spengler’s thesis, I think that post-modern subjectivity is due to a spiritual
crisis and that its roots are in the quest for objectivity and certainty. Among
other things, the cynical nature of modern civilization gave rise to a new
attitude toward the uses of technologies.
MASS MEDIA AND THE NEW NEIGHBORHOOD
Lyotard noted in his book about the postmodern condition that the
computer and new technologies have transformed knowledge into
information. This means that knowledge has been reduced to its
propositional dimension, and more specifically, to semantic information.
Knowledge is seen as a final product split from the process by which the
knowing subject obtained it. We can manage information as a useful thing
with a market value, but all these technologies and commercial operations
have no connection with the knower’s feelings. As a result, we can build
different language games, using multiplicity of meanings and the diversity
of subjective understanding.
But another effect of new technologies is the so-called suspension of
space. Using the computer and the virtual web we can be in connection with
any person in real time. We can see his or her pictures, we can change
impressions about an event, be in a state of neighborhood, without borders
or other obstacles. We can learn almost anything about anyone from
anywhere in the world. Bauman has tried to show how computers have
produced the decline of traditional public space.17
Instead of a Cosmopolis and an order of national states, we have a
network of people who are connected in a global village. It is easy to travel
far and wide so that the planet becomes a common space for all its citizens.
We live in a world in which time is accelerated and space is compressed.
14 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental
Philosophy, translation and introduction by David Carr, (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 269.
15 Ibid., p. 170.
16 See Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West. Form and Actuality,
trad. Charles Francis Atkinson (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1926).
17 See Zigmunt Bauman, 1998, Globalization. The Human Consequences
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
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But even under conditions providing for an apparently unlimited access to
the Internet, the global village suffers from what is called the “digital
divide”: different groups within a community or society don’t have equal
access to new technologies. Moreover, we could also speak about a global
digital divide on an international scale between developing and developed
countries. If we take into account the content which is transmitted, then we
can identify a second level digital divide between the producers and the
consumers of content. So, the global village, far from being an open space,
leads to further internal fragmentation.
According to Henry, in mass media we find the highest expression of
barbarism, because the subjectivity and the sensibility are minimized,
deleted, and replaced by technical procedures in the name of
communicational efficiency. For example, television reduces life to an
event. A suicide becomes an event for prime time news and journalists
don’t pay any attention or respect to human despair or to human dignity.
Television reduces all events to incoherent and insignificant facts.
Henry claims that mass media is the best example of mediocrity in
social life. Mass media becomes in time the root of evil. Although initially
mass media seemed to be an element of a rational and free society, it was
used as a means for social control. Mass media has become, – let’s use
Marcuse’s terms, without his ideological commitment, – a source of one-
dimensional man. The question raised by Marcuse becomes an exercise in
rhetoric: “Can we really distinguish between the mass media as instruments
of information and entertainment, and as agents of manipulation and
indoctrination?” 18
A NEW AGENDA
Is there an antidote to all this? I will try to portray a modest and
minimal way to improve, to overcome the bottlenecks. In the paragraph
“From Leviathan to Lilliput,”19 Toulmin asserts that we need a new
intellectual agenda that forces us to shift the focus from stability and system
to adaptability and function. For instance, the sovereign nation state has led
to inequality at the international level. We need to take into account the
sub- and transnational levels and to consider seriously multinational
institutions and procedures.
Things have already happened in this way in science. We passed from
a disciplinary approach to subdisciplinary, transdisciplinary, and
multidisciplinary perspectives. We have given up looking for a universal
18Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man. Studies in Ideology of
Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p.8.
19Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis, The Hidden Agenda of Modernity
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 192-3.
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method and we make science in a new mode, opened to context and
centered on the needs of society.20
Undoubtedly, we are dealing with a change in all areas of society. But
what do we have to do if we want to do the best? Toulmin notes some
trends, philosophically supported, that could be seen as a revival of culture.
Let’s enumerate them:
- Return to timeliness. Philosophy worked traditionally with universal
timeless questions but it’s time to look at this strategy with skepticism.
Even if our goal is to describe the order in Nature, it is a mistake to describe
everything in terms of stability and hierarchy, using the pattern of
cosmology. Biology, for example, suggests a discourse in terms of
adaptation. Anyway, we don’t deal only with abstract ideas, but also with
flesh and blood human beings. As is done in clinical medicine, we must
follow the “course” of a disease and to change the procedure.21
- Return to the oral tradition. In last decades, text was recontextualized
after a long period of decontextualization. Modernity keeps the text as such,
in its letter, and the moderns focused on the rationality and meaning of
different parts of language, preferably, on the printed text. But the return to
oral language means the revival of discourse, rhetoric, and communication.
The philosophical movement from propositions to utterances, speech, and
forms of life was made gradually by Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin, Gadamer,
and Habermas. The logical validity remains important, but it doesn’t
capture anything from the linguistic interactions between subjects in the
context of discourse. Moreover, the reasoning itself depends of its context.
- The return to the particular. Modern Science has imposed the idea
that knowledge is equal to the discovery and the understanding of universal.
A scientific experiment must be intersubjectively testable in order to be
available. But the temptation to generalize was challenged, first of all, by
moral philosophers. They discussed so-called case ethics and rediscovered
the casuistical traditions. Life isn’t something abstract, real processes aren’t
just effects of essences, and actions aren’t entirely the results of purely
rational decisions. Applied ethics is as important as moral philosophy.
-The return to the local. Modern philosophers thought that human
nature was universal and that we didn’t need to use our time for
ethnographical or anthropological studies. The factual realities and the
cultural differences don’t matter in the search for the truth about the human
person and peoples. But this view was overturned. Researchers are now
taking the facts into account in their local context in trying to reconstruct
the historical forms of life in their uniqueness.
20 For a larger debate on this topic see Gibbons et al. (1994).
21 For this analogy see Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis, The Hidden Agenda
of Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 189.
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In my view, one way to unify and to save all these returns or
reversions is to rediscover nature and to overcome the modern dichotomy
between nature and culture. The global village would be truly designed
starting from the natural dimensions of our life on our planet. In this
respect, the environmental movement belongs to post-modernity. As
environmental patterns of thought, I could mention Barry Commoner’s
book The Closing Circle or the Silent Spring manifesto published by Rachel
Carson, and the idea of a “deep ecology” launched by Arne Naess. If we
judge positively and optimistically, then we could claim that the modern
Cosmopolis could be really replaced in an ecologistic way by a global
village. As the environmentalists say, we are all in the same boat.
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CHAPTER VIII
HERMENEUTIC DIALOGUE AS
SOCIAL VALUE: AN INQUIRY INTO
“UNDISCOVERABLE OBJECTS OF THOUGHT”1
ADRIAN COSTACHE
Abstract: In our globalized world as the locus of encounter between a
multiplicity of cultures, religions, traditions, customs, and views of the
world, hermeneutic dialogue is taken by a growing number of philosophers
to be the social value par excellence. The reason for this, as Hans-Georg
Gadamer argues, is that the dialogue that leads toward understanding
another is ontologically constitutive to the human being and represents the
foundation of our social and historical life. But is this really so? This study
endeavors to offer an answer to this question through an analysis of the
exchange between Gadamer and Jacques Derrida by showing first that
Derrida’s interpellation and “critique” of philosophical hermeneutics is
neither nonsensical, nor misguided or misdirected as it has been intimated
in the literature, but, rather, goes straight to the heart of the matter. Also,
when properly understood, the phenomenon of language makes dialogue as
philosophical hermeneutics conceives it and the social value attached to that
dialogue both undesirable and impossible.
Keywords: Dialogue, language, social values, hermeneutics,
deconstruction.
It is enough to take a quick glance at the dominant public discourses of
any social sphere to be convinced of the value associated with dialogue, of
the valuable character of dialogue in our society.
Take, for example, the discourse on interdisciplinarity dominant in our
academic institutions. What it comes down to and what it requires of every
researcher is, in the end, an openness to dialogue with his or her peers from
the other fields and a striving toward the constitution of a common
language. In this sense Jacques Derrida remarks:
…I believe that no research is possible in a community (for
example, academic) without the prior search for the minimal
1 This paper was written within The Knowledge Based Society Project
supported by the Sectorial Operational Programme Human Resources
Development (SOP HRD), financed from the European Social Fund and by the
Romanian Government under the contract number POSDRU ID 56815.
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consensus and without discussion around this minimal
consensus.2
In 1964 one of the most prominent religious institutions in the world,
through the voice of Pope Paul VI, proclaimed:
Dialogue is demanded nowadays…is demanded by the dynamic
course of action which is changing the face of modern society. It
is demanded by the pluralism of society and by the maturity man
has reached in this day and age.3
After the pronouncement of this encyclical, theologian Leonard
Swidler set out to establish the basic rules that ought to guide any intra-,
interreligious and interideological dialogue whatsoever. Swidler’s canon
has the respectable quality of being both common sensical (i.e., easily
acceptable) and exhaustive.4 Along with the “ten commandments” of
dialogue (ten, of course) Swidler also offers us a vast array of conversation
starters between the different Christian confessions and with the other great
religions and the most prominent ideologies of our times (e.g. Marxism).
In our institutions of education and in the sciences of education – the
cradles of our societies and, respectively, their guiding light – dialogue is
praised as the prominent means for the transmission of knowledge and the
development of a harmonious personality well suited for active engagement
in social life.
And, in international relations and cultural studies, the idea of
dialogue, of cross-cultural conversation, is taken as the only means for
facing and diverting the perils confronting humanity as a whole in our
times.5 If we do not engage in dialogue with our neighbors, if we do not
heed to their voicing of their discontent and listen to their claims, our local
conflicts could easily escalate into a war whose consequences are hardly
imaginable in the atomic age. The only philosopher that begs to differ – at
least, that we know of – is Richard Rorty, who does not question the
valuable character of dialogue per se but, rather, its necessity. For him,
cross-cultural conversation between West and East and how to make it
happen should not be a concern for us in the West, because the West has
2Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc, trans. Alan Bass and Samuel Weber
(Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1988), pp. 2-3., 146.
3Pope Paul the 6th, "Ecclesiam Suam. No. 9, August 6,"
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-
vi_enc_06081964_ecclesiam_en.html.
4See Leonard Swidler, After the Absolute. The Dialogical Future of
Religious Reflection (Minneapolis: Fortress Press: 1990), pp. 42-46.
5See Anindita Balslev (ed.), Toward a Greater Human Solidarity. Options
for a Plural World (Kolkata: Dasgupta & Co. Ltd., 2005).
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reached a cultural and civilizational peak that the East ought to try to
achieve by following in the footsteps of the West and learning from it.6
All these discussions in few, albeit important, dimensions of our
society attest in a convincing manner that dialogue is regarded as one of its
highest values. But is it really a social value? A value in and for a society is
one thing, a social value, another. An example in extremis shows us that
there is a fine but nonetheless clear distinction here. Respect for the Arian
race was definitely a value in German society in the 30s, but it was
definitely not a social value, for it led to the extermination of a large part of
it. It is our conviction that if one takes a closer look at what could be called
the “dynamic genesis” of dialogue, understood simply as an exchange of
ideas or views about a matter at hand between an “I” and a “Thou,” it
becomes apparent that dialogue is not only a value in and for our society,
but the social value par excellence.
From the point of view of what we call “dynamic genesis,” from the
point of view of the factical circumstances in which the dialogue with an
other is established, it is manifest that it presupposes as a precondition the
existence of a third person. Dialogue, just like society, involves a third
along with myself and the other, for only with the appearance of the third
and through the third is the other seen as an other “I,” thus as a “Thou.”
Otherwise, the other is perceived as a non-”I” whose claim to truth need not
be heard and who can be treated as an object, as a means, but never as an
end in itself. The third brings about and embodies the law that institutes and
governs all possible and acceptable relations between human beings.
This is readily apparent. In a lonely world the first encounter with an
Other is experienced either as the arrival of a long awaited guest or as the
violation of an intruder. The Other I love or hate; I befriend or attack as foe;
I cherish or exploit for my own advantage. And I do all these “silently,”
without ever wanting or trying to understand him or her.
Only with the third person, the neutral, indifferent Other, who comes
after the long awaited one has arrived or after the familiarity of my world
has been violated, does the necessity to understand the Other, to engage him
or her in dialogue, to listen to his or her claim to truth and to expose mine
appear. Otherwise it is unnecessary.
This is the greatest lesson we have been taught by Daniel Defoe’s
Robinson Crusoe. But it is also one of the great lessons of psychoanalysis.
Re-read Defoe and you will see that so long as Robinson is alone with
Friday on the island, there is no dialogue taking place. Friday is told what to
do and how to behave; he is told how to think and what are the standards
with which to judge his deeds. He is told over and over again that he is a
savage and is engaged in a process of transformation, a becoming, that will
annul everything that he has been, that is, to annul himself. The moth
6 See Anindita Balslev, Cultural Otherness. Correspondence with Richard
Rorty (New York & London: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.19.
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becomes a butterfly nimble and gentle, thus well suited for the company of
gentleman, but only at the price of its annihilation.
Friday is never given by the more powerful (because armed) Robinson
the chance to state his claim to truth, to say what he thinks and feels, to
express his views about Robinson’s customs. He is taken as an entity ready-
to-hand that is to be instructed (“educated”) so as to fulfill Robinson’s
desire for company.
Dialogue first occurs on the island only with the arrival of the
Spaniard – Robinson’s equal, more or less, for which reason he is more or
less indifferent to him – and with the planning for leaving that God-
forsaken place disguised as a tropical paradise.
But we can go even further with our dynamic genesis of dialogue
taking a step back from the situation of an I in a lonely world to the very
moment the ego enters the world for the first time. This is the great lesson
of psychoanalysis.
As Melanie Klein showed, the child’s becoming a social being by
yielding to the injunctions of the superego (the instance of social order per
se) and the development of his or her ability to speak (to employ sounds
made by his or her body as words) mark the same stage of his or her
development – the passing from the paranoid-schizoid to the depressive
position and the formation of the oedipal complex. And this takes place
only through the separation of the father’s body from the mother’s – that is,
through splitting the Other in half and thus by the appearance in the child’s
world of a second Other, a third.
In view of all these, we take it we have established with a certain level
of conviction that dialogue is the social value par excellence. When seen at
the same time and through the same conditions, dialogue and society might
very well be co-originary. Coming into being at the same time, one might
be the form or give the law of the other: there’s no society but through
dialogue, or there can be no dialogue outside certain sociality.
Thus, along with Derrida we could say that nothing is truly good for a
society, for any community whatsoever, but the good will to understand the
other, to understand one another at play as a fundamental precondition
every time someone begins a dialogue. This good will, taken as a
“commitment to the desire for consensus in understanding” is “not just one
of the axioms of ethics. It is the point where ethics begins for any
community of speakers, even regulating the phenomena of disagreement
and misunderstanding.”7
But does this axiom refer to something real? Is dialogue as exchange
of views about a matter at hand between an “I” and a “Thou” real, if not in
the strong philosophical sense of Realität at least as Wirklichkeit? Or is it,
7Diane Mitchelfelder and Richard E. Palmer, eds., Dialogue and
Deconstruction. The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter (Albany, New York: State
University of New York Press, 1989), p. 52.
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as Derrida puts it, an “unfindable object of thought,”8 a mere illusion of
reason sprung forth in the shadows of society? (Which would explain their
com-possibility and the appearance of their co-originarity…)
Throughout the history of philosophy the idea of dialogue, the
possibility of dialogue and its reality, has been taken as the most evident
thing in the world, even as self-evident. That is why, from Plato to
Gadamer, philosophy is usually defined as the soul’s dialogue with itself.
It goes to Derrida’s credit to have questioned for the first time the
evidence of dialogue for Western thought. And he did it during his first ever
encounter with Gadamer in Paris in 1981. The encounter was a carefully
planned event, being regarded from the very beginning by the organizers
from the Goethe Institute as a context for a head-on confrontation between
the two major philosophical orientations of the times: hermeneutics and
deconstruction.
In good faith and animated by the good will to understand the other,
Gadamer prepared a talk on text and interpretation marking explicitly
several cues that would facilitate the dialogue with Derrida.9 Derrida did
nothing of the sort. He delivered a speech on signatures in Nietzsche10 and,
when it came to the discussions part, he addressed Gadamer three questions
that seemed unrelated to what he said.11 That is why the first gesture of
most interpreters of the whole affair was either to question Derrida’s
seriousness or to project behind his words a hidden strategy meant to put in
question dialogue on ethical grounds. Is dialogue to be searched for? Isn’t it
an expression of the will to power, and thus a means of domination?
We have seen in the first paragraph quoted in this paper that for the
French philosopher, too, dialogue is to be sought after, that it has a social
value. We do not have the space to show here that Derrida’s questions are
not to be taken as mere frivolities. We did it elsewhere, convincingly, we
hope. What we would like to do is, rather, to show that the French
philosopher is actually right in describing dialogue as an “unfindable object
of thought” by reconstructing (but not necessarily rehearsing) his
investigation into the problematics of language pursued in Of
Grammatology and Dissemination. The question of language is a key
problem for any hermeneutic project whatsoever. On the terrain of
language, on the question of the reality, the unreality of dialogue is decided.
8 Ibid., p. 52.
9See Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Text and Interpretation” in Diane
Mitchelfelder and Richard Palmer, eds., Dialogue and Deconstruction. The
Gadamer-Derrida Encounter, pp. 21-51.
10See Jacques Derrida, “Interpreting Signatures (Nietzsche/Heidegger):
Two Questions” in Diane Mitchelfelder and Richard Palmer, eds., Dialogue
and Deconstruction. The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter, pp.58-71.
11Jacques Derrida, “Three Questions to Hans-Georg Gadamer” in Diane
Mitchelfelder and Richard Palmer, eds., Dialogue and Deconstruction. The
Gadamer-Derrida Encounter, pp. 52-54.
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Whereas in his philosophical hermeneutics Gadamer approaches
language from a diachronic point of view, trying to describe the movement
of its constitution and the process whereby it stocks within itself human
experience becoming thus a “view of the world,” Derrida approaches it in
strictly synchronic terms. For him, too, language is a “view of the world,”
but as a system of differences subjected to an arbitrary bonding.
As Ferdinand de Saussure has shown, formally, language is a system
of signs taken as the union of an acoustic image (signifier) and a mental
representation (signified) bonded together simply because each differs from
all the other acoustic images and mental representations possible. For
example, what makes “five” an English word is that the sequence of sounds
“f-i-v-e” constituting it is different from all the other sequences of sounds
that can be uttered in English and that it sends to the determinate idea “5.”
In Course in General Linguistics Saussure writes:
Psychologically our thought – apart from its expression in words
– is only a shapeless and indistinct mass. Philosophers and
linguists have always agreed in recognizing that without the help
of signs we would be unable to make a clear-cut, consistent
distinction between two ideas. […] The characteristic role of
language with respect to thought is not to create a material
phonetic means for expressing ideas but to serve as a link
between thought and sound, under conditions that of necessity
bring about the reciprocal delimitation of units.12
But if language is constituted as a system of arbitrary signs, the
fundamental principle governing it being the principle of differentiation,
insomuch as language is a system of differences without positive terms then
every linguistic sign is forced to carry within itself traces of all the other
signs of the language to which it belongs. For example, sending to the idea
“5” the word “five” sends also to “4” and “6” as those natural numbers
preceding and, respectively, following it, the numbers that make it possible
and, respectively, those made possible by it; “5” appears through the
addition of a unit to “4” and serves to the constitution of “6” through the
addition of a unit to it.
Gadamer obviously knew something of this when in Truth and Method
he spoke about a “center of language” and its “speculative nature”:
…every word breaks forth as if from a center and is related to a
whole, through which alone it is a word. Every word causes the
12Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, ed. Charles
Bally, Albert Sechehaye, and Albert Riedlinger, trans. Wade Baskin (New
York, Toronto & London: McGraw Hill, 1998), pp. 112-113.
Hermeneutic Dialogue as Social Value 107
whole of the language to which it belongs to resonate and the
whole world-view that underlies it to appear.13
What neither Gadamer nor Saussure knew, but should have known, for
it is one step away from these premises, is that by carrying within itself the
traces of all the other signs of the language to which it belongs, every sign
“is” ontologically the sign of something that is not given in language, of
another order than language and, in general, of something that can never be
present as such.
The “unmotivatedness” of the sign requires a synthesis in which
the completely other is announced as such – without any
simplicity, and identity, any semblance or continuity – within
what is not.14 (italics are mine)
In truth, the work of the principle of differentiation in language can be
carried on to infinity. The signifiers can be forever differentiating
themselves from all the other signifiers just like the signifieds can. This is
the reason why the final term of the sequence of signifiers and, respectively,
signifieds serving as reference for the differentiation of the antepenultimate
and all the others before it is, in fact, itself always already antepenultimate.
Derrida calls “différance” – with an “a” (not the usual “e”) written but
never read or pronounced15 – this “completely other” announcing itself in
language only to ceaselessly withhold its presence from it and from the
present. As soon as it makes its trace seen, this différance renders the idea
of dialogue de facto impossible. It is easy to see that insomuch as the
possibility of meaning is tied to the ceaseless deferral of its full presence
from itself brought along by the “completely other” inhabiting language, the
“Thou” expressing itself in and through language will itself be forced to
forever become an other. The constant deferral of the full presence of
meaning from itself will engage also a deferral of the “Thou” speaking to
the “I,” obviously, just as it defers the presence of the “I” to the “Thou.”
Between parentheses, we should note that if it is true, as the
hermeneutic philosophies of Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricœur contend, that
language either as Rede, Gesprach, or narrative is an ontological condition
of human existence, then we ought to say that différance as the “completely
other” inhabiting language suspends not only the presence of the “I” and the
“Thou” but also their stable identity as such. Through the play of différance
13 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and
Donald G. Marshall (London & New York: Continuum, 2004), p. 454.
14 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
(Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p.47.
15 See Jacques Derrida, “Différance” in Margins of Philosophy, trans.
Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp.1-27.
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the “I” and the “Thou” become many, “I” and “Thou” labeling
multiplicities.
Thus, a dialogue aimed at understanding an other will not be an actual
dialogue with the other as such, but with an other that has been. For as soon
as the other has expressed his or her position, he or she ceases to be who he
or she was and becomes an other. In this sense the possibly other than
myself whom I engaged in dialogue becomes a mere projection of my
endeavor to understand an other as myself.
Despite how complicated it may sound what is referred to here is
something quite simple. Anyone familiar with how a therapeutic session
goes knows very well that simply by discussing what he or she thinks and
feels, by putting his or her mental state into words, the patient gains a
certain relief, this constituting also the first step of the cure. What we are
actually witnessing here is a movement of becoming an other rendered
possible by the fact that through its very expression, the expressed meaning
brings to light other meanings and other ways of being the patient could
assume.
But différance puts the possibility in question not only of what might
we call its “I” – “Thou” axis, but also on that of the “Sache,” the matter at
hand, or the theme around which any dialogue whatsoever revolves. In the
hermeneutic tradition the possibility of the “Sache” has always been taken
for granted. Philosophical hermeneutics in particular go so far as to even
define dialogue in terms of it. Above, we were actually following Gadamer
closely in defining dialogue as “an exchange of ideas or views about a
matter at hand between an “I” and a “Thou.”
Insomuch as we assume the play of différance in language, though, the
possibility of the Sache becomes problematic. For this play, in a
paradoxical manner, makes language at the same time rich and poor in
meaning. It is rich for the reason that every signifier will send meaning to
the idea signified plus all the other ideas on which the first depends plus the
trace of the “completely other” of différance. And poor for, insomuch as it
makes any idea signified dependent on others, this “completely other”
indirectly signified represents basically a depletion of the fullness of
meaning. By being rich and poor in meaning, though, language is endowed
with a “certain inexhaustibility”16 transcending the possibilities of the
concept of horizon. The play of différance makes us say both more and less
than we want to say each time we open our mouths or put pen to paper, and
what is actually said exceeds the boundaries of the horizon of meaning of
what could have been said. The “completely other” of différance pierces
through the horizon that might encircle any meaning uttered and thus it
displaces its limits.
In this manner the play of différance prevents the appearance of a
matter at hand in any dialogue and does not let any theme become thematic.
16Jacques Derrida, Positions, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: Chicago
University Press, 1981), p. 250.
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But insomuch as no dialogue gravitates toward one matter at hand, this does
not mean that it gravitates toward two or any other determinate number.
The play of différance actually transforms the to and fro movement of
question and answer in a chaotic movement going in an indefinite number
of directions at once.
Now, this is again complicated talk for designating something quite
common. Many are the cases when we start talking with someone about one
thing, end up talking about something else, after having made quite a few
digressions, and the only thing we recall afterward is how our interlocutor
pronounces certain words or his or her smile. Here we find the play of
différance with its exceeding of intentionality and the displacement of the
horizon of meaning at its finest.
Now we can understand that, as Realität, the reality of dialogue is
actually out of the question. For, as we have seen, there can never be a true
exchange between the “I” and the “Thou,” because each is forever
becoming an other in the process. What takes place in our speaking to one
another is really a simulacrum of exchange. And such a simulacrum never
takes place around a matter at hand for the flow of uttered words does not
go in the direction of a dominant meaning but in all directions possible.
But neither is the reality of dialogue as Wirklichkeit very real. If a
conversation happens to have any effects on the partners this is only by
accident. For this reason, from the point of view of the expectations leading
them to engage in conversation, their impact can only be very low, if not
completely insignificant.
The disparaging of the power of dialogue for the development of
human relations and social life and the introduction of chance in
understanding, though, should not be taken as a nihilist gesture. We are not
proclaiming here that all is good for nothing, and we are not advocating
muteness. On the contrary, we are proclaiming life and advocating the
necessity of reconstructing the idea of dialogue in other terms, ones that
would increase its efficacy and make it more real (Wirklich). In our opinion,
the axioms of this reconstruction can be found, above all, in Gilles
Deleuze’s thought, but their being put to work presupposes giving up quite
a few of our philosophical obsessions.
If we would like our dialogues to matter, to change something in
ourselves and others, and eventually to change our world, first of all, we
will have to give up our obsession with the question of being, to renounce
any philosophy of being altogether in favor of a philosophy of multiplicity,
of the “and.” We will have to learn how to think not in terms of what “is”
this or that, and not out of the wonder that there “is” something rather than
nothing, but in terms of and this and that and that and…
Such a metaphysics of the “and” will lead us to the realization that the
speaking subject and the “I” that engages a “Thou” in dialogue (just like the
“Thou”) is not the substratum of the world, respectively, a transcendental
condition of possibility. Rather, the speaking subject is a collective
assemblage of enunciation through whose speech a multiplicity of order-
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words is expressed, and the “I,” the intersection of various series of
singularities and its actualization according to a rule. We “are” collections
of singularities – a smile, a scar, a gesture, a belief or another, this or that
emotion, several thoughts…
And, second of all, we will have to stop attributing language and
discourse (either written or spoken) any privilege. We will have to finally
understand that although the flow of words is the only one to have meaning,
it has just as much or as little sense as any other flow. The sense of the flow
of sound taking the form of music or of a howl is not inferior to that of a
philosophical text or a poem. Each is just a flow like any other; it pushes us
toward one direction or another.
When we have learned to give up these philosophical obsessions, we
arrive at the only rule of dialogue, the only axiom of the “ethics of
discussion” (Derrida): do everything in your power to touch and join the
other; do everything possible so that the flow of your words intersects and
gets interconnected with the other’s, or with the flow of his or her gestures,
or song, or dance… whichever. Never interpret, analyze, or criticize what
the other says. Interpretation never led anyone anywhere. Rather, try to
establish points of communication so that something comes to pass between
you, something that changes both and leads to the construction of a “me-
you.” The goal is to create other flows from those given, to create
something new.
As Deleuze puts it:
This could be what a conversation is – simply the outline of a
becoming. The wasp and the orchid provide the example. The
orchid seems to form a wasp image, but in fact there is a wasp-
becoming of the orchid, and an orchid-becoming of the wasp, a
double capture since ‘what’ each becomes changes no less than
that ‘which becomes.’ The wasp becomes part of the orchid’s
reproductive apparatus at the same time as the orchid becomes
the sexual organ of the wasp. One and the same becoming, a
single block of becoming, or, as Rémy Chauvin says, an ‘a-
parallel evolution of two beings who have nothing whatsoever to
do with one another.’17
The precise contours of this new form of dialogue are yet to be traced,
but from its axioms, it announces itself to be more real and more fruitful
than the other.
Romanian Academy
Jassy, Romania
johnadriancostache@gmail.com
17 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues, trans. Hugh Tomlinson
and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), pp.2-3.
CHAPTER IX
RATIONALITY AS A HUMAN VALUE
LAVINIA MARIN
Abstract: Rationality is not a value in itself but it can be used in contexts
where a debate among opposing values or cultures takes place, thus making
it valuable in an instrumental way. In order for rationality to work as a
mediator in discussions about conflicting values we have to assume a
Scanlonian contractualist framework and also a few other virtues of thought
such as as maturity, imagination, sympathy, and culture.
Keywords: rationality, values, contractualism, cultural difference,
objectivity, autonomy, instrumental, intrinsic
The modern times in which we live have generated several new
problems, some of them being caused by the unprecedented situation of the
culturally mixed environment in which we all have come to live.
Nowadays, more than ever before, people of different cultures and religions
live together in big cities and are forced to interact with the “strangeness” of
others’ cultural backgrounds on a daily basis. The problems arise when the
education one has received doesn’t provide enough basis for this
interaction; this problem is not only a social one – namely how are we to
behave in culturally mixed environments – but it’s also a philosophical one
because it makes people reevaluate their own values and attitudes toward
values.
A person can be quite neutral about his or her values in a culturally
homogenous environment, yet when confronted with shockingly different
values, one might develop unexpected behaviors, such as violence,
aggression, self-doubt, and feelings of social inadequacy. The
internalization of the statement that there are different people out there who
don’t believe the same things as oneself, and that maybe they are not
necessarily wrong while oneself is not wrong either, requires a certain
philosophical background and preparation. Most people are not prepared
philosophically to argue for their values, to concede when necessary, to
defend those values, to negotiate and accept compromises. Most people still
live in the paradigm of the “one and only truth, my truth” while thinking
that everybody else is dead wrong. How can philosophy be of help in these
cases? How are we to use philosophical thought as a tool to reconcile these
differences and make possible a self-fulfilled life among strangers?
As Donald Davidson pointed out, we all think our values are objective:
In our unguarded moments we all tend to be objectivists about
values. We see ourselves as arguing with others who maintain
values opposed to ours. In the heat of dispute it does not seem
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that we are expressing attitudes with which our opponents are at
liberty to differ, nor do we think we are merely trying to bring
them to share our goals. We are convinced that we are right and
they are wrong, not just in the sense that our values are better
than theirs, or more enlightened, but that we are objectively
correct and they are not. We assume, and assert, that our
judgments of what is good, right, or just are true, and that those
who disagree with us hold false views (Donald Davidson, The
Objectivity of Values, Problems of Rationality).
When individuals feel isolated inside multicultural communities, their
response is either the diminishing of trust in one’s own values or the
emerging need to defend one’s values publicly and perhaps to perform
solitary acts of fanaticism.
On the other hand, when a large homogenous community contains a
few minorities that require respect and a voice in the community, the
majority feels threatened by this diversity and feels the need to repress these
manifestations, even though nothing illegal has happened. Such were the
cases in Romania when the gay community wanted to be seen and heard
through at its annual “gay pride” marches – immediately a reaction
appeared from the religious orthodox community who wanted to assert its
values at the same time, on the same day, and in the same place, by another
march, one of Christian pride. Two marches took place in the same time
and the situation almost escalated to a riot. Why did the majority feel
threatened by this display of different values and why did it feel the need to
assert its presence, which was otherwise well expressed in everyday life?
The most obvious answer would be that people can’t be rational about their
own values when they feel threatened, even though in other areas of life
they are perfectly rational. Yet I would like to propose the mediation of
rationality in exactly such cases of cultural difference and conflicting
values.
How are we supposed to talk in public about our own values? How are
we to negotiate our values in a multicultural society? It all depends on what
type of values are we discussing: communitarian values lead to a necessary
dialogue between communities, while personal values lead to the dialogue
between the community and the individual or between different individuals
inside the community framework. We need to have this dialogue because
we want meaningful lives and such lives are impossible without being
integrated socially. We don’t want to be left out, alone with our values; we
want to share them with a community or with a few peers, at least.
A few examples of conflicting values are the following: traditionalism
vs modernity, patriotism vs cosmopolitanism, hierarchy vs equality,
individualism vs solidarity, risk-taking vs safety, health vs. pleasure.
I am not going to enter into the metaphysics of values here but in
general it is accepted that there are two types of values: intrinsic values and
instrumental ones. Instrumental values are those which are good because
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they serve a higher purpose which is good in itself, for example health is
valuable because it serves and prolongs human life, which is valuable in
itself. However, this distinction isn’t as clear-cut as we would want it; there
are people for whom instrumental values became intrinsic values, health
being again the suitable example.
When people choose their values there are a few possible attitudes that
I will outline here:
- We can be irrational when choosing our values yet defend them in
a rational manner.
- We can be rational about our values yet be fanatic about them and
refuse any type of dialogue.
Most of the time, these types of attitudes, and not necessarily the
values in themselves, generate the responses we get from the other
participants in the dialogue.
RATIONALITY AND VALUES
Wittgenstein once said in the Tractatus that goodness, value, or
meaning are not to be found in the world; therefore his conclusion was that
one shouldn’t talk about such things, as it was a pointless endeavor.
The tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or
Religion was to run against the boundaries of language
(Wittgenstein, Lecture on Ethics, 1929).
Good is outside the space of facts (Wittgenstein, Culture and
Value, p. 3).
Wittgenstein’s point here was that one cannot argue rationally for
certain values, as rationality has a constraining effect. If there were a
mathematical proof of what is beauty and, following this proof, most of
what we think as beautiful would be considered ugly, would we give up our
aesthetic judgment? Would we start thinking that what was once beautiful
is now ugly for certain? Of course not, we would still perceive beauty in
spite of our own rationality or judgment.
Yet here comes the problem we need to face: in our social dialogue in
the multicultural society we need to talk rationally about values; we can’t
have a public discourse that is irrational when we negotiate values. Yet
philosophically speaking we also know that we shouldn’t talk about values
at all, as there is nothing to say, as Wittgenstein warned us. So how are we
to talk about something about which we should keep silent? The solution I
propose is to use rationality not in order to say what values are, but rather to
say how we should behave in a value-ridden context. Rationality can be
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used as a means to reach social consensus and set boundaries between the
public and private display of value allegiance.
The rights that occur from values are determined partially by how we
see values, as either objective or subjective, and also by the attitudes people
have toward them: either autonomous or dependent. If our values are
objective, are we entitled to impose them upon others? I personally think
that truth doesn’t need eloquent lawyers, as it makes a case for itself. What
we can do effectively is just create the conditions necessary for people to
see the true values more clearly. However, if we tried to impose them
dogmatically, their objectivity would become futile. If, on the other hand,
our values are subjective and we acknowledge this, we can’t impose them
on anyone, but we can argue that, although they are subjective, the world
would be a better place if more people would adopt them. If we chose our
values by an autonomous process of thinking, it doesn’t make any sense to
impose them dogmatically to someone else because the autonomy of the
others would be breached.
However, it is the duty of every rational person to manifest a certain
critical detachment toward one’s own values because, in order to rationally
talk about values, one has to keep in mind that none of the interlocutors has
chosen his/her values completely autonomously. Up to a point in our lives,
our values were imposed upon us. So neither interlocutor can argue for the
objectivity of one’s values. If one assumes subjectivity on the interlocutor’s
part, one has to assume subjectivity for oneself as well. And if one assumes
objectivity about one’s values, one has to concede the same to the
opponent. Only if this condition is fulfilled can we have a genuine dialogue
about values.
Sometimes, even if we share the same values as our own community,
the difference in attitudes toward them can make us strangers inside the
same community: we can see those values as instrumental and not final, we
can chose other means to serve or respect those values, we can interpret
those values to mean something different than the majority ruled. Every
value in the world can generate fanaticism, as the cause is not in the value
itself, but in the attitude toward it. In order to have fanaticism, one would
have to think that the value is intrinsic, that there is only one correct
interpretation of it and only one way of serving or respecting that value,
everything else being blasphemy and defilement.
Being rational about one’s own values is very hard because, as Francis
Bacon shows, rationality has the tendency to overlook arguments against its
point and give preference to favorable arguments. Up to a point, rationality
can be misguided by values, but only if we never engage in a dialogue
about values. In such a dialogue the errors we make can be easily pointed
out by an outside observer.
The human understanding when it has once adopted an opinion
draws all things else to support and agree with it. And though
there be a greater number and weight of instances to be found on
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the other side, yet these it either neglects and despises, or else by
some distinction sets aside and rejects, in order that by this great
and pernicious predetermination the authority of its former
conclusion may remain inviolate (Francis Bacon).
The requirement for any rational person would be, then, to be critical
and open to discussion about one’s values and yet remain loyal to them – a
very hard task. Rationality can be classified in many ways but, following
the work of Max Weber, we notice that rationality falls in almost the same
categories as value does: we have instrumental rationality (zweckrational),
a sort of technocratic thinking related to the means used to attain certain
ends, and intrinsic rationality (Wertrational) which is value or belief-
oriented.
So, how can we use rationality when discussing values? One obvious
proposal would be to use it in order to check for internal consistency of
value sets, but this would be a misuse of rationality, because on one hand it
does too little and, on the other hand, as Simon Blackburn points out,
internal coherence doesn’t give us much to work with as there may be an
infinite number of internally coherent systems of values.
We can appeal as well to other virtues of thought, such as
maturity, imagination, sympathy, culture. An immature,
unimaginative, unsympathetic, and uncultivated ethic might be
quite coherent, in the way that the Decalogue is quite coherent.
But that does not make it the last word (Simon Blackburn, Ruling
Passions).
We can’t argue for or against a certain set of values, but we can argue
for rational behavior while holding a certain set of values. We don’t want
just the “right values,” we need to be rational about them. That is to be
moderate, mature, sympathetic, and imaginative about them. All these are
rational qualities and we need them in order not to fall into the traps of
fanaticism or intolerance. If one adopts a rational attitude toward one’s
values in the sense outlined by Blackburn, one should be safe from
fanaticism, no matter what values one holds.
Another way of using rationality to rule in cases concerning opposing
values would be to use Scanlon’s contractualism, which presupposes a
mutual recognition between rational agents. What Scanlon’s contractualism
proposes is “a way of living with others which is typified by an ideal of
mutual recognition between rational agents, where mutual recognition
demands that moral agents acknowledge the value of human life and
respond to this value in the right ways.” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/T._
M._Scanlon)
There are a few major forms of contractualism and Scanlon’s has its
distinct place among them. First I will make a few distinctions and show
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how contractualism fits in but also distinguishes from the main forms of
similar political thought.
Contractarianism appeared first in Hobbes’ writings, and the main
idea was based on mutual self-interest. People were agreeing to cooperate
because it was mutually advantageous for all the selfish subjects involved
in it. Contractualism, however, is based on the equal moral status of each
person involved, because the persons are seen as autonomous agents, each
one with one’s own rationality and purposes.
According to contractualism, morality consists in what would
result if we were to make binding agreements from a point of
view that respects our equal moral importance as rational
autonomous agents (Ashford, Elizabeth and Mulgan, Tim,
“Contractualism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).
There are at least three main types of contractualism: Kantian,
Rawlsian, and Scanlonian, and all of them presuppose a rational agent that
seeks to pursue one’s interests in ways that are justifiable to other agents
who have different interests in mind.
In the Kantian type, the contractualist establishes certain principles
with which all rational agents would agree, while the Scanlonian
contractualist seeks principles that that no one can reasonably reject, rather
than principles all rational people would agree to. Rawls’ contractualism is
first of all a political one rather than an ethical one (as it is the case with
Scanlon’s) and second, in following Kant’s work, also seeks principles that
all rational agents would agree to.
Scanlon, by contrast, invokes no veil of ignorance. I know my
own circumstances. It is not self-interest combined with
ignorance of self that makes me take account of everyone's
interests, but rather my concern to justify myself to everyone else
(Ashford, Elizabeth and Mulgan, Tim, “Contractualism,” The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).
By not using the veil of ignorance and assuming from the start the
known situation of the moral subject, Scanlon insures that the rational
agents can in fact argue for particular sets of values that would have been
unthinkable behind the veil of ignorance, and this makes it very useful in
arguing real life positions. Also, by ensuring that the consensus reached
concerns principles that no one would reasonably reject, Scanlon’s
contractualism has another advantage, as it aggregates the opinions faster
because people will focus on where they all agree rather than on what
separates them. Not using idealised rational agents makes this type of
contractualism more suitable for real life situations also.
What about Utilitarianism? Is contractualism a better framework for a
rational dialogue than Utilitarianism? First of all, one has to notice that
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contractualism doesn’t apply to all of morality (unlike Utilitarianism) but
only to the public sphere of it, in the realm of what we owe to each other.
Secondly, by not seeing the well-being of persons as a basic moral concept,
contractualism makes room for other types of values and personal
preferences that Utilitarianism couldn’t. Utilitarianism supposes an
underlying set of moral values with happiness, pleasure, or well-being
among them, and this makes it unsuitable as a framework for discussions
when other types of values are involved, values that cannot be reduced to
well-being or that even oppose it.
Instead of lumping everyone together and allowing one person's
rights to be trampled to provide greater aggregate benefits to
others, contractualism recognises that each of us has a unique life
to live. The contractualist objection to utilitarianism is that it does
not guarantee principles that benefit each individually, and that
command each person's free assent (Ashford, Elizabeth and
Mulgan, Tim, “Contractualism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy).
By considering the principles that no one could reasonably reject,
Scanlon’s contractualism facilitates the finding of common grounds
between subjects with extremely different views and values and, while
doing that, it doesn’t suppose that there is one unique rational attitude
toward value, but that there have to be certain principles that all people
adhere to if they want to live together. When objecting to someone else’s
principles the subject has to take into consideration not only the burden it
imposes on itself, but also how it affects others in the same community: if
strangers have to bear a greater burden than I do, although my inherent
egoism tells me to pursue the principle benefiting me the most, the rational
principles to which we all agree tell me to yield.
An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would
be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation
of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for
informed, unforced, general agreement (Scanlon 1998, p. 153).
In Scanlons’s contractualism, the main moral predicate is “wrong”
while the “right” is defined as the absence of wrong. No wrong act can be
justified to others and this is what all wrong acts have in common. We
might not all agree on what we want to happen to ourselves but a common
agreement on what we don’t want to happen can be reached.
We should expect enlightened values – the reasons we would
have for valuing and acting if we had all the (non-evaluative)
facts straight – to converge; we should expect people who are
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enlightened and fully understand one another to agree on their
basic values” (Donald Davidson, Problems of Rationality).
Following Davidson’s account of rationality, I think we can all agree
that rationality may be used as a universal language common to all sets of
values and as a mediation tool.
CASE STUDIES
Even inside the same culture there can be diverging opinions
concerning the same set of values to which everyone adheres. Let’s take the
case of the smoking ban imposed by the state upon its citizens. The main
reason for doing this lies in seeing human health as an intrinsic value. When
the State tells people not to smoke, not to eat junk food, or to exercise more,
the State actually tells them that they should pursue certain purposes.
However, people have the right to disagree with the State and they can
bring arguments against these kinds of policies.
Even if we also believe that health is a value worth pursuing, we might
think of it as an instrumental value, not an intrinsic one, like the instrument
for a happy life. If a life of smoking and eating junk food makes me happier
and more fulfilled, the State has no case against me. I can argue rationally
that for me this is a better life even if shorter.
How can the State argue in a contractualist way against my smoking?
If the State says: “smoking kills you,” then I can reply: “I know this, but the
quality of life I lead until death will be much improved because I will be
much happier.” And then the State will have to yield.
However, if the state says: “your smoking kills others (by second-hand
smoke)” – then I have no possible rational argument to defeat this (unless I
am to deny the premise).
In the case of eating junk food and exercising, the State has no right to
tell me what to do because it’s telling me how I am to be rational about my
life and that an instrumental value should be an intrinsic one. The State is
actually telling me that my rationality about health should be Wertrational
(value-oriented) and not instrumental, but it has no way of proving that.
A second case study concerns the recent controversy regarding the
wearing of the Islamic veil in France, or L'affaire du Voile, as it was
called.This is a typical cross-cultural conflict about values, with both parties
involved coming from different cultures with different values. Below is a
summary of the main arguments for and against the scarf:
For the scarf Against the scarf
“Respectability” and
“discretion.”
Submission to men
Avoidance of violence Not a free choice/ public
pressure
Muslim identity Laïcité arguments
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The people who argued for the scarf had the following arguments:
a) The argument of the “respectability” and “discretion.” This was a
typical example of how an attribute such as “respectable” has different
meanings in different communities. For the Islamic community, a girl
showing her hair was seen as offering herself, being “easy” and
promiscuous. By wearing the veil, the girls stated their virtue and
unavailability to strangers.
b) Avoidance of violence. In some neighborhoods there were cases of
unveiled women being targeted by attacks of Muslim men.
c) Muslim identity. By wearing the veil, the girls clearly differentiated
themselves from the local Western people and stated their cultural
background in an obvious way.
The motivations of those opposed to allowing hijabs to be worn in
schools:
a) The feminist arguments stated that the wearing of the veil
symbolized women’s submission to men as the wearing of the hijab was not
by free choice but rather imposed by family and by the social pressure.
b) Another argument stated that France is a laic state and the wearing
religious clothes in schools infringes upon this constitutional principle.
How are we to rationally evaluate these arguments presupposing a
Scanlonian contractualism? The arguments for wearing the veil are all
culturally embedded; they infer that because the Islamic culture is such and
such and we cannot change it, we have to abide by it.
a) The argument of the “respectability” and “discretion” advances
prejudices. As in Eastern culture “easy” women are judged by their clothes,
the same thing happens in Islamic culture to women, just that there are
different types of clothes and opposite judgments. Instead of challenging
these prejudices, this argument states that we should live by them.
b) The argument against the violence makes a point: who would want
to get hurt? But then again, the practice of people hurting unveiled women
shouldn’t be accepted, because it’s something illegal. It shouldn’t count in
the general norm just as the risk of crime or theft shouldn’t count – we
don’t assume theft when we make laws, we fight against it. If we lived in a
country ruled by a mob and the general practice was to pay protection fees
to them, this would make it rational to follow this rule in a practical or
instrumental way, but not in a universally justifiable way.
c) The identity argument. If the identity of Islam were given by the
practice to wrap women in veils and only by this practice alone, then this
argument would make sense. However, we all know that Islam is much
more than this. Also Western Christian identity for a long time accepted the
submission of women and treating them as inferior, forbidding them to
work or to get an education. The Western Christian world has actually
given up this practice without losing its identity. Identities change over time
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and this should be encouraged if these identities involve the unfair
treatment of other human beings.
All three arguments so far show a non-critical attitude by Muslims
toward their own values. The arguments against wearing the veil are also of
cultural origin to some extent.
d) The submission to men. If the law had stated that men should dress
in a certain way also, it wouldn’t have been a submission to men anymore.
If the law that forces women to wear the veil had been passed by women
would it have been just then?
e) The argument stating that women don’t want to wear the veil but
are forced to do so. We need sociological studies to prove that women
would not actually want to wear the veil if they had a choice. But if this is
true, then we have found the principle that no one could reasonably reject:
no culture should make its citizens do something they don’t want to do.
John Stuart Mill argues for the Harm Principle, which says that the only
legitimate grounds for social coercion is to prevent harm to others, but what
harm to others prevents the wearing of the veil?
f) The argument in favor of the laïcité is also an identity issue, but for
France. If it is so important for France not to lose its laic identity, the same
right should be also conceded for Muslim people – namely, not to lose their
religious identity.
CONCLUSIONS
Public debates about values are possible if
a) We assume the opponents to be rational
b) We all agree upon a contractualist framework (Scanlonian)
c) We are critical and detached about our own values first, that is to
say, rational.
We all have the fundamental right to hold other values than those of
the society’s in which we live, even if the society has chosen these values
by vote or in an utilitarian fashion by preference aggregation. The life of
every individual is unique and should be lived to its maximum potential. A
gay person has to look for happiness even when born in a homophobic
society; he can’t put his life or his happiness on hold because he had the
misfortune of being born in the wrong place. We don’t have the option of
giving up on a happy and fulfilled life, so we need to negotiate our values
with whomever we can. And for this we need to appeal to the common
ground of rationality; rationality in itself is not a value, but its employment
in value negotiations makes it valuable in an instrumental way.
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CHAPTER X
SPIRITUAL COGNITION OF
A PERSON AND CULTURE
NIZHNIKOV SERGEY
Abstract: Nowadays, humankind loses the character of its spiritual
archetype; the person loses its humaneness. It is therefore necessary to
reveal time-honored values with new force. These values form an integral
part of all spiritual-cultural traditions of peoples that dwell on Earth. The
spiritual archetype of humankind is unique, but it is formulated by different
languages, cultures, symbols, concepts, and methods. Spiritual knowledge
is defined in this case as deployment of the essence of a person that leads to
a display of the spiritual archetype of humankind.
The spiritual phenomenon is present only when there is a carrier – a
spiritual person. In other words, without a concrete person there is no
presence of the spiritual at all. It can be ciphered in cultures and in their
texts but to decode it, to make it effective and alive, the person is called.
Therefore the spiritual exists only there, and then, where it is existentially
filled. Spiritual self-knowledge is possible only in such a seizure of the
person, or transcendence in existential fullness at which personal essences
are unpacked.
Keywords: spiritual cognition, self-knowledge, transcendence, existence,
spiritual archetype of humankind, symbol.
Nowadays, there is much debate about the lack of spirituality in a
society and in a person, but what is the spiritual as it is? You may hear the
various answers to this question: someone sees the spiritual only in the
sphere of religion or mysticism, someone else associates it with the whole
area of culture or identifies it as morals. Especially frequent nowadays is
the connection of the spiritual to any mystical visions or ideas, extrasensory
or parapsychological abilities. The ordinary consciousness maintains the
concept of spiritual1 in the individual interests. But what does its essence
consist of? It is possible to answer this question in a more or less objective
way if you rely on the analysis of the concept of the spiritual and on the
1 Gramatically speaking, it is generally agreed upon that spiritual is to be
used as an adjective, while spirituality is the corresponding noun. However,
considering the specificity of the Eastern theological thought, the author has
deemed it necessary to use the former rather than the latter, as it embodies a
particular, clearly delineated concept (Ed).
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history of its development, of the creation of the spiritual sphere as it is;
then such a description will crystallize and shape the concept of spiritual.
In order to clarify the problematic of spiritual it is necessary to already
know something about it from the very beginning. Starting research, it is
already necessary to know something about the subject, because we can
investigate the unknown, but not the totally incomprehensible. The
incomprehensible shows itself in the unknown, and by that, it allows us to
ask some questions. The unknown concerns that about which it is possible
to formulate a question, when something is already shown for a question,
but remains rather inconceivable and demands deeper explorations, for
expansion of thinking about itself.
Such unknown objects are for us the concept of spiritual. The word
spiritual has already been found. It reflects something about ourselves, but
it was already found, only in vague and intuitive ways. It is still indistinct,
but undoubtedly present in human life and makes it what it is. It is
necessary to look closely so that the spiritual should become more clear.
Having designated our unknown as spiritual, it is further necessary to
reveal its characteristics as concepts which would be appropriate and would
now give us the possibility to carry out theoretical research. Thus, we
inevitably find ourselves within a limited circle, or a hermeneutical circle2,
and only again and again passing around it and marking and outlining its
borders, can we define the specifics of the spiritual phenomenon, its
difference from anything else. And only after the spiritual field and its
arrangement and its action are determined is it possible to move further to
the center of the circle, getting deeper into the spiritual as it is. There are no
doubts that such preliminary knowledge of the subject should inevitably be
abstract, because it may become more concrete only as a result of complete
and full research. Nevertheless, even this abstract knowledge should be
essential enough that the object under investigation would never get out of
sight, which should result in its more detailed and deeper description.
Thus, for the analysis of the problem of spiritual it is necessary to have
the initial definition of the characteristics of a spiritual phenomenon, and
also of the sphere of its actions and reflections. If anything should develop,
it is necessary that right at the beginning of the process it should comprise
within itself the further becoming in the closed and undeveloped form. It is
necessary to define right at the beginning of research an orientation of
expansion of that which is curtailed. The concept itself represents a kind of
such self-developing cell.
By analogy, the definition of the concept of spiritual can be compared
to the definition of the concept of philosophy and its subject. Nobody can
ever give the exhaustive answer to this question as both philosophy and its
subject are in constant becoming. The fullest answer can only be the history
of philosophy itself, which proceeds constantly. It is the same with the
2 Gadamer H.-G. Truth and Method, translation by Joel Weinsheimer and
Donald Marshall (New York: Continuum, 1989), pp. 291-293.
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concept of spiritual, which will be described and filled up with content in
the process of research; therefore it is not necessary to hasten with
definitions. The present work as a whole is an experience of expansion of
the concept of spiritual in all directions through the description of a spiritual
problematic both from the point of view of the individual life of a person
and from a social-cultural, historical one.
However, we shall try to approach directly the clearing up of a
spiritual phenomenon. First of all, it is not likely that anybody will
challenge the fact that spiritual is closely connected to significance,
especially with the most important part to any person – to the significance
of his own life. This question stands in front of any person, regardless of his
being a grain-grower or a philosopher, but not everyone thinks of it. And
only when a person tries to pose this question himself can he make the step
toward understanding the spiritual. The human being has an existence, but
not always in the human image, and especially asking about the meaning of
life clears up his own life for a person. All history of humankind’s spiritual
culture is endlessly asking for that purification and revealing of the essence
of the human being in the world. However, a person poorly advanced in the
spiritual-moral attitude could connect the meaning of life to sensual
pleasure, to satisfaction of his extremely material, egoistic needs. But along
with the growth of a person’s sensibleness, intelligence grows as well, and
so he begins the transition from material needs to spiritual ones, from
satisfaction of egoistic inquiries to creativity for the benefit of other people
and all humankind.
SPIRITUAL AS SELF-KNOWLEDGE
In the most intimate spiritual work, where the person is extremely
honest with himself, he is capable of touching the depths of his own life, of
meeting himself, sometimes for the first time is able to truly discover and
know himself. Thus the spiritual self-knowledge is carried out, for such
self-recognition brings simultaneous spiritual transformation of the person.
Spiritual as a process represents itself in disclosing the essence of a
person, and that is nothing else than self-cognition. In the act of self-
knowledge a person is given to himself, but in a paradoxical way, so that he
has a special essence that is in the dark concerning his own nature.
Therefore the first precept appealed to a person from God, became a
commandment “know thyself.” In history, it arises for the first time as an
inscription on Apollonian temple in Delphi, then it is repeated by Thales,
and it becomes the meaning of life for Socrates, getting into Plato’s theory
about knowledge as reminiscence of a complete kind. The same
requirement is proclaimed in religion, though in the form specific to it, it
also becomes the basic theme of art, especially in Aeschylus’s tragedies in
Ancient Greece, in Indian Bhagavad-Gita and even in Epos about
Gilgamesh in ancient Mesopotamia.
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The spiritual phenomenon develops in a person, and this process can
be named self-knowledge. Hegel characterized the given process in the
following way: “Know thyself.” This absolute precept has no value, neither
in itself, nor there where it was stated historically, as the self-cognition
directed to certain abilities, character, propensities and weakness of an
individual, but only the value of knowledge of that originally in the person,
originally in itself and for itself, knowledge of the essence as spirit. In the
philosophy of spirit so-called human-knowledge is of small value, aspiring
to investigate in other people their features, their passions, and weaknesses
– these as they are called, the bends of human heart – knowledge, on one
hand, having the sense in case it can appraise the knowledge of general – a
person as such and by that the essence – spirit and on the other hand –
engaged in casual, insignificant, not original kinds of existence of spiritual,
but not penetrating up to substantial – up to the spirit itself”3.
Resulting from the aforesaid, the spirit could be defined as the essence
of spiritual. However, in distinction to Hegel, who has taken as a principle
the philosophy of absolute idea and spirit as metaphysical categories, in the
present work the object will be not spirit, but spiritual as it is reflected in
human life: not so much about metaphysics, but mainly about a form of a
human spiritual life. Certainly, metaphysics shows the quintessence of
concept of spiritual in philosophical categories, but at the present stage of
investigation the spread of scope plays a more important role. And from
this point of view it is necessary not to metaphase the spiritual
phenomenon, but to study how it is submitted in a human life and its
spiritual products: philosophy, religion, and art.
True philosophy is spiritual making, within the framework of it, and
by it, self-knowledge is accomplished. Even the first naturalistic
philosophers studied the universe to learn about themselves. Heraclites,
even earlier than Socrates, in fact, was also engaged in self-knowledge,
sitting on the steps of a temple, playing dice with children and reflecting on
eternity. He, “…as if having realized something majestic and important,
speaks: “I searched for myself” – and from Delphian sayings considered, by
most, divine: “Know thyself,” – that has served Socrates as a starting point,
raising this question and his research…” So wrote Plutarch about
Heraclites.4
Socrates passes to a more direct self-knowledge; he is not interested
anymore in roundabout ways to himself: “I have refused research of
objective reality,” he said.5 Following Socrates, it is possible to say that
spiritual knowledge is “art which helps us to care for ourselves,” that is to
say, it is directed not toward that which belongs to us, but toward
3 G.V.F. Hegel, Encyclopedia of Philosophy Science, in 3 volumes. V. 3
(Мoscow, 1977), p. 6.
4 Abstracts of Earliest Greek Philosophers. p. 1 (Мoscow, 1989), p. 194.
5 Plato, Dialogues, 3 volumes, V. 1 (Мoscow, 1970), p. 70.
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improvement of ourselves.6 As per Socrates, spiritual knowledge is directed
as a search of the essence of human ego that later Plato has defined as the
idea or the eidos of a person.7 The identification of idea with the essence of
spiritual has resulted, then, in its understanding as metaphysic-super-
sensual; to avoid it in the given work, spiritual knowledge is defined as
disclosing of essence of a person.
Deep conformity can be found in Eastern philosophy. In Ancient
Indian philosophy the spiritual purpose began to be determined by the
concept moksha, or “deliverance” in translation from Sanskrit, and
Mokshadharma – as a way of delivering the law and one of Mahabharata’s
books simultaneously. Mokshadharma, as well as the Upanishads,
comprises the basic conceptual system and principles, that is, the archetype
of Ancient Indian Culture. In Indian philosophy spiritual knowledge and the
essence of a person are defined through transcendental-immanent
understanding of Brahman-Atman. The same is said, for example, in Taoist
book “Guan In-Tzu “: “to search for wisdom outside of itself – the height of
nonsense,” and the ancient Confucian philosopher Meng-tzu, said that “the
doctrine has only one purpose – search of lost human nature.”8
The fundamental metaphysical categories of philosophy and basic
religious symbols can be considered as conceptions of the essence of a
person. Then also the category of being is a symbol of the essence of a
person, because to it he is called to transcend from his existence, finding
himself, thus, in a gleam of being (Heidegger). A person is an eternal way
to himself, and for this purpose it is necessary for him to learn about all the
universe as in the breadth of the heavens, and the depth of his own psyche,
the logos of which is infinite in its self-increasing (Heraclites). And for this
purpose he needs transcendence and immanence, being and empirical
world, and such concepts as atom (Democritus), idea (Plato), “the
unmoved-mover” (Aristotle), the supreme unity (Neoplatonist’s The One,
Vedanta, Vl. Solovyev) etc. They are, among other things, symbols of the
essence of the person, points of a foothold for thought and self-creation. In
spiritual knowledge a person finds a way to his essence.
A person can be a slave not only to empirical circumstances, but also
to ideas which are imposed on him by culture or ideology. Therefore, by
researching the forms of spiritual and analyzing the concept, we clear the
consciousness of illusions. The philosophical analysis of the spiritual is a
way to freedom, in the process of self-purification and self-deliverance. In
this sense philosophy, for example, is an esoteric science, accessible to
everybody, but not comprehended by all.
6 Ibid., p. 49.
7 Plato, Collection of Compositions, 4 volumes, V. 1 (Мoscow, 1990), pp.
256, 733.
8 Anthology of the World Philosophy in 4 volumes. V.1. Part. 2 (Мoscow,
1969), p. 210.
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SPIRITUAL AND CULTURE
Spiritual penetrates all spheres of human activities. Without the
spiritual a person does not exist at all, but there can be various levels of
spiritualization. In connection to this we shall consider reflections of
spiritual phenomenon in culture, mysticism, and morals.
The experience of spiritual self-cognition that creates the essence of a
person also creates a culture. It is the form-building core; we shall recollect
confessions of St. Augustine, Rousseau, and Leo Tolstoy: they are not only
the reflection of revolution in culture, but in many respects have also served
as its catalyst. In the cultural history of mankind, the spiritual experience of
knowledge is seen as Revelation, – a Tree with three branches: religion,
philosophy, and art. They are united by the phenomenon of spiritual that,
however, is materialized in these three spheres in a specific way, based on
various intrinsic forces of the person, his abilities, and his potential.
Strictly speaking, the phenomenon of spiritual is not the property of
culture in the sense that it arises on the basis of spiritual acts. From
nothingness strings of being are weaved, from spiritual the cultural is
created, its cloth is weaved. In culture, the movement of spiritual is
objectified. Culture alone is capable of preventing the degradation of a
person down to a barbaric condition, and even that is not always within its
power. A person who has tasted the spiritual always stays in opposition to
prevailing representations, whether he is a philosopher or a religious
reformer, an art worker or a spiritual mystic. Culture lives on spiritual acts,
without which culture would be incomprehensible and useless. But, after
having become set as congealed and objectified knowledge, culture can
become hostile to any appearance of really spiritual creativity which
frequently destroys the established traditions and outlooks. However, at the
same time there is also a way back from spirituality objectified in culture
toward spiritual.
Nietzsche is the brightest representative of a struggler with a culture,
with congealed spiritual values. He struggled alone, face-to-face against all
the might of a long-established thousand-year stubborn culture, but,
eventually, its pressure destroyed him. Gains of spirit are not given to a
person as a gift; for that he pays in blood, for spiritual creativity is always a
revelation. F.M. Dostoevsky has shown the animosities of culture to any
real display of spiritual very well in the novel the “Brothers Karamazov”
(the legend about the great inquisitor) where the congealed religious image
became more important than its direct appearance. Spiritual is always
unknown, and demands from a person his total self- rebellion, risk, and
struggle.
SPIRITUAL KNOWLEDGE AND MORAL
The phenomenon of spiritual, when implemented as a process of self-
cognition, during which the essence of a person is developed, finds itself in
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the increasing degree of the humanizing of the person. The basic moral
precepts are born as revelations in the deep experience of self-knowledge.
And this means that spiritual knowledge is directly connected to morals.
Spiritual knowledge develops the humanity in a person, because in fact it
can come to light only in its own existence. “The humanity of a person,”
wrote Heidegger about this, “is based in his essence.” And further: “non-
humane,” is someone “not humanistic” (we name the person, – S.N.)…that
has broken away from his essence.”9 From this it is possible to conclude
that a person in his essence, by his spiritual nature is good-natured and that
he becomes malicious only when he forgets himself, keeping away from his
essence. Out of such oblivion grows the spiritual crisis of humankind as the
loss of humanity by a person, the loss of humanism, the loss of his own
countenance. “It starts to seem that to the person that now only he appears
everywhere,” writes further Heidegger. “Meanwhile actually with itself,
i.e., with the essence, the person does not appear anywhere.” His essence is
hidden both by technique and by his own not-spiritualized sensuality. From
spiritual knowledge also grows true humanism, which is the intrinsic
characteristic of the spiritual phenomenon. Heidegger, examining
ontological roots of humanism, thinks of it as “humanity of a human being
from affinity to being.”
In spiritual creativity the person finds freedom and dignity. Spiritual
acts require senses and real values, social and juridical rules, morals. A
person being of an extremely versatile essence is nevertheless compelled to
make his way to integrity of spiritual knowledge through absolutization of
one of his intrinsic forces. As a result, various spheres of demonstration of
spiritual appear that, despite of their intrinsic unity, enter in inconsistent
mutual relation: reason may be opposed to belief, to mind – to feeling, but
these contradictions stimulate spiritual development, conduct humankind
along the way of creation of the complete person.
Frequently in ordinary consciousness spiritual is identified with ethics
and moral norms that do not correspond to the truth. It is already
determined that spiritual knowledge is expressed in the disclosing of the
essence of a person; the outcome of that is finding humanity. Then morals
are essentially connected to spiritual and are one of the forms of its display.
Morals are moral only when born from the depths of spiritual, instead of
being postulated from the outside and prevailing over a person. Morals
having the basis of spiritual are centered not so much on the law, but mostly
on blessedness, which itself forms the laws. Spiritual love is the supreme
legislator and includes in itself a duty.
The basic moral precepts have been born as revelations within the
depth of self-cognition experience, regardless of the basis on which it was
grounded. So, for example, a precept “Don’t kill!” has been known for
thousands of years, but wars proceed on Earth, and the state laws of many
9 Problems of a Person in Western Philosophy (Мoscow, 1988), pp. 318-
319.
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countries include a death sentence in its codes. All this speaks of a spiritual
level that does not understand that life of any person is beyond any price,
and nobody has the moral right to take it away. It is not understood that evil
can not overcome the evil, but only goodness is capable of transforming it.
Leo Tolstoy with his sermon of nonresistance to harm by violence was not
understood even in the homeland, and Mahatma Ghandi was killed by
people to whom he had devoted his life. The presence of murders on Earth,
regardless of whatever “plausible excuse” it is based upon, means that
humankind has not yet entered a spiritual phase of its development.
SPIRITUAL AND MYSTICISM
After analyzing some intrinsic characteristics of a spiritual
phenomenon and defining its displays, for the sake of clarity, we shall also
define what is not spiritual and what it is frequently identified with by
ordinary consciousness. Let's move further to the analysis of mysticism and
its relations to the phenomenon of spiritual, for in ordinary consciousness it
is the most confusing question. Especially during the years of changes,
when consciousness is no longer tied to the old ideology, huge numbers of
all possible kinds of psychics, parapsychologists, sorcerers, and preachers
come to the surface of public consciousness, many of whom characterize
their activity as spiritual. On the other hand, many serious people place
mysticism entirely into the area of imaginations and superstitions.
Therefore, first of all, it is necessary to define the term.
In translation from ancient Greek, “mystical” means “mysterious.”
This term characterizes, probably, the position of a person in the world, that
any knowledge expands the sphere of unknown. The essence of a person
and its world existence have their roots in this mysteriousness, being
unknown and even incomprehensible, and there is nothing unnatural in it.
Mysticism always turns to mysterious, always looks with skepticism at
what is already obtained by reason, and this stimulates a person to search
his new cognition and earlier unknown areas. New types of cultures and
knowledge arise in an intuitive sphere and within a mystical frame, and then
slowly transform into a certain rationality and completeness of forms.
Heraclites and Pythagoras were closely connected to priests and all sorts of
diviners; originally the archetype of Christianities had been developed in
the mystical philosophy of Philo Judaeus (Alexandrian), Origen, St.
Gregory of Nyssa, and Maximus the Confessor; in Meister Eckhart's
mysticism and then Jakob Boehme, it has served as the catalyst of thought
for German classical philosophy. Thus, it is clear that within a mystical
shell acts the spiritual itself, though not in a clear shape yet, but intuitively,
because it is not yet illuminated by enlightening of consciousness.
Eventually, the mystical is a root of religious views, said Ibn Sīnā
(Avicenna). Philosophical metaphysical categories also contain it in
themselves, many of them more postulated than proved. Mysticism in a
positive sense is a constant openness of a person to the unknown; constant
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inquiring and searching. Presence and realization of a spiritual phenomenon
here are again available.
But mysticism can also have other meanings; it can be understood as
extrasensory perception and parapsychology, or simply as some concept
that designs other levels of reality. And the matter is not that all these are
products of imagination; they can probably just as well exist. But the
essence of the affair is that all this has no relation to spiritual. In this case,
mysticism represents only the expansion of an usual way of human
knowledge, but in unconventional areas for modern culture. The crux is that
the spiritual knowledge is not characterized by expansion in breadth; it
qualitatively differs from all other methods of knowledge as it spreads itself
into the depth. While scientific and extrasensory perception of any kind is
distributed horizontally, though in different directions, the spiritual acts in
relation to them as knowledge are vertical, not only as knowledge that
relates to the abilities of a person and his properties and their development,
but also as knowledge concerning its owner, knowledge of essence, ego,
and human nature. The spiritual person is not anxious about the
development of his abilities and expansion of the horizon of his knowledge,
but he is anxious about the detection of his essence or perfection of his
nature, or moral purification. He is interested in, first of all, how to dispose
of that he already has in the proper way.
SPIRITUAL ANTHROPOLOGY
The aforesaid understanding of spiritual does not coincide with the
anthropology of L. Feuerbach. The latter reduced all understanding of
spiritual to love, and mostly sensual, rather than spiritual. In the pathos of
bringing the transcendental down to earth, he has missed the essence of the
person disclosing itself through the process of transcendence, without
which the birth of spiritual is impossible. Love, as the strongest and the
deepest experience, regardless of the object toward which it is directed,
already comprises in itself elements of transcendence, self-rebellion, and
spreading beyond its limits. For this reason Descartes said: “the concept of
God precedes me.”10 This short phrase contains more wisdom than in all
directly anthropological representations. Through the given statement, the
philosopher probably wanted to say that a person is born spiritually from
the supreme idea, from the original pattern of transcendence, instead of a
monkey. “The pure concept,” explains Descartes in another place, “is there
is a God.”11 Only relying on such high concepts is a person capable of
accomplishing spiritual cognition, which creates his essence. Through
them, a person pulls himself out of an animal life, same as Munchausen –
out of a bog. In this sense, a person has his origin from God, or from human
being, depending on what conceptual system he selects. As to the
10 R. Descartes. Selected Works (Мoscow, 1950), p. 363.
11 A.J. Lyatker, Descartes (Мoscow, 1974), p. 184.
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traditional anthropology, Heidegger remarked that it “is such interpretation
of the person which basically already knows what he is; consequently it is
never possible to ask a question as to what creature he is.”12
However, despite everything that has been said, spiritual knowledge as
constructing the essence of a person, or developing it, should be studied
under the name of the object, such as, anthropology, science about a person;
in this case, it is possible to express it as “spiritual anthropology.” The latter
should not evaluate a person as something that is constant once and forever,
and not as a static concept. Even when a person thinks about himself and
defines himself through a pronoun I, I is no more than a symbol of infinite
depth, and I is only its name. The essence of a person is not something
static; the creative person is capable each day of recognizing himself as
something else. The essence of a person is developed during the spiritual
self-cognition leading a person in his infinite way to the Person, to
perfection, and to an ideal that is to open the spiritual archetype of
humankind to the full volume. This process by itself is the supreme kind of
spiritual creativity and creation where a person creates not something alien
to itself, or something auxiliary for his existence, but his very essence.
Up until now we have established that the concept of spiritual as
different from all others, and, having made this work, we inevitably gave
birth to a word. Heidegger remarks, that “everything that occurs in the
‘logos,’ is the task of ‘sofia,’ or philosophers.”13 Thus, a vicious circle
appears: if we try to address the problem of spiritual without depending on
religion, philosophy, and other spheres, and start to allocate it as
independent, it becomes impossible to avoid logos and sofia; and if the love
for an object of research is initially present, then all characteristics of
philosophy are intact. It seems to be ineradicable. It happens that exactly
those who break the established stereotypes and opinions about philosophy
are the true philosophers. That is exactly what happened with Pascal and
Kierkegaard, with Camus and Kafka. Then the true philosophy appears as
meta-philosophizing, for which there are no borders. Then the analysis of
the problem of spiritual becomes an attempt to catch all its intrinsic displays
in logos, and these displays are not limited by the sphere of traditional
philosophy, but they comprise both ancient mysteries and the newest
scientific research about the person.
The ideal of Eastern Christian anthropology can be expressed through
the concept of theology14 (coming from Greek.  – theosis) that is
12 M. Heidegger, Metaphysics – What is it? (Мoscow: 1986), p. 117.
13 M. Heidegger, Main Concepts of Metaphysics // Journal «Questions of
Philosophy», № 7, 1989, p. 136.
14 Concerning this thematic see the following materials: Illarion (Alfeev),
Hierom Saint Simeon New Theologian and Orthodox Tradition (Мoscow: 
1998); Illarion (Alfeev), Hierom Life and Doctrine of Saint George Theologian
(Мoscow: 1998); Macarius Egyptian (the Great), Spiritual Talks of Saint
Trinity Sergio Monastery (1994); Mythical Theology, Kiev, “Way to the Truth”
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characterized by the ecstatic experience of direct uniting with Absolute.
Though a historical analogue and prototype of deification can be
distinguished in ancient times in shaman – orgies cults, that aimed at
removing distance between a man and the Gods (world of spirits),
nevertheless deification in the true sense of the word appears only when
spiritual cognition comes to the concept of transcendental Personality –
personalized theism.
Deification is not just “moral” unity and utmost limit of human
perfection, but it is an ontological one. At the same time it does not mean
unity with God; that is impossible in personalized theistic traditions of a
transcendental type. According to these traditions, a problem appears: What
is a way to bring together an ontological character of a man’s deification
and transcendental incomprehensibility of God? The source of the
deification of a man is not his deity essence (Nature) but a grace, God-
blessing energy. Grace of Spirit differs, but it is not separated from essence.
Thus, the divine presence becomes possible regardless of the absolute
transcendence of God. Present basic postulates that characterize deification
were approved by Constantinople councils of 1341 and 1351, and that was
connected with the activity of St. Gregory Palamas (1296-1359). In Russia,
Hesychastic ideas of deification developed in the creations and lives of St.
Sergius of Radonezh (ок. 1315-92), Nil Sorsky (St. Nilus of Sora, 1433-
1508), Blessed Paisius Velichkovsky (1722-1794), Seraphim of Sarov
(1760-1833), the Optina Monastery Elders (startzy), Joann Kronstadtsky -
(1829-1909), and others.
Deification is directed to the transformation of a man as a biological
specimen into a man as a spiritual creature; it does not diminish or destroy
humanity but enriches it. (J. Meyendorff). It is realized through
transcendence of real existence and it means a break to being and reason, on
the basis of religious-existential experience (death, depravity, penitence,
cry, blessing, and love). At the same time, not only the identity
(personality) of a man remains, but a fundamental self-cognition occurs that
leads to deployment of man’s essence and revelation of a spiritual archetype
of humankind. Theosis in this connection means orthodoxy and not
absorption of a creature being (V.N. Losskiy). Deification not only keeps a
man personality intact (holism), but for the first time at the ontological level
establishes it; not only a soul is glorified but also a body. Thus, the
deification doctrine expresses the anthropological ideal of Eastern
(1991); Gregory Palamas, Triodes for Protection of Saint-Mutes (Мoscow:
Canon, 1995); I.V. Popov, Idea of Divinity in Ancient Eastern Church (1909);
Saint Simeon New Theologian, The Deity Anthem, (Sergiev Posad, 1989);
Kiprian (Kern), Archimandrite, Anthropology of St Gregory Palamas
(Мoscow: «Palmer», 1996); G.V. Florovsky, Gregory Palamas and Divinity //
Dogma and History (Мoscow: 1998), pp. 386-393; S.S. Horougiy, To
Phenomenology of Austerity (Мoscow: 1998); N. Russell, The Concept of
Deification in the Early Greek Fathers, Ph.D. thesis (Oxford: 1988)
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Christianity which, to some extent, was a foothold for Russian philosophy
that, contrary to Kant and Hume, established I substantiality as a
metaphysic of faith; personalization in contrast to Hegel; spiritual origin of
a personality as different from L. Feuerbach.
The spiritual phenomenon can also be defined through the concept of
transformation. Spiritual is carried out when a certain essence is
transformed into the Person. Furthermore, this process can acquire its own
symbolism and terminology, depending on what material is accomplished:
religious, philosophical, or other creative materials. But in its essence the
spiritual act is only spiritual, and then it is objectified in other certain areas
and disciplines. When asking a question about spiritual, we inevitably find
ourselves in the bosom of thousand-year cultural traditions. For spiritual
knowledge, a person requires some levers which would enable him to
release him from himself. Here we inevitably enter the three mentioned
spheres; each of them has the language in which and by means of which
spiritual knowledge is gained, the results of which are fixed in the same
language, and on which it is carried out. Certain methods of spiritual
knowledge have developed appropriate to specifics of spheres of its
realization: philosophizing on the basis of thinking, religious belief on the
basis of ability of the person to access the supreme feelings. According to
young K. Marks, “the originality of each intrinsic force”15 of a person
creates “the original way of its objectification.” The disclosing of a united
process of spiritual knowledge disintegrates and shows results in different
areas, and through these channels it allows a person to create himself. The
phenomenon of spiritual cannot be turned off from its manifestations as
being from living, but it is also impossible to reduce it to them. Spiritual
only shows itself in an image; only then it can be seen by a person, but any
image disguises spiritual as such. “Jesus said: Images appear to the person,
and the light in them is shadowed. In the image of the father’s light, the
light will be disclosed, and the image of the father will be shadowed by the
light.”16 Identifying images of spiritual with the spirit itself, the person
limits himself and, thus, deforms his own essence, running into narrow
dogmatism and fanaticism. However, living in the world of alienation, in
the world of spiritual the person is also compelled to move by way of trial
and error.
We say that the spiritual exists, is, but it is nothing like any other thing
in the common world. Spiritual is boundless both in breadth and in depth,
but only manifests itself concretely. A person cannot cognize himself
directly, for that would contradict his position in the world; he should either
eliminate his consciousness or become God. He is capable to cognize
himself only indirectly, through displays of the essence and its symbols.
And since the spiritual essence basically can’t be objectified, it is possible
to cognize it only in its existence. The cognition of spiritual can be carried
15 K. Marks, F. Engels, Early Works (Moscow: 1956), p. 593.
16 See Thomas’ Gospel.
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out only through its available products. A less direct way can turn out to be
the easiest way, as a roundabout road uphill is easier to take than climbing
it straight. Therefore everything that is created in culture is a mediated path
to spiritual. And each person chooses an appropriate way that appeals to
him and to his essence. It is impossible to say that A. Pushkin's aesthetic
creativity was not the spiritual way, compared to St. Seraphim of Sarov’s
prayer.17 For the writer or the poet, his artistic activity is the spiritual
creativity, the appropriate method of disclosing his essence. From this point
of view it is probably difficult to allocate what has most importance and
priority, religion or philosophy, art creativity or, for example, music. The
concrete personal approach is necessary here, the criterion of which is the
depth of disclosing his essence.
Spiritual knowledge is revelation that splits into three basic spheres,
but forms a unity, nevertheless. Philosophy, religion, and art as specific
ways of displaying the spiritual do not only contradict each other, but also
communicate and interact with each other in the entire culture of mankind.
CONCLUSIONS
Therefore, some intrinsic characteristics of the spiritual phenomenon
are already determined, the spheres of its actions and objectivities allocated.
When talking about the definition of the concept of spiritual, it is
impossible to stop at any of the pre-established points of view, for example,
extremely religious or atheistic; it would deform the concept of spiritual as
this would only be a one-sided consideration of it. In the modern world we
notice every possible, and sometimes opposite, type of world view. The
task is that their carriers must find a common language, and, moreover, the
general spiritual basis for dialogue. Therefore this work attempts an all-
round analysis of a spiritual phenomenon and through its displays it
attempts to create a complete and intrinsic representation about it. But it is
equally necessary to find some starting point of research, and it is already
determined: spiritual is examined as the process of uncovering the person’s
essence. The basis of this analysis is the position of a person in the world, a
position in which he discovers himself in the act of consciousness. He
discovers himself as essence, which inside him contains contradictions and
moves among them. The essence of them is that the person is as if crucified
between two worlds: empirical and theoretical, sensual and speculative; he
is simultaneously spiritual and material essence. This position of a person in
the world is reflected by religion in the basic doctrines and by philosophy in
categories: through the symbol of the fall from grace and a category of
being or essence. Disclosing of religious symbolism and philosophical
categorical apparatus is the answer, in the attempt of making judgments and
17 A.S. Pushkin is a great Russian writer, while Seraphim of Sarov is a
famous saint of the Russian Orthodox Church. They lived at the same time at
the beginning of the 19th century.
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in the feeling of overcoming the contradictions of the human position in the
world. There are concepts of ideal and material, goodness and
maliciousness, etc. The concept of spiritual in this case is considered not as
a category that is counter material, and not as some absolute that would
have removed in itself matter and spirit, but as the highest level of
intelligence, sensibleness by a person of his position in the world, his being
and his essence. The spiritual truth is nothing else than true and correct,
agreeable to the attitude of a person to himself and the world. “Truth that,”
wrote Kafka, “is necessary for each person for life; nevertheless, he can not
receive or get that from anybody. Each person continuously should give rise
to it from itself, otherwise he will be lost. Life without truth is impossible.
It can be said that the truth is the very life.”18
Originally, the spiritual existed for a person as such a mystery in
which he must lose himself, enter some kind of ecstasy, the changed
condition of consciousness, thus accomplishing thus some transcendence of
his routine existence. But all this occurred mostly due to the elimination of
conscious life, rather than due to the increase of sensibleness. However, a
person needed some way of transcendence, because even now, having come
to a deadlock, he can choose as a remedy alcohol, drugs, or various
mystical illusions. Qualitatively a new understanding of spiritual and a
method of its achievement has appeared along with the occurrence of
philosophy and monotheistic religions. The spiritual attitude toward life
began to appear, where a person began to comprehend life metaphysically
from his position in the world. Based on such judgment the representation
of Plato’s idea was born; the idea about the ideal relation to life, that is, the
spiritual, appeared. The idea as a spiritual vision is expressed most
adequately, though not without some problems, in Plato’s philosophy. In
religion the metaphysical comprehension of life is fixed on its central
symbol. Through such a symbol or idea for human consciousness arises the
possibility of an entry into spiritual and it is the realization by a person of
his spiritual life. Christ, Buddha, and Plato have managed to penetrate into
the spiritual essence of a person’s position in the world and to express it in
symbols and concepts. Their positions contain a speculative truth which is
demonstrated in the materials of various cultures and through various
methods. And as spiritual knowledge concerns neither the abilities of a
person nor what he has, but what he is in his essence, the spiritual truth is
he himself on the highest level of sensibleness of his being, once the
essence is completely developed, resulting in the appearance of the spiritual
archetype of humankind. For this reason Christ said “I am the way,” and al-
Hallaj, “I am the Truth.”
Spiritual results from the position of a person in the world, which is
characterized by such concepts as freedom, will, consciousness,
speculation, etc. From the realization of spiritual cognition and from its
18 F. Kafka, Castle. Stories and Legends // Letter to Dad (Мoscow: 1991),
p. 568.
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consideration here and now arise such concepts as existence and
transcendence, which essentially characterize a phenomenon of spiritual.
The necessity of spiritual comes from the position of a person in the
world that is characterized by duality and contradictions: a human person
by nature is a biological creature, and by essence, spiritual, but a person is
a unity and integrity of everything he has. He enters the sphere of spiritual
or essentially human area when he starts posing existential questions about
the significance of his own life. Spiritual is represented as truth of human
life, which is born from comprehension of the life itself. Spiritual is the
supreme product of life as it is, which comes to the self-consciousness and
conscious increasing in the person. Searching for the meaning of life results
in the necessity of self-knowledge, the essence of being. Spiritual cognition
is a vertical path whereas all other kinds of knowledge are distributed in a
horizontal plane. This vertical path, or the intrinsic cognition of the
meaning of life, is nothing else but self-cognition, as a result of which the
essence of the person is developed and created, showing the spiritual
archetype of humankind.
The self-cognition as knowledge of the cognizing subject is
speculation about his essence, as a result of which it comes to the increasing
appearance that, in its turn, is characterized by the humanizing of a person,
results in his complete humanization. Such knowledge is the supreme kind
of creativity: self-mastery. In an ideally achieved spiritual perfection it is
possible to count in the one who has developed his essence, has humanized
himself, and has opened in himself the spiritual archetype of humankind.
The process of spiritual creativity in a history of culture splits into
three basic streams in which spiritual proves the most direct image:
religion, philosophy, and art. Spiritual as it is, is the unity in its concept, but
during historical periods it is carried out in various ways. It is
transformation of a person into a spiritual creature which would be
impossible without “points of support,” symbols of religion and
metaphysical categories of philosophy, based on which the consciousness is
capable of purifying itself. Spiritual penetrates all human life activity and
without it in general there is no person, though in other spheres its activity
is submitted only indirectly. However, to its self-consciousness spiritual can
come, if it is inquiring not about something else, but about it itself, not
about its spheres, even some directly objectified, but about spiritual as
initial revelation, as contemplation in which all intrinsic forces of a person
result in supreme harmony, and as perfection when the essence of a person
is completely realized in its existence, history, and culture.
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CHAPTER XI
THE ENDS OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE CONTEXT
OF CONTEMPORARY BIOPOLITICS
CRISTIAN IFTODE
Abstract: The purpose of this study is to propose and endorse a specific
answer to the question regarding the ends of philosophy in the context of
today’s culture. After a series of general remarks about the baffling
landscape of twentieth century philosophy, I will suggest that we could
regard the radical critique of modern subjectivity as being a guiding thread
for the understanding of all the relevant issues in contemporary (post-
Nietzschean) philosophy, as well as for the understanding of the way
philosophers have been relating to what they were doing. Nevertheless, I
shall argue that a very important philosophical and cultural phenomenon
can be noticed in the West since the beginning of the 1980s: the death of the
“death of the subject” and the practical turn in contemporary philosophy.
More than this, I will hold that it is this return of the subject, nowadays, as
an action subject (at the same time, a principle of practical reflexivity and
the result of a process of subjectivation), rather than an epistemic one, that
favors a rebirth of philosophy in its inaugural concept of “way of life” and
“care of the self.” After pointing out three levels of resistance to the idea of
philosophy as a practice (or set of practices) aimed to perform an effective
transformation of its subject (the prevailing socio-cultural context, so
favorable to the idea of self-acceptance; the tradition of modern moral
philosophy, bracketing the very meaning of ethics as an “ascetic” work
whose goal is the self-fashioning of the individual; some of the influential
trends in the field of contemporary moral psychology), I will speak about
three aporias that illustrate this “form of life” that is philosophy and also
define the “condition” of any philosopher: (a) disinterested contemplation
vs. existential practice; (b) Socratic-Nietzschean unsettlement vs. full
embrace of a philosophy of life; (c) self-creation vs. self-discovery. In the
end, I shall emphasize the present ethical and political relevance of the
practice of philosophy, both on a personal or rather interpersonal level (with
the goal of self-transformation) and on a public level (with the task of
consistently critically approaching all forms of disciplinary power).
Keywords: self, subject authenticity, Foucault, philosophy as practice,
self-fashioning.
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The Contemporary Landscape of Philosophy: The Distinction between
“Analytic” and “Continental” Philosophy
What is the meaning and purpose of philosophy in the context of
today’s culture? There is most likely no other discipline whose tradition
could match that of philosophy. In fact, any person having a medium degree
of education is probably aware of the following situation: it is in the realm
of philosophy that most of the disciplines constituting the “educational
offer” of a university nowadays first came into being as specific ways of
interrogation. But it is also true that there is no other discipline today that
offers, at least at first sight, the impression of such a fragmentation,
dispersion, irreducible plurality of approaches, methods, research programs,
and “objectives,” as contemporary philosophy does. The “mental cramp” –
to make use of a Wittgensteinian expression – that any given fresh graduate
student in Philosophy would experience if asked to produce one of those
fashionable presentations “in a nutshell” on the topic Contemporary
Philosophy, has to do, I believe, with something more than an education
urging him or her to be extremely cautious with any quick generalization: it
is the expression of a fundamental difficulty, if not a sheer impossibility. It
is not only about assessing an unavoidable hermeneutical circle that
constrains us to realize any historical or thematic presentation of philosophy
from a particular philosophical perspective; it is also about how many
aspects or elements of the contemporary landscape our graduate student
would feel he has to leave aside or be silent about. There is no doubt that
philosophy has presumed since its early beginnings opposite schools, that it
has lived and fed from polemics, quarrels, mutual criticisms of the most
bitter kind between its “followers.” But we could state that what has
happened in the twentieth century brings the traditional polyphony of
philosophical discourse toward a worrisome scattering. To paraphrase a
Nietzschean saying, not only do we know today less than ever what a good
philosophy book should look like; we are not at all sure about the
philosopher’s role, purpose, or task in the public space. It is no accident that
this kind of major uncertainty about the ends of philosophy is reflected in
the social environment, making hard to reject an embarrassing remark such
as the following, quoted from one of P. Raabe’s books on philosophical
counseling: if we were to analyze the job opportunities that the graduate
students in philosophy have outside universities and research institutes, we
would be forced to conclude that “academic philosophers give birth to
children who must live in other people’s houses in order to survive.”1
It is true that, in order to get a better orientation in the complicated
landscape of twentieth century philosophy, we are usually referred to a
strongly “ideologized” distinction: that between “analytic” and
“continental” philosophers. The English philosopher B. Williams once
1 P. Raabe, Issues in Philosophical Counseling (London: Greenwood
Publishing, 2002), p. 4.
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convincingly argued that “the distinction rests upon a confusion of
geographical and methodological terms, as if one were to classify cars into
front-wheel drive and Japanese.”2 Also, K. Mulligan openly admitted that,
“in numerous ways, continental philosophy is an Anglo-American
creation.”3 Most of the times the “analytics” use this expression, they refer
to a “nosology of thought” (D. Stove), that is a (hopefully) complete
inventory of ill or bad forms of doing philosophy, away from the “canon”
of the exact sciences. But even if we were to assume (which may prove
extremely unwise) that “analytic” philosophy is something unitary,
supposing a powerfully individualized way of philosophizing, specific
conceptual tools, and a clearly defined research program, it will be almost
impossible for us to make any order (let alone subsuming all the visions to
any common “denominator”) out of the troubled landscape of so many
different trends and orientations in contemporary philosophy, such as
phenomenology, hermeneutics, existentialism, neo-Marxism, personalism,
structuralism and post-structuralism, “debolism,” deconstruction, critical
theory, neo-pragmatism, and so on.
There is yet another particular circumstance that could definitively
block our graduate student trying to produce that overview of twentieth
century philosophy I mentioned earlier. There is surely no other field apart
from philosophy in which so many notable figures have made careers by
announcing, loud and clear, its death. All these successive “deaths” of
philosophy would no doubt deserve an independent study. But what
interests me now is the complicity between this kind of discourse and the
compelling announcement of yet another illustrious death: the death of the
subject.
The Radical Critique of Modern Subjectivity: A Major Theme in Twentieth
Century Philosophy
We all know that “the death of the Author” represented a real
obsession for contemporary literary theory and a trademark of structuralist
approaches; nevertheless, from a philosophical point of view, such a theme
should be regarded as an echo or an “application” of the radical critique of
modern subjectivity, an essential motif for contemporary (post-Nietzschean)
philosophy, at least on the “continent.” We could argue that for someone
interested in finding a key, a guiding thread that would allow him or her to
grasp, at least to some degree, the inner logic of the polymorphous
spectrum of philosophical debates in the last century or so, the critique of
the subject (in fact, of the entire modern philosophy denounced as being
2 A clear presentation of Williams’s point of view is to be found in S.
Critchley, Continental Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford
University Press, 2001), pp. 32-34.
3 K. Mulligan, “C’était quoi la philosophie dite «continentale» ?”, in Un
siècle de philosophie.1900-2000 (Collectif) (Paris: Gallimard, 2000), p. 334.
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grounded on a “metaphysics of the subject”) appears not only as one of the
main themes, but also as a horizon of understanding for all the relevant
philosophical issues, as well as for the way philosophers have been relating
to what they were doing, to the nature of philosophy, its relevance, its
purpose or its lack of “practical” purpose. The critique of the modern
subject, generically identified (yet often in extreme haste) with the
Cartesian cogito, a subject understood as a center of experience and action,
endowed with the attribute of reflexivity (self-consciousness) and, thus,
capable of self-determination, is, in a sense, “the mark of destiny” for our
late modernity (or “postmodernity,” if the term is not somehow imprudent).
Moreover, it doesn’t seem unwise to point out the correspondence between
this radical, generalized critique of the “subject” in all its shapes and forms
(the contemporary anti-humanism being only a dimension of this critique),
so popular in the “continental” tradition, and the “reductionist” way, to use
D. Parfit’s word, to deal with the problem of personal identity, embraced by
most of the analytic philosophers.
The Death of the “Death of the Subject” and the “Practical” Turn in
Contemporary Philosophy. The New Action Subject: A Principle of
Practical Reflexivity. Philosophy as a Way of Life. Conflicting
Metaphilosophical Views: Applied Philosophy Versus Practical Philosophy
Without going any further with the presentation of this generalized
critique of the subject, I would like, to draw attention to a very important
philosophical and cultural phenomenon that can be noticed in the West
since the beginning of the 1980s. To put it briefly and a bit theatrically, I
am speaking about the death of the “death of the subject.” We notice in the
last decades more and more approaches claiming “the return of the subject,”
the rethinking of the concept of subjectivity, or even the resettlement of the
subject in that central position of knowledge and action so strongly
challenged since the end of the nineteenth century.4 And yet, I believe we
are not fully grasping the historical challenge that all these approaches
suppose, as long as we perceive them as being nothing more than attempts
to restore a naïve conception about subjectivity (one that identifies “subject”
4 “So it seems that this subject, which the moderns had tried to propose as
its own foundation and also that of the real, is now broken. Having become,
from now on, opaque for its own gaze, knowing itself thrown into a world that
it doesn’t constitute, how could it still remain, at the end of the various
upheavals whose object it was, a subject for philosophical interrogation? And
yet, paradoxically, perhaps the debate around subjectivity has never been more
alive as it is in the different traditions of thought that structure world thinking
today,” A. Renaut, Découvrir la philosophie: Le sujet (Paris: Odile Jacob,
2010), pp. 31-32.
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with “consciousness”),5 or a notion of subject elaborated in modern
philosophy (whether we are referring to the Cartesian cogito, the Leibnizian
monad, or the transcendental subject of Kant).
The subject that seems to return, nowadays, is an action subject, rather
than an epistemic one;6 it is not a transcendental position, but a principle of
practical reflexivity; it is neither an “originary auto-affection” nor merely a
discursive function (as in post-modern approaches), but the result of a
process of subjectivation.
I will make another strong assumption: it is this death of “the death of
the subject” that favors a rebirth of philosophy in its inaugural concept of
“way of life” and “care of the self.” And yet, in order to avoid a primary
misunderstanding of these old desiderata, a considerable effort might be
required, an effort to conceive the nature of philosophy in a significantly
different manner than the one currently propagated in universities and
engraved on the minds of the public. What I mean is that we are
accustomed to regard philosophy as a body of theories having possible
applications. But what if we tried to see philosophy as a kind of practice in
itself or, even better, as a set of social practices, most of which have, of
course, an eminently discursive or dialogical character?7 What I have in
5 “It is not about exploiting, for instance, the conscience of a loss that we
all feel, more or less, when confronted by the tyranny of Mass Media or
publicity or by the phenomena of cultural conditioning, in order to simply
reestablish, in its old form, the theme of subjectivity (…); we rightfully exclude
the idea of an unproblematic return to the perspective of a self-transparent
subject, sovereign author of all of its acts” (ibidem, p. 34).
6 The hypothesis I am embracing rests also upon this fact, stated by
Renaut: it is in the field of moral and political reflection that contemporary
philosophy explicitly attested its impossibility to abandon the theme of the
subject. Regarding the former, it will be sufficient to remember the
impossibility of understanding “moral experience without understanding
ourselves as being responsible for our actions,” which obviously refers to “a
‘self’ capable of answering to another as well as to its own conscience” for its
deeds, and thus to a moral subject (ibidem, p. 34). As to the political philosophy
of our times, it is interesting to notice that we are witnessing, in the following
of the Heideggerian reading of modern metaphysics, “the condemnation of a
founding subjectivity as being the distant root of totalitarian or technocratic
subjection,” since this kind of denouncement makes sense only by appeal to “a
particular idea of the human being as one to whom, in an enslaved world, is
denied any opportunity and any right of being the fundament of its own
thoughts and actions; in short: of being a subject and not only an object, reified
bearer of an endless manipulation” (ibidem, p. 33).
7 “What is philosophy when rather than as merely logos, one wants to
think of it as ergon? … For philosophy to find its reality it must be practice
(both in the singular and plural, a practice and practices); the reality of
philosophy is found in its practices,” stated Foucault in his 1983 course at
Collège de France, while commenting on Plato’s Seventh Letter, see M.
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mind are two conflicting representations about the distinctive mark of
philosophy, or even two competing metaphilosophical views: according to
the one I am now endorsing, “practical philosophy” is a very different thing
from “applied philosophy,” while the famous dichotomy between
theoretical and practical philosophy seems to become rather irrelevant.
This change of perspective regarding philosophical activity is then
decisive in order to have a right evaluation of the strictly philosophical
purpose that the so-called “techniques of the self” suppose (or, if we are to
use the traditional expression, prone nowadays to unfortunate
misunderstandings, the “spiritual exercises,” involving various techniques
of concentration, meditation, increasing attention, etc., developed and
transmitted in the field of philosophy since its historical beginnings). I am
referring to exercises of thought (in a very generic sense) aimed to produce
a determined ethical effect: performing an effective transformation in the
“being” itself of the one who philosophizes, in his or her way of living, of
relating to the world, to people and to himself or herself; curing illusions
and freeing from prejudices; strengthening the mind and the soul, acquiring
serenity and inner equilibrium through “the therapy of desire” (M.
Nussbaum) and “the education of affectivity” (P. Aubenque). These
“techniques of the self” (I make use of M. Foucault’s expression) shouldn’t
be regarded as applications of a philosophical doctrine of some kind; they
are the very concretization of a philosophy, its “incorporation,”
synonymous with the subjectivation of a discourse of truth.
The Contemporary Spirituality Crisis and the Levels of Resistance to the
Idea of Philosophy as “a Way of Life” and “Care of the Self”
I am convinced that we shouldn’t hurry with the celebration of this
alleged re-appreciation of philosophy in terms of “way of life” (P. Hadot)
and genuine ascetics (Foucault); it is natural to ask ourselves whether we
are dealing with something more than an attractive slogan lacking any
coverage in daily life. And it is clear that, no matter how sincere this appeal
made by some of the notable figures in contemporary philosophy may be, it
has to face powerful resistances.
The first level of resistance is no other than the prevailing socio-
cultural context, one so favorable to the idea of self-acceptance. We are
being bombarded on all channels with messages, commercials, promos,
“enlightening” examples, and motivational speeches whose basic idea
seems to be the following: Learn to accept yourself as you are, and
everything will be fine! An amazing web of forces is eroding the faith in the
spiritual potential within each of us that is in our inborn capacities of
personal evolution, our power of self-fashioning and self-cultivation. How
far we are today from that precept of sages from Antiquity: learn to accept
Foucault, The Government of Self and Others (1982-1983), trans. G. Burchell
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 251-252.
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what is not in your power to change, but never indulge in accepting yourself
“as you are” – there is always room for improvement; there is always room
for spiritual development and self-change! We thus forget the warning that
could be read behind Nietzsche’s definition of man as “the animal whose
nature has not yet been fixed”8: the moment we stopped evolving, we’ve
already begun to devolve! What we risk losing for good in the “affluent
society” is precisely the idea of spiritualizing daily life, not in a mystical
sense9, but in the sense of a continuous effort (hence the generic meaning of
the philosophical “askesis”) to expand our horizons and deepen our
perspective, acknowledging the fact that, “in contrast to the tradition of the
cogito and to the pretension of the subject to know itself by immediate
intuition, …we understand ourselves only by the long detour of the signs of
humanity deposited in cultural works.”10
Ch. Taylor has underlined the following fact: a “simplified
expressivism” permeated Western society after the Second World War.11
We are told incessantly: be yourself! But the right question to ask ourselves
is whether this modern obsession for authenticity (generating all kinds of
“recipes” for personal happiness) is not, in fact, yet another mechanism in
service of the “System,” certifying the “biopolitical paradigm” of our time
(so-named by critics of modernity such as Foucault or Agamben): a
paradigm in which the telos of our existence is practically reduced to the
“ideal” of physical and economic health of the society’s members, and the
subjectivation of human beings is being realized by a repertoire of
disciplinary techniques aiming at the “normalization” and leveling of
individuals. Encouraging us to “be ourselves” without stipulating any need
for a prior spiritual “training” whatsoever, the modern ideal of authenticity
is addressed to an individual led to believe that he can find himself through
a spontaneous and unprogrammed effort. Convinced that he is knowingly
“choosing himself,” the individual who is in complete ignorance of the
ancient “techniques of the self” (techniques of detachment, of analyzing
representations, and enhancing attention) is actually and unavoidably
8 See Fr. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, § 62.
9 Following Foucault’s suggestions from his 1982 course at Collège de
France, if “we will call ‘philosophy’ the form of thought that … attempts to
determine the conditions and limits of the subject’s access to the truth … then I
think we could call ‘spirituality’ the search, practice, and experience through
which the subject carries out the necessary transformations on himself in order
to have access to the truth,” M. Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject.
Lectures at the Collège de France 1981-1982, trans. G. Burchell (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2005), p. 15.
10 See P. Ricoeur, From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II, trans.
Kathleen Blamey and John B. Thompson (Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 1991[1986]).
11 Ch. Taylor, A Secular Age (Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 475.
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assimilating one of the identity “recipes” that circulates on the market.12
Each of us thinks he is being “himself,” but we all become the same: people
following the latest fashion and trends, hollow, obsessed with material
wealth, and deprived of any spiritual horizon.
“When one sees the meaning, or rather the near-total absence of
meaning, given to all the familiar expressions, such as: come back to
yourself, free yourself, be yourself, be authentic, etc….one might begin to
suspect the impossibility of constituting today an ethic of the self. However,
it is perhaps an urgent, fundamental, and politically indispensable task, that
of constituting an ethic of the self, if it is true that after all there is no other
point…of resistance to political power than in the relation of the self to
itself,” stated Foucault in his 1982 course at Collège de France.13
An edifying clue regarding the spiritual crisis we are facing today14
comes also from the confrontation of the Socratic maxim of care of the self
– the fundamental principle for the entire Greek and Latin ancient
philosophy, at least in Foucault’s view – with the principle of moral
indifference toward yourself, so fashionable today. This last principle could
be seen as the slogan of an ethical minimalism exerting great power of
seduction in the present context, a minimalism whose stake is to transfer the
principle of neutrality from political liberal philosophy into the realm of
personal relationships, by denying the relevance of any moral judgment
about what you are doing with your own life, as long as you are not causing
any direct and intended harm to others15. But we could again ask ourselves
if this principle of “neutrality” is not in fact yet another instrument of
disciplinary power designed to put us off our guard, a slogan behind which
operates multiple conditionings and manipulations, diverse and subtle
techniques of domination, leveling, and “normalization.”
We spoke until now about a cultural and social resistance that the
revival of the meaning of philosophy as “care of the self” has to face. A
second resistance comes from the philosophical sphere itself, more
precisely, from the tradition of modern moral philosophy, a philosophy
12 Thus, the demand for authenticity loses any actual meaning and, worse
than that, it becomes itself a disciplinary technique, an instrument used in
ascribing to individuals “normal,” standard identities, reassuring them that this
is what they “really” want or what they “really” are.
13 The passage is quoted from E. McGushin, Foucault’s Askêsis: An
Introduction to the Philosophical Life (Evanston, IL.: Northwestern University
Press, 2007), p. XV. The full passage, in a slightly different translation, is to be
found in M. Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, pp. 251-252.
14 A theme for reflection that perhaps shouldn’t remain the monopoly of
religious fundamentalism is the extent to which a specific “spirituality” crisis in
Western society could be regarded as one of the key factors in the current
global economic crisis.
15 See R. Ogien, L’éthique aujourd’hui. Maximalistes et minimalistes
(Paris : Ed. Gallimard, 2007).
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focused on the elaboration of theories of right action that bracket (when not
explicitly denying) the very possibility of fashioning the character through
“practices of the self.”
If we take into consideration the general framework in which moral
philosophy has been elaborated in twentieth century, I think we can easily
observe a few major tendencies:
(A) Anglo-Saxon moral philosophy was characterized by an
oscillation between the Kantian tradition of duty-based ethics and versions
of utilitarianism. But what these two methods of moral thinking have in
common, despite the differences – intrinsically right principles vs. rational
evaluation of consequences – is “the impersonal point of view,” the
assumption that the right action is the action that any given subject should
choose in a similar situation. It is clear that such an approach implies, as I
said earlier, the bracketing of the meaning of ethics as an “ascetic” work
whose goal is the “self-fashioning” of the individual.
(B) On the Continent, in the first half of the twentieth century, as in
the years following the Second World War, we witness the rise of a number
of existentialist ethics that highlight the subject’s “transcendence” and the
agent’s freedom, but are denying this subject any substantial reality,
reducing it to (or confronting it with) “a set of perpetually open
possibilities.” It would follow that any “self-choice” is nothing but an
accident, a contingent fact, the ideal of authenticity thus being reduced to a
perpetual self-distancing or self-denial (at least this is the Sartrean
conception of the thirties and forties, one so influential in its times16). Then,
the ascent of structuralism in the decades following the war is in fact
synonymous with that announcement of “the death of the subject” earlier
mentioned: a subject seen only as a variable position in a structure or being
reduced to a simple discursive function, a kind of approach that seemed, at
that point, to produce the decisive frame for the “dissolution” of the
traditional issues of ethics (“the good life”) into a “political” theory
searching to define “the optimum of political functioning.”17
It is not before the 1980s – on one hand, by the emergence and the
success of “philosophical counseling” in the Anglo-Saxon space (a practice
resuming, in a very pragmatic spirit, the ancient claims of philosophy to
prove itself relevant in the context of daily life), and on the other hand by
16 Note how MacIntyre points out that the “nullity” of the self, separated
from its social roles, is a common assumption (and thus symptomatic for the
“spirit of the time”) of two seemingly opposite approaches, such as Sartrean
existentialist philosophy and Goffman’s sociology, see Al. MacIntyre, After
Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory (University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), p. 32.
17 See, for instance, the interview given by M. Foucault to P. Caruso in
1967, “Qui êtes-vous, professeur Foucault?”, reproduced in M. Foucault, Dits
et écrits I. 1955-1975 (Paris: Ed. Gallimard (Quarto), 2001), pp. 645-646.
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the extremely favorable reception of the pledges of Hadot or Foucault for
understanding ancient philosophy as being ultimately a form of life18 – that
the possibility to see the constitution of the ethical subject as the explicit
stake and task of practical philosophy is constantly and insistently brought
into discussion.19
A third level of resistance that the philosophical concern for the “care
of the self” has to face is located in the field of a moral psychology that
declines the very possibility of ethical subjectivation by challenging the
central assumption of any “virtue ethics”: the idea that the “character” of a
human being can be shaped by forming some stable habits or behavior
reflexes. This rejection would seem justified on the basis of two different
(even opposite) approaches:
(A) In the psychology of personality there is an influent current called
“situationism,” which states, on the basis of some empirical researches
more or less relevant, the non-existence of character in a strong, Aristotelian
sense.20 For instance, conducting a series of tests on preschool children
designed to provoke reactions of honesty and honor, some psychologists
pointed out the fact that these children behaved fairly or unfairly in a totally
inconsistent way; hence, it was concluded that “honesty” is not an “inner
entity,” but only “a function of situation.” Still, let’s recognize that an
Aristotelian wouldn’t feel at all embarrassed by such an experiment,
precisely because he is not tempted to refer to the personality of a child as
something certifying Rousseauist purity of the authentic and intrinsically
good “self,” uncontaminated by society, but only as to a raw material to be
shaped. Also, the critics of virtue ethics often tend to neglect a fundamental
distinction for the Stagirite, that between “natural virtues” and “real
virtues,” the former being nothing more than rough and especially
fluctuating impulses that, in the absence of right assessment of each
18 Let’s not forget the massive success, not only in the French space,
currently registered by the books of L. Ferry, M. Onfray or A. Comte-
Sponville.
19 It can be argued in this context that the analysis of the “care of the self”
in ancient philosophy is the starting point in formulating a current philosophical
alternative to the various attempts to “deconstruct the subject” registered in the
twentieth century. However, it can be argued, based on Derrida’s statements,
that the experience of “deconstruction” is a “spiritual exercise” in itself,
necessary to all of us that have received a philosophical education (see on this
topic E. McGushin, ”Foucault and the Problem of the Subject,” in Philosophy
and Social Criticism, vol. 31, 5-6 / 2005).
20 See on this matter J. Doris, Lack of Character: Personality and Moral
Behavior (Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 23-27, approvingly quoted
by R. Ogien, L’éthique aujourd’hui, pp. 63-66.
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situation, often cause reckless behavior, contrary to truly virtuous
conduct.21
(B) There would be yet another alternative, opposite to the one
outlined above, but equally disastrous for “virtue ethics”: to claim that
“characters” really do exist, but in a sense so strong that they are
exclusively the result of heredity, possibly of the experiences from the first
years of life, however, excluding any prospect of further (re)shaping! In the
same context, recalling that “character shaping” is, in terms of the Ancients,
a task synonymous with “the education of affectivity” and, at the same
time, defining emotions as “involuntary reactions” in the strictest sense,22
we would conclude that the idea of acquiring the virtues is a goal lacking
any coverage in real life.
But what if we were to confront these two divergent positions and,
using a strategy not at all unfamiliar to philosophers, see the Situationist
arguments as arguments supporting the possibility of considering the self
not a fixed and immutable given, but a work to accomplish? I think a
similar strategy is also used by P. Ricoeur when, taking note of the
sequence of puzzling cases through which Parfit sought to undermine the
importance we “spontaneously” attach to the idea of ”personal identity,” he
suggests that we see them not as arguments in favor of a “quasi Buddhist”
dissolution of the self, but as arguments stressing the need to assume a
narrative conception about the self.23 Perhaps our personal identity is truly
not the summing up of some physical determinations, but the assuming of a
personal history – which is a completely different thing than the evidence
of a “psychological continuity” more or less fluctuating. I also find relevant
for what I have earlier qualified as being the death of “the death of the
subject” in contemporary philosophy the fact that in the last decades of the
twentieth century, two philosophers descending from completely different
traditions, D. Dennett and Ricoeur, come to propose (beyond all that
separates their conceptions and methods) an open notion of narrative self as
21 “Each of us seems to possess the character he has in some sense by
nature, since right from birth we are just, prone to temperance, courageous, and
the rest. Nevertheless, we expect to find that what is really good is something
different, and that we shall possess these qualities in another way; for both
children and animals have the natural states, but without intellect they are
obviously harmful … But if the agent acquires intellect, then his action is quite
different; his state, while similar to what it was, will then be real virtue … so
there are two in the part related to character – natural virtue and real virtue; and
of these, real virtue does not develop without practical wisdom,” Aristotle,
Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 13, 1144b, trans. R. Crisp (Cambridge University
Press, 2004).
22 A possibility outlined by R. Ogien, L’éthique aujourd’hui, p. 67.
23 See P. Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. K. Blamey (The University
of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 138-139.
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a way to overcome the paradoxes that the problem of personal identity has
raised in modern philosophy.
Aporias that Define the Philosopher’s Condition: (a) Disinterested
Contemplation vs. Existential Practice; (b) Socratic-Nietzschean
Unsettlement vs. Full Embrace of a Philosophy of Life; (c) Self-Creation vs.
Self-Discovery
If we try to regard philosophy not as a body of theories having
questionable applications in the real life, but as a set of social practices,
most of which have a discursive character or even an eminently dialogical
one, I think the following aspect will result: the aporias that we first have to
face are not those that equally configure and complicate the philosophical
discourse in general, but the aporias that illustrate this “form of life” that is
philosophy, philosophy as a practice, therefore the aporias defining the
condition of the philosopher himself or herself!24
I will try to make explicit three such aporias intimately linked, drawn
from what I would imagine as an open-ended series:
(a) The first emphasizes the tension between the aim of philosophical
“contemplation” on one hand, understood as a way to transcend the
concrete data of existence and to connect, by Reason, to the eternal and the
universal, and to the “practical” meaning of philosophy on the other (“the
return to the cave,” if we were to make use of the Platonic metaphor), the
task of enlightening and educating, the care of the self and of one’s fellows,
which many philosophers have felt as their ultimate calling. At this point,
we are not speaking, as before, of two conflicting metaphilosophical views
(“one focusing on the pole of discourse, the other, on the pole of life
choice”25), but instead we are trying to grasp what may lay behind a
personal choice for philosophy. Each of us who have received
philosophical instruction should ask ourselves why we chose philosophy: in
order to escape from the miseries and frustrations of everyday life in an
“ivory tower,” or because we fostered the belief that philosophy can change
our lives and our selves, that it can bring us “spiritual strengthening” and
greater control over the daily facts of life, a control emerged from a
superior understanding of the world, of the relationships with the others,
and with ourselves? And yet, it is precisely because I don’t think we can
give a clear-cut answer to this question that I am speaking of an “aporia.”
24 Following Aristotle but also N. Hartmann, I assume that the discovery
of “aporias” does not amount to a definitive blockage, to a stunning of thought;
on the contrary, an aporia could be seen as the invitation to find a personal
answer (with contextual validity) to an “eternal problem.”
25 See P. Hadot, La philosophie comme manière de vivre : Entretiens avec
J. Carlier et A. Davidson (Albin Michel, 2001).
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Hadot has shown that in the ancient world, the philosopher always
seemed to the others a strange (atopos), unclassifiable character, one who
was not “at ease” in the world. All the ancient schools of philosophy, even
the Skeptics, saw the philosophical life as a rupture of the quotidian; “but at
the same time, the philosopher acts in the quotidian life, sometimes giving
even specific indications.”26 Socrates provided the model par excellence of
the philosophical life, conceived not as a complete escape from the
quotidian, but as a way of sustaining a modified and lucid relationship with
oneself, with others, and with nature. (It is here that we could detect the
roots of Heidegger’s notion of “authenticity”). This relationship defines the
very meaning of the spiritual conversion attained through the practice of
philosophy in Antiquity: not the immersion in a private, interior world of a
human being, but a modified relation to the “exterior,” or the entire network
of practices that equally express and constitute the self (as extended self, to
use an expression borrowed from sociology, as opposed to the modern
nuclear self). Plutarch, as reminded by Hadot, clearly stated: “Socrates was
a philosopher not because he taught from a chair, but because he talked to
his friends and joked with them; he also went in the agora and, in the end,
he had an exemplary death. So it is the practice of Socrates’s everyday life
that was his true philosophy.”27
Still, such a judgment may seem extreme and unfair in regard to all of
those philosophers who had outstanding contributions in various fields of
academic philosophy, even though there was nothing special about their
lives, at least compared with Socrates’s legendary destiny. This is why I
would prefer to suggest that a general and very formal “solution” of the
aporia above may lay in its “temporalization”: trying to see philosophical
contemplation as a necessary moment of escape from the quotidian, and the
“care of the self,” the community practices, as a necessary sequel of the
philosophical course.28 But I believe a more accurate picture would be that
of a continuous “back and forth” along the entire philosophical life,
between the space of abstract thought and the demands arising from the fact
of living in the world and sharing it with your fellow people. It should be
said that the “abstract” often proves itself to be “a necessary hiding space”
and an existential respite in order “for understanding, and maybe change, to
take place”29: you temporarily run away from the death of your loved one
by thematizing “the being-toward-death.” But the important thing is not to
forget to return and examine your concrete existence in the light of your
26 Ibid., p. 162.
27 Ibid., p. 164.
28 The Stoics could provide us with the model of combining the exercise
of the “view from above” in their moments of solitude with the focus on the
present and the increasing of attention in relation to others in the agora.
29 See L. Amir, “Philosophical Practice: A Method and Three Cases,” in
Practical Philosophy, vol. 6.1, 2003, pp. 36-41.
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philosophical commitments; without the belief in the power of philosophy
to change and improve your life, you are no better than any sophist.
It is also worth adding that, in the end, each philosophical school of
Antiquity proposed a specific way of conversion and of harmonization of
the theoretical dimension of philosophy with the demands of living in
community, but that these “life choices” are placed, following Hadot’s
point of view, in a relatively small number of “transhistorical or
transcultural” possible attitudes toward existence.30
(b) A second aporia that a philosopher has to face engages other two
conflicting demands: the Socratic-Nietzschean demand for a specific
unsettlement and a continuous experimentation, an extreme willingness to
place oneself in any position, to judge things from as many perspectives as
possible, to think otherwise than before, to think against your own
“intuitions” and prejudices, confronted with the demand for full acceptance
of a particular point of view, involving a notion of authenticity that
“condemns” to an existence lived in perfect harmony with the philosophical
principles already adopted.
You do not permit yourself to stop before any ultimate wisdom,
ultimate goodness, ultimate power, while unharnessing your
thoughts;…perhaps man will rise ever higher as soon as he ceases
to flow out into a god.31
On one hand, the critical willingness that a philosopher must prove by
questioning any personal belief and by always trying to see things through
other theoretical “lenses” than the ones he or her has grown accustomed to
use32 seems to be a prerequisite for any philosophical training whatsoever:
assuming there exist, for instance, those “transcultural” philosophical
attitudes Hadot spoke about (corresponding, say, to the six major schools of
30 See P. Hadot, La philosophie comme manière de vivre, pp. 118-119,
where the French exegete mentions, for instance, the attitudinal agreement
between Pyrrho and Lao Tzu, between the Plotinian mystic and some trends in
Hindu thought, or between the Stoic attitude of accepting fate and of placing
your individual existence in the grand scheme of things, and some Chinese or
Buddhist attitudes.
31 Fr. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, § 285, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York:
Random House, 1974), pp. 229-230.
32 “Brief habits. I love brief habits and consider them an inestimable
means for getting to know many things and states, down to the bottom of their
sweetness and bitternesses” (Nietzsche, The Gay Science, § 295, p. 236).
Nietzsche refines this idea in a footnote: “some stability and temporary
equilibrium are needed to permit the concentration of all mental and emotional
resources on the most important problems. One simply cannot question
everything at once. The most one can do is to grant nothing permanent
immunity.”
The Ends of Philosophy in the Context of Contemporary Biopolitics 151
philosophy in ancient Greece), how could I truly understand their
positioning and particularities without becoming myself, in turn, Platonist,
Epicurean, Stoic, Skeptic, and so forth? But on the other hand, the
philosopher who confines himself or herself to change his or her ideas as
often as he or she changes shirts loses credibility before his or her fellows
and is considered a mere sophist. Besides the internal consistency of a
doctrine, the harmony or the full correspondence between acts and words
has always been a criterion for judging the relevance of a philosophy. And
it is precisely this existential or – to use a term of ancient origin –
“parrhesiastic”33 notion of truth that gave to the spiritual exercises the
meaning of concrete techniques of subjectivation or “incorporation” of a
philosophical discourse. The texts and, in particular, the courses from
Foucault's last years brilliantly illustrate this tension between the demand of
a permanent self-distancing (se déprendre de soi-même) and the
requirement to make of your own life and body a “theater of truth.”
Again, a specific “temporalization” seems to be the generic “solution”
of the aporia, transforming its two “arms” in a succession of moments: the
self-distancing may thus be regarded as an indispensable preparatory
moment before choosing a particular philosophy. In fact, as in the previous
case, it may be just a theoretical simplification of a continuous “back and
forth”: the philosopher is a person without dogmas, who puts everything
“on the table” in any debate, in any genuine exercise of dialogue, only later
to find out what remains of his or her beliefs or, more precisely, which of
the ideas he has endorsed, in various formulations, return. (Here I have in
mind a possible application of Nietzsche’s doctrine of the Eternal Return as
an “ethical-selective” criterion, in the sense of Deleuze’s interpretation.34)
Perhaps the philosopher’s truths can never “freeze,” cannot take the
form of definitive certainty, being only the ideas you regain, here and now,
with every dialogue and every controversy. Likewise, maybe your
projective self can only be subject to retrospective consideration: it is
nothing but the “precipitate” of numerous variations35.
33 Term derived from the noun parrhêsia, the Greek word that designates
boldness and freedom of speech. Initially employed in the political context of
Athenian democracy, parrhêsia supposed the determination to speak the truth
at any cost, to fearlessly speak at all times, regardless of the consequences.
Foucault focused his last courses on the study of the ethical-philosophical
implications of this notion.
34 See G. Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. H. Tomlinson
(Columbia University Press, 2006).
35 Assuming the fact that we cannot simply discover “who we really are”
and that the elaboration of our own conception about life is always made on the
ground of the possibilities of (self)interpretation available in our culture, we are
left with the hope that by trying different perspectives and by constantly putting
to the test our professed beliefs and commitments in the space of free dialogue,
we will finally be able to “sediment” our guiding ideas. Perhaps this remains
the only way to get to affirm “It is a fact that I think what I think and I am what
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(c) If we place the “philosophical life” conceived as “true life” (alêthês
bios) between the two poles of authenticity mentioned above, we may be
led to a third aporia: is the philosopher’s “self” something that has to be
(re)discovered or something that has to be created?
“I do not think it is ever completely clear or resolved … whether the
self is something to which you return because it is given in advance or an
objective you must set for yourself and to which you might finally gain
access if you achieve wisdom. Is the self the point to which you return
through the long detour of ascesis and philosophical practice? Or is the self
an object you keep always before your eyes and reach through a movement
that in the end can only be bestowed by wisdom? I think this is one of the
elements of fundamental uncertainty, or fundamental oscillation, in this
practice of the self,” stated Foucault in his 1982 course about the techniques
of the self in Greek and Roman philosophy.36
In fact, this is the point that ultimately separates the two interpretations
provided by Foucault and Hadot to the goal of “salvation” and spiritual
conversion in Greek and Roman philosophy: while, for Hadot, the
conversion signifies a way to access “the best portion of the self,” “the
perfect reason,” thus reaching a kind of cosmic consciousness, Foucault
would seek to identify the coordinates of a genuine “culture of the self “ in
late Antiquity, motivated by the aspiration to transform an ordinary life into
a “work of art.”37 While Foucault is interested in shaping the coordinates of
a self-creation process, insisting “much more on the exercises of auto-
subjectivation, of the ethical fortification (reinforcement) of the self by
I am,” without implying a theological reference to the idea of personhood or
the dismissal from the start of the idea of freedom. However, two clarifications
should be made. First of all, I am not trying to suggest the possibility of a
chronological sequence of moments; it is not about periods of life that would
succeed in the philosophical “training,” but, as is also shown in thematizing the
aporias outlined above, the more accurate perspective is that of a “back and
forth” between philosophical debates and the daily life, a process of self-
interpretation without firm boundaries and an existential bet that will always
preserve a dose of uncertainty. Secondly, it has to be said that the “putting to
the test” refers to conceptions about life, not to immediate life decisions. I
believe it is here that the uses of philosophical “training” stand out: while
decisions about concrete life situations are generally irrevocable (in fact, you
are never being offered a second chance, but, at the most, an another chance),
regarding conceptions, you always have the chance to change your mind, to
radically revise your beliefs and start over again. Philosophy could then
become a “school” that prepares us for a life lived without regrets, increasing
our chances to get to relate to our own existence as a whole in a fully committed
fashion.
36 M. Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject, pp. 213-214.
37 See P. Hadot, “Reflections on the Idea of the ‘Cultivation of the Self’,”
in Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault,
trans. M. Chase (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1995).
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itself” and “marginalizing the spiritual exercises of the dissolution of the
subject in a cosmic totality,”38 Hadot interprets self-discovery as a release
from the individual and an access to the universal, as an awareness of the
fact that you are a part of nature and of “universal reason,” in other words,
as a process of trans-subjectivation.39
A general indication in order to find a personal answer to the aporia
“discovered” vs. “created” self could be the following: even a radical
proponent of self-creation will have to agree that there will always remain
something that cannot be regarded as a creation in itself, something that has
to be acknowledged as “already there,” in the human person; at least the
ability for self-creation remains something to be discovered as an original
potency of each and every person. But the amount to which the alleged self-
fashioning is dependent on external factors or social and cultural
conditionings varies greatly from one philosophical doctrine to another.
The Practice of Philosophy and its Present Ethical and Political Relevance
We began by addressing a vital question: What is the meaning and
purpose of philosophy in the context of today’s culture? Now, it seems that
all the comments made so far were in fact aiming at the possibility to
reformulate the starting question in a way that directly concerns us, in other
words, in a more personal interrogation: What is the task of a philosopher
today?
It may be considered that asking the question about the philosopher’s
task in a way that directly connects him or her to the present already
expresses a specifically modern attitude. (Analyzing Kant’s small text Was
ist Aufklärung?, published in 1784 as an answer to an inquiry carried out by
a German periodical, Foucault regarded it as a paradigmatic text for
modernity, insofar as Kant explicitly inaugurated there a type of critical
reflection in which a philosopher openly addresses the problem of “the
contemporary status of his own enterprise.”40) This “attitude of modernity,”
38 F. Gros, ”Le souci de soi chez Michel Foucault: A Review of The
Hermeneutics of the Subject,” in Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 31, 5-6 /
2005, pp. 698-699.
39 “Seneca does not find his joy in ‘Seneca’, but by transcending ‘Seneca’;
by discovering that there is within him – within all human beings, that is, and
within the cosmos itself – a reason which is a part of universal reason”. P.
Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, p. 207.
40 “No doubt it is not the first time that a philosopher has given his reasons
for undertaking his work at a particular moment. But it seems to me that it is
the first time that a philosopher has connected in this way, closely and from the
inside, the significance of his work with respect to knowledge, a reflection on
history and a particular analysis of the specific moment at which he is writing
and because of which he is writing. It is in the reflection on "today" as
difference in history and as motive for a particular philosophical task that the
novelty of this text appears to me to lie,” see M. Foucault, “What is
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as Foucault named it, would suppose, precisely, a critical interrogatory with
respect to the present, a philosophical problematization of our own
“historical mode of being.”41 In fact, it is not until modern times that the
present itself becomes a central issue. The claim to reach an eternal,
unhistorical truth becomes increasingly difficult to sustain, and the
connection between the philosophical reflections on one hand and the
present moment on the other (that is, a particular social, cultural, or
scientific context) becomes an explicit task. “You have no right to despise
the present,” warned Baudelaire, approvingly quoted by Foucault.
So how are we to answer the question about the philosopher’s task in
the present context? I shall propose only some guiding threads that may
help us in finding a viable answer to this question.
I think that when you try to look “from the outside” at the history of
philosophy and see it as the history of a genre of discourse, sooner or later
you will be haunted by a form of exasperation close to despair. On one
hand, you realize that the effort of conceptual clarification knows no end
and that you cannot avoid a kind of “regression to infinity”: you may very
well build a philosophical jargon where you will get the impression of
comfortably living (maybe together with your philosophical “friends”), but
you will never be able to fully overcome the semantic indistinction that
requires the bringing of your philosophical terms into the so-called
“common” language as soon as you need to explain yourself, to make
yourself understood by a public. On the other hand, a structural analysis of
the types of philosophical discourse may give the impression that, in the
end, there is nothing but an impersonal textual machine: everything is being
reduced to an indefinite series of structural oppositions or hierarchical-
oppositive structures,42 pairs of concepts placed in opposition to each other
only to reveal afterward their mutual complicity or chiasmic nature. It
seems enough to detect the structural opposition that outlines some
problem’s field in order to subsequently obtain the number of (logical)
possibilities of location in that field, the “functionalization” possibilities of
that aporia, each possibility being sooner or later linked to some
philosopher’s name.43
Enlightenment?”, in P. Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader, (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1984), p. 38.
41 Ibid., p. 42.
42 “…one might say philosophy’s unique thesis, the thesis which
constitutes the concept of metaphor, the opposition of the proper and the
nonproper, of essence and accident, of intuition and discourse, of thought and
language, of the intelligible and the sensible,” see J. Derrida, “White
Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy,” in Margins of Philosophy,
trans. A. Bass (The Harvester Press, 1982), p. 229.
43 The “quarrel of the universals” remains the paradigmatic example of
philosophical “production” in the field of an “eternal” problem. A book that
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It is only when you try to regard philosophy as a personal “affair”;
when you ask yourself how it is possible to choose one particular
philosophy over so many, how it is possible that this sum of abstractions
directly concern you, and how it is that you resonate with certain “founding
metaphors” (from a philosophical discourse) rather than others; when you
ask yourself how you can be moved by a philosophy, how it may seduce
you, convince you, how it might really become your “philosophy of life”; it
is then and only then that the problem of self-choosing regains its central
significance and the choice for a particular philosophy becomes a
consequence or a personal option on the horizon of this fundamental choice.
It is then that philosophy reveals to yourself a whole spectrum in which you
can gain (or waste) your freedom, if not a higher form of freedom in itself –
the “spiritual” one.
Perhaps it is only at this level, when confronted by the task of self-
choice, that you can rediscover, after many sterile experiments, the
confidence in philosophy – a confidence corresponding to that hope that
defines us, above all despair and exasperation, as projective beings, looking
for something, in need of purpose and direction. In this context, we can
truly grasp the value of the lesson provided by MacIntyre in his famous
book After Virtue44: the teleologism continues to function on a “local” scale,
giving meaning to our personal histories, even after the alleged
abandonment of the grand narratives of legitimation, abandonment which
would characterize, using Lyotard’s notorious expression, our “postmodern
condition.”45 The same context grounds the salutary attempt to change our
representation about the nature of philosophy, ceasing to consider it as the
summing of some abstract theories and instead trying to regard it as being
from the start a “form of life” and a set of practices whose goal is the self-
transformation of the individual,46 the never complete release from various
social conditionings, and the widening of the range of options. We could
brilliantly illustrates this perspective is La querelle des universaux: De Platon à
la fin du Moyen Age (Paris: Seuil, 1998), by A. de Libera.
44 See Al. MacIntyre, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, first edition:
(University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), in particular chapter 15: “The Virtues,
the Unity of a Human Life and the Concept of Tradition.”
45 See J.-F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge,
trans. G. Benington and B. Massumi (University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
46 “But the active life is not necessarily active in relation to other men, as
some people think, nor are only those processes of thought active that are
pursued for the sake of the objects that result from action, but far more, those
speculations and thoughts (theôrias kai dianoêseis) that have their end in
themselves and are pursued for their own sake; for the end is to do well, and
therefore is a certain form of action (praxis tis). And even with actions done in
relation to external objects, we predicate action in the full sense chiefly of the
master-craftsmen who direct the action by their thoughts (dianoiais
architektonas).” Aristotle, Politics, VII, 3, 1325b, trans. H. Rackman (Harvard
University Press, 1959).
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state that the telos of “authenticity” thus migrates from the so problematic
realm of “being yourself” to the position of a temporary escape from the
“System” – an escape that will not leave you unchanged.
More than this, I believe that this shift to self-transformation or
spiritual conversion reconsidered as the ultimate philosophical end is also
consistent with a significant contemporary mutation with respect to our
understanding of the notion of truth. Our hermeneutical age makes us
extremely skeptical about both the idea of factual correspondence (our
“truths” prove to be provisional, only “hinges” of some episteme or
paradigm) and the idea of textual coherence (there will always remain
points of undecidability). As to the possibility of an essential revelation, we
reasonably doubt the function and the recognition that a prophet or a
“master of truth” could still claim in a “disenchanted,” secularized world.
Our truth remains the making of the truth (facere veritatem), the
confirmation of the truth by someone’s living example: more simply put,
truth is what you make true by keeping your word. Our truth is a truth of
hope (not of faith or entrustment), the truth of promise, the commitment for
a future truth, in a world shared with our fellows.
There is no doubt that we may frequently encounter similar reflections
about the importance of self-realization on the beaten track of the so-called
pop culture of authenticity. But what if this entire self-help “industry” is not
mistaken with respect to the central message, but rather in the manner in
which it oversimplifies it,47 neglecting or, even worse, making us neglect all
that is keeping us at every moment connected to the social network,
promising us instead a seductive but illusory radical alternative: the “inner”
self? Maybe the self always already lives outside of itself, and what we can
really do about it – and what we should perhaps not hesitate to express in
all its “banality” – is trying to be a little better every day, in all our
enterprises: only thus will our world become, here and there, a little better.
Neither the “world of ideas,” nor the divine Revelation, nor the
universal Reason can ground, today, the parrhesiastic truth, the truth of
existence; the philosopher is forced to sustain his or her proposal before the
community as the artist does, to submit it to local and historical validation,
based on intersubjective criteria. But, in order not to fall back on the aporia
that practically generated the modern ideal of authenticity as an
individualistic declaration of independence from all the social roles we are
constrained to assume with the purpose of being accepted by others, I
would say that this validation is not the shallow recognition of the general
public, but the recognition offered by the ones to whom you feel close, the
ones you regard as being important characters in your narrative. Or, in an
even more “exclusivist” perspective, the recognition provided by those you
47 “The problem with self-help ideas is not that they are wrong, but that
they are one-sided,” Ch. Guignon, On being authentic (London and New York:
Routledge, 2004, p. VIII).
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recognize in your turn as being valuable and significant, those who have
gone through a philosophical training like your own.48
In short, neither the withdrawal in a virtual space (it matters less than
one might think if we are talking about Second Life or The Phenomenology
of Spirit), nor the promotion of great revolutions (which will inevitably end,
in the event of success, in another system of power and oppression), but
only the work on yourself, the increased attention to you and others, and the
attitude of critical vigilance continuously and consistently exercised toward
all forms of disciplinary power remain today (perhaps today more than
ever) the philosopher’s task, and also the hope that philosophy still reserves
for its practitioners.
Faculty of Philosophy
University of Bucharest
Bucharest, Romania
cristianiftode@yahoo.com
48 Isn’t that the very meaning of Plato’s warning from the Seventh Letter,
addressed to anyone who would have ventured to claim “competence” in
Platonism and, more generally, in philosophy? Perhaps we should acknowledge
the fact that “the love of wisdom,” “the care of the self,” or Aristotelian
happiness are callings that remain, in principal, universal, but are in fact
accessible only to a spiritual élite.

CHAPTER XII
THE HUMAN VALUE OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES
DORINA PĂTRUNSU
Abstract: According to Aristotle, for an individual to be human is to have a
place in a society. Such a place, I believe, can be located only relative to the
existent institutions – even better, relative to the constraints the institutions
set on the individual. In other words, the relevant place an individual has in
a society structured according to some institutional network is
circumscribed by the limits within which the individual may freely interact
with the social environment.
Arguably, in the societies guided by democratic values, there is a
natural tendency of diminishing the differences among individuals in regard
to their degrees of liberty. In principle, it is supposed that democratization
generates that kind of social space in which institutional structure provides
the individuals with equality in opportunities and with the same degree of
liberty. By speaking about equality in opportunities and limits of liberty, I
do not mean the obtaining of social uniformity, but rather the providing of
equal conditions for each individual to develop freely his/her own
personality, and also the imposing of equal constraints for each individual
to respect his/her duties as member of society. Thus, to be individual in a
democratic society is to enjoy an equal social status defined by certain
generally accepted rights and duties.
Nevertheless, in real life, democratic societies have to face cases
where some rules fail to impose the same constraints upon each individual,
acting systematically to the disadvantage of some of them. In such cases,
the obvious and correct thing to say is that those people who are victimized
are frustrated and, more than that, they are entitled to let others know about
the unfairness of the current system of laws by protesting in one way or
another. For one thing, in democratic societies civil protests are supposed to
play a crucial role in the process of self-regulation and self-correcting of the
institutional structure. In this connection, Anthony Arblaster (1987) justly
remarks that society is perceived as a collection of individuals whose
interests and preferences are different and divergent; but what brings a
society into agreement with the democratic values is that each of the
individual interests is acknowledged as legitimate and, hence, each of the
individual options matters in the process of designing the institutional
framework.
This discussion aims to analyze civil disobedience – one of the means
to be employed to the effect of improving the existent institutional system.
In particular, civil disobedience is intended for a minority systematically
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disadvantaged by the laws imposed by a majority that is not well-informed.
Of course, one of the presuppositions is that the majority is already
committed to democratic values, including that all citizens should enjoy
equal basic liberties. The direct consequence is that, in a case where a group
of citizens is systematically oppressed, that is, some of their basic liberties
are denied to them by some of the existing laws, the civil majority, if it
were well-informed about the injustice, would be ready to put pressure on
their political representatives to amend the system of laws.
Let us consider for a moment that in a democratic country, there are
elections. Before the second ballot tour there is a strong possibility that a
candidate whose previous political statements express discriminatory
beliefs directed against a certain ethnic minority will be elected. A group of
individuals belonging to civil society decide to organize a demonstration to
inform the population about the danger of xenophobia and the real
convictions of the aforementioned political leader. But, during the elections,
such a meeting is not legally allowed in this particular country. Thus, the
participants commit an act of civil disobedience. Is it justified? I advocate
not only for the legitimacy of such political acts, but also for the claim that
the existence and the success of civil disobedience is a test-condition for
any society oriented by democratic values.
Keywords: civil disobedience, democratic society, globalization
WHAT IS MEANT BY CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE?
Civil disobedience, says John Rawls, is a political, conscientious,
public act contrary to law, but remaining nonviolent, by which it is made an
appeal to the sense of justice of the majority of the community, with the
aim of bringing about a change in the law or institutions of government. (A
Theory of Justice, cap. 5, § 55, p. 364) Along these lines, Garry Francione
and Ana Charlton consider that civil disobedience is the purposeful
violation of law to communicate the protester’s belief that the law is
unconstitutional or morally defective. (Demonstrating and Civil
Disobedience: A Legal Guide for Activists, cap.4, §.1) Thus, it is customary
to associate civil disobedience with those kinds of public protests that break
the law in a nonviolent manner, with the intention of informing people
about the unjustness of the legal system, and creating public support and
pressure to force a change in the law in question. The acts of civil
disobedience are not guided by anarchical principles, but rather by the idea
of improving the existing laws in the spirit of justice.
It is a familiar point that any democratic society should be a society
open to change and improvement. But if this is so, then the possibility of
taking the action of civil disobedience is a test for any democracy, because
such an alternative, if available to civil society for controlling the
government, gives individuals an important tool for adjusting the laws to
their actual needs. Civil disobedience draws its justification and legitimacy
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from the directory principles of any democracy: tolerance, diversity, and
openness.1
Both the act of civil disobedience and its success require several steps:
- the existence of some injustice in the legal system by which a
minority is systematically disadvantaged, and the identification of the
injustice by some people of the minority;
- the effective protest consisting in the action of making public the
truth about the injustice by breaking some laws, especially the laws
responsible for the blamed injustice;
- the immediate reaction of the public authorities (i.e. the authorities
legitimated by the majority) for reestablishing the order in accordance with
the laws;
- the spreading of news through the media channels;
- the acknowledgement of the injustice by the majority and, as a
subsequent reaction, a change in the law made by the representatives.
Therefore, a discussion on the justification of civil disobedience
should take into account at least two levels. On the first level, the analysis
should identify which are the democratic principles shared by the majority
of the social corpus – which are the principles that ground the institutional
framework in any democratic society. The second level of analysis should
identify the practical aspects that maximize the efficiency of an action of
civil disobedience and minimize its risks.
The present discussion focuses only on the theoretical level of
analysis. On that level, two different justifications for the legitimacy of civil
disobedience can be distinguished. To begin with, principle justification is
supported by the fact that, in a democratic society, its major part is
committed to the elements – premises, rules, and goals – specific to the
democratic game. More specific in any democracy is what might give to
any kind of protest its moral ground, even though the protest violates the
existing legal system: the spread and popular option for obeying the
democratic principles. Nothing is above the law except the principles
inspiring the law. Therefore, the appeal to civil disobedience is a legitimate
violation of the law, because the law, in its turn, violates the democratic
principles.
Functional-justification, the second kind of justification for civil
disobedience, relies on the idea that it contributes, along with other forms of
social protest, to the society, to the process of self-regulating and self-
1 According to Robert Nozick, one of the characteristics of a liberal-
democratic society is its capacity for receiving new individuals together with
their wishes, preferences, and interests, even though these individuals are
ethnically or racially different from the initial residential individuals, given the
principles promoted by this kind of system, the democratic system. If the
system is unjust, the late comers should have the same right as the older ones in
proposing modifications to, and, ultimately, modifying the system. See Nozick,
Anarchy, State and Utopia, chapter 10.
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correcting. Thus, it is its status of sensor for inconsistency with the
democratic principles that gives acts of civil disobedience their democratic
legitimacy.
Arblaster calls attention to what a danger the problems usually
signaled by acts of civil disobedience – such as cases where minorities are
disadvantaged in the process of political decision-making – would be for
any democracy, if they were remain unknown to the majority and if the
majority were insensitive to the aspirations of individuals belonging to
minorities. In his paper Democracy, Arblaster remarks that “the existence
of permanent minorities, whose aspirations, wishes, and even principles are
systematically ignored or overridden in the collective decision-making
processes, can easily make a majoritarian democracy unworkable.” (p. 68).
He reiterates the point a bit later, showing that “a democracy in which some
groups, ethnic, religious, or political, are permanently in a minority, and
thus, in opposition, is likely to be instable and may lose legitimacy.” (p. 71)
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE – AN APPEAL TO THE THIRD
AUTHORITY
The act of civil disobedience should be understood as an endeavor
made by some individuals to be acknowledged in their social space. The
Aristotelian idea that the individual cannot be human outside of a social
space (that is, the individual’s membership in some polis is a necessary
condition for being human) should be supplemented with the specification
that the individual acquires human status only if the individual and his/her
fundamental aspirations and interests are acknowledged by the social
environment. Along the same lines, Berlin notes that the individual wishes
to be acknowledged and understood even though such acknowledgment
might bring hate or antipathy against the individual; the only persons able
to give the individual the acknowledgement sought are the very members of
the society with which the individual is historically, morally, economically,
and, in some cases, ethnically related.2
If we grant that it is essential for any individual to receive social
acknowledgement and consideration as a fundamental need, we should also
admit that his/her attitude toward the existing rules, rights, duties, and
obligations regulating public interactions among individuals is to be judged
according to the degree to which the content of the social rules shows
acknowledgement of the individual’s interests.
Given the premises that (1), the individual’s actions and behavior
acquire intelligibility only when considered in the context of the
interactions the individual has with other individuals, and (2), that these
interactions, in order to be optimal, have to be regulated by some rules, then
the conclusion that the existing social rules are necessary does not follow.
2 See Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1969), p. 241.
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What follows is only the necessity of there being social rule in general. The
social rules existing at a certain time should not be treated as absolute
truths, but rather as standing under the sign of contingency in a land of
approximation.3 The present rules specific to any period of time have at
most a temporal guidance role, and they remain to be dismissed, revised, or
amended according to the social dynamic and the particular crises emerging
in the community. Recall what shock waves the technologic revolutions
(e.g., the possibility of human cloning, sex-change surgery, etc.) and the
emancipation of various minorities produced in the law system. Thus, the
act of civil disobedience is justified as long as it signals a certain state of
affairs in conflict with the social rules, the latter oppressing the individual’s
development of personality and the affirmation of the individual’s identity.
Berlin claims that the laws ruling a society should rely on fundamental
human needs. Granting that almost any individual pursues the fulfilment of
the fundamental needs, Berlin infers that the changes affecting and
modulating individuals’ needs provide, when necessary, a reliable guidance
for revising the social rules. By militating for an agreement among the
fundamental needs and the existing rules, the act of the person who chooses
the solution of civil disobedience becomes justified and justifiable to the
majority. (It should be noted here that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights is the document by which the fundamental human needs are
explicitly defended, this document grounding most of the modern
democratic constitutions.) The protest against the instauration by law of
censorship or of restrictions on personal moral behavior, says Berlin, is
based upon the belief that the prohibited activities correspond to some
human fundamental needs, their prohibition being nothing else than a
violation of personal liberties.4
Berlin justly notices that, in a democracy, the law is a product of the
will of the majority, but, given that society is a heterogeneous construct, the
will of the majority should not be taken for a coincidence of individual
wills. Therefore, naturally, the law can come to affect some minorities in a
negative way. In fact, this is the very limitation brought by majority rule.
Then the question is: what would justify the protest made by a minority
against a law adopted by a majority? In my view, the question as it is now
cannot be answered. An analysis of whether or not a protest is justified
requires some specifications about how the protest is made. In our case, the
specification is that a protest consisting of an act of civil disobedience
involves the protestant’s breaking the law in a nonviolent way. Of course, if
the protests remain within the limits prescribed by free speech rights, their
justification is a superfluous matter. But, if they break the law, as is the case
with the protests of civil disobedience, their justification requires some
elaboration. The question is: “Who is right? The defenders of the law
expressing the will of the majority, or the protesters who break the law in
3 See also Berlin, p. 272.
4 Ibid., p. 255.
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order to call attention to its unfairness?” The question requires a choice to
be made between the authority of the order imposed by a majority and the
authority of a protest shaking the actual order in the name of justice. The
answer should rely upon a third authority that is higher than both parts.
According to Berlin, as I have mentioned, fundamental human needs
constitute the wanted referential authority. Democratic principles make
explicit the ideal of respecting those needs. Therefore, if the contested law
is in contradiction with some higher principles, such as some democratic
principles, then the action of breaking the law in order to highlight the
contradiction is justified even though the law is an expression of the will of
the majority. The inference may also have practical value if it is the case
that the majority is committed to democratic principles, and the imposing of
the conflicting and contested law is nothing more than the effect of a lack of
information.
For Peter Singer, the justification of civil disobedience is given by the
intention of informing about an injustice. The protester’s actions disobey
the law, but obey the principle of communication on which a well-formed
democracy depends. In his Applied Ethics, Singer says that the law imposed
by the majority is not violated in order to force the majority to change its
decision, but rather for the sake of informing the majority about the
injustice made by supporting a contestable law through a hasty decision.5
Singer shows that, frequently, the conflicting decision is not a genuine
expression of the will of the majority. Rather, the decision is made by the
representatives by virtue of their investiture by the majority, and it is
different from the opinion shared by the majority. Thus, many times, the act
of civil disobedience undertaken by a minority is not against a majority, but
rather the protest does the majority a service by informing it about the side-
slip of its representatives.
Rawls posits the analysis on civil disobedience within the context of
the conflict of duties, such as the conflict between the duty to obey the law
and the duty to participate to the implementation of the principles of justice
in valid laws. Thus, according to Rawls, the act of civil disobedience is
justified because it is entitled by the highest authority of “the natural duty
of justice.” By the same token, I believe that the conflict between the
defenders of the law and civil disobedience can be translated as a conflict
between two kinds of interpretations of the principles of justice. On one
hand, there are some inaccurate, but publicly notorious interpretations. On
the other hand, there are some accurate interpretations whose defenders
fight for their public recognition. For the case of civil disobedience, the
defenders of the second show that the first interpretations are not what they
should have to recognize.
In a society, says Rawls, there are only a small number of individuals
situated in a superior position. Certainly, these lucky individuals have no
5 See Singer, Applied Ethics, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986)
p. 303.
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interest in the transformation of the world. For one thing, they are content
with their actual privileged status and do not want to degrade it by any
change. In contrast, other individuals, being less lucky, feel frustrated and
tend to act toward changing not only their own situation, but also toward
reforming the political and legislative framework; that is to say, they orient
their social behavior to their natural political duty.
That the social attitudes of individuals are guided by a public
conception of justice is a thesis that can also be found in the texts of Berlin:
“The respect for the principle of justice and the shame which we feel in the
face of flagrant inequalities of treatment are as fundamental in a human
being as the desire for freedom.6
THE FEEDBACK FUNCTION OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
The institutional framework of any democratic society should be a
dynamic structure whose profile is continuously modulated by a mechanism
by which the law comes under revision when it is necessary. The feedback
function of this mechanism of self-regulation and self-stabilization is
provided by civil society. In a democratic society, civil society plays the
crucial role of signaling, when necessary, the incongruence between the
legal system and social needs. Civil society is sensitive to the discrepancy
between the present institutional design and the social state of affairs.
Usually, the signals sent by civil society consist of debates about social
problems, actions of protest, and proposals for social improvement. Thus,
the action of civil disobedience as a reactive signal sent by civil society is
not oriented against democratic society, but rather it helps democracy,
behaving like a symptom of malfunction. The act of civil disobedience
announces to society the existence of an anomaly in the implementation of
the democratic principles. As Berlin remarks, the protesters appealing to
civil disobedience do not claim an unlimited liberty, but rather they militate
for an affirmation of the identity of the minority to which they belong.
The starting point in the process of improvement of any institutional
structure is marked by granting an approximate interpretation of the
principle of justice and working with the law implementing the
interpretation. This is a compromise justified by practical reasons: without
such a starting point, the potential of finding the optimal interpretation by
engaging in theoretical debates would disappear.
There are at least two reasons for saying that legal debates are
prevented from reaching in vitro the optimal form of a legal system. First,
democratic debate cannot proceed without a legal framework. No matter
how imperfect an institutional framework is in a democratic society, it
should be seen as being a precondition for finding a better institutional
solution. On the other hand, even though it is necessary for a period of time,
no institutional framework should be considered sacrosanct. Once it comes
6 See Berlin, p. 255.
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under the fire of justified criticisms, even if those criticisms are
communicated by actions of civil disobedience, the present institutional
framework should be revised accordingly.
The second reason against trying to find an optimal legal system
exclusively by means of debates is that one cannot realize to what degree a
law fulfills social expectations without confronting it in real situations, that
is, without seeing how it succeeds in regulating human interactions. The act
of civil disobedience is nothing more than one of the answers from social
space, bearing relevant information about the justness of the laws.
CONCLUSION
Democratic society is based on the culture of acknowledging the
identity of minorities. Civil disobedience is an extreme means for
promoting the individuality of a minority and for protesting against the
tyranny of the majority.
There are two arguments that provide acts of civil disobedience with
democratic legitimacy. Prima facie, the act of civil disobedience emerges
from a conflict between a majority and a minority. Actually, the conflict is
only between a minority and the representatives of the majority whose
decisions oppressed the minority. Granting that a large part of the society
shares democratic principles, it follows that the majority, if were correctly
informed, would take side the minority. Fundamental human needs and
their expressions, such as the democratic principles, constitute the ultimate
authority. Therefore, in a democratic society, a political act should be
morally judged only in relation to such an axiological authority.
Consequently, civil disobedience is justified from a democratic perspective.
The deployment of the second argument for legitimizing civil
disobedience has emphasized the feedback function that justifies acts of
protest in the process of self-regulation of society and its institutions.
The paper leaves aside the discussion on the practical or
implementational aspects of the acts of civil disobedience. Nevertheless, I
want to remark that an exhaustive approach to the issue of civil
disobedience, whose ultimate aspects are practical in nature, should try to
answer the following question: how far could it reach? For one thing, the
risks should be minimized for both parts involved in “confrontation.” On
one hand, the individuals engaged in the action of civil disobedience should
be granted a diminished risk of legal punishment. On the other hand,
society should be secured against the risk of the degenerating of civil
disobedience into violent manifestations and extended social instability akin
to a state of anarchy.
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CHAPTER XIII
BEAUTY AS AN AESTHETIC VALUE:
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES
MIHAELA POP
Abstract: The Avant-Gardes and especially the Dada movement generated a
real revolution in the artistic world, not only at the theoretical level, but also
by making artistic works. Aesthetic thought was called to answer to
extremely courageous and shocking questions as the artists were exploring
new ways of artistic expression. Theoretical principles, themes, methods of
artistic work, materials, all were reconsidered. Was it “the end of art”
already prophesized by Hegel? And what was going to happen after the end
of art? And artistic beauty … was it yet a value for the new kind of art
initiated by Duchamp? These are some questions to which this article tries
to give some coherent answers. After a short presentation of the Avant-
garde movements and their main characteristics, we shall use some
significant aesthetic theories and their arguments in order to prove the fact
that beauty is not only a historical aesthetic value, it is a fundamental
human value that always finds its expression in accordance with the cultural
context of the moment. In order to be more pertinent in our analysis, we
chose two artists whose works could illustrate our position.
Keywords: artworld, aesthetic judgment, taste, beauty, conceptual art.
Beauty used to be one of the most significant values in European
culture, especially in the field of artistic production. It was one of the
fundamental principles of human spirituality, beginning with Socrates and
Plato. According to Plato, Beauty, in close connection with Truth and
Good, had not only an aesthetic meaning, but also an ontological one. The
aesthetic side of Beauty itself was, in its turn, based on the Pythagorean
concepts of harmony, symmetry, and proportion. In fact, this meaning of
Beauty became the basis for the magnificent classical art of ancient Greece.
Later on, during the Renaissance, it was reactivated, contributing
significantly to the artistic definition of Beauty as an aesthetic category.
Afterward, the entire Western culture was dominated for centuries by this
category, theorized by philosophers and artists until the end of the
nineteenth century.
Immanuel Kant and G.W.F. Hegel carried out deeper research on the
aesthetic concept of beauty, pointing out that this general aesthetic category
did not have only the Pythagorean meaning. Hegel moved forward with this
matter, assuming that art should already have reached its end, since it is a
product of the Spirit, which itself undergoes a process of evolution. Art was
only a step taken in this process that should end in philosophical thought.
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At the end of the nineteenth century, it seemed that Hegel’s prediction
became reality. Could the Avant-garde movement be considered anything
other than a declaration of the “end of art”? All the “traditional” or
“classical” criteria of making and evaluating art seemed to crumble down,
piece by piece.
The Impressionists abandoned many of the painting techniques in use,
including the process of painting in the painter’s workshop. Their manner
of laying colors on the canvas grew more and more different from the
“classical” one. Moreover, their paintings were, of course, only
“impressions” of reality, impressions generated by the way real objects
were illuminated by solar light. The main characteristic of the
Impressionists’ paintings was the fact that the real world was perceived in
strict correlation with the moment of the day and the optical effect
generated by the solar light at that very moment. The object could show
many faces, from very bright and clear to very gloomy and strange. Thus,
reality proved to be illusory or in some way uncertain, showing many
different and various appearances.
Cl. Monet - Impression . Sunrise E. Manet - Bar at Folies Bergères
Then the Expressionists considered it more interesting to express their
deep inner emotions freely, by means of colors. They hardly used clear
lines in their drawings at all; instead, colors became their means to express
themselves, to release very strong emotions arising from their inner
tensions. Rouault, Munch, Rottluff, Marc, and Matisse endowed their colors
and paintings with much force of expression.
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G. Rouault-Mystic Masque E. Munch-Golgotha
Sch. Rottluff-Skrigedal H. Matisse-Open Window F. Marc-The Blue Horse
Other artists, such as Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, James Ensor, or Egon
Schiele, were interested in expressing deep inner troubles, dissatisfactions,
dilemmas, uncertainties, and fears. The war’s horrors, as well as the
alienating feeling of loosing one’s personal identity in the fast-growing
European towns of the Industrial Age were the fundamental themes worked
out by the Expressionists.
J. Ensor- Skeletons E.L. Kirchner-Self E. Schiele - Dead Mother
Fighting for a Herring Portrait as a Soldier
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The Cubist painters showed a deep interest in the study of reality in
order to reveal its basic and almost geometric structure. The search for this
structure supposed an elaborated process of de-construction. Braque and
Picasso are illustrative examples, especially in their analytical phases, when
they were looking for the basic geometric and rational elements of reality.
G. Braques-Viaduct at Estaque P. Picasso-Weeping Woman
Then, the Abstractionists Kandinsky and Klee1 pursued this process of
de-construction of reality even more deeply. They eliminated any objective
representation of a material reality. Thus, they succeeded in liberating
colors from subordination to mimetic purposes. The point, the line, and the
surface (in fact, the point in its moving process) were the main characters of
Kandinsky’s paintings. Abstractionist painting eliminated in this manner
any surviving ideas of the principle known since the Renaissance as the
principle of mimesis (the painting should be an image, a re-presentation of
reality). The Abstractionists’ principle said less is more and it proved their
need for purity. The two-dimensional completely replaced the three-
dimensional in classical painting. And this movement was especially a
conceptual one.
1 Wasily Kandinsky, Spiritualul în artă (Concerning the Spiritual in Art)
(Bucureşti: Meridiane, 1994); Point et ligne sur plan (Point and Line to Plane)
(Paris: Gallimard, 1991); Paul Klee, La pensée créatrice. Ecrits sur
l’art(Creative Thought. Writings about Art) (Paris: Dessein et Tolra, 1989).
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W. Kandinsky-Happy P. Klee-Southern Gardens P. Mondrian-Composition
Structure
And what could be the definition of artistic beauty for this movement?
Or, for the Cubist way of painting? Are these paintings beautiful or they are
not? It is clear that the characteristics of classical beauty, at least the visible
ones, have been abandoned. But do such paintings lack any sense of order
or rhythm (meaning symmetry and proportion)? The answer is “No.” If we
take into consideration Kandinsky’s and Klee’s writings, we can see how
much they were interested in thinking, in projecting their works. The point
itself was considered mostly in its dynamic condition, an entire process of
thinking and projecting relations among figures. The inner and exterior
forces which acted upon this tiny element were also taken into
consideration. Every element of the painting was considered in relation to
every other element of the painting and to the entire structure itself. But this
way of thinking was already specific to Plato, as we see in the Republic or
Parmenides. What, then, could this mean? The fact was that abstract
painting had its beauty, but this beauty was not similar to the classical one.
Thus, at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the
twentieth century, art was obviously going through a process of “profound
becoming,” or trans-figuration. Classical art seemed obsolete and a new
style was triumphant. It was the end of a certain type of art. The new one
was liberating itself from the old norms and principles. This liberation grew
more powerful with the Dada movement. It was the most revolutionary
artistic movement of the beginning of the twentieth century. It claimed the
death of art (of “classical” art). Once free, it started to explore a lot of
possibilities (technical perspectives and also ways to communicate its
messages) which were unacceptable for normative art. Cubist art had
already explored the collage technique, bringing into the artistic world
certain parts of contingent reality (small sheets of journals, parts of tissues,
some raw materials such as sand, etc.) which were incorporated into the
painting itself. Dada art took a huge step forward when Marcel Duchamp
exhibited objects produced industrially. He exhibited such objects as a
bottle rack and a snow shovel, which he named ready-mades.
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M. Duchamp - Bottle Rack Playing Chess Bike Wheel
Bringing such objects into an art exhibition2 was a real declaration of
war against all the “classical” principles of the artistic world: the opposition
between the uniqueness of the work of art and serial industrial production
was now contradicted. And how could such a common thing be artistically
appreciated? Where was the artist’s contribution? What could be the
significance of such an object in the artistic world? How can we understand
the meaning of the material used by the artist in such a work? These were
only a few questions arising from such a tremendous change. One could say
that the admittance of the most commonplace physical object into the art
world should be interpreted as “reductiveness,” driving toward the
“reification of art.” Rosalind Krauss insisted on this idea3, using some
earlier studies written by Clement Greenberg, especially The Crisis of Easel
Painting (1948).
From the Dada movement onwards, art was obviously completely
different from what it had formerly been. And the same questions arose:
what was the place of beauty in this new art? Could such works still be
considered beautiful? How?
In our opinion, in order to answer to these questions, we have to see if
this kind of beauty meets the “classical” criteria or not. And how could we
define it, in the second situation?
Kant tells us4 that beauty is based on aesthetic satisfaction. But this
kind of satisfaction differs from the moral one, which is earned through
good behavior, and differs also from simple sensory pleasure. Aesthetic
satisfaction is based on the fact that, even if it is not an objective judgment,
like the philosophical one, it is still a judgment, a reflective one, tending
toward universality. We have to remember that Kant spoke about the
antinomy of taste. In his thesis, Kant says that the judgment of taste is not
2 It was the art exhibition organized at the Grand Central Palace in New
York, on April 9, 1917.
3 Rosalind Krauss, “A Voyage on the North Sea” – Art in the Age of the
Post-Medium Condition (London: Thames & Hudson, 1999), pp. 57-58.
4 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, transl. by J.C. Meredith (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1952), pp. 206-208.
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based upon concepts, for if it were, it would be open to dispute. Then the
antithesis follows: the judgment of taste is based upon concepts, for
otherwise, despite the diversity of aesthetic judgment, there could be no
room even for contention. Thus, we have here the aesthetic judgment of
beauty, which is a noncognitive and subjective judgment, but which is still
a judgment. And this is possible because this judgment of taste belongs to
the reason, to the regulative rational idea, and this makes possible the
tendency toward universality, a tendency which is specific to the judgment
of what is beautiful. Kant speaks about the sensus communis, a subjective
principle which determines what pleases or displeases only by feeling and
not by concepts, but yet with universal validity. The faculty of taste is in
fact the product of reconciliation between what Kant calls the “aesthetic
inexponible idea” (it is not theoretically established) and the “rational
indemonstrable idea” (which cannot be shown to the senses). Thus, the
faculty of taste ought to be supposed to be the endowment of every human
being.
Nicolai Hartmann tells us in his Aesthetics5 about an entire process of
artistic creativity. It supposes the idea of using both a material (an
unworked physical support) and a spiritual medium belonging to the artist’s
cultural identity. These two elements or components (one material and the
other spiritual) are put together in order to work in a process which should
assure the appearance of, or the fact of getting concreteness of, what was
initially only a mental image – the creative idea. In this process of showing
up, the work of art becomes a reality, rising from the inside of the artist’s
mind. That is why the work consists not only of a single layer, the material
one, but also of many other layers, more profound or more general
(abstract), containing the artist’s ideas.
This vision is reactivated by Krauss, who speaks about the “flatness”
of this first layer. At this level, the other deeper layers can reveal or show
themselves. Thus the work of art is a “recursive structure,” a multi-layered
construction. “It is something made, not given, something which is able to
specify itself.”6 The creation of such a structure supposes a particular effort
of rational thinking. Aesthetic satisfaction will be obtained when the
spectator is able to get a comprehensive vision of this entire creative
journey made by the artist.
In his Theory of Formativity7, Luigi Pareyson pointed also to the role
of rational contribution to the artistic work. He proved that the work of art
is not only something made, but something creative by its very nature.
Works of art should be considered not only as formata, but also as formans.
Pareyson wanted to emphasize that the work of art, after being produced by
5 Nicolai Hartmann, Estetica (Aesthetics) (Bucureşti: Univers, 1974), pp.
124-135.
6 R. Krauss, op.cit., p. 61.
7 Luigi Pareyson, Estetica. Teoria formativităţii (Aesthetics. Theory of
Formativity) (Bucureşti: Univers, 1977), pp. 93-183.
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the artist’s creativity, can generate by itself new ideas in the spectator’s
mind. The process is based on the supposition that the spectator has an
aesthetic satisfaction, which stimulates him to develop certain suggestions
generated by the work itself.
Liviu Rusu, a Romanian philosopher who lived during the second half
of the twentieth century, pleaded in favor of the same theory.8 He insisted
on the idea that the concept of beauty ought to be understood in a wider
meaning. The creative process is very complex. Even if the result could
seem chaotic to the eyes of a less attentive spectator, artistic thinking has its
inner logic, conferring to the artistic product a specific order and structure.
Even in a work praising the complete hazard, there is a certain intention,
joining together the apparently chaotic elements. It is precisely this order
that gives beauty to the work. And this order is due to the use of certain
“logic” of composition within the creative process. In fact, Marcel
Duchamp said that “choice is the main thing in art”9; the choice means a
rational activity.
There are in fact today two major directions in the art world as Thierry
de Duve already proved. One is based on Clement Greenberg’s theory
claiming that aesthetic value, the judgment of beauty, is based on feelings:
“Aesthetic value, aesthetic quality, can be said to elicit satisfaction or
dissatisfaction (which is) ‘verdict of taste’.”10 The second theory,
corresponding to Kant’s antithesis, belongs to Joseph Kosuth. He claims
that “all art (after Duchamp) is conceptual in nature because art exists
conceptually.”11
Arthur Danto mentions12 a specific distinction separating a work of art
from a common object, even if they look similar. He holds up the Warhol’s
Brillo Box and the cartons of the Brillo product as an example.13
8 Liviu Rusu, Logica frumosului ( (The Logic of Beauty) (București: 
Editura pentru Literatură Universală, 1968) and also Eseu despre creaţia
artistică. Contribuţie la o estetică dinamică (Essay on Artistic Creativity.
Contribution to Dynamic Aesthetics) (Bucureşti: Editura ştiinţifică şi
enciclopedică, 1989).
9 In an interview with Georges Charbonnier, RTF, 1961, see Thierry de
Duve, Kant after Duchamp (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: The MIT
Press, 1996), p. 161.
10Ibid, p. 258.
11 Joseph Kosuth, Art after Philosophy, Idea Art (New York: Dutton,
1973), p. 80.
12 Arthur Danto, The End of Art: A Philosophical Defense,
www.jstore.org/Feb.9, 2006.
13 Arthur Danto, Beyond the Brillo Box: The Visual Arts in Post-Historical
Perspective (The University of California Press, 1998). We have to mention
that we used these terms which are specific to Danto’s theory. They are present
in all the works we quoted.
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A. Warhol – Brillo Box Tomato Soup Three Coca-Cola Bottles
This distinction is based on the fact that the artistic work has certain
aboutness: it “speaks” about something more general, more abstract that the
common object to which it might correspond; it has a meaning. Whatever
we name it, “aboutness” or capacity to appear (to show itself), or
“formativity,” or logic of beauty, it is obvious that the work of art is very
different from the commonplace item that is later trans-figured, according
to Danto.14 And the beauty of this transformation of the commonplace
consists precisely in the creative process of trans-figuration itself. It is clear
that contemporary art is more generic than and not as specific as it used to
be. The painter has become artist, and painting was assimilated to a generic
art. The classical concept of beauty was replaced by art. What used to be
judged as beautiful is now judged as art. Clement Greenberg used to say
that the aesthetic coincides with the artistic. “This is art” is the judgment
that has already replaced the classical “this is beautiful.” But this does not
mean that this proposition does not suppose aesthetic feeling and that this
feeling includes not only the love of artistic products, but also aesthetic
dissatisfaction, negative aesthetic feelings. It is clear that the concept of art
is not a determined concept but a nondetermined idea of reason which
cannot be demonstrated theoretically and cannot be shown empirically, but
can be analogically exemplified by an object designated by the word “this”
of the sentence “this is art.”15
Contemporary art has become an artistic expression of a theory-about-
art, or it could be considered Art as Idea. Referring to the Hegelian
definition of historicity, Danto regards this new art as “post-historical.”
Following Duchamp, art has reached its autonomy, acquiring the capacity
to explore any possible way of expression. This is what Danto understands
14 Arthur Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: a Philosophy
of Art, (Harvard University Press, 1981), After the End of Art: Contemporary
Art and the Pale of History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); The
Philosophical Disenfranchisemnet of Art (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1986) (P.D.A.); Hegel’s End-of-Art Thesis, 1999,
www.wikipedia/arthurdanto/works/20dec.2011(H.E.A.).
15 Thierry de Duve, op.cit. p. 321.
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by “disenfranchisement” of art and Harold Rosenberg by “de-definition” of
art.16 It has reached its philosophical level, becoming a philosophical
artistic meditation on its own condition, in other words, it has reached its
self-consciousness.
In the twentieth century, being an artist means to question the nature
of art. It already implies an ontological approach. Marcel Broodthaers
speaks also about a complete transformation of the artistic production into a
branch of the culture industry. The role of the artist’s rational contribution
is more important. Even the sensitive layer is reduced to its abstract
dimension. Joseph Kosuth pointed out this process of reduction. The
essence in its Greek meaning (ousia) has become a medium, a spiritual and
abstract art material. Thus painting, both as creative process and finished
work of art, was turned inside out, becoming, especially in conceptual art,
“the generic category of art” according to Kosuth.17
The spectator is attracted or has an artistic satisfaction when
contemplating that type of art. What would contemplation mean in this
case? – Especially an intellectual comprehensive process.
Ted Cohen says that aesthetic satisfaction rises when the spectator
discovers the artist’s idea, that regulative idea which is not demonstrable.18
It is obvious, in Cohen’s opinion, that the beauty of Duchamp’s ready-
mades is given by his creative idea of exhibiting a bike wheel or a shovel.
Hence, the creative idea is the fundamental contribution of the artist, the
beauty of the work consisting especially in the intellectual satisfaction the
spectator feels. It is a “phenomenological vector,” as R. Krauss names it,
and implies an organizational and connective process. Through this process,
the artist reveals a world of meanings waiting the spectator to discover it.
Thus, contemporary art is rather “conceptual” than perceptive. We could
say, in agreement with the opinions mentioned above, that contemporary art
has its beauty, and it has an intellectual connotation. Duchamp’s Fountain
is completely aesthetic being symbolically ethic and also artistically
theoretic.
Let’s take two examples.
A. Jackson Pollock (1912-1956) made a significant contribution to the
disenfranchisement of postwar art. He put a strong accent upon the creative
gesture, not on its result, as in the past. A new relationship became evident
between the artist’s body and the canvas. It generated a process of de-
centralization of the artist’s ego. In the same time his dripping method
raised an important issue: the problem of horizontality in painting. Until
then, the painting was created in a vertical position and the image of the
16 Harold Rosenberg, The De-definition of art (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1972).
17 R. Krauss, op.cit., p. 67.
18 Ted Cohen, “Notes on Metaphor,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art
Criticism, vol. 34, nr. 3, 1976, pp. 249-259.
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painting was also vertical. The change of the painting position or its
rotation had high implications.
J. Pollock – Dripping action J. Pollock –Untitled (Number Eight)
In fact, verticality is a distinctive characteristic of the human being and
it created, during the entire human evolution, a specific way of perceiving
and understanding the world. It also generated a specific human
representation of the world. In his Three Essays on Sexuality (1905) and
Civilization and its Discontinuity (1930), Sigmund Freud analyzed the re-
orientation process affecting our unconscious life as a consequence of the
vertical position of the human being. Due to this position, the human being
can get a full perspective on any living thing or object around him, by
comparison with the animals, which have a partial view. Thus, a process of
sublimation of the libidinal energy takes place, supposing a diversion from
erotic purposes to art. Or, the option for horizontality in painting could be
understood as a de-construction of the basic human characteristics in order
to create the opportunity for a new and different construction. This idea
belongs to Georges Batailles who wanted to point out the fact that Dada
artists and their followers were looking for new meanings and ways of
artistic content and expression as Rosalind Krauss mentioned.19
Before Pollock, there were some others who experienced the
horizontal vision. Cézanne did this in his Still Life with Fruit and Curtain.
19Rosalind Krauss, ”Horizontality” in Formless (New York: Zone Books,
1997), pp. 93-103.
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P. Cézanne – Still Life with Fruit and E. Degas – Dancer on the Stage
Curtain
We can see that the level of the floor is courageously verticalized. The
objects seem to glide. The separation line between wall and floor
disappeared. Then, in some of Degas’ paintings, we can see how the vision
has changed. The woman having a bath is seen from an upper point, as well
as the ballet dancer at the end of her performance. Paul Valery was one of
the critics who wrote about some of Degas’ paintings in 1936. He thought
that the purpose of this change was a new redistribution of light and thus, a
study of light effects. A similar vision can be found in some of Matisse’s
paintings. The separation line between wall and floor almost doesn’t exist
anymore.
H. Matisse-Still Life P. Picasso-Still Life with Chair Canning
In his Still Life with Chair Caning (1912) Picasso also changed the
position of the objects. Their position is rotated as if the objects would be
seen from above. Duchamp and Giacometti explored this new position too.
Andy Warhol also showed a certain interest in the horizontality of
footsteps, especially in his paintings of 1961.
Jackson Pollock explored horizontality, taking it to its limits. The
creative process is strictly connected to horizontality and its consequences.
The gestures are different and even gravity intervenes. It affects the way the
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colors are sprayed on the canvas. The viscosity of the color also affects its
spreading out and the quantity of color absorbed into the canvas. According
to Krauss,20 Pollock’s intention was to oppose the form (which supposes
order and thus culture, in a wider scope of understanding) to the
unconscious level of our psychic life and thus, to oppose the vertical to the
horizontal position, dominated by the lack of order and chaotic movements.
Pollock lays his canvas on the floor. In his Full Fathom Five (1947), he
creates a drip and encrusted surface, containing different types of garbage:
sand, broken glass, burned matches, and tacks.
J. Pollock – Full Fathom Five J. Pollock – Time is Art
The allusion to the lower existence of used and consumed objects is
evident, all being now reduced to horizontality or the equality of the
garbage. But these remains are revalorized and sublimated by the elegance
of the title which comes directly from Shakespeare’s Tempest.21 Robert
Morris named this option for horizontality an anti-form option.22 If the
vertical form is well built as it stands against gravity, horizontality supposes
the un-constructed, the anti-form because gravity acts as a force that de-
constructs any structure.
If we look at Pollock’s paintings, they make a strong impression on
our eyes. It is generated by the combination of colors and especially by the
continuous and chaotic movement of the lines. In fact, Pollock seems to
have set free the line and the color from any bondage. And due to this
characteristic, Pollock could be considered a painter who developed
Kandinsky’s and Klee’s ideas.
20 R. Krauss, Horizontality, in Formless, pp. 93-103
21William Shakespeare, The Complete Works, The Tempest (Glasgow:
Geddes & Grosset, 2010); “Full fathom five thy father lies/ Of his bones are
coral made/ Those are pearls that were his eyes” (Ariel’s song in Act I, scene
2, verses 398-400).
22 According to R. Krauss, op.cit., p. 97.
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B. Joseph Beuys (1921-1986) is a German artist known for works
belonging to a wide scope of contemporary artistic expressions:
performance, installations, and graphics. He was one of the prestigious
artists belonging to the Fluxus movement in Europe. Beuys was also a
professor who taught the new artistic concepts. His theory was based on a
humanistic approach, social philosophy and anthroposophy (especially,
Rudolf Steiner’s thought). Beuys developed an extended definition of art
(“each human being is an artist”) and used the idea of “social sculpture” or
social shaping encouraging creativity: “power to imagination!” Thus he
was considered an artist who perpetuated the old tradition of German
Romanticism. He played a significant role in the development of a social
way of thinking and in the shaping of the political thought of the German
people between 1960 and 1980. He was the founder of the Organization for
Direct Democracy (1972) and of the Student’s Party in Dusseldorf in 1967.
Many of his ideas have been developed, especially within American
cultural life.
He wanted to make people understand the role of forms, and objects’
appearance. Thus he organized artistic workshops where students were
taught to think in a broad manner, perceiving the connection between art
and life. He thought that the artist should have a wide experience of all
types of forms. For one of his workshops, gathering students and non-
specialized people interested in art, he used tree branches brought from the
forest.23 He put them onto the floor in various positions analyzing the
optical effects resulting from those positionings and the relations
connecting each element to the others (which branches of the composition
acquired significance in certain positioning and which could be eliminated
without affecting the entire composition). He discovered that the limitation
to a minimum number of elements did not diminish the multitude of
meanings of the entire work as a whole. On the contrary, he observed that
the energy and the forces generated by the relations between the elements
seemed to be more intense. And the forces seemed also to differ in
intensity. Beuys admitted that this approach could be considered an
application of Kandinsky’s and Klee’s writings on the study of fundamental
forms and their polarity. He used these abstractionist theories in order to
create compositions with commonplace objects (branches, sticks, iron sticks
of different lengths and thicknesses, etc.), not with abstract, geometric
elements.
The Shaping Problem
Beuys thought that art is a domain that belongs to all life phenomena.
It is influenced by the movement that he perceived in its Aristotelian
23 Harlan Volker, Ce este arta? Discutie-atelier cu Joseph Beuys (What is
Art? A Workshop-Discussion with Joseph Beuys) (Cluj Napoca: Ideea Design
& Print, 2003).
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meanings. According to one of these meanings, movement is seen as a
continuous becoming, a qualitative and quantitative process, positive or
negative, evolutionary or destructive. The artist mentions that his “objects”
(he doesn’t designate them as works of art) stimulate the desire to change –
the significance of the word plastics. This word acquires, in his
interpretation, various meanings. It comes from the Greek word euplastia
meaning a correct and beautiful shaping. This notion helps us to understand
how to shape our ideas and how to express them as harmonically as
possible through words. Thus, even a social shaping process could be
achieved, helping us to shape our world. It is obvious that it could be
considered utopian in this meaning, for the process supposes an evolution.
Through this process, any man can become an artist. But this process never
ends as it supposes a permanent transformation. We can notice that Beuys
proposes a new positioning of the art within the living world; he perceives
art from a radically extended perspective. Even if the work of art reaches a
final form, in Beuys opinion, it is only a temporary result. Beyond this
form, there is a permanent development within living nature. According to
Beuys, that is the reason why the art is always moving toward something, it
cannot reach the final perfection, corresponding to all possible
determinations of the universal spirit. We could consider this idea as a reply
to the Hegelian notion of end of art. It is a vitalist vision. “Art is something
alive, it is a fragmentary impulse,” according to Beuys.24
The Honey Pump
This is one of Beuys’ installations. The work is composed of many
elements and is situated in various locations. In a hall, there is the pump
symbolizing the center of knowledge and thought, and also of the organic
life – the heart. The system of cables and wires spreading from the center
toward the other locations could symbolize the circulatory system in
different meanings (blood circulation, knowledge circulation through
media, and also, money circulation within the world’s economic system).
J. Beuys – Batteries and fat Honey pump and motors System of cables and
wires
24 Ibid,, p. 57.
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Another element of the installation is the fat. It is a symbol of the
energetic substances. There are also two motors connected to a thick
cylinder of copper where the fat is melted down. The heat generated by the
two motors and the rotating movement of the fat mixing device insures its
liquefaction. Thus, the process suggests, on one side, the idea of plasticity
or well shaping is necessary to the production of a work of art, but, on the
other hand, this process of energy production is necessary to any human
activity. This action suggests not only the process of transformation but also
the will to act. Thus, the work can be considered as a symbolic answer to
the question: What is a human being?
We can see that the artist looks for the deepest universal meaning in
any object or assembly he designs. The commonplace materials are
articulated in such a manner that they could become revealing metaphors.
Thinking in a vitalist way, the artist mentions the necessity for polarities.
On one side, the form could be obtained through cooling or crystallization
(chemical and physical processes) and, on the other side, through the
dynamism of the inner transformations. Beuys remarks that, if we take
nature into consideration, things evolve impelled by their inner sides, as the
honey comb, the bird’s nest, or the development of the tree trunk. The river
stones are shaped from the outside by water, and quartz crystals have a
certain regular disposition resulting from a process of crystallization. The
artist thinks that, in the case of art works, there is a similar necessity to
perceive them from the inner side of the creative process. This
understanding is not limited to the disposition of its elements. It also
assures a good communication between people and nature. That is why the
agriculture should not be considered only a mere activity of subordinating
nature to human purposes. It should be seen as an artistic issue, responsible
for shaping the relations between people and nature. And the artist should
fulfill the purposes of nature and should not damage it. This idea is also
promoted by the land art artists.
We can see that euplastia (beautiful shaping) is a fundamental theme
for Beuys. Its role is to achieve a spiritual shaping of the artist within the
process of artistic creation and, at the same time, shape the medium he uses.
In this way, the artist becomes a demiurge (demiourgos) but a different kind
of demiurge than the Platonic Demiurgos from Timaeus. In Beuys’ vision,
the artist is a craftsman who gives shape not only to the works he creates
but also to his spirit. Beuys seems here to apply the theory developed by
Luigi Pareyson which we have already mentioned above.
There is another problem which the artist should be able to solve.
When should the process of artistic creation end up? Or, when can the artist
decide that he finished his work? Beuys says: “I should start from the object
itself according to its dynamics;”25 “I have to take into consideration the
material and the process.”26 Thus, in Beuys’ opinion, it is not the artist but
25 Op.cit. p. 35.
26 Ibid., p. 36.
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the material that decides when the artistic process is finished. “I try to
understand what they want from themselves, the wood, or the stone.”27 The
artist remarks that the Avant-gardes decided to abandon the Renaissance
principle of mimesis in order to make possible the discovery of the
fundamental intention of each material. It was thought that only in this way
could the work of art reach its absolute beauty and value. “The table should
be as beautiful as a temple because it should be a living thing. If it is not
good, it is like a sick animal.”28 What could this mean? The material and
the form should “fit,” should “be in harmony with one another.” Only in
this way can the work be self-sufficient, according to the Kantian theory.
This is precisely the characteristic of the Greek temple but also that of the
olive tree near it, says Beuys, as this harmony implies a trans-figuration of
nature into art, as well as the art reflects itself (in its very essence) on the
entire surrounding nature.
This harmony is not only the prerogative of the ancient arts, according
to Beuys. The Coca-Cola bottle can be an example of the same idea of
harmony for the contemporary society and art. Beuys perceives in the shape
of the bottle, in its ribs, its neck, its solid and elegant basis, in its thin wave-
like writing, an assembly that should be considered a metaphor of vitality,
of energies flowing upward and downward within a living organism. In the
same way, the car, “the most beloved child of the twentieth century,”29 is
also “the most shaped and polished contemporary object.” And Beuys adds
with a certain melancholy: if a politic idea had been so much shaped and
“polished,” mankind would probably have an amazing evolution. Along the
same lines, agriculture should be seen as a work of art. It should take into
consideration the minerals that plants extract from the soil and store
afterward in their vegetal structure. Similarly, art should understand the
essence of the materials it uses.
The artist is convinced that art could contribute to a new culture.
Unfortunately, nowadays, the meaning of freedom is distorted, according to
each one’s considerations, as everyone has a different perspective on it. In
order to achieve true freedom, responsible freedom, it is necessary to
understand its meaning. Free thinking implies will and responsibility. Thus
the meaning of freedom refers to the creation of an entire world.
***
In our opinion, beauty, according to its aesthetic meanings, is still
present in contemporary art, but has profoundly changed its characteristics.
Aesthetic satisfaction is also still present, but it is based especially on the
rational contribution, as the work of art seems to attract mostly by its
intellectual allusions. This is, in fact, the beauty of our times, founded on a
vast culture and civilization surrounding us through any object we use.
27 Ibid., p.41.
28 Ibid., p. 42.
29 Ibid., p. 57.
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Contemporary art is indeed a new art having wider meanings, as we tried to
illustrate by the examples above. The beauty of this art should then
correspond to this diversity of meanings. One could say that this might
cause a sort of dissipation or evanescence of the artistic phenomena. In our
opinion, on the contrary, this wide variety of artistic expressions is in fact
the product of our contemporary mentality and it significantly contributes to
a better understanding of the world in which we live.
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CHAPTER XIV
WHAT KITSCH TELLS US ABOUT OUR TIME
ULRICH STEINVORTH
Abstract: There has always been kitsch: things that were to sweeten bitter
reality. But in modern societies, kitsch plays an additional role that it did
not play before the nineteenth century. Theorists disagree whether kitsch
indicates political decay. That it does was the prevailing view in the first
half of the twentieth century, but today the stern critique of kitsch is
considered rather pathological. Discussing views of Kulka, Kundera, Saul
Friedlander, Adolf Loos, and Kant, I argue for the older evaluation. My first
thesis is that kitsch is an illusionary form of autonomy preventing
autonomy. It is the new opium for the people. It is not the product of
manipulation, but satisfies a specifically modern demand.
My second thesis is that the way kitsch produces the illusion of
autonomy consists in the fact that the buyer and user of kitsch objects is led
in his choice by strong emotions. When he follows them he believes he is
following authentic nature rather than uncivilized nature. Lack of judgment
and civilization favor susceptibility to kitsch. This quality allows kitsch to
become a global attitude uniting individuals in their undifferentiating
responses to strong emotional stimuli.
Nonetheless, this is my third thesis: kitsch is not inescapable.
Contemporary societies seduce individuals not only into using the opium of
kitsch but also require of them initiative and creative activity, with which
kitsch is incompatible. The more initiative individuals use, the less they are
in need of kitsch, for they then have to attend more to stimuli, to
differentiate between them, and to abandon the uncivilized responses that
make them susceptible to kitsch.
The organizers of the Nazi movement knew well enough that they
would thrive if they made the masses believe in their autonomy by staging
mass mobilizing events that would underchallenge rational capabilities and
yet suggest having the applause of all naturally feeling mankind.
Contemporary election campaigns in Western democracies and mass events
such as the Olympics or Church World Congresses do not differ in this
respect. Kitsch has become a means of communication even for those who
do not want to deceive. It would be a first success of reflection about kitsch
if they stopped using kitsch.
By understanding kitsch as a political rather than an aesthetic
phenomenon, we can explain two conspicuous facts about kitsch. First, a
word to refer to the phenomenon came into use only in the 1860s, when art
dealers and artists in Munich called the “cheap artistic stuff” bought by the
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nouveaux riches “kitsch.”1 Second, the phenomenon has become an all-
pervading ideological culture soaking our feeling, thinking, and acting.
These facts cannot be explained by the prevailing aesthetic
understanding of kitsch. According to the aesthetic understanding, kitsch is
a reality sweetener rather than a reality contact reducer, or it is a product of
bad taste. The aesthetic understanding can explain kitsch as a phenomenon
that is shared by modern and pre-modern societies, but fails to explain the
specifically modern role of kitsch.
Moreover, although it is an aesthetic understanding, it cannot solve
problems of the aesthetics of music and architecture: how so-called serious
music can be kitsch and why not all ornament is a crime. Yet surprisingly,
the political understanding of kitsch I propose can solve these problems.
Keywords: kitsch, reality sweetener, aesthetic phenomenon, politic
phenomenon, bad taste.
There has always been kitsch; things that were to sweeten bitter
reality. Yet in the nineteenth century, kitsch began to play a new role.
Without anyone’s intention it became a political tool used without regard to
the consequences. Kitsch is no longer the innocent reality sweetener it may
have been at earlier times. This is what I’ll argue for.
DEFINITIONS OF KITSCH
Kitsch has become too conspicuous not to become an object of
analysis and controversy. It is controversial as to whether it indicates
political and intellectual decay. This view prevailed in the first half of the
twentieth century,2 but today, the stern critique of kitsch is suspected of
being pathological. 3 Kitsch is defended as a reality sweetener not reducing
reality contact, even as necessary to soften the inescapable hardship of
modernity. I argue for the older evaluation. Modern kitsch is the new opium
disabling the reality contact necessary for rational action.
1 Matei Călinescu, Faces of Modernity (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1977), p. 234.
2 Cp. Hermann Broch, Geist and Zeitgeist: The Spirit in an Unspiritual
Age (Berkeley, CA.: Counterpoint, 2003); Theodor Adorno, The Culture
Industry (London: Routledge, 2001); Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the
Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in Hannah Arendt, ed., Illuminations (New
York: Harcourt, 1968). This line lives on in Karlheinz Deschner, Kitsch,
Konvention und Kunst (Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1991), pp. 23-38, and Hans-Dieter
Gelfert, Was ist Kitsch? (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 2000).
3 An example is Konrad Paul Ließmann, “Kitsch und Kult. Jenseits von
Gut und Böse,” Neue Zürcher Zeitung Folio 12/03, diagnosing the critique of
kitsch as a “pathological chromophoby”: “With kitsch we retrieve what
modernism refuses us: the allure, the sentiment, the gaudy and the small
happiness.” (My transl.)
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It is uncontroversial that kitsch has become conspicuously rampant. As
Tomas Kulka, the author of perhaps the most systematic essay on kitsch,
states:
Whether kitsch began at some point in recent history, or whether
it is as old as art itself, one thing is beyond dispute: Kitsch has
become an integral part of our modern culture, and it is
flourishing now more than ever before. You find it everywhere. It
welcomes you to the restaurant, greets you in the bank, and
smiles at you from advertising billboards, as well as from the
walls of your dentist’s waiting room. The phenomenal success of
Dallas and Dynasty seems already to have vindicated Milan
Kundera’s prophetic dictum that the ‘brotherhood of men on
earth will be possible only on the base of kitsch’.4
As another author aptly remarked:
If Martians were to take a cool look at the world they might well
re-name it Kitsch. 5
This conspicuous fact provokes Kulka’s question:
Milan Kundera exposed kitsch as a main instrument for the
manipulation of the masses by Communist regimes, while Saul
Friedländer showed how central a role it played in the
mobilization of the masses in Hitler’s Germany. However, the
question of how kitsch performs such wonders, as well as the
question of what its appeal consists of…has not been fully
answered.6
Curiously though, Kulka claims the questions he points to are
“essentially questions of aesthetics.”7 True, if we call something kitsch we
imply a negative aesthetic judgment, ascribing to the object’s lover,
whether or not she calls it kitsch, bad taste or a lack of aesthetic sense. Yet
this does not imply that aesthetics can answer what the appeal of presently
4 Tomas Kulka, Kitsch and Art (Pennsylvania State University Press,
1996), p. 16. The quote is from Kundera’s novel The Unbearable Lightness of
Being (New York: Harper, 1984), p. 251.
5 Jacques Sternberg, Kitsch (London: Academy Ed., 1972); from Kulka
loc.cit. p. 17. I could not find the quote in the book, which in fact indulges in
porno kitsch.
6 Kulka loc.cit. p. 17. The reference to Kundera is to his Unbearable
Lightness, p. 251; that to Friedländer to his Reflections of Nazism: Essay on
Kitsch and Death (New York: Harper, 1984).
7 Kulka loc.cit., p. 7.
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rampant kitsch consists of. The typical kitsch objects, however, do suggest
the prevailing non-historical understanding of kitsch as innocent reality
sweetener. As Kulka lists such objects, they are pictures of
puppies and kittens,…mothers with babies,…beaches with palms
and colorful sunsets, pastoral Swiss villages,… pasturing
deer,…wild horses,…cheerful beggars, sad clowns, sad faithful
old dogs.8
No doubt, many kitsch objects do sweeten reality. There is also kitsch,
such as flashy wear or gaudy makeup that presents something as not
sweeter but rather more shocking or “sourer” than it is.9 Kulka would
accept this. What he rejects is that to understand contemporary kitsch we
need to go beyond aesthetics. In fact, kitsch objects, whether sweet or sour,
look innocent. If the Nazis used them to manipulate the masses, it’s not the
fault of kitsch, Kulka would say; kitsch results from bad taste, and we need
to define good taste both to tell kitsch and art apart and to prevent its
misuse. I call this understanding of kitsch its soft understanding:
(SK) Kitsch is nothing but a product of bad taste.
In contrast, I claim we need not know the difference between kitsch
and art to understand what makes kitsch rampant today. We need to know
the quality of kitsch, whether it is aesthetic or not, that allows social
conditions to render it rampant. Yet let’s first look at Kulka’s approach.
Kulka uses the notions of unity, complexity, and intensity as the
criteria of art and its quality to define good taste and to demarcate art from
kitsch.10 His problem is whether the explicated notions of unity,
8 Ibid., p. 26.
9 On sweet and sour (and more forms of) kitsch cp. Gelfert, Was ist
Kitsch? (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 2000); H.E. Holthusen, “Über den sauren
Kitsch,” in Ja und Nein (Munich: Piper, 1954); Matei Calinescu, Faces of
Modernity (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), p. 236.
10 Kulka ibid., p. 46, draws “on the time-honored theories of Plato and
Aristotle, which were refined by medieval church philosophers” and by Monroe
Beardsley and George Dickie; M.C. Deardsley, Aesthetics (New York:
Harcourt, 1958); G. Dickie, Evaluating Art (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1988). Kulka defines unity by the number a of alterations of a work W
that cause “some aesthetic damage to W” minus the number b of alterations that
“aesthetically (improve) W”; hence as a-b. He defines complexity by the
additions of a, b and the number c of alterations that do “not aesthetically affect
W”; hence as a+b+c; and intensity as the rate of improving and worsening
alterations (a+b) to the number of alterations without any aesthetic effect (c);
hence as (a+b)/c. Finally, he stipulates that the “overall aesthetic value of a
work of art” is indicated by the multiplication of the values of unity,
complexity and intensity; thus, the formula “(a-b) x (a+b+c) x (a+b)/c” is the
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complexity, and intensity do distinguish art from kitsch. He thinks they do,
because he denies kitsch the quality of intensity. His explanation of
intensity requires that a work is sensitive to alterations, such that the rate of
worsening and improving alterations (a+b) to the number of alterations
without aesthetic effect (c) is high. In contrast, “Kitsch pictures can be
subjected to many alterations without turning out either better or worse.” 11
He concludes:
In kitsch paintings, unlike in real art, what is represented is more
important than how it is rendered. The what overshadows the
how. 12
However, kitsch paintings such as Disney figures are very sensitive to
alterations. There is hardly a trait in them alterable without aesthetic effect;
hence c is small and intensity high. As Kulka says himself, the painter of a
kitsch work
should avoid all unpleasant or disturbing features of reality,
leaving us only with those we can easily cope with and identify
with.13
Paint the kitten a little too spiteful, the child a little too malicious, the
garden gnome too ugly, and their kitsch quality sinks. Disney figures need
hardly less craftsmanship than art works do.
Moreover, the what can be important in art too.14 Speaking of the what
that overshadows the how in kitsch, Kulka may have thought of the fact that
unlike art, kitsch produces feelings that do not allow differentiating, but if
so, his description is misleading. The conclusion to draw is that we cannot
distinguish kitsch from art by formal aesthetic qualities or by bad and good
taste.
aesthetic value of a work of art (ibid., pp. 68-71). As Kulka emphasizes, “The
proposed model should be seen as a suggestion for a rational reconstruction of
our aesthetic value judgments,” not implying that “that we actually do, or
should, form our aesthetic judgments by making calculations” (ibid., p. 72, n.
34).
11 Kulka ibid., p. 73.
12 Kulka loc.cit., p. 80.
13 Ibid., p. 27.
14 In his assigning the what to kitsch and the how to art, Kulka seems to
follow the most influential post-World War II art critic Clement Greenberg
(who certainly expressed a general “pro-abstract” tendency of this time). This
assignment is convincingly rejected by Noel Carroll, A Philosophy of Mass Art
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), 31ff.
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As an art critic remarked, “With regard to the norms of art there is
nothing wrong with kitsch.”15 Kitsch requires skill and judgment no less
than art. Yet they do require different kinds of skill and judgment. What
makes the difference? Kulka has no answer to this question. However,
rather than dropping SK we might drop Kulka’s explanation of bad taste
and look for another defense. Here is an alternative.
Think of gaudy make-up; or of a souvenir such as Rodin’s Thinker,
doubled, the backs flattened and used as bookends,16 or of a memory stick,
marbled and in the form of a cross. They make us laugh, and why? Because
they are cases of doing something at the wrong place which is right at the
place where it belongs. Such misplacement is the essence of both bad taste
and kitsch. The cross has its home at some higher place of a wall, not in a
laptop; Rodin’s Thinker is for a public place, not for stabilizing book rows;
gaudy make-up is fine in a circus, not at an ordinary public place; fluffy cat
and wild horse pictures as well as Donald Duck are right for children, but
wrong for adults; buying a plastic replica of the Cathedral of Florence is to
remember our tour but not to present beauty. Bad taste is not a lack of
knowledge or morality but a lack of a sense, loaded with experience, of
when and where to apply one’s factual or moral knowledge. Thus we can
also explain why kitsch is felt as pretense and ostentation, as fake,
hypocrisy, and parasitic on art:17 it pretends that a misplaced behavior is
right.
The big problem with this defense as with any other defense of SK is
that it cannot explain why kitsch has become rampant. There has always
been misplaced behavior, as there has always been bad taste, but these facts
did not make kitsch the dominating phenomenon it is today.
Moreover, there are more problems with SK that show up if we have a
closer look at kitsch objects. It seems obvious that what makes objects
kitschy is their sweetening, or in another word, adulterating style of
presenting reality and the implicit claim that reality is lovely, lively, or at
least more interesting and acceptable than it is. If there are poverty and old
age, cheerful beggars and faithful old dogs witness that basically reality is
fine. The novelist Kundera follows this idea of kitsch when he ascribes to
kitsch a “categorical agreement with being.” He even assimilates the
conflict between kitsch friends and kitsch enemies to that between
those who believe that the world was created by God and those
who think it came into being of its own accord…Kitsch is the
15 Harold Rosenberg, The Tradition of the New (New York: MacGraw-
Hill 1965), p. 266.
16 I take this example and the following one of the plastic replica from
Kulka 81f.
17 Cp. Gillo Dorfles, Kitsch: The World of Bad Taste (New York:
Universe Books, 1969) (tr. from the 1968 Italian version, Il Kitsch), 12;
Calinescu, 229, Kulka, p. 80.
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absolute denial of shit, in both the literal and figurative sense of
the word; kitsch excludes everything from its purview that is
essentially unacceptable in human existence.18
Yet if believers believe in God, they do not necessarily agree with
being, as they often also believe in the devil and do not agree with evil. And
think of Alexander Pope’s great verse:
And spite of Pride, in erring Reason's spite, One truth is clear,
Whatever is, is right. 19
If something categorically agrees with being, these lines do; but I
wonder if Kundera would call them kitsch. They are not. They show we can
categorically agree with being without sweetening reality, as they imply the
rigor of rejecting the human inclination to blame their own faults on the
world. They would be kitschy only if they yielded to this inclination and
ended with the words “Whate’er we do, is right.”
Can’t we nonetheless stick to SK and argue that what makes
something kitsch is not its sweetening or adulterating any part of reality but
only our actions? The problem is that fluffy kitten pictures seem to imply
not that whatever we do is right but that the kittens are right. Yet, as Pope
declaring “whatever is, is right” shows, the mere presenting of something as
right cannot become the kitsch factor. What then makes a presentation
kitschy, if it is neither the presentation as right nor the presentation of our
actions as right? What we are left with is a presentation that produces in us
feelings we indulge in. In fact, whether we like it or not, if we look at
kittens, they produce in us strong positive emotions. We can reject or
indulge in them. If we indulge, it seems we use the kitten pictures as kitsch;
if we reject the feeling the pictures trigger, we resist the attraction of kitsch.
So can we say that kitsch is an object made to trigger emotions in which we
may indulge?
No, since pornographic objects are also made to trigger feelings we
indulge in and yet they are not necessarily kitsch. Worse, many if not all
works of art are made to produce feelings in us that we indulge in without
indulging in kitsch. Otherwise Sophocles’ Antigone, which is said to have
caused the Athenians to indulge in crying for a week, would be kitsch. It
seems we need to qualify the feelings indulging in which is kitsch.
Here Kundera, despite his mistaken starting point, seems to hit on the
right quality:
Kitsch causes two tears to flow in quick succession. The first tear
says: How nice to see children running on the grass! The second
tear says: How nice to be moved, together with all mankind, by
18 Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness, 247f; from Kulka 95f.
19 Alexander Pope, Essay on Man, End of First Epistle.
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children running on the grass! It is the second tear that makes
kitsch kitsch.20
Kitsch can cause not only two tears but also two laughs or smiles or
admiring wows. Kundera’s point is that a presentation is kitschy if and only
if it is made to produce feelings we indulge in because we think we feel as
all mankind does. First tears, or laughs, or wows, are right. Second tears are
wrong because in them we feel not for the specific reason for which the
feeling would be right, as when the Athenians admire Antigone’s
steadfastness, but for its presumed agreement with mankind. Second tears
drown the first tears. Indulging in a feeling for its agreement with mankind
prevents us from attending to the reasons of our first tears, and reduces us
to enjoying only our feeling rather than responding, by our emotion, to the
facts that deserve our emotion. Indulging in a feeling for the facts that
deserve our emotion is a case of exploring reality by our feeling and of
doing something for its sake. In contrast, indulging in a feeling for its
agreement with mankind is a case of doing something only for our
pleasure.21
Understanding kitsch as producing a second tear or emotion by which
we think of our agreement with mankind allows us to understand some
peculiarities of kitsch. We may wonder why the picture of fluffy kittens or a
sunset is kitsch, while real fluffy kittens or a sunset that look exactly like
the pictures are not. Similarly, a Gothic cathedral is often great art, but the
same cathedral rebuilt in our time is felt to be kitschy. The reason is the
picture or copy is made to trigger not only a first emotion but a second one
that indulges in our agreement with mankind. Similarly, a child or youth
who the first time sees a picture we regard as kitschy and enthuses over it is
pardoned for his misjudgment, because we assume he indulges in it only for
the first tear. However, we should add to or explicate Kundera’s description
of the second tear, stating that it is a reference not necessarily to a given in
mankind, but to a presumed one that the kitsch producer may only feign.
We might even describe rhetoric by its reference to a suggested feeling of
mankind and thus explain why philosophers become kitschy when they use
rhetoric rather than argument.
Recognizing the second-tear-triggering property as the constitutive
property of kitsch allows us to explain another specificity of kitsch.
Indulgence in kitsch is often felt as a protest against rules that check and
channel our responses. Civilization channels our immediate responses,
expecting us not to blurt them out but to have regard to the sensibilities of
others. Unlike cattle and barbarians, we should know how to control
ourselves. In contrast, kitsch objects invite us to respond uninhibitedly to
20 Kundera, Unbearable Lightness loc. cit., p. 251; from Kulka, p. 27.
21 Kundera’s “second tear” can distinguish kitsch from both mass art and
Avant-garde art as defined by Noel Carroll, Philosophy of Mass Art, pp. 185-
211.
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strong feelings, such as rapture at the cuteness of kittens and the pathos of
sunsets. We can be sure that everyone has such feelings; otherwise they
would lack the strength that makes them the feelings that kitsch objects
trigger. This is why indulging in them is also indulgence in our conformity
to mankind, and why kitsch objects replace the rules of civilization with the
authority of strong feelings that we believe are common to mankind. In
contrast, by explaining kitsch as bad taste, we take account only of the
failure of kitsch to meet the standards of taste, and not of its implicit claim
to be superior to the conventions of civilization.
By its appeal to the natural feelings of mankind, kitsch unites people
of the most different civilizations in a universal brotherhood. Yet it is a
brotherhood only in the most primitive responses to blunt stimuli or raw
nature, a brotherhood that can be as obtrusive as the uniting responses are
elementary. Moreover, the raw nature that unites the global kitsch
community is often only the pretense of human nature, since certain
responses that in fact result from specific conditions, such as taking a
cigarette or a drink after some strain, or taking offense at the behavior of a
minority, can be hyped by kitsch producers so as to appear as the right
response of all mankind.
The crucial element in the second-tear-triggering property of kitsch
that explains the rampancy of kitsch is not only that it confirms us in feeling
like all mankind, but also that it pardons and even applauds under-
achievements and failures, such as that of the German bourgeoisie in 1848,
if they are taken for a rebellion against the standards of art and civilization.
Kitsch promises liberty for the price of abandoning standards of
civilization. As we experience the tools’ tyranny as civilization’s tyranny,
we are attracted to kitsch, taking it for a badge of liberation.
Thus, kitsch has become rampant today. The suffering from the tools’
tyranny and the evasive response to it by muddling through, rather than
taking up the challenge, cry for a confirmation by the agreement with
mankind. They make us eager to look for things that allow us to enjoy
ourselves rather than what merits admiration; for if we think of what merits
admiration, we’ll not come off well. On the other hand, those who profit
from the given conditions, interested in the prevalent evasive response to
the tools’ tyranny rather than in an autonomous society, will produce such
confirmation as much as they can. We can be sure that under the given
conditions, kitsch spreads like fire in a parched forest, as something people
cry for and minorities kindle.22
22 As far as I see, except for Kundera, kitsch theorists have failed to
understand this crucial property of kitsch and therefore end up with amazingly
trivial or misleading descriptions of kitsch. Thus in explaining why kitsch is so
popular, Adorno (“On Popular Music,” Studies in Philosophy and Social
Science 9, 1941, p. 38; from Calinescu, p. 242) desperately states: “People want
to have fun. A fully concentrated and conscious experience of art is possible
only to those whose lives do not put such a strain on them that in their spare
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There are, however, more sophisticated forms of kitsch that attract just
because they demonstrate that the chooser of this form of kitsch differs
from the rest. We find them in particular in forms that combine with
fashion. They are interesting because they indicate that kitsch can turn from
an obstacle into a motor of autonomy. Yet they are still obstacles because
their autonomy is no less illusionary than that of ordinary kitsch. If my goal
is to be just different from the rest, I remain dependent on the rest. Rather
than my telling myself what I must do, the rest now tells me what I must
not do. I will not take account of these forms of kitsch here, though.
Now, am I (and Kundera) not moralistic and prejudiced against kitsch?
Isn’t what I depreciatingly call raw nature our real nature or a very
important part of it? When I buy a poster of fluffy kittens, do I not follow
my impulse rather than a rule of art or civilization that commands me to
prefer a more artistic picture? Am I not entirely independent of what “all
mankind” feels, as I follow only my impulse? So, isn’t the claim of kitsch to
liberate perfectly justified?
True, actions are autonomous only if they are our actions, chosen by
us and suiting us. Yet another condition of autonomy is that we deliberate
about our actions, look for alternatives, ponder the pros and cons, and only
then decide. But deliberation is the very thing kitsch cuts off. Kitsch invites
us to follow the first strong impulse we feel when looking at it. True, in
young people kitsch can have an emancipatory effect, as it can push them to
trusting their own feeling. However, if the young do not learn to add
deliberation to their self-confidence, they stick with deciding by their
strongest impulse. Rather than becoming autonomous they become objects
of manipulation of kitsch producers, who offer them the stimuli to which
they will respond the way most people do, just because they are the stimuli
most people spontaneously respond to in the same way.
So they will judge their responses right because others are responding
the same way. Their criterion of the rightness of a response is not whether it
is adequate to the stimulus (they may even lose the concept of such
adequacy) but whether it conforms to how other people respond.
We now have sufficient reason to formulate the following lengthy
explanation K of kitsch:
time they want relief from both boredom and effort simultaneously. The whole
sphere of cheap commercial entertainment reflects this dual desire.” Why does
this sphere produce just this special phenomenon of kitsch? There are many
other ways to find relief from boredom without effort, such as riding a roller
coaster or getting drunk. Calinescu, p. 244, even states: “Cheap or expensive,
kitsch is sociologically and psychologically the expression of a life style,
namely, the life style of the bourgeoisie or the middle class” and invents a
“principle of mediocrity.” Yet the bourgeoisie did not incline to kitsch at all
before the 19th century, and since then the non-bourgeois classes were no less
fond of kitsch.
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(K) Kitsch is an object producing feelings indulged in because their
strength invites us to enjoy ourselves in what seems to be an autonomously
chosen agreement with an alleged mankind, but is only the indulgence in an
unavoidable response to stimuli too blunt as to allow a differentiated
attention to reality and therefore preventing the reality contact necessary for
autonomy.
K does not exclude that kitsch sweetens reality or offends good taste,
as the strong feelings a kitsch object triggers may be sweet and offending to
good taste, but it contradicts SK, as it claims that kitsch is more than just a
product of bad taste. K may define the kitsch of all times, but by describing
the feelings kitsch produces, it allows explaining the historical role kitsch
has acquired today; so we may call it a historical approach. Let’s now have
a look at its historical role.
THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF KITSCH
The word kitsch was introduced in the 1860s by art dealers and artists
in Munich for “cheap artistic stuff” bought by the nouveaux riches.23 This
was the time when the German bourgeoisie stopped reflecting the failed
1848 revolutions and looked for new goals, allowing them to forget about
their failure. The historical coincidence of the German bourgeoisie’s desire
to wipe out their historical failure and the beginning of the career of the
word kitsch may be a mere accident. Yet it is not too implausible to guess,
either, that the Germans’ susceptibility to kitsch was an effect of, or favored
by, the humiliating defeat of 1848.
Autonomy would have required of the German bourgeoisie to seize
political power, as the English bourgeoisie had done two centuries earlier.
The German bourgeoisie did have the power to impose its own order on
Germany, but it submitted to a decaying aristocracy and its state
institutions. While before 1848 it had cultivated the moderately
authoritarian Biedermeier, this was no longer possible after its partial
commitment to the 1848 revolutions. Now the bourgeois desired
compensation for their 1848 failure by sticking to their ideal of autonomy,
yet without risking another revolution. Enjoying kitsch allowed them to
have an omelet without breaking an egg, to be radical in words and
conservative in deeds. For kitsch invited them to follow their immediate
strong and uncivilized impulses in responding to “artistic stuff” and to take
their responses for acts of liberation by which they also showed their
agreement with all true mankind not yet spoiled by the suppressing rules of
feudal civilization. The artistic stuff of Munich art dealers found a fertile
ground in novels, operas, dueling fraternities, and national celebrations
Yet the failure of the German bourgeoisie that triggered the career of
kitsch was only the last straw that broke a camel’s back burdened by the
23 Călinescu, p. 234.
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tools’ tyranny. Since all modern societies suffer from the tools’ tyranny,
and the failure of the German bourgeoisie was followed by similar failures
of other classes in most other nations, kitsch spread. The price to pay for the
comfort of kitsch, for indulging in sentiments that provide the illusion of
autonomy and distract from deliberate actions, was reduced reality contact.
Friends of kitsch become blind to alternatives and to the dangers of their
conformism. The costs were billed by World War I and its consequences.24
If this explanation is true, we should expect that despite the prevalence
of the soft understanding in theory, in practice kitsch is recognized as a
means to assure us in our resignation into conditions that we criticize in
words but accept in deeds. Kitsch could not become rampant without
recognition of its function in practice. And it is thus recognized. Here is an
example, a comment, titled Kitsch Rather Than Crisis, in a German weekly
on the announcement that the English Prince William and his girlfriend
Kate Middleton would marry in 2011:
The British government is said to have rapped the tables,
overjoyed, for minutes…Hardly could there have been a better
present in a year when Britain has to implement the strictest
austerity plans of the recent past. In such a time some kitsch feels
good. And since the crisis will be very hard indeed, some more
kitsch will feel still better…Kitsch gilds the crisis, and we are
beguiled.25
Kitsch is here understood as a means that helps accept a life in need of
“gilding.” By causing second tears on a marriage, kitsch is expected to
create a universal brotherhood that by its indulging in second tears accepts
what deliberating people would not accept. The author of the comment
certainly does not think that kitsch reduces reality contact, but his words
imply such reduction nonetheless.
Kitsch has become a recognized tool to reduce us to a community of
raw feelings, willing to follow feelings because they seem the feelings of
mankind. In practice, it is recognized to be not just a reality sweetener but a
tool to bend people’s will in one direction that makes consent by argument
superfluous. As such a tool, kitsch is used in politics and advertisement,
religion and rhetoric. Making the masses believe in their autonomy by
staging mass mobilizing events that underchallenge rational capabilities, yet
suggest having the applause of all naturally feeling mankind, is common to
totalitarian systems, election campaigns in Western democracies, and mass
24 Sennett, Fall of Public Man, assigns similar importance to 1848, though
he focuses on “personality” rather than on kitsch: “The revolution of 1848 was
the first appearance of the dominance of a culture of personality” (262).
25 Die Zeit, Nov 17, 2010. (My transl.) Yet in August 2011, commentators
explained the reduction of Britain’s economic growth down to 0.2 percent by
the extra holidays introduced for the marriage celebrations.
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events such as the Olympics or Church World Congresses. Even those who
do not want to deceive use kitsch as a means to bend people’s will as if it
was legitimate.26
As kitsch is an opiate, its spread indicates the spread of despair over
the impotence in mastering the modern life. In his Civilization and Its
Discontents, Freud analyzed the despair kitsch indicates, even though he
does not mention kitsch. Rather soothingly, he calls the despair “uneasiness
in civilization” and explains it as a result of a “disappointment,” not by “an
extraordinary advance in the natural sciences and in their technical
application,” but by the discipline that any civilization imposes on human
desires to make peaceful coexistence possible.27 Thus Freud provides an
argument to defend kitsch as a necessary means to buffer the burdens of the
tools’ tyranny. Yet he recognizes the destructive potential of the uneasiness
in civilization by adding to the instinct “of hunger and love,” as he here
calls libido, “an instinct of death or destruction.”28 He is probably wrong to
assume such an instinct, but right to state a strong readiness to destroy in
contemporary society feeding on the suffering from the tools’ tyranny.
By stating such a readiness, Freud implies that kitsch, like other
opiates, may stifle but cannot eradicate the aggression that responds to the
tools’ tyranny. The illusion of autonomy with which kitsch provides its
adherent will turn into a “fury of destruction,”29 when the illusion breaks
down but reality contact is not resumed. This happened in Germany after
World War I. The defeat smashed Germans’ power fancy without
improving their reality contact. The result was a rise of the readiness to
destroy that found its expression in Nazism. As we may expect, also this
readiness was wrapped in kitsch.
Saul Friedlander described the vicinity of kitsch and killing that
appears in the kitschy glorification of death by the Nazis and by artists who
felt attracted to death.30 He illustrates the method of how to pass crime off
as virtue by Himmler’s speech to the SS generals who had to execute the
decision to delete the Jewry of Europe. Himmler commands the generals to
make sure that nothing is stolen from the Jews, “for the love of our people”
26 Sennett, Public Man, describes the use of kitsch in politics by the
concept of (inconspicuous) “narcotic charisma” (271). Yet he focuses on
aspects of “personality” rather than of autonomy and its inhibition.
27 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (New York: Norton,
1962), 34f.
28 Ibid., pp. 64 and 66.
29 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit § 589; Philosophy of Right § 5. Yet
Hegel applies the term to abstract liberty.
30 Saul Friedländer, Reflections of Nazism: Essay on kitsch and Death
(New York: Harper, 1984), p. 135. Italized in original.
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and to prevent “any damage to our inner self, our soul and our character.”31
He presents genocide as an act of decency.
What Friedlander describes characterizes not only Nazi Germany but
all contemporary societies, even if to a lower degree. Wars are a welcome
way to make use of the economically superfluous, but they also meet a
readiness that indicates an unbroken destructive potential. Today, Islamist
leaders of terror organizations wrap their calls to murder in the language of
religion that contains the accumulated kitsch of centuries. Western
governments are not inferior to them. The American military doctrine of
Shock and awe32 that aims at gaining rapid dominance over an enemy
nation by a sudden destruction of its infrastructure was presented as
minimizing “civilian casualties, loss of life, and collateral damage,” even
though the more detailed description said the effect would be that of
“dropping nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.”33
The use of kitsch for wrapping crime in virtue demonstrates the worst
property of kitsch: it replaces rational deliberation, by which alone we can
distinguish between true and false and right and wrong, with the criterion of
conformity to mankind. Corruption, mafia blackmail, and government
terror, all the horrors thrillers are detailing, are backed up in a civilization
with reduced contact to what is and ought to be the case.
Ascribing so many vices to kitsch is not very credible if we think of
our buying a pink plastic replica of the Cathedral of Florence or of kids
convulsed with laughter about Donald Duck. Such behavior would be
entirely innocent indeed if it did not contribute to the stupid kitsch of
advertisement and movies, the nasty kitsch of mass mobilizations, and the
subtle kitsch of administrative orders and scientific presentations.
Understanding kitsch as reality sweetener or bad taste prevents us from
recognizing the crimes kitsch makes possible. Still, we must not forget that
by its appeal to what individuals strongly feel, kitsch opens up the chance
that people will discover what else belongs to them: their power of
deliberation, or reason, and their power of negation, or free will. Under the
right conditions, kitsch can promote autonomy.
31 Friedlander loc.cit. 103. Himmler held his talk on October 4, 1943 in
Posen.
32 The doctrine was developed by Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade,
Rapid Dominance: A Force for All Seasons. Royal United Services Institute in
Defense Studies, 1998. This publication was preceded by a report to the United
States’ National Defense University in 1996. The next quotation is from the
Introduction. Klein, The ShockDoctrine, p. 396, pp. 399-406, describes
Rumsfeld’s part in the doctrine and its terrorist consequences.
33 Ibid. Chapter 1. The use of shocking crises to produce “real change,”
recommended by Milton Friedman and described by Naomi Klein, The Shock
Doctrine 2007, no longer needs wrapping in kitsch.
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APPLICATION TO THE AESTHETICS OF MUSIC AND
ARCHITECTURE
It comes as a surprise that we may apply the understanding of kitsch
by definition K to aesthetical problems of music and architecture. Such an
application confirms K.
There has been a dispute about whether there can be kitsch in music,
or at least in so-called serious music. The dispute may seem bizarre, as it
seems obvious that Wagner and other composers are sometimes kitschy.34
Yet if we presuppose kitsch consists in sweetening reality or in bad taste,
rather than in preventing differentiating responses to stimuli, we have a
reason to claim music can never be kitschy, for music cannot do without
producing emotions, and, in the end, enjoyable ones. To understand music
we have to indulge in it to some extent. So if we cannot avoid indulging in
enjoyable emotions when listening to music, understanding music is a case
of indulging in sweetening reality; hence it is always kitsch. Yet obviously
not all music is kitsch. So it seems best to deny music the possibility to be
kitsch in the first place.
Obviously, too, we can apply this argument to literature and any other
kind of art. Works of art, as Antigone shows, often require an immersion in
the feelings they produce. If we follow the logic of the argument, either all
art is kitsch or there can be no kitsch in art. Yet we can avoid this
implausible conclusion if we understand kitsch as preventing differentiating
responses. Then we can understand music and any other work of art are
kitsch if and only if they lead to indulgence in powerful emotions that
exclude differential attention. Wagner’s music does produce such emotions;
in particular emotions of an unconditional surrender to a power the listener
identifies with, if only to the power of music. The surrender is of the kind
enjoyed in mass mobilizations and masquerades as autonomy. No wonder
Wagner’s music is loved in such mobilizations.
Kitsch is a problem also in architecture. The Vienna architect Adolf
Loos, famous for the the essay “Crime and Ornament,”35 argued that
ornament is crime. He regarded ornament as sweetening, hence as kitsch,
hence as condemnable, and propagated functional architecture. Architects
followed in flocks, wreaking havoc in most cities, making buildings bleak
and boring. Yet unless functional architecture is witty, it is oppressive and a
pretext for cheap production.
Like music theorists, architects ignored the fact that kitsch consists not
just in using ornaments and other reality sweeteners, but in their use to
34 Reported by Kulka 101; Susan Sontag, in Dorfles ed., Kitsch, loc. cit.,
p. 239, said that “as far as serious music is concerned, very little is called
kitsch.”
35 In his Sämtliche Schriften, Wien (Herold) 1967; transl. in Ulrich
Conrads, “Programs and Manifestoes on 20th Century Architecture”
(Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1964.)
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produce illusionary feelings of autonomy, in particular to make the observer
identify with the power represented. Such design was cultivated by the Nazi
architect Albert Speer and by most Middle Eastern and Western empires,
from ancient Egypt and Rome to the Soviet and the American Empires with
their wedding-cake palaces and staggering business towers. Like Wagnerian
music, it invites the subjects to rave about a power mistaken for autonomy.
It demonstrates power that frightens the foe and fortifies the friend.
Yet building and composition cannot only use ornament and
sweetness, but can demonstrate power, namely the power of intelligence in
architecture and composition, without any kitschiness at all. Examples are
an overwhelming mass of musical compositions36 and Gothic cathedrals,
Roman aqueducts, and modern bridges and dams, demonstrating the most
developed construction technology of their time. Such works allow
admiring technological or compositional power but do not invite to
identifying with or dissolving in it.
Our historical approach to kitsch also provides an explanation as to
why what has been art yesterday often is kitsch if imitated today. To build a
house today in the Gothic style does not pass for art, however great art the
same house has been in Gothic times. Similarly, to compose music in the
style of a past epoch is not taken for real art. Remarkably, authors agree in
this aesthetic view.37 A house or a composition was art in their times only if
it composed the elements then available so as to allow differentiating
judgments and feelings in looking at and living in it or in playing or
listening to it. But imitation is felt to promote indulging in something of
which general admiration is presupposed, hence to exclude creating an
object that allows differentiating responses. Moreover, if the artist
renounces the use of means available in his or her time, he or she performs
the very underachievement pretending to be an achievement that marks
kitsch. In contrast, if a city recreates its historical buildings destroyed in
war, the restored buildings will not be felt to be kitsch because there is no
pretension of an artistic achievement.
For their condemnation of any ornament and not only those that aim at
illusion, Loos and his adherents might appeal to Kant’s aesthetic. Kant said:
36 When Bach added to his compositions the words Ad maiorem Dei
gloriam, (to the greater glory of God), he expressed that he did what he did not
for his sake but for the sake of a work to which he felt subordinated.
37 To escape this problem, Kulka 54ff distinguishes between the aesthetic
and the artistic value of art, the latter taking account of the “art-historical
value” of a work of art. This distinction can explain (as Kulka shows) the
different judgments on a work such as Picasso’s Les Demoiselles d’Avignon but
not the phenomenon mentioned.
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At any time, taste is still barbarian if it uses allures and emotions
to please or even makes them the measure of applause. 38
Kant thus seems to deny any music and ornament aesthetic value, as
there is no music or ornament that does not somehow use allures and
emotions to please. Yet art may not only play with allures and emotions;
often it ranks higher because of the deeper the emotion it produces. Not
only music and architecture but all art is misunderstood if we understand
kitsch as sweetening rather than as preventing differentiating responses; for
a work of art turns into kitsch, not if it moves or pleases, but if it does so by
preventing differentiation. Kant is right to warn us against the second tears
kitsch literature tries to produce in the reader, but wrong if he condemns the
first tear.
Yet we can also read Kant in a more favorable light. He did not
prohibit all “allures and emotions,” but those that only serve to please, and
thus stop art from following its intrinsic aim. Kant insisted on judging the
value of a work of art by its inherent standard rather than by an external
goal. Anyway, however we interpret Kant, if we understand kitsch by K, we
have to agree that art may present its object in a pleasant form, but must not
do so if pleasing is its only goal.
University of Hamburg
Hamburg, Germany
ulrich.steinvorth@uni-hamburg.de
38 Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft §13: “Der Geschmack ist jederzeit noch
barbarisch, wo er die Beimischung der Reize und Rührungen zum Wohlgefallen
bedarf, ja wohl gar diese zum Maßstabe seines Beifalls macht” (my tr.).

CHAPTER XV
GLOBALIZATION:
MODERN MYTH OR IDEOLOGICAL PROJECT?
IULIA ANGHEL
Abstract: The present wears the visible tracks of a new and effervescent
idea – the unification and symbiosis of identities. This type of vision over
cultural values and geopolitical limitations tends to dissolve the previous
picture of a world dominated by heterogenic and irreducible differences and
raises some hard questions. Are we confronting a disguised ideological
project or is it a new and modern form of myth? The main aim of this
article is to explore the lines of struggle and tension regarding what we call
today the phenomenon of globalization. The central hypothesis refers to a
pre-existent background for this type of symbolic unification which made
possible the concentration of human relations and interactions, considered
to be a mark of a late modernity.
One of the core issues contained in this article will refer to an attempt
of identification of the primary sources of the great change of paradigm
generated by the secularization of the social sphere. On another level, this
could also imply a short inquiry on the rise and extension of the very
influential dimension of political mythology.
Another subject that I intend to present is linked to an analysis of the
communist ideology defined as an intermediate stage for a specific type of
globalization. At the same time, I will try to offer an interpretation of the
communist mythology as a form of exploitation of the perennial collective
aspirations and dreams.
The final part of this article will be focused on a discussion of the
mythological dimension of globalization and will host an attempt to identify
and de-construct its stereotypes and hidden structure. The study will evolve
mainly through the reference frames designed by the writings of Alain
Besançon, Katherine Verdery, and Lucien Sfez, but also will consider other
possible visions. It is important to mention that even though this kind of
global and very theoretical approach will necessarily involve some
simplifications and generalizations, and could not exhaust the whole sum of
significations and senses of the discussed terms, it could still be useful in
designing a new space of debate.
Keywords:Globalization, human values, cleavage, identity, political
myth, unity
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INTRODUCTION
One of the major provocations of democratic theory is to offer answers
about its main scope. Hard to accept or not, democracy tends to action and
to influence political entities and historical epochs, without a clarifying
justification1 . Often it is said that the democratic option is the best option
for the majority of people. The question remains: What majority? Is it an
eternal rule for every type of society and evolutionary moment? Is it
suitable for every cultural pattern? The only answer is the silence.
Interactions between the specific democratic model and the tendency of a
particular structure of values are united today by the complex term of
globalization. Its vocation is doubled by an implicit rule that proclaims it as
the only possible option, which generates an illusory picture.
We are tempted to believe that the whole planet is included in this
new, humanistic and progressive movement. The real sense of globalization
is perhaps lost in this variety of implications. One of the central scopes of
this article is to try an exploratory view over the real limits and shapes of
globalization, as we face it today. Also, I will try to show some hidden
aspects of this extremely provocative reality. First I have to mention that the
term “globalization” is used in a specific way and is understood as a form
of colonization of a particular model, the Western culture, with limits and
edges often determined by very subtle political interests. Of course,
globalization is much more than that, but we may accept that one of its
important elements is this domination of a set of “core values” that tend to
minimize other cultural alternatives. One important argument will be linked
to the concept of the “extended border,” understood as a limitative line that
arises between the space of the universal project and the rest of the world.
The central argument is that even if we tend to believe that
globalization is a natural, progressive, and legitimate evolution of a
universal and humanistic project, in fact we may suspect the intervention of
an ideological frame. This way globalization becomes an expression of a
silent dominance of a cultural pattern against diversity and not an “open
model” that slowly evolves and includes new types of values. The term of
“myth” placed also in the title is used in a metaphorical way and its target is
to stress our vulnerability in front of the perennial ideal of a universal and
borderless society.2 Even if this type of very general and abstract
exploration is exposed to some limitations and simplifications, it could still
prove its utility in highlighting the hidden aspects of the globalization
movement.
1 Ed. Ian Shapiro, Casiano Hacker-Cordon, Democracy’s Edges
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
2 J. J. Wunenburger, Politics Imageries (Bucharest: Paideia Publishing
House, 2005).
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GLOBALIZATION BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE TIMES
The concept of globalization is controversial, multivalent, and hard to
define in the light of its uncountable set of consequences. Involving a
complicated range of symbolic, ideological, and economical perspectives,
globalization tends to function as a unification vector for divergent
phenomena such as: the free market extension, the invasion of the Western
cultural model or the informational revolution. All these fragmentary
elements are paradoxically chained by the idea of “boundary annihilation.”
One of the main features of this new vision is the problem of
indetermination of limits. Compression of the space functions at the same
time as an extension of identities. The domination (real or not) of a
Western-originated model raises some deceitful questions in the field of
classical problems of ethical and political philosophy.
An important part of the theoretical exploration of the problem of
globalization is based on the idea that all these dissolving tendencies are in
fact an exclusive mark of the contemporary world. Nevertheless, a short
look at the history of ideas may bring to light some hidden roots of the
globalization project. If we define this paradigm in terms of a unification
project of cultural identities and at the same time as a dissolving vector for
classical boundaries and limitations, we may discover that globalization is
not such a new reality. One of the first cases with relevant similarities may
be considered the Medieval structure of identities. Here, religious influence
generated some interesting key points. The world was not yet a melting pot,
but we recognize the presence of an extended border. The Enlightenment
movement continued this unification of values and functioned as a primary
stage of global identity. This first dissolving frame suffered in the end a
fragmentation generated by the intervention of the Age of Nations, but its
fundamental ideas survived in a cryptic form. These hidden tendencies were
revealed again by the intervention of the ideological projects of the
nineteenth century. Class identity and the new born proletarian values
shattered the national limits and gave birth to a new type of global and
universal project.
Marx’s theory over the annihilation of space sustains the thought that
the capitalist system generates an accumulation of resources and slowly
destroys the old form of economic relations.3 This natural movement of
historical evolution will bring, in the end, the pauperization of the
proletarians, but also will raise their class consciousness, making revolution
possible. It is interesting to mention that in Marx’s approach, the unification
of values and cosmopolitan world ideas are not surprising at all and they
make sense for the future of the communist project. There is a complicated
road trip between idea and reality, so this kind of ideological unification
3 K. Marx, "Maniesto of the Communist Party" in Selected Works, third
edition, vol. 1 (Bucharest: Political Publishing House, 1966).
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didn’t last, and the universal and non-limited vision of the fathers of the
communist project was replaced by a kaleidoscopic range of small systems.
For Medieval unification there were two major types of main points, the
religious identity and the intellectual bridge of the Latin language. The
small informational revolution implied by Gutenberg’s invention will be
reproduced on a different scale by the informational era, opened through the
interventions of the new technologies.
The ideological stage invented its extended borders through the
complicated tool of the political culture. Proletarians from all types of
societies were this way linked in a determinational chain. Karl Marx’s
prophecies were not respected and this world-spread revolution didn’t
generate a social heaven, but as a paradox it made possible today's
globalization. From a general point of view, we could identify four major
paradigms that fit globalization tendencies: The Medieval community of
religion that had its elitist language, the Lights of modernity that used the
cultural language centered on humane values, Marx’s ideological project,
which was linked with the class consciousness, and in the end, the present
concentrations of the identities which are patronized by the informational
revolution.
All these stages share some interesting similarities that make us accept
as possible a cyclic-shaped model. The unification trends are supporting a
dissolving element: the elitist Medieval community was brooked by the
Illuminist vector, the Enlightenment lost its general aimed values by the
interventions of the ideological culture, and the last one was proclaimed
defeated through the installation of the informational era.
An important question remains about the essence of globalization: Is
this a genuine contemporary reality, made possible by the interventions of a
natural process that had its roots at the beginning of modernity, or are we
discussing a recurrent pattern of compressing and extending identities,
through a dynamic type of borders? It is difficult to raise an ultimate
response, but it is quite obvious that today's globalization shares some
provocative features with past similar projects. The expansion of a specific
cultural pattern and its self-proclaimed universality also raises some
specific questions about the domains of ethics, values, and politics.
THE PROBLEM OF THE EXTENDED BORDER: INSIDE AND
OUTSIDE THE “UNIVERSAL” PATTERN
All the previous attempts to create a universal, general, and uniform
space of identity were paradoxically linked by the concept of borders.
Extended or not, the border was a limitation line, between this pattern and
the rest of the world. The “war line” was not placed in an evolutionary way,
splitting the past from the future, the evolved visions from the retrograde
ones. What makes this separation so interesting is its eliminatory vocation.
The Medieval community was labeled as an elitist construct, its values and
its language being quite non-accessible to regular people. Despite these
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extremely restrictive conditions, we may consider it in a light of a universal
project.
Supporting this thesis we could invoke three major aspects: the
dissolving effect of the religious factor, the presence of new, specific, and
unitary path of communication (Latin), and the alchemy of a new system of
values. This way the evolution of the “Gutenberg’s code” began.4
The world placed outside their model was often ignored and treated as
a “neglected part”5 of reality. Of course, it may be said that the universal
communion of the Medieval project was not perfect, and this aspect will be
resolved in the next stages. The Enlightenment movement induced the
sensation of a change, but the border is still there, as a defining line and not
as a temporary element. The aims of the Light’s Revolution are more
general and more universal, but they are still trapped in a hermetic
paradigm. This profound change that took place in the referential system
didn’t affect all the people. The “good savage” was perceived as an ideal
model of harmony between human and nature, but he didn’t know it, and
because of that, the Enlightenment received some counterexamples quite
late. These structures were repeated for most of the revolutions and
manifestations of the “extended border” phenomena. The new and
extremely militant ideological cultural paradigm is one of the clearest
examples.
Marx’s revolutionary vision drastically excluded whole categories of
social groups from the global and glorifying future. As an observation, we
may conclude that all these revolutions and changes of paradigm that in a
first stage had the appearance of universal and global projects are, in fact,
dependent in a fundamental way on the concept of limit. There are other
worlds outside the pattern that did not participate in its values, types of
interactions, and internal rules. This exterior was in the past slowly
included in the extended border. The main questions remains: is today's
project one that devoured the external space?
Is there nothing outside the influence and the systemic values of what
we call today the “global village”? The previous theoretical and quite
simplifying analysis proved its utility by revealing some interesting aspects.
First, universal projects like the Enlightenment or the proletarian revolution
had their own limits that eliminated the rest from the equation. The Lights
epoch did it in an implicit manner and Marx’s revolution in an explicit and
violent way. Secondly, the border line is not a temporary limitation of these
types of projects, but a specific and constitutive feature. And in the end,
global projects imply some eliminatory operations against other types of
systems and values that did not fit the pattern.
4 M. McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002).
5 G. Bataille, The Accursed Share (Iaşi: European Institute Publishing
House, 1994).
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GLOBALIZATION OF VALUES: LIBERATION MOVEMENT OR
“TOTALITARIAN MODEL”?
We already saw that an important variety of universal-aimed projects
like the Marxist revolution or the Enlightenment were dependent on the
concepts of limit and “rejected groups.” The problem of the extended
border was not solved by the modern frame of globalization, and we can
still perceive an “external reality” that refuses to fit into this model. The
present expression of the “extended border” generates an acceleration
process for some old conflicts and separation lines. The hermetic
communities that functioned through the intervention of a self-regulatory
mechanism must face unexpected influences in this new reality. The fate of
distant countries and extremely different political structures is, in the
present paradigm, linked by globalization’s chain. At first look, this
extensional model could be considered as a liberation tool. There is a core
of “good” values that are replacing some “dark paradigms” such as
totalitarianism or archaic structures. But the real problem rests in the label
that we apply to these specific values.
There is a sphere of interest where our attention is concentrated and
there is another spatial dimension, very similar to the first, that rests in dark.
The globalization model and its specific features didn’t extend quite
naturally; its geography is a very well established one. What I am trying to
highlight here is the non-legitimate tendency of selection of the interest
spheres that must melt in the project. Also, it is important to mention that
the cultural model of globalization has a very selective pattern of
manifestation. There are places where the ideal of promoting democracy is
not valid, and globalization acts only as a rejection force.
We fight for democracy and a free market in some places, and in other
extremely similar contexts we choose to remain passive. Also, the silent
dominance of the “European-American pattern” is labeled as the only
possible model. But the question remains: is it about liberation, or we are
witnesses to another pulsation of the limit? The philosophical approaches to
these new challenges launched by globalization are divided in two major
types of visions: an isolationist model that militates for preserving some
kind of hermetic evolution, and the “open approach,” where the central aim
is to promote and extend the model and the values of this type of
globalization.
At first, it may seem that the two possible lines of evolution are
extremely different and leave space for a real decision. But an important
aspect remains hidden behind them. The whole debate is referring to one
single and exclusive model: the Western system of values and
significations, which is about being inside the border or not being at all.
The cultural dominance of this “Western made” universal project is
often unnoticed inside the “extended border.” The real and quite violent
consequences tend to become visible outside this symbolic line. The culture
of globalization is defined in a stereotypical way as an obviously exclusive
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way of evolution. If one specific society places itself in a different
paradigm, the border refuses to extend anymore.
SOME PARTISAN CONCLUSIONS
An important part of the modern democracies is based on the
principles of freedom and equality that are directly linked to the doctrine of
human rights. The evolution and extension of this vision in the post-war
world was extremely complex. Its unique role was to prevent abuse and
oppression. Still, this humanistic and universal project, directly linked to a
sort of “late Enlightenment,” had its own limits and dark areas. Outside the
border, there is a world defined by ethno-cultural diversity and with
significant differences in the field of values.6 There are two kinds of visions
over this failure to eliminate the limit line. Some voices maintain that the
whole doctrine of human values is based on culture. It may be useful for
one type of culture and dangerous for another. So, there are parts of the
world that refuse to fit into this pattern. Another sort of explanation is based
on the idea of a split between a majority culture, in this case “the Western
model,” and the minority’s values, other possible visions, placed outside the
border.
The cosmopolitan project appeared in history very often as forms of
reactions generated against the privileges of a majority group. In this way, a
sort of particular type of values was extended and replaced an old paradigm,
which represented the most seductive image of the universalistic ideal.7
The battle between the small identity and the extended one is not new
and not even specific for our contemporary crisis. Enlightenment
cosmopolitism accepted the possibility of creating a universal culture, but at
the same time they were conscious of the danger of domination from one
specific model. For these early prophets of globalization, the new
dimension of identity could not be limited by a dominant culture that
excluded the rest from its own universe. This intuition is more interesting in
the light of its premonitory aspect; the Enlightenment was not confronted
with the result of its own ideas, but in a strange manner its main voices put
forth some guidelines regarding a possible corruption of the initial model.
Today’s project of globalization is a very complex one that implies a
combination of various ideological and political elements. Its seductive
force tends to put in shadow the fundamental implications and promote the
image of a universalistic idea. Maybe the Western cultural pattern is a good
one and its extension is a sign of evolution, but the lack of permeability of
this model and its monopolizing tendencies are the proofs of a profound
6 W. Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular – Nationalism,
Multiculturalism, and Citizenship (New York: Oxford University Press Inc.,
2001).
7 A. Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity (Standford University Press,
1991).
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internal crisis. Maybe the border will continue to extend, but its eliminatory
propensity remains constant.
The solution is probably an “open model,” where values could be
adapted, changed, hybridized. This way the border will be dissolved and
transformed into a fluid line. But the question remains: is this possible?
Could the internal structure of the globalization project support a plurality
of systems of values? The answer is still uncertain and probably will be
delivered in a quite distant future.
Faculty of Philosophy
University of Bucharest
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PART II
NEW AXIOLOGICAL CHALLENGES IN
TECHNOLOGIES AND SCIENTIFIC THINKING

CHAPTER XVI
HUMAN BEING: FROM SPIRITUAL VALUES TO
TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS
CRISTIAN BERŢI
Abstract: This paper will discuss the meaning of the human being today, his
role in the world, and his expectations concerning knowledge. We will
discuss the opinions of three great thinkers of the last century: Constantin
Noica, Werner Jaeger, and José Ortega Y Gasset, who debated the problems
of the human being throughout history and presented an image of the man
of the future (which begins about now) which, as we will see, is very close
to our image today. This image has suffered a great many changes
throughout history. It remains to be seen if those changes were good or bad
for mankind as a whole. Our destiny is influenced by our past decisions and
by the level of understanding of our past mistakes. Human values have
always been the focus in many fields of study, but philosophy has taken an
even greater interest in it because of the implications in the construction of
a better world with man at its center. One of man’s ideals was (and still is)
finding the truth, if not as a whole, at least in part. For this purpose he
continuously searched within himself and his surroundings, even as his
knowledge of the world evolved. Therefore, we shall try to examine the
implications of technological developments in molding human values.
Keywords: human being, ancient view, progress, ethics, values.
In this new age of endless possibilities, man is faced with many
changes and new challenges. Technological developments represent a new
way of living, and people have to adapt to these requirements. In order to
do so, they have to understand themselves and comprehend their common
fundamental issues. Therefore, man has to go back to the past to see how
his ancestors saw themselves and their own essential values. For his
foresight to be as accurate as possible, he has to be able to better understand
his past. Looking into the past will help him to have a clear image of the
stage of development he has reached. This is the method used by the three
philosophers we will discuss in this paper. They tried to understand the way
of life of the ancient Greeks, who were the most important and most
developed people of ancient times. This was because of the great
philosophers and thinkers who lived then: Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle,
among others.
The first philosopher we will consider is Constantin Noica. He is one
of the greatest philosophers Romania has ever had. He wrote a substantial
work about the human being and the becoming of Being. All his works are
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centered on Man and the problems concerning him. He was very attached to
the Greek philosophers, especially Plato, and their way of thinking.
According to Noica, today’s man is preoccupied with his freedom and
with his lawful rights, and therefore concentrates on what he feels he
deserves, rather than respecting his obligations. Unlike the ancient Greeks,
who were preoccupied with the community, modern man is concerned with
himself only. This, in the Romanian philosopher’s opinion, indicates that
we are living in a world of egotism, like the world of Narcissus: the man
who only loved himself, for which he was punished by the gods. By
“automating his spiritual life,” man “came to the point of not having the
sense of sin at all,”1 says Noica. Throughout his work, the Romanian
philosopher appears to be very concerned about the moral issues brought
about by new technological developments.
He considers knowledge to be one of the most important values of
man, so he puts him right in the middle of that world: “the world of
knowledge is not the world as it is, but the world as we make it to be.”2 He
says that although the search for truth is beneficial, it cannot account for our
knowledge. A simple correlation between the fact and its announcement (as
believed by the Greeks) does not tell us much, because it cannot show us
that what we know is actually the truth. So we need another level of
discussion, which is called by Noica the “objectivity level,” which means
that knowledge will be valid anytime and anyplace: “in the act of
knowledge not only the process of receiving – willingly or unwillingly –
certainties is performed; there is at stake something much more than that: it
is perhaps a destiny not set to appear in a world already finished, which
man’s mind could record, admire, and leave untouched, but rather one of
participating in a relentless remaking of the world, or of enriching it, if one
cannot remake it.”3
Noica presents modern man as one who has to search, to uncover
underlying truths, to find out new things in some way independent of his
conscience. Truths exist in reality, and we just have to reveal them; this is
the motto of the modern man. The sentiment that “everything is possible” is
specific to the modern man, but then he also feels he loses face to technical
advances, the product of his own work. Actually, he is scared he may not
control its consequences, may not foresee its new developments.
Noica says that in Plato’s dialogues, moral law prevails for man, and
that the Greek philosopher affirms the atonement for and accountability of
sin. The Romanian philosopher considers that when the world speaks of
“the new man,” it defines him as the negation of the old man. But for him
this is just another illusion, because the new man actually is a sequel to the
old one, with his principles and values. In the present, according to Noica,
man is trapped between apathy and fear, and is agonizing about the future.
1 Constantin Noica, De caelo (Bucureşti: Ed. Humanitas, 1993), p. 110.
2 Ibid., p. 30.
3 Ibid., p. 42.
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The individual experiences these two conditions because he is situated in a
singular state. Today’s man can escape from this situation only through
morality and ethics, and this can only be achieved within the community, an
idea in agreement with the Greeks. The best modern example, according to
Noica, is Christianity.
Another philosopher preoccupied with the subject of modern man is
Werner Jaeger. In his work History and Classical Philology, he is
concerned with the values of modern man and with the level of education
needed to achieve a higher standard of knowledge. The German philosopher
says that the ideal of culture is that of the humanism of the Renaissance:
free culture, with no exact purpose, achieved for and through man. So he
pleads for a return to Antiquity, to the values of that period, now destroyed
by modern technological progress. He says that humanism, and all of its
values, was the highest form of Greek culture, and was successfully
resumed in the Renaissance. The most important value was the famed
paideia of the Greeks, understood as the culture of humanism. Paideia
means education, and it contains all the forms of culture existing in Ancient
Greece.
Jaeger proposes that molding the young – education in general –
should be done by following the example of the humanist culture and its
principles. The main principle of this culture focuses on the essences of
things – on the bases, not on forms; on authentic ideas and their strengths.
The Greeks formed the idea of man as a whole4 and not as a whole made of
pieces, says Jaeger. That is to say, the pure image of man is that of the unity
of the spiritual and the organic. The German philosopher offers a very
beautiful definition for humanism: “humanism is nothing but man's journey
to become man, and the way was first shown to us by the Greeks.”5 The
whole idea of culture, in Jaeger's work, refers to education, to the Greek
paideia; he agrees with the Greeks in seeing the total education of the body
and the mind as essential and as the only thing that can bring the human
being closer to himself, to his essence.
Jaeger's work is set with the same guidelines as other works from his
time and earlier, like Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy, having the purpose
of reviving German culture and spirituality through the appeal to Greek
tradition, to that wonderful ancient culture which served as a model. This
culture was the first one to have created itself through man and his essential
values. Jaeger proposes that before we progress in the technological fields,
we should return to the ancient Greek tradition and learn its language, so we
can understand its greatness.
The third philosopher preoccupied with the state of modern man is
José Ortega y Gasset. This Spanish philosopher writes about the impact that
changes undergone by modern man have had on his way of living in
4 Werner Jaeger, Istorie şi filologie clasică, trad. Alina Noveanu, (Cluj-
Napoca: Ed. Grinta, 2008), p. 97.
5 Ibid., p. 99.
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community and on his new ideals in comparison with those of the Greeks.
He says that the most accomplished image of man is that of his projection
into the future. In his opinion, the worst thing that could happen to man is
to lose his future, to lose the hope of “what is about to come.”6 Man lives
both with the past and the present through the perspective of the future.
Ortega y Gasset believes that in our day, the idea of nation has
disappeared and has been replaced by the idea of Europe. The nation
becomes a mere province, because it can no longer offer the idea of future.
The Spanish philosopher tries to understand the concept of nation by
comparing it to the Greek polis. The polis is built up as a simple society, as
a union that doesn’t look into the future, but lives in the present, while the
nation is composed of a “dense population, a numerous one, which is why
its social form is characterized by being essentially profound,”7 and,
moreover, it is focused on the dimension of the future.
The Greek man lived a shallow life, according to Ortega y Gasset,
because there was in his conscience the necessity of political involvement
and a preoccupation with the existence of his city, while the modern man,
reassured by the enduring existence of his nation, has none of those
concerns, because he is sure of its continuous existence in the future. Ortega
y Gasset sees the Greek man as an inertial being as opposed to the modern
man, who is an active being, a man of action. The former is a traditional
man while the latter is an enterprising man.
Like Noica and other great thinkers of the twentieth century, Ortega y
Gasset feels compelled to discuss man’s technological advancements in the
past few centuries. He follows the guidelines of those who believe that this
represents a danger for society, because it is a menace to morality: “Nations
found themselves suddenly closer dynamically. And that is exactly the time
when European nations have departed most from morality. Therefore, is not
the danger of such circumstances clear?”8 Ortega y Gasset presents here a
very well-organized chain of causality with the purpose of showing the
paradox of technological developments. Man is closer and closer to his
fellow man, thanks to new advancements, but it is exactly that progress that
leads to a social rift between people, between communities. Ortega y Gasset
believes that we cannot talk about modern man, because we don’t know yet
the nature of man in general, let alone that of the contemporary man.
The Spanish philosopher talks about the Greeks’ idea of human nature,
especially the ideas of Aristotle and the Stoics, which were narrowed down
in time to the “postulate of the invariability of the laws of Nature.”9
Possession of such a fixed nature gives man the liberty of action, yet that
liberty is limited by his boundaries.
6 José Ortega Y Gasset, Europa şi idea de natiune, trad. S. Mărculescu
(Bucureşti: Ed. Humanitas, 2002), p. 13.
7 Ibid., p. 61.
8 Ibid., p. 118.
9 Ibid., p. 133.
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Ortega y Gasset also talks about a theory of life, and about the fact that
human life is a continuous equation of the past and the future. Thus, the
present is an integrative synthesis of the other two times of our existence.
But though they belong to us and to our history, we never live them as
either memories or projections; they escape us because we are situated in
their synthesis, which is the limit.
Continuing his discussions about the Greeks, Ortega y Gasset attacks
Aristotle and says that he is in error when he claims that man is endowed
with the occupation of knowledge, “first of all because most people perform
a sufficient amount of intellectual activities and still aren’t engaged in
knowledge. Secondly, because it could not be further from the truth that
man could possess those activities capable to achieve what, by its lofty
name, knowledge represents – our great promise.”10
Concerning contemporary man, Ortega y Gasset believes that he is in a
poor situation, dominated by instability and uncertainty, because the factor
that should ensure his stability, in this case, the past, is useless and
unworthy of respect: “The past is like the tail of a comet; it is the factor that
provides stability. Hence, the radical instability of our times. Well, ladies
and gentlemen, this is, simply, the current human situation.”11 Ortega y
Gasset proclaims that the death of contemporary Western civilization
occurred by itself, through the suppression of the principles that constitute
its cornerstone, namely, science. The best example for the Spanish
philosopher is the fact that it has been proven by Gödel that logic doesn’t
exist as a science. But it doesn’t have to disappear; it can be reborn by
itself, and Ortega y Gasset 's solution is the invention of new forms. He says
there isn’t a will in man, but certain rules established by society determine
his gestures, independent of his nature. The laws exert a pressure upon man
that suffocates him, and so his relationship with society is not natural but
artificial. Thus, the State with its hyperorganization is man’s biggest
enemy, because it does not take him into account individually, but is
concerned only with society as a whole. In order to maintain his identity
and his essence, man today has to fight with all of his strength against the
stifling force of the State.
Ortega y Gasset considered that with new technology, war is now only
a threat that could hardly materialize, because weapons have a total
destruction force. That is why the configuration of the world is about to
change. We believe the Spanish philosopher to be wrong, as, indeed, there
have been other wars since he wrote those thoughts. He believed that if in
all previous wars the newest weapons were always used, that would have to
be the case for future wars too, and one can be sure that humans wouldn’t
be so stupid as to use lethal weapons in a future battle. But a war can be
fought with less lethal weapons, and new conflicts emerged even after the
discovery of the nuclear bomb. These lethal weapons have their own role in
10 Ibid., p. 143.
11 Ibid., p. 153.
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the world, because given their destructive force, they represent a bargaining
tool in the effort of maintaining peace.
While it doesn’t strictly concern our study, we cannot ignore the
position of the great philosopher Ernst Cassirer on the issue of man. He also
tries to understand the meaning of the human being, and he says that we can
do that if we follow the history of this concept. He believes that this
concept has a history of its own that starts in the ancient period and
continues to the modern era. By following its history, we can understand its
evolution and its transformation, its problems, its struggles, its place, its
role in the world, and everything else concerning the human being. Cassirer
believes that as early as ancient times, humans’ purpose was to seek the
self: “The human being is considered to be that being which is constantly
on the search for self – a being that at every moment should be examining
and contemplating the conditions of its existence.”12 There is an entire
history of man, starting from the Presocratics and on to our days, not
formulated by anybody. What Cassirer is trying to do is present some
general line of thinking and understanding as to how it developed. So he
presents man’s image in the history of thought, as provided by Socrates,
Plato, Aristotle, Marcus Aurelius, Augustine, Descartes, Pascal, Montaigne
Bruno, Darwin, and others. The reason he proposes this way of
comprehending man and his actions is to target the real understanding “of
the general character of human culture.”13 Another new idea brought to the
issue of man by the German philosopher is that of the existence of a third
system of man (in addition to receptor and effector): the symbolic one. The
German philosopher believes that “instead of defining man as an animal
rationale, we should call him animal symbolicum.”14 This new system
opens up, in his opinion, the way to the civilization of the human being,
because for him, symbolic thinking is one of the essential characteristics of
human life.
The first step in establishing human nature is the separation of man
from animal, and for Cassirer (as opposed to other philosophers) this is
done at the level of language (not at the rational level) – that is, as the
difference between the discursive language and the emotional language.
The symbolic is essential for the problem of man, because, according to
Cassirer, if there is a definition of man, it can only be a functional one and
certainly not a substantial one, and what better way to render something
functional than by symbols. Noica notes the distinction made by Cassirer
regarding man’s definition, but, unlike the German philosopher, Noica
believes in the existence of a substantial definition, the functional one being
just the first step to successfully finding a complete definition.
Man’s creation is composed of a sum of elements which constitute the
so-called circle of humanity: language, myth, religion, art, science, and
12 Ernst Cassirer, Eseu despre om (Bucureşti: Ed. Humanitas, 1994), p. 17.
13 Ibid., p. 40.
14 Ibid., p.45.
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history. Cassirer starts his analysis of the human being from the premise
that man is always involved in a self-search, in the search for unity within
himself, but, after getting through the phases of his creation, he discovers
discontinuities, contradictions, multiple forms as opposed to one only, so he
considers that human nature doesn't consist of the search for its unity, but
rather of the discovery of new sides, of new ways of being, which, although
conflicting at times, have a unity of their own.
The problem of the human being is a very complex one. It has
concerned a lot of thinkers and scientists. We can't offer a solution for it,
but what we could observe is that almost all discussions were conducted
around the two big aspects that determine man's life: morality and
knowledge. Greeks believed, in general, that man has to live his life
according to moral values. Christians took the idea even further, saying that
only through a completely moral life man can save his soul. In our time
now, the concern raised by new technological advancements gives morality
an even bigger role in the world. On the other hand, knowledge has changed
its meaning and its position in the world from age to age. Greeks, especially
Plato, believed it is the way to save your soul and that it’s the only thing
that could ensure a moral life. In Medieval times, Christianity changed the
perspective and man was not interested in obtaining knowledge, because he
was told faith is enough. In modern times, knowledge again plays a central
part in human life, but now it has an inclination toward the scientific field
and it means having as much information as possible.
Man is now at a crossroads in his existence because of all the changes
in his life, but he is learning to adapt to them. It is the only way to survive
in times like these. In his essence, he is still something great, and because
of that, we are sure he will overcome all obstacles.
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CHAPTER XVII
HUMAN WORTH ON THE THRESHOLD OF ITS
TECHNOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION
ANA BAZAC
Abstract: In fact, this paper is about social philosophy: it questions the
social consequences of the technological transformations of man and how
they will be managed. The social significance results from and is
emphasized by the ontological approach to man. AI (artificial intelligence)
has such a predictable consequence upon the human being that it has to be
conceived of from an ontological point of view.
I do not want to talk about what happens to humans as they are living
longer, with lives improved and enhanced by medicine and bioengineering
and about how they strive for a more capable, physically able body. I want
to focus on the influence technology has on the human mind and classical
human values, and whether old-style humans, as we knew them, are still
going to be amongst us – are any classical human values going to be left to
guide us or are we on the way to becoming super-intelligent humans guided
by motives and ideals we do not yet fully comprehend? Is “technological
singularity” upon us?
“Technological singularity” is a term which has been introduced by
Vernon Vinge, and it refers to the point of no return, the threshold one
passes over and breaks, leaving all other people behind. Is it possible that
passing this threshold will change our assessment of global problems and
turn us from pessimists into optimists? For the moment, it seems rather that
the optimistic theory of engineered singularity seems rather to transfigure a
deep social pessimism.
The result of the examination of both the consequences of AI on the
human being and the social use of the present revolutionary science and
engineering is the conscience of the contradictory state of man: from one
standpoint, this state demonstrates the power of human reason, even though
this reason would transform the human being as such, while from another
point of view it shows the weakness of human reason and the social
translation of this weakness, which generates a waste of human capabilities
and lives.
Thus the problem here is not to answer the dilemma of using our better
reason and pass over the threshold of technological singularity, nor is it
caving in to our lesser reason and rejecting AI and the option of going past
the point of no return, but to discuss the social stakes at this present
moment of choosing.
The present era is on the threshold of the future transformation of the
human into a technological singularity, but at the same time, it challenges
222 Ana Bazac
the future of mankind as such through the present social (political) use of
scientific discoveries. Therefore, this paper questions how the worth of man
at this moment of technological transition is manifesting, and we do have to
accept that both the better/optimistic and lesser/pessimistic reasoning will
have a say in our action about technological singularity.
Keywords: AI, Theory of Technological Singularity, philosophy, man,
human person, kairos, science, technological risks, society, politics.
Warning
The person is the concrete expectation and prospect of the human
being. The person is a specific human, and only from this concreteness do
we conceive of the notion of person and personhood.
When we are worrying about the worth of man, that is, the manner in
which any certain person is treated by his/her fellow creatures, we think
first of all of how his/her dignity could be menaced by some inimical
circumstances, leaving his/her esteem and merit less valued by others. Just
as humankind is revealed through the real facts, thoughts, and lives of the
specific persons forming this species, the real dignity of a person – namely
his/her merit, appreciation, and the due he/she deserves – is the result of the
consideration of other persons.
Philosophers have consistently emphasized that humans are creatures
who freely shape their nature and evolution and that these “spiritual
intelligence(s) think and decide “all possibilities.”1 Thus, they have too
optimistically suggested that human characteristics and human reason
would be “the most evenly distributed thing in the world.”2 In fact, although
the will and choice exercised in order to attain self-esteem and self-
realization belong to the individual, they reflect the social and historical
circumstances where the consideration of others is crucial.
If this consideration were missing, and if the lack of human
possibilities for the future erased opportunities, people would be far from
the circumstances necessary to demonstrate their human dignity. If they are
not dignified, if others no longer consider them as worthy of representing
human dignity, they become indignant: in Latin, in + dignatio means just
the opposite of dignity, and the awareness of the situation where others no
longer treat a person with respect for his/her humanity, but treat him/her
indigne – unjustly, with cruelty, shamefully.
Nowadays, we are facing waves of worldwide indignation against the
disregard of the right to be considered, each of us, as a unique human
person, because indignation is the natural human answer to undignified
1 Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Oration on the Dignity of Man (De
hominis dignitate, 1486), http://www.cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/Mirandola/
2 Descartes, Discourse on Method (1637), Part 1,
http://public.wsu.edu/~wldciv/world_civ_reader/world_civ_reader_2/descartes.
html
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behavior. Indignation belongs to the human person, not to the abstract man.
And because the worth of the human person is jolted, the worth of man as
such is jolted.
About Ontology, Humans, and Technology
The need to understand the trans-temporal essence of man – even
though this essence and this understanding have a concrete and historical
content – has for a long time generated the preoccupation of philosophy
with the being and, within this preoccupation, with the ontology of the
human.
However, there is no such a philosophical domain as the “ontology of
the human.” The main object of philosophy is just the human. The human is
both the mediating term and the object upon which the philosophical
reflection practices. If ontology is the decrypting of what belongs to human
existence (including human understanding and representations),3 the
“ontology of the human” is rather a metaphor for the main analysis and
object of philosophy. From this standpoint and in this broad sense, the
ontology of the human means putting man first, that is, philosophical
humanism. In a stricter sense, the ontology of the human configures what
phenomenology, ethics, social philosophy, political philosophy, and the
philosophy of knowledge elaborate. The metaphor of the ontology of the
human presupposes an integrated representation of human complexity,
composed of many fragments. According to this view, the ontology of the
human highlights the features and specifics of man in his relationships with
the world of objects as well as the world of subjects. An issue of these
relationships is “the conscience of the present, when historical thinking and
utopian thinking fuse.”4 An example of this fusion would be the theory of
engineered singularity.
But there is also the ontology of the objects people create and use.
Related to our problem, the ontology of technology researches the
possibilities illustrated by technology through the externalization of “human
capabilities through technique and technical devices,” and, at the same time,
the internalization of “the way these machines work inside the human being
(in both its mind and behavior).”5 But all these types of possibility belong
3 Jacques Derrida, ”Le supplément de copule. La philosophie devant la
linguistique” (1971), in Jacques Derrida, Marges de la philosophie, (Paris:
Éditions de Minuit, 1972), p. 218: ”Aristotle tended to re-conduct the analysis
to the place of turning up, or to the common root of blended language and
thinking. This place is of the ’being’... But also how the being is said, how is
said what is it, by the fact that it is, as it is”.
4 Jürgen Habermas, “La crise de l’État-providence” (1984), in Jürgen
Habermas, Écrits politiques (Paris : Éditions du Cerf, 1990), p. 124.
5 Ionuţ Isac, ”The Ontology of Technology – Assumptions and
Meanings,” in (eds. Viorel Guliciuc and Emilia Guliciuc), Philosophy of
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just to the human (if essentia is possibilitas to exist, as Heidegger showed6),
the two ontologies converging and overlapping.
One last word here is that this ontological and epistemological process
of convergence and overlapping means that we cannot conceive of the
human as separated from the technology he creates, which transforms him,
contributing to the construction of his humanness: “We have always been,
and therefore are, ‘cyborgs’ needing external prosthesis in order to act,
think, create, and define ourselves.”7 If that is true, what are the
consequences of the present development of technology upon the worth of
man?
Theory of Engineered Singularity
As it was coined, “engineered singularity” is a technological
discovery8 that changes in a rapid and radical way the state of things and
the state of the world. In fact, it signifies the discovery of artificial
intelligence that would transform, through different ways, the definition of
man himself, of his singularity in the framework of natural and engineered
things. Man becomes a new human being, formed by both traditional
natural parts and artificial parts managed by artificial intelligence, and then,
Engineering and Artifact in the Digital Age (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge
Scholars Publishing, 2010), p. 115.
6 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (1927) (Malden, MA., Oxford:
Blackwell, 2005), pp. 55-57; but also M. Heidegger, Letter on Humanism
(1946), Translated by Miles Groth, http://wagner.edu/depertments/pscyhology/
sites/wagner.edu.departments.psychology/files/download/Martin%20Heid
egger-%20Letter%20On%20'Humanism'.pdf . Possibilitas means here
conscience of risks, risk-assuming, but also prevention of humanly undesirable
events.
7 F. Kaplan, “Intégration, incorporation, interface – l’évolution des
systèmes techniques,” Association F Gonseth, Cahiers de l’Institut de la
Méthode, 31 (Janvier 2009), St-Imier, Switzerland, p. 13, in the translation of
Ionuţ Isac, “The Ontology of Technology – Assumptions and Meanings,” p.
114.
8 The researchers who proposed the entire program of technological
singularity insisted on the appearance of smarter-than-human intelligence (AI)
as the main technological revolutionary event that would change the position of
man in its even cosmic environment. See Vernor Vinge, The Coming
Technological Singularity: How to Survive in the Post-Human Era, 1993,
http://www.aleph.se/Trans/Global/Singularity/sing.html.
But there are other technologies of smarter-than-human intelligence, such
as: direct brain-computer interfaces, biological augmentation of the brain (or
“smarter minds creating still smarter minds,” (Why Work Toward the
Singularity, http://singinst.org/overview/whyworktowardthesingularity/),
genetic engineering, ultra-high-resolution scans of the brain followed by
computer emulation. All of these are emerging technologies.
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finally, since intelligence is what generated the crowning of man as the
dominant and superior being on Earth, man himself is dethroned by AI.
There are three scenarios of engineered singularity: first, the more
classical one – the rise of the intelligent robot surpassing the human brain
and directing it onward; the second, which is the specific unification of AI
and the human brain; and the third, the biomedical one, through
nanotechnology and neuroscience. The first two scenarios are the basis of
the new post-human entity. In the competition of these perspectives, even
though the first seems to be the closest idealogically to the founding fathers
of the theory as such, the second would be the most probable, at least as a
step toward an absolute dethroning of the human brain by technology.
Thus, let us accept that the second scenario is the core of the theory of
engineered singularity: the new mind – natural plus AI – will generate a
new kind of sapiens sapiens,9 who is still named only as post-human or
trans-human. In fact, he will name himself. If we support the first scenario,
the most radical, then the post-human or trans-human being appears more
clearly. Anyway, the theory points out the consequences of the
technological possible: the emergence of a new superhuman being by
whom the entire environment will be transformed and new significances of
this environment and its clash with the new rational being will be grasped.
Engineered singularity challenges an epistemological break or
rupture10 within “normal science”11 and philosophy, for it poses not only
the transformation of the means of man (the instruments and objects) but
also the change of the subject, the man himself. In ancient times, the human
conscience used to consider the object – whether material from the world
outside him, or the products of his mind – as subordinated to it. The object
was that on which man acted, while the subject was him, the actor, or his
mind and spirit, although his life and will were influenced by the inimical
environment: he was the one who chose the kairos of his action over this
environment. At least, this was the common representation, including the
common representation of philosophy. But engineered singularity is a
concrete unity of object and subject, an artificial human being with artificial
intelligence acting over his natural basis – an object has become subject and
a subject has become object – this special subject is the new singularity, for
it is/will be mastering the decision and is/will be the criterion of all criteria.
As bio-integrated AI, or as AI and human intelligence synthesis, or only as
AI, the new subject is overthrowing once more Aristotle’s ϋποκείμενον,
since this time it could be considered to be subsistent to the attributes of
existence. Thus it is transiting from “the closed world” of the old
representation of the mind and the subject, to use Koyré’s expression.
9 Sapiens sapiens – entity conscious of his intelligence.
10 G. Bachelard, La Formation de l’esprit scientifique (Paris: J. Vrin,
1938), pp. 27, 74.
11 Th. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) (Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 23.
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The problem of engineered singularity has appeared in order to keep
alive the conscience of the necessity to forecast the results of the
technological developments on the entire society. The main aspects to be
foreseen certainly belong to technology as such, but they are not the only
ones. Although technological developments are moving within an uncertain
and open space, the purpose of the research into technological singularity is
to transform the unanticipated consequences into anticipated ones. In this
respect, research into engineered singularity is situated under the sign of
Prometheus. That is why it would be sad to take this research only as a
cheap technophile tendency, not difficult to uncover.12
At the same time, the analysis of the imaginary background of a theory
is important to understand its social motives and power within human
activity.
The Worth of Man
As David Chalmers shows,13 the theory of engineered singularity as
the evolution of super-intelligence poses some interesting analytical
problems: whether this super-intelligence could constitute itself as an
infinite artificial intelligence,14 and if this would ever be better from a
human standpoint. But the theory is also important for a “continental”
philosophical outlook: that which is preoccupied not only with the final
result of the AI engineering facing the present common problems of
mankind, but also with man as “residual” output within the process of AI
engineering.
The premise of this approach takes into account that logos – the
human reasoning, the human capacity to create the logical world of the
understanding and its objects, its ideas – is that which differentiates man
from the animal that is his origin. Man is, therefore, his own creature,15 by
developing his ability to think and to articulate what he thinks, and by
enjoying this ability and the colors of this new ideal world he configures.
By doing so, he grows up as a special being within the terrestrial world of
beings: as a being nurtured from the world of culture he creates.
12 See N. Bøstrom, interviewed by Jean-Paul Baquiast, 15 octobre 2005,
http://www.automatesintelligents.com/interviews/2005/sept/bostrom.html.
13 D.J. Chalmers, The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis, 2010,
http://consc.net/papers/singularity.pdf.
14 IT and sciences have been optimistic about the rapid rhythm of the
evolution of intelligent machines creating more intelligent machines (this is the
concept of “speed explosion”), but the practical process has so far shown that
this rhythm is slower than was prefigured.
15 V. Gordon Childe, Social Evolution, N. Y., Henry Schuman, 1951, p.
169; but also T. Taylor, The Artificial Ape: How Technology Changed the
Course of Human Evolution (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
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Man is a cultural being and important are the means by which he
maintains and amplifies the human cultural characteristic of his existence.
The world of culture as such reflects the contradictory tendencies of man as
natural, artificial, and social being.
Consequently, there is continuity between AI research and what is
essential in man as a “genuine” being, which appears following the
transformation generated by the information technologies (IT). Indeed, the
virtual world generated by the present IT does not change the culture-
specific characteristics of man:16 “It is in being virtual that we are human:
since it is human nature to experience life through the prism of culture, the
human being has always been a virtual being. Culture is our ‘killer app’: we
are virtually human.”17
At the same time, evolution means transformation, thus discontinuity:
for we are not clever enough;18 with all the networks of scientists for
responsibility,19 maybe the “virtual worlds do have significant
consequences for social life…in virtual worlds we are not quite human –
our humanity is thrown off balance, considered anew, and reconfigured
through transformed possibilities for place-making, subjectivity, and
community…the layers of contingency within the category of virtually
human, rather than exiling such contingency into a category of the post-
human and thereby retrenching the borders of the human itself.”20
Finally, it is important to mention two aspects. The first is that another
scenario is adding to the theory of engineered singularity: the “collective
intelligence” resulting from the explosion of IT.21 The second is that there
is a time overlap of the discoveries of AI and human bioengineering with
the contradictions and shortcomings of the present civilization and relations
of power. This is the reason for the problem of the adaptation of man to
himself,22 through the emphasis of the ill-fated consequences of human
16 K. Lee, The Natural and the Artefactual: The Implications of Deep
Science and Deep Technology for Environmental Philosophy (Lanham:
Lexington Books, 1999), pp. 49-62, 123-148.
17 T. Boellstorff, Coming of Age in Second Life: An Anthropologist
Explores the Virtually Human (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 2008), p. 5.
18 J. Lovelock: 'We Can't Save the Planet', 2010,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_8594000/8594561.stm .
19 See INES (International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global
Responsibility) for Peace and Sustainability), http://www.inesglobal.com/news-
2010.phtml.
20 T. Boellstorff, op. cit.
21 This insistence on the collective intelligence could be joined to Marx’s
collective worker. But see also Could the Internet Become One Giant Evil
Entity? http://www.environmentalgraffiti.com/sciencetech/internet-become-
evil-entity/8678.
22 F. Rebufat, L’industrie humaine sera-t-elle la fin de l’homme ?, 7
décembre 2010, http://www.vivagora.org/spip.php?article789.
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industries and the means23 to re-direct their evolution. At the same time, it
seems most probable that the technological engineering of man will exceed
present man’s ability to control his industries.
Nevertheless, man is and will be the model of AI: because conscience
is more than intelligence, the complex historical construction of man is and
will be the pattern of the development of AI as conscience. The evidence
that there is between man and machine a relationship closer than that
supposed by some thinkers does not annul this source of AI: on the
contrary, it supports both directions in the creation of engineered
singularity.24
However, following Pico’s observation, and even though being the
model of the new AI creature, man as such will not survive: technological
singularity will not be human.25
Therefore, theoretically, the worth of man seems to be at the same
time denied and assured by engineered singularity: denied – because the
new creature will exceed the human logical capabilities to solve the
problems; assured – since the pattern, not only of logic, but also of goals, is
human.
Intermezzo with the Problem of Risks
The agglomeration of the consequences of the modern and post-
modern industrial revolutions – that is, of the modern and present
technology and science – and the evidences of many bad, and even tragic,
manifestations of the human civilization have been the basis, as we know,
of a rich literature.
It is important to mention here the theory of risks as one of the main
theories concerning both the ontology of technology and the ontology of the
human. According to this theory,26 modern society has developed the
23 One is the research of the principle of precaution and its functioning.
Another one could be an engineering of large consultations, see Gilbert
Gouverneur, L’« ingénierie de concertation » pour coller à la réalité sociale,
novembre 2007, http://www.vivagora.org/spip.php?article174, and S.
Parkinson, Science and Technology: Making a Difference, 16 October 2010,
http://www.sgr.org.uk/sites/sgr.org.uk/files/Manchester-scitech-difference.pdf.
24 See H. Leggett, Robot Teaches Itself to Smile, July 9, 2009,
http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2009/07/robotsmile/, also the Psi-Theory
(Dietrich Dörner) and the cognitive architectures.
25 Pico della Mirandola, ibid.: ”a pure contemplator, unmindful of the
body, wholly withdrawn into the inner chambers of the mind, here indeed is
neither a creature of earth nor a heavenly creature, but some higher divinity,
clothed in human flesh”.
26 See Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Toward a New Modernity (1986),
(London: Sage, 1992); Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society (1991) (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1998); Ulrich Beck, World at Risk (2007) (Cambridge: Polity
On the Threshold of Human Technological Transformation 229
paradoxical coexistence of the progress of civilization through science and
technology, and the risks of this progress have multiplied. Moreover, at
present, the risks are not only systemic (confronting the entire world and
resulting from the world development of R & D), but seem to be no more
imputable to anyone (there would not be a concrete responsibility), and
cannot be compensated through insurances. At the same time, the theory
mixes the natural and human causes and catastrophes, by focusing only on
their occurrences and denying the technical and social possibility to prevent
serious human error.
This point of view illustrates rather a “pragmatic sociological
fatalism:” “What we could do is to study, to prepare us, but…” Or, we have
to remember that: 1) modern technological development has been integrated
into a precise and specific social framework, so that the rhythm, paths, and
objectives of technological development are not neutral and cannot be
understood simply as resulting from the logic of knowledge, and 2) at least
from the second half of the twentieth century on, scientists have taken into
account that technological change could be anticipated, and that that
anticipation allows the reduction of the possible negative consequences of
discoveries, but that the final decisions do not belong to them. As long as
the risks were not so high – or, rather, were pushed outside the countries
hosting the scientific research – and obviously because of the ideology of
political neutrality of scientists they embraced, most researchers did not
focus on the social consequences of their deeds. (In a sense, one could say
that the theory of engineered singularity is just reflecting the composed
situation of aggravating global problems and ideological inertia of the
intellectuals).
But the last years – and now Fukushima – send us to another approach.
Obviously, and leaving aside the concrete partial preventing of risks inside
the technological projects, one cannot neglect the fact that nuclear plants
were constructed near the ocean in a high seismic risk region. No one
expected a 9-degree earthquake and a tsunami, but the engineers knew very
well that, in case of accident, the highly radioactive water in the pressure
vessel of a boiling water reactor would leak out of the damaged reactors and
that the contaminated water leaking from reactors would flow into the sea.
It is not here the place to discuss whether “the social needs of the
population – including the need for a safe and environmentally sustainable
energy system – are subordinated to the financial interests of the major
corporations.”27 Indeed, there are social and political regulations
Press, 2008). See also Ulrich Beck, « C'est le mythe du progrès et de la sécurité
qui est en train de s'effondrer », Le Monde, 25.03.2011.
27 Patrick O’Connor, Nuclear Power, Private Ownership and the Profit
System, 24 March 2011, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2011/mar2011/pers-
m24.shtml
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constraining the technological treatment of risks.28 But we should not forget
that technological change is, or could be, anticipated from a technical
standpoint. The replication of technique is predictable. If one does not give
full scope to anticipation and predictability, it is because of non-
technological reasons. The framework created by these reasons has
damaging consequences on the lives of millions of human persons, and the
ability of these persons to understand the real stakes of social facts and
political decisions is weakened by the media and a handful of professionals,
who inject scepticism about the warnings of scientists29 and stir doubt
concerning the scientific data and facts.30
The result of such a civilization, where poverty coexists with a
shameful waste31 and the ecological challenges could, at least to a certain
extent, be integrated into the functioning of the profit system,32 is the
contradiction between so many theories providing illusions about the worth
of the human person as opposed to the real situation of so many persons.
For the time being, some researchers offer the theories which counterpose
the impersonal risks to the model of risk conscience society,33 of
sustainable economy beyond growth,34 of eco-sufficiency and ecological
economics,35 of the common good,36 or the French model of décroissance.
In all of these models, present mainstream neo-classical economics is
replaced with revised concepts of economy, society, and progress,
subordinated to the worth of every human person as the only way to
demonstrate the worth of man.
28 Isabelle Stengers, Au temps des catastrophes. Résister à la barbarie qui
vient (Paris: La Découverte, 2009).
29 Jules Boykoff, Reheating the Climate Change Story, 30 January 2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jan/30/climate-
change-climate-change-scepticism
30 Naomi Oreskes & Erik M. Conway, Merchants of Doubt (N.Y.:
Bloomsbury Press, 2010).
31 Michel Rocard, Dominique Bourg et Floran Augagneur, « Le genre
humain, menacé, » Le Monde, 2 avril 2011.
32 See the old observation of André Gorz, „Leur écologie et la notre,” Les
Temps modernes, mars 1974.
33 Jean-Pierre Dupuy, Pour un catastrophisme éclairé, Quand l'impossible
est certain (Paris: Seuil, 2004).
34 Herman E. Daly, Beyond Growth: The Economics of Sustainable
Development (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1997).
35 Tim Jackson, Prosperity Without Growth: Economics for a Finite
Planet (London: Earthcan, 2009).
36 Herman E. Daly and John B. Cobb Jr., For the Common Good:
Redirecting the Economy toward Community, the Environment, and a
Sustainable Future (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1994).
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Worth of the Human Person
The change of civilization realized by science and technology is not
only a technological one; the change is out of the range of the “natural”
order of things. In other words, the ontological change itself is sociological,
because the power relations of the present society are framing the
technological transformation: they are choosing its criteria, the rhythm of
the changes, the domains of the preliminary application, the human persons
selected as being able to face the challenges of the process, to conduct or
manage it, to be considered as preferred models or disputable mirrors.
The change under discussion takes place on a large scale, from the
present chemical, biological, nano-technological manipulation of the human
mind to the explicit intention of connecting the “natural” human mind with
AI, and finally to the creation of what is called engineered singularity.
Consequently, one could affirm that there is not only a logical discontinuity
in the treatment and evolution of man – discontinuity realized through
engineered singularity – but also continuity, as in sequential chemical,
biological, nano-technological procedures participating in the ontological
construction of man and the ontological transformation of the human being.
This aspect of continuity is, again, not only the result of scientific and
technological discoveries, but it goes on as part of political intentionality
from inside “late modernity” (Mandel, Habermas).
From a philosophical standpoint, the importance of this double
determinism, technological and political, has to be highlighted. The worth
of man is obviously challenged when confronting the concept and extension
of possibility. Technologically, if something can be done, it will be: the
guiding marks of the possibility of man would belong only to the inner
logic of technology. But even this logic is legitimized by the traditional
concept about the world of man: the return of the acceleration of scientific
and technological discoveries37 are conceived of as aiming at the increase of
consumption and profits, all human values being subordinated to the
implicit reasoning that if something can be bought, then it will be
beneficial.
In fact, the technological transformation of man, and especially of his
mind, follows the social logic of power relations. This phenomenon
suggests that keeping the worth of man is manifold, and the intertwining
contradictions faced by this desire to keep the worth of man cannot be
ignored.
One example is the precedent of the industrialization of health care.
Leaving aside the excessive interpretation of both the author and the reader,
we should not forget that Ivan Illich38 showed that the result of the
37 Ray Kurzweil, The Law of Accelerating Returns, 2001,
http://www.kurzweilai.net/the-law-of-accelerating-returns
38 Ivan Illich, Limits to Medicine. Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of
Health (1976) (London: Marion Boyars Publisher, 2000).
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industrialization of health care is pain and sickness, and restricts the vital
autonomy of people. This result is iatrogenesis: the transformation of man
into a dependent being and, at the same time, impregnated by illness
induced by industrialized medicine and pharmacy. This is a social
phenomenon generated not by the mere logic of medical discoveries, but
one of the social frameworks within which these discoveries take place.
“Iatrogenesis cannot be understood unless it is seen as the specifically
medical manifestation of specific counterproductivity. Specific or
paradoxical counterproductivity is a negative social indicator for a
diseconomy which remains locked within the system that produces it… The
recovery from a society-wide iatrogenic disease is a political task, not a
professional one.”39
By using this pattern of understanding – which is consonant with
Gödel’s theory that the last explanation of a system lies outside it –, we
could obviously extrapolate it to many fields. One is, for example, the
industrialization of food and distribution of food. The counter-productivity
of these processes has to be considered when we speak about the worth of
man and the values involved and supported by a being whose worth is
cherished.
But let us pass to the present chemical, biological, and
nanotechnological manipulation of the human mind. This manipulation is
related to both military and consumerist economic interests,40 and following
its procedures, not only are cures developing, but also deeper dependencies.
If the former example was sketched in Plato’s systemic prefigure41 of man
as having to develop moderation and prudence as main values supporting
the harmony of mind and body, warnings linked to the technological
manipulation of the human mind are related to modern theories from
Francis Bacon to post-Freudism.
At a general level, the result of these processes is the first
transformation of man as possibilitas to exist as such.42 Leaving Heidegger
aside, the processes point out the consequences of technological
possiblities: the emergence of a new superhuman being according to which
the entire environment will be transformed, and new significances of this
environment and its clash with the new rational being will be grasped. The
39 Ibid., pp. 8, 6.
40 While Nicolas Georgescu-Roegen, ”Energy and Economic Myths,”
Southern Economic Journal, 41, no. 3, January 1975,
http://dieoff.org/page148.htm, wrote that from the standpoint of power
economy, “the production of all instruments of war, not only of war itself,
should be prohibited completely.”
41 See Plato, Gorgias, 464d, 456a-b, 518c-d, and Republic, 376e, 404b-c,
372a, 372c-d, 373b-c, 373d, 373e, 425e, 426a.
42 Logos meaning what-is-made-to-be-seen, the essence of being, and
what we see is always the same – the being – and different, as possibility to
exist as such, see Martin Heidegger, ibid..
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direction of nanotechnology and neuroscience constitutes one scenario
leading to the rise of engineered singularity.
By again coming back to Heidegger, the action over the possibilitas of
man changes this possibilitas itself: man, that is, his subjectivity, becomes
the object of manipulation, thus no longer seeming to be its subject.
This scenario is obviously the application of scientific principles to the
structures with which man is dealing. The scientific principles are the result
of man’s research and discoveries, and to apply them intelligently (with
ingenium, generated by ingenium) means to create new entities using
physical laws. The development of engineering concerning the human
being generates not only an improved body by replacing ill or non-
functioning parts with artificial devices – thus illustrating Descartes’
metaphor of the human body as a machine43 – but also an improved mind.
In its simplest model, the mind itself proves to be a machine – a set of
reactions to parameters of inputs – and thus it could be accorded with
artificial models of human intelligence. The artificial intelligence (AI)
created first in the world of computational devices, external to the human
person, comes to be engrafted to the natural mind. Human reason receives
the unlimited capabilities of AI, and, since conscience is the differentia
specifica of man in the family of animals (he is sapiens sapiens), the new
combination of the genuine human mind and AI gives birth to a new kind of
“man”: the engineered one. This engineered man – rather, this engineered
mind – becomes a new singularity,44 as the vector of the future of all the
discoveries and transformations of kosmos and logos.
But concretely speaking about every human person, and surpassing the
level of theories, it would be worth noting that the social conditions of the
realization and generalization of the discoveries related to engineered
singularity are intertwined with the hierarchy of the social conditions of the
realization and generalization of a dignified life for a larger and larger
number of human persons. As these last conditions are contradictory,
excluding millions from the realization of humanness “in the comparatively
humble sense of pleasure and freedom from pain, and in the higher meaning
of rendering life – not what it now is almost universally, puerile and
insignificant – but such as human beings with highly developed faculties
can care to have,”45 as the imagined realization and generalization of the
43 See Ana Bazac, “The machine motif in Descartes,” Noesis, XXXV,
2010, pp. 71-87.
44 This new singularity could become immortal for the time being by
uploading the brain's contents to a silicon support and then download it again
into a new body. See Terrence Aym, http://www.helium.com/items/2029699-
mind-uploading-immortality?page=2. Also The Digital Immortality Institute
(DII).
45 J. Stuart Mill, The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume VIII,
“A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of
the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation (Books
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discoveries related to engineered singularity – the destiny of a large number
of anonymous human persons.
Concretely, some scientific discoveries would have been helpful to the
life of the human person worldwide, if these discoveries had not been
treated economically from a short term private profit standpoint. We should
not forget that, through the mediation of financing, many discoveries were
postponed, and many even annulled; and that, by the agency of the same
financing, some discoveries are channelled into an irrational and wasting
use.
The worth of the human person is quite low when the scientists’
warning about the necessity of bio-economic economy while seeing to the
industrial comfort of the present generations by also seeing to the survival
of the future by a pollution-free and rational use of energy and resources is
neglected. The simple analysis of the financial funding of alternative energy
research counter-posed to the armament and war expenditure46 illustrates
this conclusion. For this reason, to discuss it only in terms of old benevolent
intentions and theories concerning the human person is no longer sufficient.
A theory which sets off the difference of phase between theory and practice
is needed.
Time
Singularity research shows that the anticipation of unpredictable facts
is related to the problem of time, mainly to the propitious interval to
question and develop singularity. In the Greek tradition, the opportune
moment, kairos, is the only propitious interval to act, specifically, to act
IV-VI and Appendices),” ed. J. M. Robson, Introduction by R.F. McRae,
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1974), Book VI, Chapter XII,http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_
_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=247&layout=html#chapter_40043
.
46 Global military spending hits high but growth slows, April 10, 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/10/military-spending-idUSLDE733228
20110410: “Worldwide military spending edged up in 2010 to a record
$1.6 trillion… Global spending rose 1.3 percent in real terms, a slowdown from
5.9 percent the year before as the economic downturn caused by the 2008
financial crisis hit military spending… U.S. spending +2.8 percent, European
spending 2.8 percent…The Unites States, with costly military operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq, increased spending by 2.8 percent to $698 billion – about
six times as much as China, the second-biggest spender, ahead of Britain,
France and Russia. In 2009, U.S. spending grew 7.7 percent…The United
States has increased its military spending by 81 percent since 2001…At 4.8
percent of gross domestic product, U.S. military spending in 2010 represents
the largest economic burden outside the Middle East.”
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efficiently. If one loses time by delaying the realization of big discoveries,47
one loses human lives and humanly-lived lives.48
The decision concerning the kairos, rhythm, and content of developing
singularity does not depend only on scientists (thus on the specific logic of
science), but on politicians taking part in the power relations. Regardless of
how they are persuaded by visionary researchers, politicians reflect the
short term political criteria to judge the efficiency of the development of big
discoveries and post-human state of man. This observation, based on the
coexistence in the last 30 years of an exponential rhythm of apex science
combined with the increase of wars, suffering, social diseases, and troubles,
the ecological crisis, and the quest for natural resources, aims only to put a
precautionary brake on the dreams concerning singularity.
The scientific and technological revolution is real, but depends
ultimately on political interests: what kind of discoveries and where they
are to be implemented. For this reason, the attitudes of common people,
their education and enlargement of horizon, (including the political one),
and thus the development of their rationalism “all the way,” are important
factors to counter-press the interests of domination and to realize
singularity. The scientific revolution is not the only one in our society. But
“a revolution may be ripe, and yet the forces of its creators may prove
insufficient to carry it out, in which case society decays, and this process of
decay sometimes drags on for very many years.”49 Constructed from a
social viewpoint, this representation is somehow similar to Bøstrom’s
possible trajectory of the future development of technology as “a stasis at
(or close to) the current status quo.”50 But, as this trajectory would be
improbable according to singularity theorists, a huge problem for
philosophy still remains: why does the explosion of knowledge and
technological realizations coexist with so many signs of social decay,
suffering, and injustice? And would the paradigm of engineered singularity
be sufficient for the future representation of man? What kind of society is
47 See Nick Bøstrom, Astronomical Waste: The Opportunity Cost of
Delayed Technological Development, 2003, http://www.nickbostrom.com/astro
nomical/waste.html
48 I doubt that this humanly lived life would mean to be happy (only)
through “safe and effective methods of controlling the brain circuitry
responsible for subjective well-being”, Nick Bostrom, “The Future of
Humanity,” in Jan Kyrre Berg Olsen, Evan Selinger, and Søren Riis (Eds.),
New Waves in Philosophy of Technology (New York: Palgrave McMillan,
2009), see http://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/future.pdf, p. 16, quoting David
Pearce, The Hedonistic Imperative, 2004, http://www.hedweb.com/hedab.htm.
Besides this aspect, I agree with Pearce on many points.
49 Lenin, “The Latest in Iskra Tactics, or Mock Elections as a New
Incentive to an Uprising”, 1905, http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/
/oct/17b.htm.
50 Nick Bøstrom, The Future of Humanity, 2007,
http://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/future.pdf, p. 15.
236 Ana Bazac
allowed by technological singularity? What is the luddite tendency51 within
the futurist literature, which is quite different from the man’s lack of power
to control and manage his technological results? Does the popular concern
about technology and human power not superpose the academic one? Are
they not surprisingly similar? And do we not need a social view as a meta
one (as the technological one is)?
Indeed, “transhumanism offers (what one might call) the safest unsafe
passage into the future, that is, compared to the alternatives specified” (for
it attacks the epistemic or cognitive obstacles against the stopping of the
trend toward the extinction of humanity).52 In this respect, it is a necessary
warning that our society has not yet attained the Type 1 civilization in the
Kardashev scale. But it has to do with less waste and human suffering.
The Threshold Upon Which We Find Ourselves
Taking into account the present social conditions worldwide, the
starting point is the predominance of capital as the unique manager of the
right to existence of whoever and whatever, thus of whatever possible
future: every possible fact has either to adapt to this condition or disappear.
Consequently, the engineering of man has to consider this social framework
and, obviously, to question it.
This attitude is necessary in order to efficiently navigate between the
Scylla of pessimism53 and the Charybdis of technological optimism. Indeed,
engineered singularity implicitly presupposes the old model of “human evil
by nature.” Since the present society is at least contradictory, if not
difficultly flattering for a rational being, only a post-human status would
solve the problems issued from the former irrational status (but would it?).
To surpass this pessimism and not to fall down in technophile imagery54 is
51 See Bill Joy, Why the Future Doesn't Need Us,
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.04/joy.html
52 Philippe Verdoux, “Transhumanism, Progress and the Future”, Journal
of Evolution & Technology, 20 (2), 2009, p. 60 (http://jetpress.org/v20/verdoux.
htm).
53 A form of pessimism is the retro prescription – renunciation to the
technological progress; another one – paternalism, where the control of
technologies belongs to a limited number of decision-makers; see the critique
of pessimism in David Brin, Singularities and Nightmares: Extremes of
Optimism and Pessimism about the Human Future, http://lifeboat.com/ex/singu
larities.and.nightmares.
54 Technophilia is the ideological trend which asserts that the progress of
technology would somehow solve automatically the social problems of
humankind. We have to note that Marx’s theory about the determinism of the
productive forces over the productive relations is not at all technophile. Let us
remember the feed-back of the productive relations and the principle that “No
social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is
sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never
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possible through the social standpoint. Otherwise, technological optimism
without questioning the social framework of the implementation of such a
revolutionary technology is a deus ex machina type of reasoning. Indeed,
science would be the last messianic hope in a secularized society.
The literary trope deus ex machina is, however, a kind of laic
deviation from religion as such. It consists in putting forward an improbable
event to intervene in the evolution of facts, but the author, and the
spectators as well, know perfectly that this deed is a fiction, and that they
have to admit this fiction only for the sake of the drama as such.
Unfortunately, real life is not equivalent to a play; therefore people know
that they have to strain their efforts in order to become themselves the
“machine”55 ordering the course of life. From this standpoint (and
secondly), technophile optimism by those who do not join the technical
aspects to the social ones is a mixture between a religious impulse and a
deus ex machina symptom: it suggests a kind of hope that a fragmentary
approach, as necessary as it is at a first level of science, would solve a
unitary or total problem; and also a kind of postponement within one’s own
replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have
matured within the framework of the old society”, Karl Marx, A Contribution
to the Critique of Political Economy, Preface, 1859, http://www.marxists.org/
archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface.htm.
Abundance, thus the suppression of rarity, is the result of technological
development. But, if rarity is the ontological figure of mankind (Sartre),
abundance does not follow automatically from the technological development:
rather, it is mediated by the social relations and institutions. This is the reason
why Marx was not preoccupied with rarity and abundance, but with their causes
and conditions.
Concerning the above-mentioned capital as the main social condition of
the forging of the future, it is noteworthy that the model of salvation from the
dangers menacing mankind is, in literature or movies, copying the capitalist
model of relations and mentalities.
55 The Greek μηχανή – ingenious invention, machine of theatre, with
stopgap, slyness, artifice. Μή is the root signifying a negation in a hypothetical
sense, meaning that the thing one speaks about would be uncertain, presumed,
and even inadmissible. From this root, an entire family of words emerged:
μηχαναω – to imagine, to arrange with art, to combine for a precise purpose,
whence to produce, to cause, to occasion (as well as in negative senses: to
conspire; μηχανεύς – invention, ingenuity; μηχάνευσις – apparatus, device;
μηχάνησις – machine; μηχάνημα – ingenious invention, mechanism, machinery;
μηχάνητικoς – able to invent; μηχανικός – able to work, constructed by the art
of the mechanic (engineer), the art to construct a machine.
In this sense, Irving John Good, Speculations Concerning the First
Ultraintelligent Machine, 1965, http://www.stat.vt.edu/tech_reports/2005/Good
TechReport.pdf, wrote that man would construct within his own mind the
principles which form the architecture of the new super-intelligent machine:
“man will construct the deus ex machina in his own image”.
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conscience of the necessity to frontally surpass the fragmentary. In fact,
technophile optimism is only a characteristic of thinking, far from a lack of
respectability. It has different consequences, and the problem is to
maximize the good ones, by completing the foresight of big technological
discoveries with social features.
The idea assumed here is that present trends in the development of
technology are opposing the political structure of society, and this
contradictory coexistence prepares a contradictory future. Consequently,
political responsibility is as important as scientific and technological
competence.
If so, the questions and answers have to transgress a somehow abstract
level which deals with man as an individual. In this respect, a major
problem is the representation of future relationships between engineered
singularity and its engineered fellows; between engineered singularity and
society (what kind of society could issue from the historical bifurcation that
will be engineered singularity?); between engineered singularity and
culture. Another question is how engineered singularities will master their
sentiments, how strong these will be, and, if it ever constitutes itself, which
form of belonging to community/society/world it will have. And because
domination/submission has not only been the fundamental social
relationship but also the means to taming people and to accord them to the
level of civilization, will engineered singularity ever be more tamed? If this
taming does not mean subordination and disciplined atomization, then the
application of (post)human rights has to be observed. Consequently, the
present relationships between the dominant ends of private property and the
model of man have to be considered. Do we imagine future engineered
singularity on the mass level as mentally impoverished as many of the
present average people because of the restrictions imposed by the
intellectual property on free and high standard information? And, because
present individuals feel they would be passive objects of the macro-
processes exceeding them,56 how will future engineered singularities
surpass this situation, if ever?
The acute awareness of the threshold we are on does not follow from
an idealistic view about intelligence shared by the researchers of
singularity,57 but from a very pragmatic interest: that of giving the effort to
control the evolution of technological singularity as much creativity as
humankind can manifest and offer. Any loss or waste of human lives and
possible human creativity weakens to a great extent the human answer to
56 Miguel Benasayag, « Information, réflexion, discussion », La Revue
mensuelle n° 86 Robotique, vie artificielle, réalité virtuelle, http://www.admir-
outes.asso.fr/larevue/2007/86/chroniquebbl.htm.
57 See Why Work Toward the Singularity, http://singinst.org/overview/-
Whyworktowardthesingularity/: the “transition of intelligent life on Earth
to a smarter and rapidly improving civilization with an enormously higher
standard of living”.
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engineered singularity and seems to repeat the kind of primitive attitude
manifested until now and even at present: the attitude of those who lead the
destiny of society without counting the suffering and death of the ruled, or
who consider this suffering and death as inherent and “collateral damage,”
“compensated” by the “general progress of civilization.” But could we
accept this type of judgment, at the present level of technological evolution
and scientific conscience? From its techno-centric perspective, the theory
and, moreover, the movement of technological singularity seems to counter-
pose to this judgment a humanistic preoccupation, care, and confidence.
In which direction, then, would the human be transformed? Which are
the ethical, practical, and technological aspects of this transformation? And
would this process contribute to man’s rising on superior levels of
intelligence and humanism, or, on the contrary, to his descending to lower-
than-human stages? What global catastrophes are possible through AI
technological developments and how could they be avoided? What will the
future of intelligent life be? Which methods and compulsions would this
intelligent life face, and what kinds of solutions will the new AI and
nanotechnologies need to find?
But now we are only in the waiting-room of the possible end of man’s
own creation. This situation only pushes us toward the deeper
understanding of the significance, both positive and negative, of the actions
about which human is wondering.
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CHAPTER XVIII
SOCIAL NETWORK SITES:
A MICROANALYSIS OF THE INVOLVEMENT
OF YOUNG EUROPEANS
SEBASTIAN CHIRIMBU
Abstract: The present study examines the issue of European youth’s social
involvement in relation to the same generation’s deep relationship with
communication technology and furthermore with the social network sites
supported by this fast developing technology. It is a fact that young
Europeans are showing a profound lack of interest in civic and social issues.
What we are trying to examine is whether communication technology and
social network sites might be used as a tool for increasing young
Europeans’ involvement in the “life of the city.”
Keywords: changing European society, social and political
involvement, Generation Y, networking, online civic actions.
Motto: “European youth is the Union’s most valuable resource.”
Globalization and the Internet
The most outstanding technological and social event of the twentieth
century was the invention of the internet. The development of the internet
depended obviously on technology, but not only that. It was equally
influenced by social factors, which merged with the technological ones so
that the internet became what it is today. Once installed in the fibers of
society, the internet has been continually producing new consequences on
society. The most important of them is the process of globalization, and we
can state without question that this has been supported and accelerated by
the internet. The informational society is an internet-based society, and
therefore it comes as a logical consequence to say that globalization is a
phenomenon specific to the informational society. Due to the link between
globalization and the informational society, which is an ever-developing
process, globalization also appears as a developing, unstoppable
phenomenon.
The internet is also the result of social interaction among specialists,
institutions, states, and a large number of individual users all over the
world; it is only in this context that its tremendous development can be
conceived, as a technological and social invention, and globalization will in
its turn be a phenomenon involving participants from all over the world.
This is the lesson taught by the internet, which has proven to be a great
success in the technological and social history of mankind, showing the
path to be followed by the globalization process, which is everybody’s
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participation in ways that are to be generated to a great extent by the users
of globalization themselves.
Just like the internet, globalization cannot be strictly hierarchical; both
phenomena should be ruled by general forms of coordination, unanimously
accepted, which might become possible only in a society of knowledge and
maybe of consciousness. The facts that two forms of intellectual attitudes
have already occurred, Davos and Porto Alegre, and a third one is also
manifested as street protests against globalization, show us that the process
of globalization has not yet found its balance, although it is pushed forward
by the development of the internet and its massive utilization in the
economic, cultural, and social life of the globe.
The Internet and the Social Networks
From a specialized platform destined to be used by specialists in
narrow areas, the internet has become the most important and widespread
communication service in the world. We can speak about real time
interconnectivity at a level hard to imagine a decade ago, and this is only
the beginning. Practically speaking, the social networks hosted by the
internet represent a global way of communication, offering at the same time
a good control over the content over the messages which are sent.
What do all the social networks have in common? There are a few
dominant characteristics: they co-exist in an environment with an enormous
communication potential; their use is friendly and creative; they offer fast
interaction with high efficiency; physical borders become irrelevant;
linguistic barriers become less important as users tend to accept an
international language as a code for transmitting their messages. There are
hundreds of relevant active networks in this moment to which other small
or medium-sized networks add. Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, Netlog,
Linkedin, Hi5, Neogen, and, of course, blogs, are just a few examples of
such networks among the hundreds of important ones which offer
opportunities in the fields of business, head hunting, personal development,
leadership, new relationships, games, etc. Social networks appear thus to be
interaction structures among actors in an exchange relationship, the type of
network being given by the nature of the relationship.1
Among the potential benefits of network sites we can mention the
following:2 professional success; business development; access to
knowledge; information; a larger number of opportunities; network
development; personal development; debates; the building of communities
1 Mircea Mitruţiu (2005, p. 9), Analysis of social networks / Analiza
reţelelelor sociale, Banat Bussines, [online], available at:
http://www.banatbusiness.ro/_
files/edit_texte/fisiere/Analiza_retelelor_sociale.pdf> [accessed on Nov.
24, 2010].
2 Ibid., p. 125.
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brought together by a common interest; and cheap and easy communication.
We cannot end the present section of the paper without mentioning that
there are, of course, possible shortcomings of social networks as well, such
as limitations of the digital platform, stolen identities, spams, and problems
of adaptation to the real environment.
Facebook – an Agent of Globalization?
In an interdisciplinary approach, the Facebook social network
exercises deep implications on the economic, political, and social life of the
globalized world in which we live. In the context of the new forms of
communication, which have become highly relevant in contemporary
society, the Facebook phenomenon is a distinct chapter.
Besides being anything else, Facebook is an agent of globalization and
due to it, the global village we live in becomes virtually coherent in the
infosphere. In other words, Facebook is a mental map of globalization,
maybe the most eloquent one. No other online initiative has enjoyed such a
global impact as Mark Zuckerberg’s Facebook.
The process of globalization cannot be conceived in the absence of the
internet in general and of Facebook in particular. Facebook becomes a
virtual place where we are permanently in contact with our friends all over
the world, with personalities, and with different organizations. We are their
neighbors, at a click’s distance from them.
Facebook is an indispensable instrument for bloggers and journalists,
for artists and writers, for those involved in political actions or in actions of
the civil society for certain public institutions or companies. Many domains
of activity nowadays would not be possible in the absence of Facebook.
The way young people spend their free time has changed radically in
the last decades; books, sports, and television no longer enjoy the same
public fan base. However, the use of Facebook as part of the global
communication process has tended to become a way of living in itself,
influencing our behavior, decisions, feelings, etc.
Human beings cannot live their lives without expressing themselves,
and from this point of view Facebook offers numerous possibilities. The
pictures, the music we display, the articles we comment upon, all speak
about our personality and our desire to share these experiences with other
people.
Facebook also means knowledge as part of an euristic process. Our
virtual presence offers us the opportunity – once inconceivable – of an
interaction with a very large number of persons all at once. An opinion
expressed on Facebook or a question we ask can receive fast and easy
feedback from a lawyer, professor, writer, a professional, from a liberal, a
conservative, or a socialist, be him/her Chinese or Canadian, etc. Based on
these criteria the feedback differs and can help us understand aspects of a
situation we had not thought of until then.
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Of course, the network is still young and we cannot know for sure if it
is just a passing trend, a momentary fashion, or a lasting phenomenon.
A Microanalysis – European Youth’s Social Involvement
In this part we try to examine the issue of European youth’s social
involvement in relation to the same generation’s deep relationship with
communication technology and with the social network sites supported by
this fast-developing technology.
The theoretical background we use will be supported by a research
study conducted in the period May-June 2011 on a sample group made up
of 100 young people (undergraduate and graduate students) aged 18-26.
Two main characteristics of today’s young generation depicted by
numerous social, cultural, political, and anthropological studies are their
special relationship with communication technology and their new
communicational features on one hand; their low involvement in the “life of
the city,” with weak political and societal interests on the other. Whether
there is a connection, a cause-effect relationship between the two realities is
what we are going to discuss in the following lines.
The first step in our attempt is to define the target group making up the
object of the present study. The contemporary young generation has been
given various names, such as “Generation Y,” the “Millennials,”
“Generation Next,” or the “Facebook Generation,” in an attempt to enter
and decode their world to the benefit of the whole society. They are the
generation born between the late 1970s and early 1990s, although this time
interval varies from one country to another, from the USA to Romania and
the rest of Europe. This is the digital generation, whose representatives have
grown along with the computer and the other technological developments
about which they are so expert and to which they are so addicted. But while
the computer was a common item in the early 90s in Western Europe and
the USA, in Romania only the children born after 1990 have had the
opportunity of benefiting from modern technology in their first decade of
life.
The European young generation has witnessed and has been living in a
fast-changing, fast-developing environment; the double nature of this
process of change – political and economic on one hand and
communicational on the other – has certainly been influencing the way the
young generation conceives of social and political action and involvement.
The democratization process has faced many obstacles in countries
from South-Eastern Europe, where many changes have taken place at
different levels: political, economic, institutional, and in everyday life,
where a slight change regarding the mentality and civic and political
behavior has been noticed. Therefore, one of the main targets of many EU
policies and funded programs is to lead young people to become active
citizens, to play an active role in society.
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Social and political transformations, produced in many European
Union countries (including Romania) in the last decades, have generated
various problems, which the younger generation faces. But notwithstanding
the changes and emerging opportunities in the development of pluralist
democracy, the level of youth participation in public life and politics is not
very high. Today we are eyewitnesses to what we could call a crisis in
European society, namely its members’ – especially the young ones – lack
of involvement in European or national politics.
The great potential the young generation has would allow them to
develop themselves and contribute to society’s development, successfully
including the leading of their own destiny, but most of European young
people seem not to not have full confidence in their own powers. However,
young people, through their positive thinking, dynamism and energy,
ambitions and aspirations to a more prosperous future, should be the driving
force in a changing European society (a dynamic, complex society).
If we analyze the surveys performed by EU countries, we notice that
30% of young people say that they do not know what the future holds, 10%
confess that they live only for today, 20% of them believe that the future
will not be good, 16% believe that the future will be more depressing than
the present, and only 24% of young respondents hope the future will bring
them a better life than the present one.
Most European young people seem to have lost their hope for a
prosperous life. They do not believe in promises, nor do they feel they have
the power to change anything, although the European policy encourages
decision-making processes and participation in various debates. This
position is shown by the data of a Public Opinion Barometer (POB), where
32.6% to 35.2% of young people aged between 18-29 years answered the
question “How do you think people like you can influence important
decisions taken at national level?” using “to a small extent,” “to a very
small extent,” and “not at all.”
The distance between the young people, public institutions, and the
democratic process is probably due to the lack the tradition of youth
participation in some EU countries regarding the building of a democratic
and prosperous society. Young people eventually become indifferent to
social and political life. For example, most young people in Romania’s
academic environment distance themselves from policy more and more, and
they are not interested in political or economic events taking place in the
country, although Romania needs the involvement of civil society now, and
particularly of young people.
Despite the very different situations, young people share similar values
and difficulties, and they often speak with one voice: they want their
dreams and expectations to come true.
“The colossal World Values Survey shows that only one-third of
young people across Europe are interested in politics, and three-quarters
said they did not think politics are important for their lives. Only a minority
of young people were shown to have actually engaged in politics – 28% had
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signed a petition, 22% had attended a demonstration, and 9% had joined
boycotts. Only 6% belonged to a political party, a trade union, an
environmental organization, or a professional association” (Kaila
Krayewski, Generation Y and Why They Matter, 2009). There has been
widespread fear that they are disengaging from politics, instead tending to
focus on their own immediate surroundings while blocking out seemingly
distant problems. It seems that only a rather small part of this generation,
born during the economic boom, but struggling to make a way during the
economic crisis, is eager to be involved in the community life. That is why
the main target of many EU policies and funded programs is to train young
people to become active citizens, to play an active role in society because
they have something to offer. As compared to their predecessors, the young
generation can not only listen and execute, but can force a change in the
contents of things.
As far as the young generation’s relationship with communication
technology and social network sites is concerned, existing research
(Valenzuela: 2008) points out that young people are motivated to join such
sites to keep a strong relationship with friends and equally to strengthen
relationships with acquaintances and ultimately, but less importantly, to
meet new people online.
Social networks or social communities such as Facebook, Hi5.com,
YouTube, MySpace, Xing, or Friendster are currently the most popular
ways of meeting people. These networks meet the young people’s need for
communication; help them develop/find their identity, (re)present
themselves, and practice peer-group experiences; offer them spaces of
freedom and experimentation, crossing any boundaries. The popularity of
these communities could be explained by children’s and young people’s
needs to be noticed, recognized, and to become popular. They want to be
seen and, in the same time, to see how appreciated and sympathetic they are
– or how they seem to be.
We have conducted a practical research study among a target group of
100 young Romanians aged between 18-26, all of them undergraduate (73)
or graduate (27) students, in order to find out more information on the way
they integrate social network sites in their involvement into public life and
in the civic action they take.
The main criteria for choosing the respondents were: their age and
their membership to a social network site. The questions we asked the
respondents were:
- Q1: Do you use the social network to comment on / discuss public
issues or you use it only for discussing private issues?
- Q2: Are you a member of any civic organization / NGO (Non-
Government Organization) having a profile on the social network site(s)
whose member you are?
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- Q3: Do you participate in the actions organized by such civic
organizations / NGOs a) on the social network site(s); b) in the non-virtual
environment (meetings, actions with various purposes)?
The answers we have received were as follows:
- Q1: 62 respondents (62%) answered that they use a social network
site to comment on public issues as well as on private issues, while the
other 38% use the social network sites only for discussing private issues. Of
the two categories, 42 undergraduate respondents and 20 graduate students
gave a positive answer.
- Q2: 5 respondents (5%) (2 undergraduates and 3 graduates)
answered that they were members of a civic organization / NGO.
- Q3: 46 respondents answered that they participate in actions3 /
debates organized by civic organizations / NGO on the social network site
(28 undergraduates and respectively 18 graduates) and 1 undergraduate
respectively 2 graduate students answered that they participate in actions4
organized by civic organizations / NGOs in the non-virtual environment.
Question (Q) Total number
of positive
answers
Undergraduates Graduates
Q1 62 / 100 (62%) 42 / 73 (57.5%) 20 / 27 (74%)
Q2 5 / 100 (5%) 2 / 73 (2.7%) 3 / 27 (11.1%)
Q3a 46 / 100 (46%) 28 / 73 (38.3%) 18 / 27 (66.6%)
Q3b 3 / 100 (3%) 1 / 73 (1.3%) 2 / 27 (7.4%)
It becomes obvious from the above-mentioned figures that age and
the degree of maturity play an important role in the way the young
generation gets involved in public issues.
As far as the topic of our study is concerned, we believe that the
figures demonstrate that although public involvement is indeed low among
young people, social network sites are a useful environment for creating
civic consciousness and increasing public involvement among young
people.
It is a generation whose thinking patterns are fundamentally different
from those of the previous generations, mostly due to the different way of
thinking and processing information due to a technological boom. Their
learning preferences, their motivation, and their expectations from
education are different, and while they are seen as “growing without
values,” they have something new to offer: directness, pragmatic goals,
high expectations, fast achievements. Organizations fighting for a public
cause should reshape and redesign their strategies for reaching those goals
if they want to attract the young generation and gain their support.
3 Voting, signing petitions, supporting a public cause financially / non-
financially etc.
4 Voluntary activities, support or protest meetings/ marches etc.
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CHAPTER XIX
PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTION ON THE
ETHICS OF NETWORK INFORMATION
GONG QUN
Abstract: We are living in an era of network information and the coming of
this era has changed man’s living and communicating styles. The
anonymity of the world of network information has changed the character
of human ethical life, paving the way for net crime. With maximum self-
interest, people participate in the construction and development of the world
of network information, but unrestricted pursuit of maximum self-interest
will eventually lead to the sufferings brought on by this behavior – thus,
restrictive pursuit is the best choice. The Contractarianism of Hobbes and
Gauthier offers the philosophical premise for the ethics of network
information. Seen on the horizon, Contractarianism, the equal and freedom-
restrictive pursuit of the right to self-interest, is the basic principle of
citizens of the society of network information, and respecting this right is
the most fundamental principle of the ethics of network information.
Keywords: ethic of network information, prisoner’s dilemma,
Contractarianism
I. It is said that the twenty-first century is one supported by
cyberspace. We are now living in an era of information and the Net; an era
based on the creation and allocation of information; an era of World Wide
Web when the holistic survival state of mankind is experiencing
fundamental change. Network information has enlarged our living space,
dissolved the obstacles brought about by distance, and gathered people far
from each other all over the globe together. The Internet has changed our
lives as well as our life styles, and it has also brought change to our ethical
life.
We are now living in double worlds. With the appearance of the Net
era, there appears a world of network information which joins our real
world. Are the two worlds, then, identical? The existence of the Net World
is objective which, nevertheless, is different from the actual objective
world, being one of multiple information and fictitiousness. Such a
fictitious world blended with one of information is also an important part of
human life-world, just like the actual human social world.
The Net World is, first and foremost, a world of information. With an
unimaginably vast capacity, the Internet contains the information of the
human world far more than any other carrier. It offers an unprecedented
availability of information to people, and the world thus has entered into an
information explosion. Secondly, the high speed of the communication of
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network information has accelerated the pace of globalization. It can even
be said that network information has contributed to the coming of the era of
globalization. Thirdly, the Net World is fictitious. This so-called
fictitiousness refers to its being able to invent a lively world by way of
images and animations. Fourthly, the Net World is also one where people
interact and communicate with one another. Mutual communication is
strengthened via the Net. The Internet has changed man’s way of
communication in that it has changed people’s communicating style and,
simultaneously, produced a new type of human communication: that
between human and computer. Fifthly, the Net World is a commercial one.
Internet qua the platform for commodity exchange has changed the
traditional exchanging mode, having greatly facilitated the exchange of
commodities and widened the market space.
Where there is human life-world, there are human crimes and issues of
human ethics and morals. Similarly, at the same time network information
has changed human life and brought great convenience and happiness
therewith, it has also created unprecedented problems regarding human
crime and ethics. The human ethical and moral system gradually formed
over the past several millenniums is suffering great conflicts and seems to
have lost its meaning in view of the world of network information. An
overview of the current world shows that such immoral, even criminal,
phenomena such as net crime, network information fraud and piracy, digital
destruction, the rampant spread of computer viruses, the overflowing of net
sex information, the infestation of hackers, privacy suffering outrageous
infringement, and other such crimes are trampling the moral boundaries of
people. These have made the problems of information ethics a crisis and
challenge we cannot but face. It has become a special ethical task of people
today to construct a system of information ethics and maintain a healthy
and ordered Net world.
II. The phenomenon of human ethics and morals is so common that
moral evaluations can and must be made as to good and evil in all fields of
endeavor. Seen in the sense of sociological description, information ethics
refers to the study of ethics and morals in the sphere of network
information; seen in the theoretical sense of the normative applied ethics,
on the other hand, it refers to how man should act and what principles and
norms he should follow in the sphere of network information. Put on the
level of philosophy, the study focuses on the philosophical premises of
norms and principles in the reign of network information, asking why such
principles should be used to instruct people’s behavior. Rather than making
an anthropological description of the ethical and moral phenomena in the
sphere of network information, this article aims to present some theoretical
discussions regarding the philosophical premises and relevant principles of
the ethics of network information.
To begin with, as we have seen, the world of network information is
different than the actual social world. As a multiple world of human life, the
Philosophical Reflection on the Ethics of Network Information 251
world of network information has another important trait: it is anonymous.
Any human participant on the Net is engaged in direct human-computer
communication, and communicates with others merely by means of
computers. Every participant may enter the giant Net world invisibly with
an anonymous identity when taking part in the fictitious world of network
activities. In the sense of entering the Net world invisibly, all of us are
partaking in a masque which, of course, differs from the actual one on the
final emergence – participants in an actual masque will show their true
appearance at the end, whereas the anonyms are hard to trace with regard to
their true identity.
In Republic, Plato tells a story of Gyges, the ancestor of the Lydians,
as follows: According to the tradition, Gyges was a shepherd in the service
of the King of Lydia. One day there was a great storm, and an earthquake
made an opening where he was feeding his flock. Amazed at the sight, he
descended into the opening, where, among other marvels, he beheld a
hollow brazen horse, having doors, in which he, stooping and looking in,
saw a dead body of stature, as appeared to him, more than human and
having nothing on but a gold ring. He took the ring from the finger of the
dead man and re-ascended. Now the shepherds met together, as they did
every month, to send the king of state an accounting of his flocks, Gyges
came wearing the ring, As he was sitting among them he chanced to turn
the cullet of the ring inside his hand, and instantly, he became invisible to
the rest of company, and they began to speak of him as if he were no longer
present. He was astonished at this, and again touching the ring he turned the
cullet outward and reappeared; he made several trials of the ring, and
always with the same result – when he turned the cullet he became
invisible, and when it faced outward, he reappeared. He contrived to be
chosen one of the messengers who were sent to the court. As soon as he
arrived, he seduced the Queen, and with her help conspired against the king,
slew him and took the kingdom.1 Plato says, “Now suppose there were two
such magic rings, and one were given to the just man, the other to the
unjust. No one, it is commonly believed, would have such iron strength of
mind as to stand fast in doing right or keep his hands off other men’s goods,
when he could go to the market-place and fearlessly help himself to
anything he wanted, enter houses and sleep with any woman he chose, set
prisoners free and kill men at his pleasure, and in a word go about men with
the power of a god. He would behave no better than the other; both would
take the same course.” 2 Here Plato means that if a man could do anything
evil as he will without being punished, he would do every unjust thing for
the sake of his self-interest. Isn’t the invisibility on the Net the same as the
ring of Gyges?
1 Plato, The Republic, 359D-360D, Loeb Classical Library (Oxford:
Jowett & Campbell, 1914).
2 Ibid., 360D.
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The coming of the era of network information contributes to the
development of human society in a process of three stages: rural society,
urban society, and network information society. In an ethical sense, the
arrival of the society of network information can be considered a change of
great significance in that it has changed traits of human social activities.
The rural society is one of acquaintances, and urban society has strangers,
but network information society has anonyms. Such kind of social
evolution can be seen as increasingly omitting the identity of behaviors.
The consequence of this sort of de-identification is of great significance to
human morals. The morality of the society of acquaintances is the morality
of a society of people who are face to face. In such a society, people behave
in the mutually familiar horizon of acquaintances, and acquaintance brings
a kind of restrictive mechanism of morality. The idea that acquaintance acts
as a morally protecting mechanism lies in the fact that among acquaintances
there are relatively steady social relations and social liaisons, which form
the social background for actions amid acquaintances. In addition, after
long-term cooperation or communication among acquaintances, certain
relatively stable emotional relations are easily produced, and these are a
prerequisite for their moral acts. Even so, the rural society of acquaintances
has changed with the coming of urbanization in this modern time. When
people come to the city from countryside, what they see in the street are
strange faces in lieu of familiar ones. The crime ratio in cities is higher than
that in the countryside primarily because among strangers, there is no
background restrictive mechanism whatsoever except for the law and one’s
own conscience. This being the case, however, the stranger is still an actual
existent in urban society compared with the society of network information.
The stranger becomes a symbol, one source of information. Man as an
actual existent has disappeared somewhere outside the computer. When
people conceal their real identity, the restriction of law and conscience may
not exist, as in the case of the hero in Plato’s story.
The significant change of the identity of the doer is the ontological
premise of our ethical reflection on network information. We can see,
however, that the source of any informational symbol in the world of
network information can be traced back to a human behavioral subject. The
severity of human criminal phenomena rises along with the increase of the
extent of the lack of human contact, and this has revealed the seamy side of
human nature. To study the ethics of network information, the basic evil in
human nature must be put under the microscope instead of being ignored.
As in the traditions from Sophists to Hobbes in Western ethical thoughts,
we may as well call such a person ‘natural man,’ a wolf entering the
masque without being in sheep’s clothing. He is also a selfish man, as was
mentioned by us, merely seeking his self-interest. On the other hand, it
should be seen that the individual who takes part in the Net society and
lives in the world of network information is always in quest of some
interest or hope, just or unjust. What we would like to ask now is: can such
a selfish man always gain his purpose from the Net? He may make it once
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or twice, but never more. Be that as it may, he still can accomplish his
purpose in that others believe that he is a good man or a benign one, so they
trust him too readily, leading to the fulfillment of his Net fraud. If all people
practiced deception on the Net like him, there would be no one trusting
anyone else. In this case, the credibility of this world of network
information would cease to exist. It’s like the case of a world in which
every one is telling a lie. Language’s function of conveying real
information would disappear when nobody was telling the truth. If,
furthermore, such a basic function disappeared, people could never use
language; some other communicating tools would have to be developed
instead. In the same vein, if the information we can get from the terminal of
the Net were false, nothing but misfortune would be brought about as the
result of Net communication, and the consequence would be people
abandoning the Net platform. This was the case of some web sites: since
only false information was released there, and they disappeared from the
Net. No one trusted them.
Let us presume that someone who would like to achieve his goal for
interest via network information hopes to obtain his maximum interest in
this way. What we’d like to ask is this: can he maximize his interest without
any legal or moral restriction? Insofar as this point is concerned, due to the
nature of the world of network information, law and morality are not
enough. Corresponding system construction of the society of network
information is a must. One suggestion is to build the system of identity via
real name, logging online by means of real name, so that any one who
releases information will feel that he/she is under some invisible
supervision. Nevertheless, even if such a system can be built, it’s hard to
guarantee that all the websites of the country can live up to it, nor can it be
insured that the participants in the world of network information are using
their real identity. This is because you cannot assure that the operator sitting
before the computer is the very person who has registered with his identity.
What is more, we can only carry out such kind of program in some country
with a strong supervising mechanism. We can never achieve the system of
real-name identity all over the globe. The Net is borderless, and it is an
information community shared by the whole planet. It has become a
common phenomenon in the society of network information that the
hackers of one country attack the Network of another. In this regard, this
sort of system itself is, undoubtedly, defective. We need, nevertheless,
some kind of reasonable restrictive mechanism. Without any constraint
mechanism, all those presumed men seeking for maximum self-interest are
just like the natural men in their natural states mentioned by Hobbes. In
such an anonymous space, every one is free and equal, and no one will ever
balk at hurting others for the maximization of his self-interest. Even
Hobbes, however, realized that such a natural state could not last
permanently, because the state of war between men caused thereby would
deprive all the people of safety and happiness. Therefore, the pursuit of
maximization of self-interest without restriction will result in the pursuer’s
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damage and even destruction. Hobbes contends that human reason is
capable of instructing people out of the natural state; that is, people will
realize that in regard to self-interest, peace and harmony are far superior to
mutual hurt.
Be that as it may, considering the selfishness of human nature and the
nature of the society of network information, we need to construct the ethics
of information on the basis of Contractarianism. To put it in another way,
Contractarianism is the philosophical premise of the ethics of information.3
III. Contractarianism is a kind of contract theory represented by
Hobbes and Gauthier. This sort of contract theory stresses that everyone is
entitled to seek their self-interest. But pursuing self-interest should take
morality as the premise. It has been seen by Contractarianism that without
the protection of a moral code, people’s pursuit of self-interest would be in
vain, and would even become an activity of self-destruction. Consequently,
everyone’s pursuit of self-interest should be restricted by a moral code. It
has also been seen that man’s pursuit of self-interest is a kind of social
behavior within interpersonal relations rather than being individual and
irrelevant to others. With regard to the image of the prisoner’s dilemma,
Contractarianism clearly shows what the consequence would be if the
seeker for self-interest went outside moral restrictions.
The setup of the prisoner’s dilemma has highlighted the issue of
interactions between self-interested men. Suppose that A and B prepare to
co-commit an offense with guns, but are detected and arrested by the police,
who suspect that they have committed more severe crimes but need to get
sufficient evidence. The two suspects are interrogated separately. Each of
them is told that if he confesses, the punishment may be elevated; if he
refuses to confess whereas the other one confesses, the punishment will be
increased; if both of them confess, they both will be severely punished, but
to an extent a little lighter than the former condition. Due to respective
interrogation, neither of them knows whether the other one will protect him
and keep silent, or cooperate with the police and give him up. The
prisoner’s dilemma may lead to the following four choices as the
consequence:
First, if A refuses to confess but B confesses, B goes free and A will
receive a 10-year sentence for his refusing to cooperate with the police.
Second, as above, if A confesses but B refuses to do so, the police will
set A free and B will receive the 10-year penalty.
Third, if both confess, they will receive a 5-year sentence respectively.
3[英]霍布斯：《利维坦》，第十四章，97-108页，商务印书馆，
1985年版。Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Molesworth edition (1839),
XIV.
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Fourth, if neither of the two confesses, the police can only sentence
them to 1 year penalty for lack of sufficient evidence.
The police tell the consequences to A and B, neither of whom know
what choice the other one will make, being incapable of communicating.
Let’s assume again, if two of them intend to get the best interest, their
penalty will only be slightly lighter than the heavy one. Only when neither
of them confesses, can they receive the lightest punishment. Neither
however knows whether the other one will testify for the prosecution
against him for the freedom of being acquitted. In consequence, both of
them will risk the severest penalty when making decisions. To cooperate
with the police for acquittal is, undoubtedly, reasonable to both of them,
this sort of rational pursuit nevertheless will lead to worse consequence
than refusing to cooperate with the police.
What choice would you make if, under such circumstances, A or B
were you? The assumption here is that each of the two suspects is selfish by
nature, and will choose to confess for his own best interest albeit the result
is a 5-year sentence. Nevertheless, if one of them is very selfish, the other
being more in favor of maintaining their common interest, chances are that
the selfish one gets the benefit whereas the sacrificing one ends up in the
worst possible position. The prisoners’ dilemma is a dilemma just because
the act most reasonable to the individual might turn out to be his worst
choice. The setup of the prisoners’ dilemma is, without doubt, an
experiment about man’s thought process which also portrays the act in
actual social life. The paradox of this experiment is: the most reasonable
individual act of seeking for self-interest usually leads to the collectively
unreasonable, as in the tragedies of common land and open sea, etc. The so-
called tragedy of common land is of such reference that every shepherd in
the common land is of the reason of self-interest, and hopes that he can
breed more livestock, never thinking of breeding less than others. As the
result, the limited common land is over-consumed so that none of the
shepherds can graze their livestock. That which is reproduced by the
prisoners’ dilemma is the natural state by Hobbes wherein every one seeks
for the maximization of his self-interest, only resulting in a tragic human
condition. The prisoners’ dilemma tells us that an individual’s act of
seeking self-interest is not unrelated to others, nor is it isolated, but it is
carried on in a sort of mutual influence, and is interactive or collective. That
which is turned out by the unlimited individual pursuit of self-interest is a
sort of holistic influence, in that none, including the agent, can achieve the
maximization of his self-interest, and even might be harmed.
The escape of the prisoners’ dilemma lies in the following: first, seen
from the individual pursuit of self-interest, all of us should cease seeking
for the maximum self-interest in favor of restrictive pursuit. Second, we
should choose to seek for self-interest within restriction for the sake of
others’ existence and interests. This kind of pursuit is thus choosing to
cooperate with others, resulting in the self-interest being bigger and better
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than what might be obtained by refusing to cooperate with others in hopes
of seeking maximum self-interest. This is the so-called “cooperation
surplus.”4 The interest obtained by each individual via cooperating with
others is by far bigger than that gained without cooperation.
The man of self-interest in the prisoners’ dilemma resembles the one
in the society of network information. If people maximize their self-interest,
knowing no bounds, mutual hurt will be the only result; on the other hand,
if people show respect for and cooperate with others, what they will gain is
bigger than if they refuse to cooperate. The appearance of the world of
network information puts forward the issue of collective acts by people,
telling us that if we maximize our self-interest without limitation, regardless
of others’ interests and needs, chances are we will fail to effectively achieve
our selfish goals, and everyone’s life will get worse and worse, leading to
the failure of network information to exert the expected value and effect.
The prisoners’ dilemma tells us that holistically seen, cooperation will
produce a better result than non-cooperation. How, then, can people better
cooperate with each other or follow the contract? The answer is the
necessary restriction from reason that makes people follow rules.
However, even when most people follow the cooperative protocol,
being moral citizens in the society of network information, there are still a
few who refuse to do so; instead, they take advantage of others’ following
the protocol. How, then, should we deal with this problem? According to
the contract theory of Hobbes and Gauthier, such people are fools.
Gauthier argues that “the Fool” has made double mistakes. In the first
place, intending to make use of another’s contract so as to reach his own
benefit, he nevertheless fails to understand that moral practices like keeping
one’s promise and telling the truth can really only be carried out among
those who are inclined to follow them. If you only follow the contract
where you can benefit, while refusing to follow it when your own benefit is
tied into the benefits of others, the opportunity of reciprocity will not be left
to you when it is known to others. Worse still, people will refuse to
cooperate with you for your breaking your word.
Gauthier suggests that people take the following instance into account:
the farms of Jones and Smith are adjoining. Although they are not enemies,
they are not friends either; thus neither will benefit from the other’s help.
They both have realized, nevertheless, that if they help one another on
harvesting crops, both of them will benefit. As is known to us, the harvest
needs to race against time. Jones will be ready to harvest next week and
Smith will be ready two weeks later. After the period of harvest, Jones will
retire, sell the farm, and move to Florida where will be impossible for him
to see members in this community. Jones has promised Smith that if the
latter helps him, he will return the favor next week. Both of them, however,
know that to Jones, helping Smith two weeks later is purely paying lip
4 David Gauthier, “Morality and Advantage”, Philosophical Reviews, vol.
76, 1976.
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service; even if Smith has been offered help, he will not receive that help
because Jones will be gone. On this ground, since Smith understands
Jones’s character orientation, he knows that even if he helped Jones, the
latter would not help him when necessary. As the result, Smith will not
offer help to Jones even when Jones promises to help him as the reward. By
means of this example, Gauthier intends to let people understand that if
they cannot set up a sort of credit relationship, the long-term credit and
cooperation surplus brought by mutual trust will not be achieved in
interpersonal communication.
The second mistake is the succession of the previous one. Those who
are really inclined to strictly follow moral practice rather than merely seek
for self-interest can benefit more than those without such inclination in that
the pursuers of maximum self-interest within restrictions will be the most
welcome partners in reciprocal cooperation whence every one relies on the
other’s voluntary compliance, whereas the pursuers of unlimited maximum
self-interest will be excluded.5
That contract theory is taken as the basis of the ethics of network
information consists in our assumption that all the participants in the world
of network information are of identical purpose of self-interest when
partaking of the activities and construction of this world. Like Plato, we
imagine that people gather together with an expectation of maximizing their
self-interests. Mutual hurt, however, makes people reason that only when
we seek for self-interest within restriction can we achieve the coexistence
and win-win situation in the world of network information we have created.
Nevertheless, the prerequisite of this assumption is that human nature is
completely self-interest-oriented in lieu of other-interest-oriented, although
we never doubt that there are people who care for others and even sacrifice
themselves for others. Those caring people must have the capacity for better
realizing self-restraint. But our ethical theories should not be set on the
foundation that everyone is of such a high moral stature. Our only
expectation of human nature is that many or most people can set up a
reasonable conception as to self-good during the process of interpersonal
communication and games. We do not even expect that they will have this
quality in the beginning, nor that they have the idea of justice by nature, as
was expected by Rawls. As long as people have a reasonable conception of
self-good, we may construct a better world of information than that
composed of people seeking for self-interest knowing no bounds.
The construction of network ethics on the basis of restrictive pursuit of
self-interest begins with a social contract among Netizens. This world of
network information is made to appear thanks to the participation of the
Netizens all over the globe, albeit with the prerequisite of the maturity of
the conditions of human science and technology. Individuals and social
5 David Gauthier, “Why Contractarianism?”, seen in Contractarianism /
Contractualism, edited by Stephen Darwall (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing
Company, 2003), pp. 99-101.
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organizations need network information because of the interest it brings to
people’s lives and work. People join in this world of network information to
share this interest, and every participant is a member of it, acting in it as a
symbol. In this sense, all the statuses and positions in the actual world lose
their value and significance, replaced by figures and symbols. Every
participant is thus a citizen of freedom as well as equality. On this premise,
we present that the basic principle of the ethics of network information is
the right to seek one’s self-interest freely and equally, as is stipulated in the
first principle of equality and justice by Rawls.6 In the world of network
information, the pursuit of self-interest by each individual is compatible
with the system of the freedom of the whole, and with the interest of social
security. The equality and freedom of each one takes the other’s freedom,
as well as the supreme good of mankind, as the main limitation – thus,
individual freedom is restricted only for the sake of universal freedom and
the goal of good, and individual rights must be compatible with the rights of
others, restricted only by that and by the interest of social security. What
needs to be interpreted here is this: unlike in actual society, in the society of
network information, it is inadequate to merely stress the pursuit of interest
on the premise of individual equality and freedom being compatible with
other’s freedom. This is because the safety of network information is an
issue of fundamental interest to any actual country or society. The security
of websites of national defense and military affairs, national financial and
banking systems, etc., is an important part of national as well as social
security. In the modern world, this has also constituted a no less important
part of human good.
The contract amid citizens of the society of network information
cannot guarantee that there is no ticket evader whatsoever, so it is
inadequate to have ethical and moral norms only with respect to the
construction of the society of network information. The protection of the
law must form an order of law and ethics. As the result of seeking for self-
interest but knowing no bounds, the Netizens will not get the protection of
law and morals and hence will become the very victims of it. Netizens
seeking for unjust interests in the world of the network must receive
corresponding punishment , because without this justice, the order of the
Net world will be hard to maintain. The world of network information is a
world without boundaries and Netizens are real citizens of the globe. The
happiness of all the citizens of the Net society all around the globe is the
ultimate aim of the existence and development of the world of network
information. This ultimate aim calls for the healthy and active participation
of all the citizens in the society of network information and the joint
constructing of the governments of every country. The world of network
information is the product of the development of modernized science and
technology and, simultaneously, the product of man’s pursuit of a better,
6 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971).
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more perfect life. We believe that man has the wisdom as well as moral
ability to build the society of network information into a perfect one.
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CHAPTER XX
THE DISUNITY OF ANTHROPOLOGY:
REFLECTIONS FROM A PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE1
RICHARD DAVID-RUS
Abstract: Inspired by the recent debate between anthropologists that place
anthropology among humanities and the more scientifically oriented ones, I
address the issue of the unity of the discipline, for the topic of the unity of
the sciences was a major one in the classical neopositivist conception of
science. After presenting the traditional view and assessing its inadequacy
for the question of unity in anthropological fields, I will explore some
recent modalities of approaching the issue. Local integration will be
considered as a plausible form and ways to articulate it will be discussed.
The role of models and modeling processes will also be emphasized as a
frame to implement a pertinent approach to local integration.
Keywords: unity of sciences, anthropology, types of integration,
models
The proximal motivation for this paper was given by the recent debate
among anthropologists triggered by the redefinition of the long term
objective of the American Association of Anthropologists. While the old
status stated as a long term objective “to advance anthropology as the
science that studies humankind in all its aspects,” a recent restatement says
the association seeks “to advance public understanding of humankind in all
its aspects.” This change triggered a series of reactions from the
anthropologists involved in scientific areas of the discipline and reactivated
deeper splits existing in the scientific community. A recent issue of the
journal Nature published a commentary by A. Kuper and J. Marks (2011)
on this situation, taking a stance on the media announcement of the crisis of
anthropology, and trying to identify the real reason for the debate. By going
beyond the parties’ positions and the anti-science conspiracy accusations
around which much of the debate dwelled, the authors claimed from the
beginning that “the real shocker” emerging from the debate is the fact that
“anthropologists cannot agree on what the discipline is about.”
1 Acknowledgement: This paper was written within The Knowledge
Based Society Project supported by the Sectorial Operational Program Human
Resources Development (SOP HRD), Financed by the European Social Fund
and by the Romanian Government under the contract
POSDRU/89/1.5/S/56815.
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One can define anthropology in general as an umbrella type of
discipline that comprises subdisciplines from the different registers of both
the natural and the social/human sciences. As Kuper and Marks (2011) also
emphasize, the main subdisciplines from the distinct registers have in
general ignored each other during the history of the discipline. The 1980s
were set apart by being characterized by a radicalization and an open
conflict between the different orientations. This radicalization was driven
especially by developments within the frameworks of two movements:
sociobiology and cultural theory, which polarized the reductionist attitudes
by placing the ultimate study of human behavior either in the biological
realm or in the realm of humanities. The consequence of this radicalization
was centrifugal movement of the constitutive disciplines of anthropology
toward the domains that legitimize their identity.
Leaving aside the radical approaches from different particular
tendencies, the need for a comprehensive investigation from different
perspectives of human phenomenon made interdisciplinarity a premier
concern at the educational and administrative level in academic life and
research. Despite this, as the two mentioned authors also emphasize,
anthropologists seldom collaborate on research projects that breach their
disciplinary specialties. Nevertheless, the real worry the authors address is
the fact that one cannot find any major preoccupation in actual
anthropology for understanding human nature as a whole, nor for
understanding the connections between its biological, social, and cultural
forms. Their conclusion points to an acute need for a truly comparative
science of human beings and their history all over the world.
***
The above conclusion and the situation discussed raise the issue of the
relationship between the biological and social approaches to human nature,
and, implicitly, the issue of the unity of anthropological enterprises. The
aim of this paper is to address these issues from the perspective of
philosophy and methodology of science. I will address therefore the
problem of how the quest for the unity of anthropological fields can be
posed nowadays. I’ll also discuss the means through which the integration
of the different approaches is explored and how it emerges in actual
scientific practice. Following this path, I’ll discuss my support of a position
that appears to be pertinent in the actual context of research, and I will
argue for understanding the important role a modelistic frame would have
in such an investigation.
Now, regarding the epistemological and methodological reflection on
anthropological research, one might say that the philosophy of science was,
in general, guided and dominated (not unjustifiably) by the reference to
fundamental sciences, especially fundamental physics. Anthropology was
completely ignored as a reference science and the potential philosophical
subjects relevant to anthropological investigation made their way into
topics from the philosophies of the social or biological sciences. One might
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suggest that the situation is a consequence of the multidisciplinary and
interdisciplinary character of the field. Another reason for its neglect might
be found in the fact that philosophers placed anthropology more in the
camp of social sciences or even in the humanities register, and in the frame
of these disciplines it was seen as a discipline of secondary interest.
Whatever the reasons for its neglect, it does not seem to be justifiable
to place anthropology into the context of actual preoccupations in
philosophy of science. The dismissal of the classical concept of science that
promoted a unified view built through reductive relations between scientific
disciplines opened the possibility of adopting a more flexible view that
makes room for a variety of scientific modalities that engage various
relations beside reductive ones. Taking this context into consideration, we
can say that anthropology, due to its inherent multidisciplinary and
interdisciplinary nature, represents a very interesting case, insufficiently
explored and rich in consequences.
THE CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHICAL VIEW ON UNITY OF THE
SCIENCES
From the point of view of the philosophy of science, the relevant
preoccupation in our discussion is regarding the topic of unity of the
sciences and the relations between the different scientific disciplines. The
subject of the unity of the sciences was one of the major entries on the
working agenda of the neopositivistic concept of science in general. It is
linked to the names of such prominent adherents of this orientation as O.
Neurath and R. Carnap, who were behind the project of an encyclopedia of
the unified sciences. The two authors held two different views on how this
unity should be conceived. The Carnap variant is a stronger reductive
model – the pyramidal model. It is characterized by logical constructions
from basic concepts and reductive connections between the concepts from
different levels. The laws from different sciences are connected and reduced
to the genuine fundamental laws of physics. Carnap’s approach stresses a
conceptual precision, deductive systematization, and logical rigor.
The other variant, promoted by Neurath, is less reductive. His model
adopts the image of the encyclopedia as a metaphor for the way he sees the
unity of the sciences. Instead of a single rigorous language, he
acknowledges the existence in science of imprecise terms from ordinary
language. He rejects a strong physicalistic reductionism and makes room
for the “soft sciences,” such as the social and human sciences. His unity of
the sciences is meant to promote conversations and interactions across
existing domains through local exchanges and cross-fertilizations. Taking
into account the recent directions of research in the philosophy of science,
Neurath’s view proves to be relevant for the actual existing research
agenda. It also proves to be relevant for our discussion, as will become clear
later in my paper.
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In the postwar neopositivistic landscape, we can identify two major
moments that reflect the subject of the unity of the sciences. The first one is
related to Hempel’s model of scientific explanation – a general model that
is meant to be a universal model of scientific explanation valid for any
scientific field. The second moment is related to the classical model of
inter-theoretical reduction developed by E. Nagel in his influential book
The Structure of Science (1979). I’ll first briefly discuss the two models
starting with the second, since it bears directly on the relationships between
different scientific disciplines.
According to Nagel’s account, the reduction relation between two
theories, T1 and T2, implies two fundamental requirements. The first
requirement refers to the connectivity of the terms belonging to the two
different theories and reflects the need for the continuity of the meaning of
the theoretical terms from T1 and T2. It is a condition for the preservation
of the reference for the concepts in the two theories. The second
requirement refers to the relation of derivability between the laws of the
two theories. The laws of the reducible theory are to be derived from the
laws of the basic theory from which the reduction is done.
The first condition proved to be problematic and generated numerous
counterarguments. One of the strongest challenges makes reference to the
multiple realizing of the predicates of the reducible sciences. In the classical
example of the reduction of psychology to neurobiology, a predicate such
as pain specific to a psychological theory can be realized by multiple
neuronal states in the brain. The argument from multirealizing inhibits the
possibility of a biunivocal relationship between the semantics of the two
involved theories. Meanwhile, the second condition is also problematic. A
strict deductive relationship between the laws of the two theories, such as
Nagel proposes, is of too restrictive a nature. As many examples from
science show, including the classical reduction of thermodynamics to
statistical mechanics, there are many additional assumptions that are
involved in the process of getting the laws of the reducible theory from the
main one.
Regarding the other important model of unity, Hempel’s model of
scientific explanation is a general unifying schema intended to account for
all scientific explanations, each one independent of the particular scientific
domain in which it was developed. It construes the explanation as a
deductive (or inductive, in the case of statistical explanation) inference
forming laws and boundary conditions. The subsequent critique showed its
limitation when applied in social and historical disciplines. The schema
discloses its limitations also through the fact that it bans any influence of
pragmatic factors in the explanatory processes.
The reactions against the two models intensified with the critique of
the neopositivistic conception of science. Even after the dismissal of the
“received view” of science, the models marked the working agenda of the
two topics of scientific explanation and theoretical reduction in subsequent
debates.
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The reactions against Nagel’s model took various forms, covering a
large spectrum of antireductionism. A radical sort of antireductionism could
be found in the well-known works of Thomas Kuhn (1996) and Paul
Feyerabend (1975). The consequences of their type of position bring about
an isolationism and an extreme form of relativism between scientific
theories. The main drawback of such an isolationism is the fact that it
cannot account for the interactions and the fertile exchanges that exist
between the different scientific theories. More moderate forms of
reductionism were also advanced in different variants2 but they were
disputed in their generality and ran into insoluble difficulties.3
The preoccupation with the topic of unity in the last decades of the
twentieth century diversified and took particular forms. Once the received
view of science was dismissed, the centrality of units as laws or theories
was challenged, along with their exclusive roles in approaching the unity of
the sciences. Alternative units and modes of knowledge were taken into
more serious consideration for the unity issue. The inquiry became also
more focused on specific fields of science. Taking into account the
limitation of the reductionist program in the study of unity, the possibility
of non-reductive sorts of unification caught the attention of the
philosophers.
CHARACTERISTICS OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH
The inadequacies of a pure reductive relationship among the
subdisciplines of anthropology and of the radical antireductionist view
could be easily seen in the case of the anthropological disciplines. As
anthropological research spans a wide spectrum of explanatory registers,
from the molecular level of biochemical and biological research up to the
social investigation of institutions and cultures, we would need a stronger
version of unity by reduction. The reductionist view on such a large scale
would have affinities with the initial neopositivist intention of the grand
unification. It certainly does not make sense to put the unity question into
these terms anymore.
Reductionism is implausible on a global scale, but it might be quite
workable on a smaller one. Reductive relationships might appear and
operate in limited areas between different, more restricted domains of
research. In more particular cases of anthropological research, for example,
one might encounter reductive explanations that will try to biologically
explain certain social behaviors. The issue of reduction has to be tackled in
this particular setting with an eye to the specific context of scientific inquiry
in which the claim takes place.
2 A widely discussed one uses the concept of supervenience adapted from
philosophy of mind.
3 For a updated review see Jordi Cat’s article in the Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy.
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Anthropology clearly forces a pluralistic view upon us. In a time when
the influence of neopositivism was still great, there were authors who
recognized the plurality of the explanatory forms in anthropological
research. S.T. Goh (1971) offers us such an analysis. He identifies and
compares three different positions regarding explanation in anthropology.
The first one places in a Hempelian frame, regarding anthropology as a
homothetic science. Such anthropologists as Radcliffe-Brown and Marvin
Harris saw the aim of anthropology in discovering scientific laws. The
second one takes into account the historicist reaction to the DN model and
sees anthropology as mainly dealing with particular sorts of statements,
without aiming at discovering general laws. According to this view,
“Anthropology is history, simply because as a matter of brute fact,
anthropologists are interested in historical-idiographic problems.”(Goh
1971, 342) The works of many classical anthropologists including Boas,
Lowie, Radin, Kroeber, and Evans-Pritchard are oriented to particular
analyses and descriptions. The third orientation draws on the ideas of the
philosopher P. Winch, for whom the understanding of the social sciences is
different from the one of the natural sciences. The task of the anthropologist
is to make sense of the behavior of individuals by contextualizing the
behavior within the frame of the purposes, motives, beliefs, and norms of
behavior of that people.
For Goh, none of the above approaches exhaust the multiplicity of
anthropological explanatory forms. Anthropology is both science and
history, and we can find endeavors belonging to both types of inquiry. The
explanatory practice reveals that anthropologists use a plethora of
explanations and Goh suggests, therefore, that the best way to account for
explanation in anthropology is a methodological eclectism.
Due to the complexity of the biological and social systems
investigated, anthropological research engages a large variety of scientific
representations. Different representations capture some aspects of the
systems from specific perspectives under various theoretical settings. As
Mitchell (1997, 2003) also emphasized (and I’ll discuss her ideas in a
further section), it is improbable that these representations enter into the
relationships of derivability and translatability that the classical reductive
view requires. They constitute rather different descriptions from distinct
registers of investigations that could be best integrating on a local scale.
GLOBAL VERSUS LOCAL APPROACHES
The traditional approaches to the unity of the sciences can be
characterized as being of a global sort. They look at unification on the large
scale, involving theories of whole scientific fields or scientific disciplines.
This is in a straight sense the legacy of the neopositivistic view on science,
trying to describe and subsume in one universal language (using formal
means) the variety of scientific forms belonging to different disciplines. The
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goal was to make explicit a single valid methodology of scientific thinking
and a unique valid structure of science.
Despite the rejection of the neopositivistic conception of science, due
mainly to the historical critique from the 1960s, the influence of the older
agenda can be identified in the subsequent period. We can see it in the topic
of scientific explanation that was driven by the general search for types of
explanations in all disciplines even after the dismissal of Hempel’s model.
Such are the important accounts proposed by Friedman (1974) or Kitcher
(1989) – defining the unificationist approach as well as Salmon’s causalist
approach (1998). It can be detected also in the projects that sought to
provide a general analysis of the structure of science that could account for
any sort of scientific theory. Such is the semantic conception of theories
that rejected the neopositivist syntactic view, or the “received view,” and
intended to provide a more adequate analysis of the nature of scientific
theories.
Starting with the last two decades of the twentieth century, one can
detect a move toward a different way of philosophical investigation. Nick
Huggett (2000) described this tendency as “localism” with reference to the
positions articulated in the realism-antirealism debate. The articulation of
local philosophies that characterize it indicates that the way problems are
raised and solved involves the recourse to specific scientific programs using
local resources and elements in the frame of these programs. It rejects the
appeal to prior determined views on science and scientific knowledge that
should determine and guide philosophical inquiry.
Localism is also linked to the rise of a more radical position in regard
to the issue of the unity of the sciences – the one arguing for the disunity of
the sciences. In this sense, Jan Hacking argues for the disunity of the
sciences in terms of local unities. (Hacking 1996) The local sort of unity
becomes a more plausible and workable solution than the global and more
formal accounts of unity.
The local tendency in philosophical research intensified in the last
decade and stimulated new insights into older problems. Such an expression
can be found in the philosophical research that reconsidered scientific
models and modeling practices as important elements in the production of
scientific knowledge.
In another text (David-Rus 2009, 2011) dealing with this topic, I was
arguing for a local type of solution that I saw as a plausible one, taking into
account actual philosophical tendencies. In the same text, I argued for a
specific setting that provides consistency to such a local approach. This was
a modelistic setting, in which models are taken as reference units, as bearers
of explanatory processes. As I suggested above, a local perspective on unity
is a plausible one under which a fruitful investigation could be engaged. In
a following section, I will also take into consideration a modeling frame,
and the ways the unity problem can be addressed within such a frame.
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FORMS OF PLURALISM
Localism brings with it a pluralistic perspective on unity. Pluralism
can be of many forms and shapes involving different registers:
metaphysical, ontological, epistemic, methodological, etc. I will be
especially concerned with the one involving explanations.
First, a distinction has to be introduced into the discussion.4 It is one
between the plurality and pluralism. The first one is a characteristic of the
state of scientific inquiry in the sciences today. The second is the view
about this state when considering whether it is or is not eliminable from the
very nature of scientific knowledge.
The antireductionist reaction already prepares the way for a pluralistic
view. The most usual form of this is the one we encounter relative to
theoretical frames and conceptual schema. Nevertheless, in its most radical
form we saw it lead to the unproductive form of isolationism.
One widely spread form of the pluralistic view is the “levels of
organization” schema. According to it, the world is stratified on different
registers (that we might regard from an ontological or an epistemological
angle) starting with the microlevel entities up to the macrolevel ones. So in
the biological realm we have at the bottom the particle’s level on which the
next level, the one of molecules, builds. The level of cells is the next one
and organism and populations are the higher ones. We find research at these
levels in the disciplines of biochemistry and molecular biology. If we are to
regard social phenomena, we can start with the levels of individuals or we
can go lower to the psychological states level and could build up to the
social institutions and whole societies’ or cultures’ levels.
One straight type of pluralism can be conceived of as a competitive
one, implying a competition between different explanatory descriptions and
then the elimination of the less useful explanation. But this does not
represent in an adequate way the scientific practice. As other authors also
emphasized,5 there is no certainty that the best explanation at a given
moment will remain the best in the future. So alternative explanations are
not all dismissed and eliminated; on the contrary, it is reasonable to develop
such alternatives if they are to have a chance to succeed in the future.
So some of the explanations and models are in direct competition, but
there are also others that are not actually mutually exclusive, showing a sort
of compatibility. We encounter here another kind of pluralism, a compatible
sort of pluralism. Under this view, different explanations coexist in a area
of research without any pretence of an integration.
According to one view, the different strata from the organizational
schema are also levels of different analysis that are pretty much
autonomous. We might see in this way distinct registers of explanations that
4 Introduced also in the volume Scientific Pluralism edited by Kellert et
al.
5 For example, Kitcher, 1991.
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do not intersect. Hypotheses can compete only within specific levels and
not inter-level. Sherman (1988) develops such a view reviving the classical
classification proposed by Tinbergen (1963) on different types of questions.
But this proved to be wrong. Sandra Mitchell (2002) challenged
Sherman’s account and showed that his view fails to capture adequately the
relationships between alternative explanations. She shows that solutions to
questions at one level (e.g. developmental) influence and have impact on
the possible solutions on another level (e.g. evolutionary). The other point
is that competitions that occur at different levels do not necessary imply
mutually exclusive alternatives. We often do see intralevel competition
among hypotheses that do not exclude each other.
A pertinent option is given by the sort of integrative pluralism
promoted by Mitchell (1997, 2002, and 2003). Such a view admits the
coexistence of different areas of investigation, as in compatible pluralism,
but makes a point of emphasizing also an integrative tendency of
investigation. In order to explain her position, we have to make reference to
the way phenomena are represented in different modalities. Though
Mitchell seems to reduce explanation to the causal sort and to take causal
mechanisms as the goal of our representation, her position can be claimed
with more generality to include other types of explanatory forms, such as
the functional ones that are so common in biological disciplines.
The main point hinges on the fact that our representations are
capturing only some features of the complex phenomena under
investigation. The representations deployed in science are the products of
simplification, idealization, and approximation, which makes them apt to
describe and treat the features of interest. The complex biological or social
phenomena are partially described in such representation. In fact, a system
can be seen from different views, such as an individual human being as a
biological system can be at the same time “a host to a parasite, a consumer
in a ecosystem, a phenotypic expression of a set of genotypes, a mammalian
organism” (Mitchell 2003, 182), etc. Of course, the social register will
multiply these representations. These target different causal registers that
could be seen as complementary and partially overlapping.
LOCAL INTEGRATION, MODELS, AND EXPLANATIONS
The integration backed by Mitchell is one involving models that target
such different causal mechanisms. The integration is of a local sort that
implies local unification in contradistinction to the global sort, as advocated
by Friedman and Kitcher. The local theoretically unifies some of the
models without making reference to a general overall unified corpus of
knowledge or to any strictly reductionist relationship between
representations. On the contrary, it makes evident the existence of a variety
of strategies through which interdisciplinary interaction takes place.
Pluralism is reflected also in the many types of integration taking
place at different levels of abstraction and in different modalities. Previous
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research already revealed such sorts of integration. Such is the work of
Darden and Maull (1977), who investigated different forms of “interfiled
relations” such as physical localization and part-whole relations, identifying
a structure underlying a function, identifying a cause in one field and the
effect in another field, etc. Bechtel and Richardson (2010) also investigated
such integrative modalities, especially in connection to different levels of
organization and the transfer of conceptual frames to new domains.
Mitchell (1997) also identifies three types of integration: one involving
mechanical rules that “determine the joint effects of independent additive
causal processes;” a second concerning local theoretical unification,
through which we jointly model more features of complex systems; and the
third, concerning explanatory concrete integration in highly complex cases.
This type makes integration specific to the situation or only to a narrow
class of situations.
With particular reference to the study of human nature from both
biological and social perspectives, Mitchell and collaborators (1997)
identify three major strategies that are at work in case of such integrations.
A first strategy is characterized by the attempts to build a common language
between the different scientific registers. A good example is the
anthropomorphic discourse that is used in disciplines like ethology and
primatology. A second strategy can be identified through the metaphoric
transfer of models between the biological and the social disciplines. A good
illustration is given by the populational models developed by some authors
(like Boyd and Richerson) for the study of cultural evolution. A last
strategy is given in the use of mathematical techniques of probabilistic and
statistical inference. These techniques are used in both biological and social
investigations.
The second strategy suggests engaging a modeling view for
approaching the issues of unification. I will further discuss in more detail
some aspects related to such a perspective.
***
In order to understand the modelistic view, we must recall the fact that
the philosophy of science in its classical form is mainly determined by the
logical empiricism, and its legacy centered on the concept of scientific
theory. Many of the main topics of philosophy of science (such as
confirmation, progress, etc.) are closely linked to the clarification of the
nature of scientific theories. Among the different ways to react to the
limitations of this view is to hold the idea that a major move is constituted
by the reconsideration of the role and importance models play in scientific
knowledge. As the recent trend of this type of move shows, this frame
opens the possibility of a reconfiguration and restatement of old problems,
and thus the possibility of overcoming the old deadlocks.
We can see the contribution of models of the unity problem at
different levels of scientific inquiry. Mitchell and collaborators (1997)
mention them in connection to the metaphorical transfer of concepts among
The Disunity of Anthropology: A Philosophy of Science Perspective 271
biological disciplines, and from them to social and cultural studies. This is a
way of seeking a more general unification and less strictly local one,
targeting, for example, in Boyd and Richerson (2005), populational studies
on culture and the complex phenomena of culture.
But besides the above strategy, Mitchell’s types of integration could
be put in a modeling frame, gaining in this way more consistency in the
investigation. Her local theoretical unification sort of integration would, in
many cases, involve building a more comprising model that integrates the
more specific causal mechanism. It is a characteristic of the theoretical
models to bring together submodels, mechanisms, or representations of
some features of the phenomena that were described previously. By
focusing on such types of models in specific scientific modeling episodes,
one might identify more clearly the modalities through which the different
submodels and representations are merged and pieced together. The
modeling frame provides a setting that better identifies the units at work
and the relations between them in the process of integration.
The other type of integration that Mitchell identifies could be also
illuminated in a modeling context. It is the integration through explanation
of “concrete phenomena,” an integration that targets a highly complex
system in which many factors are at work. The modeling process proposed
to account for the situation would be of a very particular sort specific to the
situation and to contextual factors, which would make it inadequate for
applications to other systems or for the extraction of a more general
algorithm. In fact, “the actual configuration of complex processes resulting
from biological and sociological causal mechanisms will be determined on
a case to-case basis.” (Mitchell et al. 1997, 124)
Both types of integration discussed above, the local theoretical
unification one and that of the explanation of concrete phenomena, could be
addressed in a frame that represents explanation through modeling
processes. In my previous work (David-Rus 2009, 2011) I argued for the
plausibility of an approach that articulates the explanatory processes in the
modeling processes, and I have suggested a particular schema developed by
Hartmann and Frigg (2005) as a good starting point.
The schema, also called the LOOP schema, involves four main
processes taking in the model and the area between the model and the
represented system. The first two steps are called identification steps. In the
first one, we identify the occurrence in the target (OIT as they call it), that
is, the behavior of interest in the target system that has to be explained. In
the second identifying step, the occurrence in the model (OIM) is identified,
or the element in the model that corresponds to the occurrence in the target
that we wish to explain. The next two steps are called the explanatory steps.
In the first one, called explanation_1, we have to reproduce the OIM in the
model, meaning that the OIM has to follow from the basic assumptions of
the model. ‘Follow’ is not made more explicit in any way but is not
reducible to deduction as in the DN model. The fourth and last step, called
explanation_2, involves the translation of knowledge obtained in the model
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(and about the model) to the target system. This way, what holds true in the
model approximately carries over to the real system.
The LOOP schema is a general, empty schema that makes sense only
if applied to particular modeling episodes. Approaching such episodes that
are illustrations of the types of integration previously discussed, we can
better illuminate the articulation of the integration process and its more
general characteristics.
FINAL REMARKS
In order to draw my discussion to an end, I will wrap up the main
points and morals of my discussion. Conceiving of the unity of the sciences
was an important goal in the classical philosophy of science. Inspired by
scientific progress at the beginning of the twentieth century, philosophers
envisioned an ideal image of a hierarchical order and reductive relations
that would bring together the way science explains reality through its
fundamental theories. Anthropology was in a delicate position due to its
particular object of study: human nature and its implications. From the
unified methodological perspective, this unity could be seen as a more local
problem concerning the reduction of the social sciences to the biological
ones. Nevertheless, as research advanced in these domains, especially in the
second half of the last century, unveiling the complexity of the systems
studied and the autonomy from the physicalist sciences, it became clear that
such a grand unification picture has no correspondence in reality.
Philosophical research focused on more local approaches, and unveiled a
plethora of interesting aspects of scientific knowledge. The disunity of the
sciences became a more plausible idea to represent the actual situation.
Regarding anthropological investigation, the actual situation does not
imply that questions regarding human nature should no longer be asked. It
is quite justified to raise them, but the obsessive seeking for a unique
answer might not be justified. Instead, science offers us a patchwork of
solutions from which one can choose. It makes for a rich and stimulating
perspective, in my view.
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CHAPTER XXI
THE CONCEPT OF DIGNITY IN THE
CAPABILITY APPROACH:
A PERSONALIST PERSPECTIVE
ASYA MARKOVA
Abstract: My intent in this paper is to develop a conceptual account of
human dignity that does not exclude persons with mental disabilities. On
one hand I share Martha Nussbaum’s critic on the rationalistic reductionism
of the dominant concept of dignity; a reductionism that consists in the
grounding of human dignity in the concepts of free will, individual
autonomy, and the ability to be a party to the social contract. On the other
hand, however, I think that Nussbaum’s conception of dignity is a
tautological one. That is why I will elaborate on this concept further by
referring to the approach of personalist philosophy, and especially to the
very fruitful attempt of Gabriel Marcel to conceptualize dignity by first
contrasting it to its opposite, which is, according to Marcel, the “spirit of
abstraction.” On the ground of Marcel’s philosophy, I argue that human
dignity consists in the very basic capability to resist to one’s own
stigmatization and reification by others, as well as to struggle for one’s own
recognition as a valuable individual person.
Keywords: dignity, capability, approach-foundational issues,
personalism
My intent in this paper is to develop an account of human dignity
which can grasp and include conceptually the normative status of persons
with mental disabilities. It is obvious that this account must avoid the
rationalistic reductionism of the common concepts of dignity. The
exclusion of persons with mental disabilities is one of the three central
problems of justice, identified by Martha Nussbaum as unsolved problems
of several rationalistic social contract theories. However, since the concept
of dignity plays a key role as a foundational issue in the capability approach
to social justice, developed by Nussbaum herself, I cannot agree with her
that it is enough just to use our intuitive understandings of what human
dignity means.
That is why I shall first systematize the implicit and explicit uses of
the concept of dignity in Nussbaum’s version of the capability approach.
Then I shall turn my attention to alternative perspectives on dignity, and
especially to the philosophical tradition of personalism, where ‘human
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dignity’ is a central and constant theme. In particular, I shall focus here on
Gabriel Marcel’s essay Human Dignity.1
Finally, on a base of the analyses of the uses of the concept in question
in the personalist tradition, I shall sketch out a way to develop a new
account of the concept of dignity that could serve as a philosophical
foundation of Nussbaum’s capability approach.
RECONSTRUCTING THE CONCEPT OF DIGNITY IN THE
CAPABILITY APPROACH
In recent years Nussbaum developed an innovative approach to social
justice that departs from the classical social contract paradigm, but remains
both critical and supplemental to it. Nussbaum’s starting point is the
understanding that the interrelated problems of gender inequalities, poverty,
and religion2 on one hand, and many of the problems of people with
disabilities3 on the other, are problems of justice that cannot be adequately
approached if we only understand personhood and citizenship in terms of
rationality, that is, in terms of free, equal, and independent persons who get
together in social cooperation for the purpose of their mutual advantage.
The conditions of justice as they have been described in classical theories of
social contracts are no more plausible when we take into consideration the
situation of persons with physical and mental disabilities, or the situation of
citizens of poor nations, whose life-chances and opportunities to practice
their rights are not equal with the chances and opportunities of the citizens
of wealthy countries. With regard to these situations, Nussbaum reexamines
critically the interrelated questions of what could be the purpose of social
cooperation and who can qualify as a citizen. Generally speaking, she
questions the priority of the distributive paradigm of justice as an adequate
perspective for catching and solving these questions.
The capability approach is her alternative framework for the topics of
justice. She claims that when one starts from the premise that many
different types of dignity are worthy of respect, then the capacity to
function as a party of social contracts, having the abilities that practices of
mutual advantage presuppose, is not necessarily a condition of being a
citizen who has dignity and who deserves to be treated with respect as an
equal with regard to the plurality of his or her life-activities.4
The central philosophical claim of a capability-centered theory of
justice is that there are different types of dignity. To accept this claim
1 See Gabriel Marcel, Human Dignity, The Existential Background of
Human Dignity (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963).
2 Marta Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities
Approach (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
3 Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species
Membership (Harvard University Press, 2006).
4 Ibid., p. 17.
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implies that rationality and language lose their status as the central
characteristics of humanity. Rather, they are to be understood simply as
life-activities that exist among many other expressions of humanity.
According to this pluralistic notion of humanity, the purpose of justice
becomes this: to secure a minimal threshold of developing various human
capabilities which a life of dignity presupposes.
Nussbaum’s project is a normative and evaluative one, since,
according to her, not every capability should be supported, but only the
ones which refer to the intuitive notion of a life of dignity. She presents a
list of ten basic human capabilities5 and claims that they must be pursued
politically for each and every person, because they are intuitively inherent
to the notion of a truly human life, or of a dignified life.6
However, it seems to me that Nussbaum’s intuitive justification of the
capability approach to dignity is insufficient. It is always possible that
someone might not share her intuition of what dignity is. This trivial
possibility is a serious argument against the attempt to justify Nussbaum’s
universalistic theory. Keeping in mind the status of the dignity concept as
the foundational point of reference for all the central claims of Nussbaum’s
philosophical project, we should not neglect the lack of a systematical and
exhaustible account of what human dignity precisely means.
In my attempt to overcome that deficit, I will first try to explicate
those aspects in the usual philosophical accounts on dignity, from which
Nussbaum tries to distance her own concept. On first sight, this attempt
seems not that difficult. In Nussbaum’s book on the philosophical
foundation of capability approach, Frontiers of Justice, there is only one
short chapter on dignity, with the title “Dignity: Aristotelian, not Kantian.”7
Despite this title, we should be aware that at one point Nussbaum fully
shares the Kantian notion of dignity: that dignity is the demand of respect
for each person as an end in him/herself. For Nussbaum, like for Kant,
every person deserves respect simply because he/she belongs to the human
race. This common view of Kant and Nussbaum is the first analytical key to
the concept of dignity. The demand to treat each person as an end in
him/herself is also the leading principle of personalistic philosophy, which I
will consider in the second part of my paper. Here, the notion of dignity
comes close to the idea of “things” that have an inherent value – and not an
instrumental one. This aspect of the Kantian concept of dignity supports
Nussbaum’s critics on the notion that mutual advantage is the only possible
aim of social cooperation: for example, if we think of society only as a joint
venture for mutual advantage, we would not acknowledge the dignity of
persons with mental disabilities. But according to Kant, persons have their
own inestimable worth in themselves – and according to Nussbaum, it is
5 Ibid., pp. 76-78.
6 Ibid., p. 78.
7 Ibid., p. 159.
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not their productivity that makes persons human. However, the differences
between Kant’s and Nussbaum’s accounts of dignity become clear when
one puts to them the following question: Of what does the inherent value of
persons that is not exhaustible from any price or from any utility consist?
According to Kant, that inherent value consists in the free will of the
reasonable man, who acts in accordance with universal moral law – and
who is also an author of that law. Kant’s principle of respect involved in the
formulation of the categorical imperative presupposes the ability of moral
judgment, which requires the capacity of abstract thinking. That implies a
high level autonomy from empirical or social dependency. So the dignity of
man, his inherent value, consists in the ability to ignore the imperatives of
needs, desires, and habits, and to act only with accordance to the primary
moral duty of reason.
But what about the dignity of persons with mental disabilities? Kant
would probably say that this is an empirical problem, and not a
philosophical one. But it could also be a problem of the theoretical
framework within which we define who is a person, and what constitutes
personal dignity. At any rate, Nussbaum thinks that we face a structural
problem here – and not just an empirical one.8 The Aristotelian and
Marxian, that is, the non-Kantian, notion of dignity, which she defends, is
based on the understanding of the human not primarily as a rational being,
but as a political animal. This is an idea that Nussbaum shares with
Aristotle. She states: “It (the Capability Approach – A. M.) sees the rational
as simply one aspect of the animal, and, at that, not the only one that is
pertinent to a notion of truly human functioning.”9 According to her, there
are different kinds of animal dignity that deserve respect, so that with
regard to humans, we should not construct an opposition between animality
and rationality.
The second distinction of Nussbaum from the Kantian perspective
comes from Marx. This is the notion that the human is a creature “in need
of plurality of life-activities.”10 To dignify different capabilities as having
equal status to rationality is a crucial move in a theory of justice that tries to
include also the particular fate of persons with mental disabilities. That
move at first glance simply reminds us that there are very different reasons
and ways to value human life. However, Nussbaum links this understanding
of humanity only in a selective way to the concept of dignity, by
discriminating between certain human activities that should be treated as
sources of dignity and other activities that do not deserve such treatment.
What is valuable in itself for Nussbaum is not simply the plurality of life-
activities; rather, the list of capabilities that grounds her concept of dignity
is normatively selected.11 Nussbaum asserts: “Of course human beings have
8 Ibid., p. 127.
9 Ibid., p. 158.
10 Ibid., p. 159.
11 Ibid., p. 162.
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all sorts of capabilities, meaning activities from which to choose and act.
The items of my list, however, are the result of an evaluative argument that
asks the question: What opportunities are entailed by the idea of a life
worthy of human dignity? The approach then, does not read capabilities
from the factual observation of human nature as it is. Many capacities in
our nature are bad (such as the capacity for cruelty) and many are too trivial
to be inherent in the idea of a life worthy of human dignity. My approach,
then, does not value capabilities as such, or freedom as such. Some
freedoms or opportunities to act are good and some bad, some important
and some trivial.”12 I quote this long passage because it seems to me that if
we cannot formulate the concept of dignity independently of the definitions
of capabilities, we also cannot (except intuitively) figure out which
capabilities are specifically human, which are good, which are bad, which
are trivial, and which are linked to the idea of respect for each human being
as an end in itself. In this central point, the definition of Nussbaum seems to
be a tautological one: to live in dignity means to have the list of capabilities
which a life worthy of dignity presupposes. This tautological argumentation
is the main weakness of Nussbaum’s conception of dignity. That is why in
the following part of my paper I will turn my attention to alternative and
more systematic concepts of dignity in order to provide an answer to the
question of whether the fulfillment of Nussbaum’s list of ten capabilities is
really a necessary and sufficient condition of a life in dignity.
ТHE CONCEPT OF DIGNITY FROM GABRIEL MARCEL’S 
PERSONALISTIC PERSPECTIVE
The concept of human dignity has been investigated in its various
forms and conceptual relations in the book The Еxistential Background of 
Human Dignity13 by the philosopher and playwright Gabriel Marcel. In this
paragraph, I shall distinguish the central features of Marcel’s concept of
dignity as they can be found in his essay “Human Dignity.” What makes
this text so interesting and fruitful for my aim in this paper is that the
conceptualization of dignity as inherent to every person from the fact of
his/her birth is here approached by first explicating the antithesis of dignity.
According to Marcel, the opposite of dignity is not its absence, but the
guilty conscience or the affected dignity. He also introduces a concept of
so-called “decorative dignity.” There is a relation between these three
12 Marta Nussbaum, “Capabilities, Entitlements, Rights: Supplementation
and Critique” in Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, vol.12, №1
(2011):23.
See also: Martha Nussbaum, “Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements”,
Feminist Economics №9, pp. 33-59.
13 Gabriel Marcel, The Existential Background of Human Dignity
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963).
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negative concepts of dignity which now I will attempt to reconstruct
systematically.
Affected Dignity and the Spirit of Abstraction
In a first approach to the understanding of what the opposite of dignity
is, Marcel refers to one of his dramatic works, Le Dard.14 Through the
structure of the actions of his hero, he describes dramatically how a certain
kind of personal success becomes a source of resentment, and so causes a
kind of ideological conscience and pathological conduct. Marcel describes
ideology by the term “spirit of abstraction”: in the drama he quotes, the
spirit of abstraction appears in the compensatory efforts of the hero to
justify his life and career advances, which he won by marrying into a rich
family. The bitterness and resentment in the hero come from the notion that
by this marriage, he has betrayed the class to which he belonged. This
notion becomes a pathological and totalitarian one, because every opinion
and every judgment of the hero are inspired by his desire to remain in line
with a certain class ideology. For example, as his friend states, our hero
likes Beethoven not for his music, but because he ascribes to Beethoven an
ideology very similar to his own. His friend also accuses the hero of often
judging others not on the basis of their intrinsic qualities, but on categories
under which he subsumes them. The pathological character of the guilty
conscience on which the concept of the spirit of abstraction or of ideology
is based becomes even more obvious by the unjust and hateful behavior of
the hero to the people he actually loves.
In order to elaborate analytically on the phenomenon that in the drama
is signified as the “spirit of abstraction,” which is the opposite of human
dignity, I shall highlight one crucial point: obviously, for Marcel, there is a
link between the totalitarian character of the ideological conscience and the
practice of depersonalization, a link that makes us unable to see and to treat
human beings as human beings instead of subordinating each and every
individual under abstract designations.
According to Marcel, the totalitarian character of ideology has
something in common with the inability to make distinctions between
different kinds of rules and principles that ground different ways of dealing
with different kinds of “objects.” This inability expresses itself in cases in
which one conducts all one’s own actions and judgments on the basis of a
single or solitary principle, thus neglecting every kind of difference. When
this neglect regards the ability to see the difference between persons and
objects (in this case we can use the term “reification”), or between persons
and ideas, this phenomenon should not be seen simply as “wrong
judgment,” because it is also a pathological judgment.
14 Gabriel Marcel, Le Dard, pièce en trois actes (Paris: impr.-édit. Plon,
1936).
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It is worth noting that when Marcel considers this kind of pathological
behavior by his hero in Le Dard to persons who are close to him, he asserts
that the most important feature of that behavior is the lack of love.15 It
seems that according to Marcel, his ideology consists basically in the lack
of love, or more precisely, in the destruction of love and of sensitivity for
others in their inherent and specific values by resentment and guilty
conscience. The concept of love is used here in the very common sense of
valuable relation to a concrete person, and the opposite of the principle of
love is the practice of bad abstraction. But why should this practice also be
the opposite of dignity? It is obvious that we do not feel humiliated if not
everyone loves us. While we demand legitimately that everyone should
respect our dignity, we could not expect that everyone should love us.
Let us link this distinctive interrelation between love and dignity to the
main questions of this paper, namely: 1) How can we develop a conceptual
account of dignity that does not exclude persons with mental disabilities,
and 2) How can we overcome the rationalistic reductionism of the dominant
concepts of dignity?
In light of Marcel’s considerations on dignity, the second appears as
nothing else but the ability to resist the ideological treatment of oneself as a
“thing,” a treatment that stands in contradiction to the ways one learns to
know and value oneself by one’s relationships of love with one’s significant
others. If we do not lose the sense of our dignity, we intuitively resist forms
of bad abstraction in our everyday practices – and we are quite sensitive to
them in cases in which they oppress our own personality or the personalities
of our close relatives and friends.
The described practice of resistance seems to have a clear moral
impact in a Kantian sense. However, unlike in Kantian thinking, the ability
for abstract thinking does not play a central role here. Rather, to have the
ability to resist against a false or disturbed construction of oneself depends
on having a basic sense of who one is (and who one is not), as well as on
one’s pre-cognitional conviction that one is a valuable person. Probably, at
the very basic level of that self-awareness, we should not insist that it
entails a developed moral consciousness, but it does entail a sense of
dignity. We should consider that even one’s aggressive and destructive
resistance against subordinating under abstract humiliating categorizations
– for example one’s labeling in racist terms, or, say, as having “mental
retardation” – are, in fact, expressions of and attempts to keep one’s own
human dignity.
As Marcel notes, in the constant desire of his hero not to betray the
social milieu of his birth, something noble may appear as well.16 Guilty
conscience is, first of all, an attempt to compensate, to correct – but it is a
pathological attempt. Marcel seems to endorse the notion that the guilty
conscience (or the antithesis of dignity) is, paradoxically, a perverted
15 Marcel, The Existential Background of Human Dignity, p.123.
16 Ibid., p.119.
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derivation of a kind of essential dignity, which is inherent to every human
being. However, in accordance with what was said here about the role of
resistance in the concept of dignity, the term “inherent” must be clarified:
instead of asserting, like Marcel, that human dignity is inherent to every
human person from the very fact of his/her birth, it would be better to turn
our attention to the conditions that make possible the development of self-
awareness and self-esteem, as well as the ability for non-pathological forms
of resistance against reification and ideological treatment. Understanding
these conditions will enable us also to understand how one could, in the
sense of Marcel, lose his/her real dignity and substitute pathological forms
of affected or decorative dignity, forms which build themselves on the
grounds of ideology.
CONCLUSION
The moral of the story I tried to tell here is that dignity consists
basically in the ability of the person to resist attempts to subordinate
him/herself to abstract and ideological categories and forms of oppression,
whose basic feature is that they destroy moral thresholds that are necessary
conditions for us to feel ourselves to be persons, and not mere instruments,
objects, or animals. Such attempts are not only acts of humiliation, but also
acts of dehumanization. To put it in the terminology of Nussbaum: the
ability to resist dehumanization is the very fundamental capability that
makes human life worth living and that should be ascribed to every human
being who participates in relationships of love. Hence, the answer to the
question of whether or not the capabilities in Nussbaum’s list necessarily
belong to the concept of dignity depends on the further question of whether
or not these capabilities contribute to the development of the central
capability to resist against one’s own subordination to abstract, impersonal
terms and schemes, and to affirm oneself as a person who deserves to be
respected in his/her concrete features.
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CHAPTER XXII
UNDERSTANDING MENTAL HEALTH:
EXISTENTIAL SITUATION AND
SOCIAL ATTITUDE1
TEBEANU ANA-VOICHIŢA, MACARIE GEORGE-FLORIAN,
and MANEA TEODORA
Abstract: Mental health is more than a specific field of medicine; it
involves a cultural understanding of what constitutes a good human.
According to this cultural understanding, social attitudes toward people
with mental health problems may range from stigmatization to acceptance
or even adulation (Plato, Phaidros). We ask what type of understanding
mental health professionals have toward these persons in terms of how they
conceptualize mental health in present day Romania.
The purpose of our work is to introduce a new perspective to the
classical philosophical debates with empirical data collected from some in-
depth interviews with mental health professionals. We are interested in their
understanding of mentally ill persons and the way the image of the mentally
ill person is reflected in and outside the clinic.
The frame theories we will use to analyze this topic are existential
analysis, phenomenology (Heidegger: Being and Time, 1927) and post-
structuralism (Foucault: The History of Madness, 1961 and The Birth of the
Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, 1963).
Keywords: Mental health, mentally ill persons, phenomenology, post-
structuralism
Why Mental Health and Philosophy?
First, for thousands of years “the mind” was the main issue for
philosophical reflection in order to describe, to understand, and to
normalize our rationality. Second, through the definition of our rationality,
we show how we understand non-rationality or irrationality. To be
irrational means either not to accept the common norms of rationality or to
act in a way that ignores the effects and the logical norms of thinking.
1 Acknowledgement: This article was written within the Project
"Postdoctoral Studies in the Field of Health Policies’ Ethics", POSDRU/89
/1.5/S/61879, co-funded by the European Social Fund through the Sectorial
Operational Program for the Human Resources Development 2007-2013, theme
no.3: “Ethical Perspectives and Determinants of Access of Vulnerable Persons
and Groups to Health Services”.
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Rational behavior that is opposed to irrational behavior can start with
expressing emotions in an exaggerated way, and with paranoia. The concept
of rationality is not a descriptive one; we think that it is a very strong
normative concept. But rationality is, as are all human things, subject to
historical experience, so the meaning of rationality and irrationality may
change with time. Often, we need a little bit of irrationality to break or to
critique conventions.
When something goes wrong with the mind of a person, as when the
expected rational behavior is not accomplished, this can be labeled as
mental illness, but we must not forget that “mental health” is a concept we
invented and agreed on in order to describe someone’s mental functioning
or reasoning capacities. It implies an understanding of a normally
functioning mind and a healthy person. So, the persons experiencing mental
health problems are not only ill, but are also prevented from sharing with
the community one of the most dignifying qualities of a human being, that
of “being rational.” The existential dimension of people affected is very
complex and far too dramatic to be ignored.
Mental Health as Seen in Different Historical Paradigms
Throughout the ages, the study of mental health and, in opposition,
mental illness, has focused upon different characteristics of persons
(physical, emotional, spiritual) according to the predominant paradigm at a
specific historical time.
For Plato (Phaedrus 244a-245c) madness was seen as a gift given by
the gods. He shows a very positive attitude toward madness: madness can
give us some of the best things we have. There are four kinds of divine
madness: 1. the gift of prophecy (from Apollo); 2. Mystic rites (from
Dionysus); 3. Poetry (from the Muses); and 4. Love (from Aphrodite).
Whether or not we believe that the madness of love is sent by a god to
benefit the lover and the beloved, we should agree that love and madness
are, as concepts, very closely related.
In his archaeology, Michael Foucault analyzed different aspects of
rationality in different periods of time. The philosophy of the Renaissance,
for example, changed the relationship between rationality and madness
present in the Middle Ages into a reflection on rationality and wisdom.
Madness started to be regarded as a complementary form of knowledge.
Furthermore, madness could now be used as a tool to critique rationality
itself. Another strange situation is present in the Christian way of thinking,
which agreed on two paradoxical forms of rationality: human reason and
divine reason. For human reason, the divine one sometimes appears to be
madness. In conclusion: madness seems to be perceived as being a part of
rationality, and only a third perspective, wisdom, can discern between
rationality and madness.
Modernity has experienced, in the vision of Foucault, the classical
experience of madness in two major notes: “mad people” are
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institutionalized, and rationality and madness are in opposition, as two
contradictory concepts. This point of view still seems to be widely accepted
today in understanding madness. We share with the modern experience of
madness the fact that madness is objectified and transformed into an object
of study; it is a positum opposed to ratio.
In order to underline the existential dimension of people experiencing
mental illnesses, we will ask in Heidegger’s manner: in what way does the
mentally ill person ek-sists? “To exist” means for Heidegger to be open to
other people, to allow others to come to you, to be in the world, to appear,
or to become. Literally, it means “to stand out.” Are those people really
opening to others or are they rather closing into themselves? If they are
feeling rejected or constantly under suspicion from the others, their world
will be reconstructed on certain grounds. Can we really understand the
grounds of their world? On what basis? We can suspect their perceptions of
“reality,” but do they or do they not have the right to construct that reality?
To what extent could this reality be really dangerous for us? How afraid are
we of alternative ways of defining or understanding “reality”? Is our reality
itself so fragile that we have to protect it from alternative ways of
description and re-definition?
Today’s Definition of Mental Health
The current conceptualization of mental health describes either a level
of cognitive (or emotional) well-being or an absence of a mental disorder.
In fact, mental health is more than the absence of mental illness. This
concept may include, from the perspective of positive psychology, multiple
facets: the individual's ability to enjoy life (and the right balance between
living in the past, present, and future), resilience (seen as the process of
interaction between one person and the environment, appealing to
protective factors which reduce the action of risk factors) (Ionescu S.,
Blanchet A., 2009), a balance between different activities in someone’s life,
flexibility (emotional as well as cognitive) as opposed to rigidity, and self-
actualization (the process of actualizing the inner potential).
The World Health Organization defines mental health as “a state of
well-being in which the individual realizes his or her own abilities, can cope
with the normal stresses of life, can work productively and fruitfully, and is
able to make a contribution to his or her community.” (WHO 2005)
Nowadays, even if there is no one “official” definition of mental
health, this concept can be understood without restricting its interpretation
across cultures. However, cultural differences, subjective assessments, and
competing professional theories all affect how “mental health” is defined.
(WHO 2001)
Normality and Abnormality, and the Boundaries Between Them
Madness – understood as the otherness of a person – and normality
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represent, as mentioned, an invention and a discovery necessary for a
knowing intellect to understand the complexity of mental phenomena of the
inner life. In other words, “madness” was invented, paradoxically, to
explain and justify the normal (Enăchescu C., 2008, p.80). But the human
person includes them both in potentiality, and these two facets are
inseparable and must be analyzed together. If we separate madness from
normality to better understand the human person, we will separate the parts
of a whole, thus abolishing the subject of psychology, which is the pure
subject (Enăchescu C., 2006), the correspondent of the “inner sense” of
which Maine de Biran spoke.
The characteristics of normality are the state of sintonicity (in its
relations with the external world) and equithymia (balance and internal
order), representing the fact of “being in accordance with the world,” “to be
consistent with others,” and “to be in correlation with the norms of the
world.”
In contrast, madness is dysthymic and brings a fracture of what is
intelligible between the knowing intellect and the object of knowledge;
epistemic medical and psychiatric discourse, based on observations and
statistics, serves to diagnose and introduce drug treatment for insanity, but
it cannot express, ontologically and axiologically speaking, what defines a
mad person. This task is taken over by philosophy and psychology.
Philosophy is the one that reinstated madness – mental illness – in the
sphere of human sciences, thus providing a path of understanding on which
psychiatry has advanced very little so far. If we try to give an answer to the
fundamental question “What is madness?”, we must first define the field of
the normal: where the normal ends and madness begins. Formally, all that is
not in conformity with the norm is abnormal and, thus, opposed to normal.
But what is the “norm”? The norm is a standard model identified by a group
that establishes and manages the specific conduct of that group (Enăchescu
C., 2008, p.103- 104). Moreover, the norm is a value, because the fact of
“being” and “not being” is evaluated in relation to an internalized value.
Concerning the etymology of the word, “norm” in Latin means a right
angle, something that does not fluctuate to the right or the left, something
that is squarely in the middle.
“Omalos,” from which the word “anomaly” stems, is a Greek term,
and it means something equal, regular, and smooth. Anomaly is the
opposite of regularity. In this case, regularity would be the quality of
something without anomalies. “Normal,” as a term, is, on one hand,
qualifying, implying applying a value to, a goal an individual wants to
achieve, and on the other hand, descriptive, indicating an average,
something that, in a way, is everyone.
Establishing Norms
To put a rule in a certain context is somewhat compelling: it puts a
certain exigency on an existence, which by its variability may seem strange
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or hostile to others. So the multitude of ways in which something can occur
is limited, resulting in few clear categories that sometimes have sharp
boundaries between them. This is not the case regarding the delimitations
between “normal” and “abnormal.”
A rule is a convention widely shared by a community of people.
Axiologically speaking, the norm is a value, but a value turned into an
imperative: “you must be X, you must be Y, and, ultimately, you must be
normal.”
Psychiatry
The main object of psychiatry would be activity on the borderline
between normal and pathological. We could even refer to the contact
boundary between what is meant by “normal” on one hand, and “abnormal”
on the other, because only by defining this transitional state one can
understand the content of the concept of the “abnormal.”
M. Lăzărescu (1994) stresses that when talking about the issue of
“normal-abnormal,” we are considering more the statistical approach. The
rules and laws and the issue of “disease” are correlated more to the
casuistry and to the concrete case, which are less susceptible to the
statistics.
Approaches of Mental Health
Tudose F., Tudose Cătălina, and Dobranici Letiţia (2002) consider that
mental health can be regarded in four different and complementary ways.
First, the mentally healthy person can be placed on a continuum. If we
were to score behavior on a scale, normality is the major part of a
continuum, that of the middle of this continuum, and the extremes are the
abnormality. Health is the complex product of several parameters of organic
and social life, all in dynamic equilibrium, resulting in a realistic-logical
vision of the world, a psychological and social discipline on the background
of the joy of living and of the balance between introversion and
extroversion. H. Ey considers that the mentally ill person lacks both outer
and inner freedom. (However, the person with a mental disorder is not
considered today, in the light of new psychiatrists, ill or sick.) G. Ionescu
(1995) believes that health is an ideal state and disease is an imbalance at
all levels of the organism.
Second, mental health is a result of a statistical process, where the
average is equivalent to normality. The classic bell-shaped distribution, the
“normalized” Gauss curve, compels us to enter under this bell and to
respect the definitions of the terms “mean” and “standard deviation” for
each phenomenon of mental life, from IQ to the meaning of the term
“normal.” The extreme is thus deviant from the mean. The phenomena that
occur often are normal; those that are rare are considered anomalies. So, if
we have to make the decision whether I am normal or not, the answer to
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this question stands only in a given socio-economic and historical
community, the community to which I belong.
Usually, we consider that someone is normal if he or she is acting like
all the others who make up the majority of people in his/her society, and if
this person can carry on with familiar cultural traditions learned from his or
her parents, doing the same activities in the same manner as his or her
parents.
The symptoms of mental illness are always opposed, in one way or
another, to the social norms: the choice of the symptom is negatively
determined by the social norms. François Laplantine considers that “you are
not becoming mad as you want; culture foresaw everything. In the core
itself of the development of neurosis and psychosis, by which we try to free
ourselves from it, culture joins us again to tell us what changed type of
personality we need to adopt.” (quoted by R. Jaccard, p.16)
Third, perfect mental health, or a person with perfect mental health, is
a utopia. It is established as an ideal for normality, for both the individual
and the entire community. It is not only important how someone is manifest
in a given culture, but also how he or she would ideally like to be. Balanced
and harmonious functioning of the mind and body leads to an optimal level
which, most of the time, is unattainable. The ideal normal is relative to the
culture that describes it in terms of certain values, according to F. Cloutier
(Tudose et al., 2002). Beginning with Freud, who said “normality is an
ideal fiction,” moving to E. Erikson's stating that “normality is the ability to
master your periods of life,” the authors conclude with R.E. Money-Kryle
that “Normality is the ability to achieve full self-consciousness, which is
never actually fully achieved. “
Fourth, mental health can be viewed as a process. Normal behavior is
the final result of subsystems that interact with each other, so changes and
processes are essential for normality, rather than the transversal defining of
normality.
In fact, these four approaches are overlapping and can be used
simultaneously or successively when we want to emphasize one side or
another of mental normality. This demarche is intuitively done by mental
health specialists, and also by philosophers and those without previous
medical training.
Contemporary Approaches and Understanding of Mental Health in
Romania
The purpose of our study is to correlate classical philosophical debates
with the contemporary view of mental health professionals. In order to
understand their opinions about the concept of mental health today in
Romania, we collected nine indepth interviews, eight with psychiatrists and
one with a psychiatric nurse who is also a psychologist, in a psychiatric
hospital in the city of Iasi, Iasi County, over a period of two months (May-
June 2011).
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Usually, in-depth interviews are a useful qualitative data collection
technique that can be used for a variety of purposes, including motivation
and needs assessment, the holistic understanding of the interviewee’s point
of view or situation, and exploring interesting areas for further
investigation. In our case, we wanted to explore in depth the modality of
understanding a concept and of putting it into practice. This type of
interview is most appropriate for situations in which the researcher wants to
ask open-ended questions that elicit depth of information from relatively
few people. Researchers engage with participants by posing questions in a
neutral manner, listening attentively to participants’ responses, sometimes
asking follow-up questions and probes based on those responses. They do
not lead participants according to any preconceived notions, nor do they
encourage participants to provide particular answers by expressing approval
or disapproval of answers given. (Mack N. et al., 2005, p.29). This last
aspect is very important in our study, because we focused on the definition
of a concept subject to all sorts of interpretations and for which people are
strongly inclined to theorize and generalize.
In our interviews, we highlighted the following major themes: the
concept of normality; the definition of mental health from the perspective of
professionals, and respectively in the opinion of psychiatric patients as seen
also by the professionals; and the image of the mentally ill person, reflected
in and outside the clinic.
The responses obtained from our interlocutors can be largely
integrated in the four approaches mentioned above. Usually, the
respondents submitted responses in more than one approach, and offered
examples from both the clinic in which they work and life outside the
hospital.
Seeing mental health as a continuum and a result of a statistical
process, one participant said that”Madness should be redefined. There is not
a clear definition. Is the Gaussian curve, normality, the extreme? You can
go to one side or another.”
The interlocutor feels the need to redefine insanity because he does not
find the right place for it on the Gaussian curve (insanity is not a “discrete”
concept, with ”0” or “1” values, but is of a continuous type): normality
should be in the midst of it, and extremes (which are generally called
“abnormality” without any further explanation) are dangerous, because one
can “fall into” them.
Situating himself in the second and the third approach, another
psychiatrist says that “Mental health is something dictated by the majority.
Like me? Like me and my colleagues? I haven’t found a definition…maybe
a statistical one. As a functioning member of society, a person is healthy if
he is doing what most people are doing: having a job, a family, respecting
the cultural norms of the society in which he is born – but I don’t think this
is a definition of health. Outsiders see the mentally ill person as we see him:
he is healthy if he’s doing the same things as I am doing. For example, what
a Roma person is doing in his own community is normal, but for anyone
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outside his culture, maybe it is not. The same for the Hezbollah terrorist.
The concept of mental health is singular, not like the one for blood pressure,
where if you have 120 over 80 you are healthy. There are exceptions:
normality for someone for blood pressure can be of 180 over 100 all his
life. Also, blood pressure is palpable, and can be measured, but with mental
health we have sensitive criteria.”
Mental normality cannot benefit from “norms”: a concept considered
by cardiologists, and widely recognized by them, as “good (or normal, or
standard) blood pressure” cannot be translated easily into the mental health
field. If we continue the above example, psychiatrists cannot use for
comparison the concept of “120 over 80” in mental health. Especially since
this “120 over 80”-type norm, even if this concept could exist, would be
different from one socio-cultural group to another. Thus, for each given
community in a specific historical moment, there should exist a working
definition of mental health that would make possible the communication
and cooperation between specialists.
Considering that mental health is the result of a process developed
in time, we have the following answer: “Mental health, as well as somatic
health, is a balance that someone possesses or not: the psychic balance. I am
referring to the equilibrium state felt by each person. “I am healthy” equals
“all works well.” The balance within you, with the outside world…there are
some types of people who feel good about themselves, but there is an
imbalance with the outside world, and some have no consciousness of
illness, but others perceive him as being different. The balance within
oneself and with the outside world, if it’s not perceived by the person, is
perceived by others. At an intuitive level, yes, the man in the street believes
the same thing. Mental balance equals the harmonious state between you
and others. I think we all perceive this harmony.”
In this case, the psychiatrist puts great emphasis on the equilibrium
state, the balance of the person within him- or herself (the balance between
the various psychological components) and the balance of the person with
others and with the environment. In terms of balance between individual
and environment, what matters is the consciousness of disease; if a person
doesn’t have that consciousness, he/she can feel mentally healthy, even if
others consider him/her as being sick (unbalanced). This doctor gave the
example of a person who received a diagnosis of schizophrenia, but didn’t
recognize himself as having an illness; that is why he didn’t accept medical
treatment. This situation bothered his family members, who declared to the
doctor that the person concerned was agitated, aggressive with others, and
used violent language “during the crisis” (when he suffered from auditory
hallucinations and delusions), facts which, of course, were not recognized
by the patient as real. In psychiatric language, this is called “lack of
criticism.” Even if the person is considered to be in good internal balance,
family members declared implicitly that the external balance, the
“harmony,” was destroyed. This situation is very well known by all mental
health professionals.
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The next psychiatrist began his discourse doubting the existence of a
single kind of mental health. Then he referred to a famous psychiatric
manual defining mental disorders and its discussion of the metaphor of
madness: “Mental health…it exists, it does not exist…[Asked if there are
differences of definition of this concept] Yes, it's pretty well covered! The
palette, the symptomatical range in depression grows and grows..see DSM
IV2. Basically, now it's very easy to give a diagnosis of depression, for
everyone can be included in that range.The man on the street thinks that
mental health..means…the more you see that your reality comes close to the
reality of others, the more you can say you're not crazy. If our realities are
different, this means the other is crazy. These metaphors are thus created in
a meaningful way. Crazy = [psychiatric hospital’s name] = psychiatrist.
Different realities? Different concepts: so I've got [the doing of a thing
in a specific way], why are you not doing things like me? Each comes into a
relationship with his or her own baggage. These differences make us
consider the other as being crazy. He who has a different mentality will
hardly accept yours.”
We come here to describe a situation that some psychiatrists foresaw a
long time ago: if the symptomatology of some mental illnesses becomes
richer, more detailed, and more expanded from one edition to another of the
DSM manual, the result would be that all, or at least, almost all, people
suffer, have suffered, or will suffer from a mental illness at some point
during their lifetime. From this point of view, to be “normal,” psychically
speaking, requires a definition tailored to a specific temporal moment.
Moreover, my mental health is defined in relation to the mental health of
my neighbor, who is part of the same community: this view has been
expressed by other mental health professionals (medical doctors,
psychologists, social workers, and even priests) who all state that the
decision-making process about a person's mental health is taken gradually,
in small steps, through continuous comparisons to the significant others in
his/her environment, to those with whom the person shares his “baggage.”
In another conversation with a psychiatrist (held separately from this
study) we were given the idea that “There are over one hundred diagnostics
in psychiatry. During your life span you will suffer from at least one.” This
idea had not been expressed with pessimism, but with precision and safety:
the statement was based on real, recent statistics, according to which any of
us, including the people involved in that dialogue, are likely to receive a
2 ”The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders" (DSM) is a
comprehensive classification of officially recognized psychiatric disorders. The
fourth version, DSM-IV, was issued in 1994. The most recent version is the
”Text Revision” of the DSM-IV, also known as the DSM-IV-TR, published in
2000. The DSM-IV organizes each psychiatric diagnosis into five dimensions
(axes) relating to different aspects of disorder or disability, depression being
included among the most common axis 1 disorders. The next version DSM-V is
due for publication in May 2013.
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diagnosis of a mental disorder and thus to experience “from the inside” the
changes in the meaning of the concept of “mental health.”
A psychiatrist offered us a comprehensive approach to mental health,
both in terms of the officially recognized definition of the World Health
Organization, and from his perspective as a practitioner who dealt with this
issue even through the eyes of an outsider to the hospital.
“A general definition of health, a state of well-being, from the
physical, mental, and social point of view, I think, is a comprehensive
definition of what I know, and the World Health Organization uses these
parameters.
Asked if he adheres to this definition, he answered: Yes. Regarding
mental health, there are some norms by which it is estimated. It may be a
statistical norm, in which the person should fall within a certain range, like
most people; it can be a norm accepted by others, but a genius who is not in
that scale does not necessarily suffer from a mental disorder… quite the
contrary. So it's a statistical aspect, one accepted by others, one in terms of
employer or society, one measuring whether the person can perform
correctly his tasks at work and can relate properly in society. If we are
talking about criteria for mental illness, other discussions occur; we can
open a manual and take a look.
Asked how he thinks this concept is put into practice: A person's state
of wellbeing is compatible with others’ wellbeing, others who accept and
value the person, and consider him as normal in all respects. These two
aspects go together. As a person, he feels good, and others feel good with
him as well.
So one aspect is not enough? No. Maybe the depressive persons hide
themselves. They seem normal. But when they remain alone, they are
overwhelmed with doubts, thoughts. They dissimulate.
Or vice versa, the person feels good about himself, but not the
others with him – could we say that? Yes, for example: in the manic
episode, the person feels very good about himself. He feels like a flower, he
blooms, it's powerful, but the others discern some problems. Yes, you need
a balance.
Beyond the issues already discussed about some other parts of the
interviews, such as the relationship between internal wellbeing and
openness to the environment, what is being presented here is an idea worthy
of note, namely, that we have to avoid the tendency to consider the
extremes of the Gaussian curve as being automatic signs of mental
abnormality. A brilliant person (a genius of mathematics or music, for
example) is not mentally “normal” in Gaussian terms, because genius,
being a rare phenomenon, is statistically “abnormal.” However, we could
not put a sign of equivalence between genius and mental abnormality on the
basis of frequency of occurrence of the phenomenon only; there must also
be considered the criterion of utility, or what that person brings to the
community, his/her degree of integration. We could mention here the
famous example of van Gogh, the gifted Dutch Post-Impressionist artist,
Understanding Mental Health 291
who had his life shattered by mental illness. Vincent van Gogh suffered
from Bipolar I Disorder at a time in history when there was no treatment for
this common disorder. Tragically, van Gogh died of suicide. Today van
Gogh is considered a genius, his contribution to universal culture is
indisputable, and his “abnormality” saved him, on one hand, from the
anonymity of history, while on the other hand it pushed him to death.
Reporting himself, as a specialist, to the perspective of the average
people:
- What does the common person understand from this concept?
He would probably define it just from the external point of view. He
would refer to others and would say that the respective person should fit in
certain norms and that one shouldn’t find in that person items that can be
included in a mental illness. From the information he has, from what was
written in press, TV, Internet, or from family information about societal
norms, he shouldn’t be able to associate or to notice anything different or
disturbing in the overall behavior of an individual.
- So it's more a matter of efficiency in the relationships with others.
Yes, he should not change the behavior that he has always had. I am
speaking now as someone who is not in the medical field. If someone was
mainly concerned about racing until that moment, he shouldn’t suddenly go
to the monastery – it’s a sharp change. I gave an example that is perhaps
exaggerated. He should be able to have a decent conversation, to respond to
my requests, and I should be able to respond to his; that means he could
provide and offer answers and questions, and to behave decently in society,
having a presence. (Behavior) He may change it, but within a longer period,
because life or school intervene; but not a major change in a period of days
or weeks. Then we should seek answers. “
In this fragment, the psychiatrist focuses on the continuity of behavior
as a criterion for defining a person as being mentally healthy. It’s not the
behavior itself that counts, but its qualitative continuity (same type of
behavior for a longer period of time). In other words, a person is normal if,
being in a monastery for some time (thus being more of an introvert), he
will continue to do so in the future. He will be predictable for others, who
will feel safe because they can foresee his behavior. If he decides that, from
the monastery, an environment that conventionally favors introversion, he
goes directly to participate in racing, where he has to behave in an
extroverted manner, and this change occurs suddenly (within a few days or
weeks), then his behavior is no longer predictable, so the people in his
environment might feel insecure. So my good mental health brings help to
the structure and continuity of relations over time in the socio-cultural
environment in which I am situated; my mental imbalance affects, in a
systemic way, all others, so that they can not relate to me and to one another
in the same manner as before; thus it asks them to make a permanent
readjustment, which requires time and effort. Not everyone is able or
willing to make these efforts, and hence appear the difficulties of
integration into society by persons with mental disorders.
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Another psychiatrist says the mental health concept holds multiple
specialties: “The concept of mental health…For me it's a vague concept.
Mental health is a combination of multiple specialties. You can have
something organic that triggers in you a mental disorder. But the organic
part is not our prerogative. Or the mental disorder is developing something
organic. So the endocrinologist or neurologist has to combine their
treatment with ours. Mental illness, for people nowadays, equals madness.
For them it is normal or abnormal, disease or no disease; in the middle there
is nothing. They don’t know there is a state of remission or plateau. They
perceive mental illness as being different from any organic disease. So it
has always been.Psychiatry is a border discipline. It is in part psychology
and in part medicine; each has to give something. Psychiatry needs the
contribution of all. The mentality of all people must change.”
For this interlocutor, psychiatry consists of more than diagnosing and
treating so-called “psychiatric” disorders; this discipline relates to other
medical fields, exactly because the human being is a whole, which suffers,
simultaneously or in turn, from mental or somatic illnesses, and sometimes
the border between them is difficult to detect. One example would be the
conversion disorders.
The idea raised by this psychiatrist, partly related to a topic previously
mentioned by another interlocutor (genius and its place on the Gaussian
curve), is that the person with an average medical education tends to push
any behavior deviant from the norm to one extreme, and to the other
extreme of the scale is normality. The person is thinking without awareness
of the infinitesimal gradations of the conditions that mental health may take
on its way from normality to abnormality in a particular person at a given
moment in time. Mental illness is thus sent to the extreme of abnormality,
but not in a way so categorically as in the past. M. Foucault mentioned what
happened to fool people, from the middle of the seventeenth century until
the late nineteenth century: the “alienated” throughout Europe, were closed
into so-called general hospitals, along with other categories of people –
beggars, poor persons, individuals with physical handicaps or suffering
from sexually transmitted diseases, the elderly, exiled priests, unemployed
– in short, all those located “outside” the social norms established in that
historical moment.
Today, of course, we stand far from this vision. To change our
common mentality, the development of social and human sciences and the
social, cultural, economic, and political changes in the last three centuries
have all brought their contribution. The working definitions of mental
health and, respectively, of mental disorders, that serve as a basis for
discussion and as a starting point for any scientific discourse in the fields of
psychiatry and clinical psychology stand as proof of the efforts of
objectification of these concepts. The definition of mental health focuses
not only on the lack of symptoms and clinical signs, but on the general
wellbeing of the person, thus attracting attention to his/her totality, as a
unitary individual, and implicitly on the necessity of his/her membership
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and integration into a social group; each person feels good in his or her
way. Sometimes we all have problems, some benefit from what Plato called
divine madness, and we all ek-syst (in the sense of Heidegger's term),
having the right to create our own reality. And it is the society that deals, in
general, with the rightness of this reality, as seen in the philosophical
theories and debates mentioned in this study. Chronologically, the specific
social context is the first to give the right of veto on this inner reality, and
only in a second moment should the physicians recognize, describe, and
offer a diagnostic for persons with mental problems.
University of Medicine and Pharmacy “Gr.T.Popa”
Iaşi, Romania
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CHAPTER XXIII
CHANGES AND CHALLENGES IN
STATEMENTS ON THE QUALITY OF DYING1
GABRIEL ROMAN
Abstract: Understanding end-of-life care quality has been a priority for
many researchers for the past few decades. It may vary, according the
patients’, caregivers’, and health care professionals’ perspectives. The aim
of this paper is to determine the perception of the meanings of a “good
death,” by reviewing changing patterns of the quality of death statement in
the traditional and contemporary Romanian communities, paying particular
attention to differences between the past and the present. For the past, the
investigation of the ethnographic material, narrative folklore, and
ecclesiastical art has disclosed that we may “categorize” good death as
having a social, psychological, and spiritual character, a time, and a spatial
aspect. Nowadays, we often talk about the quality of dying in the context of
palliative care system, but the determination of death quality is limited to
medical, philosophical, legal, and ethical issues. Medical responses to
symptom management appear, in this context, to offer a routinized response
to the uncertainty of dying rather than the psychological, social, and
spiritual counselling needed to help facilitate a good death. A real difficulty
in talking about making a good death is evident not just in the palliative
care community, but in broader Western society, and that is also analized in
this study.
Keywords: good death, traditional community, ethics, palliative care,
terminal patient.
INTRODUCTION
The influencing aspect of consciousness of death is active over the
entire life cycle and it is not restricted to the sick or aged. The meaning of
death is multidimensional and varies not only between individuals, but
within the same person.2 Dying and death have psychological, spiritual, and
social features and are not merely biological events.
1 Acknowledgement: This paper was written within The Knowledge
Based Society Project supported by the Sectorial Operational Program Human
Resources Development (SOP HRD), financed by the European Social Fund
and by the Romanian Government under the contract number POSDRU
89/15/S/61879.
2 Herman Feifel, “Attitudes Toward Death: A Psychological Perspective”
in Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 33 (1969), 3, p. 292.
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What do we mean when we say that someone had a good death?
Talking about a person’s death focuses upon its perceived “goodness” or
“naturalness.” The aim of this study is to focus attention on the values of
the human person, considered under the changes of the contemporary
process of globalization. Paradoxically, the continuous qualitative increase
of the quality of life causes more and more fragmentation in the human
being’s understanding of himself and his own cultural and social
environment. Within this perspective we identified new challenges
addressed to the present role of the humanities, medicine, and technology,
which entail a diagnosis of classical, modern, and postmodern models of
thinking related to the problems of a good death. In the Romanian area, the
Thanatos continues to be dominated by archetypal symbols, superstitions,
and rites, in a dramatic confrontation between archaic and modern
mentality. Finally, the study will provide the special opportunity to discuss
the extent to which medical and scientific measures erode traditional
religious consolations for the problems involved in dying and
bereavement.3
ROMANIAN FOLK TRADITION OF PENDING DEATH
“Death itself cannot be more than an indifferent reality; just the way
we look at and understand it is unable to give it some sense, negative or
positive.”4 In the world of the Romanian village, people treated death as
something to fear, but in some respects also as something to be welcomed.
In the collective mind, the fate of man is guided from above, by the
Supreme Being, not in the sense of a protestant predestination, but of a
divine prescience. The belief that all unhappy events are from God and are
the natural consequence of a violation of moral precepts is often expressed
as “the Lord’s rebuke,” and used as a means of understanding these events.
Death, the event of the last human route, occurs under the sign of this
divine acceptance. As a result, the Romanian peasant’s preparation for
death can take on a rigorous character of self-examination, repentance, and
a final submission to the will of God.
The stigma of sudden death, horrifying in the West during the Middle
Ages, did not decisively influence the Romanian mentality, which felt no
need to explain it in terms of the dichotomous scheme good death/bad
death.5 In the Medieval concept, a dignified death should offer respite and
warning. Accepting unavoidable aging or suffering may be an opportunity
3 Clive Seale, “Changing Patterns of Death and Dying” in Social Science
& Medicine, 51 (2000), 6, p. 917.
4 Cristian Bădiliţă, Călugărul şi moartea. Eseu despre imaginea şi faptul
morţii în monahismul egiptean, translate by Ingrid Ilinca (Iaşi: Polirom, 1998),
p. 196.
5 Cristina Dobre-Bogdan, Imago mortis în cultura română veche (sec.
XVII-XIX) (Bucureşti: Ed. Universităţii, 2002), p. 148.
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for spiritual growth through humble submission.6 This kind of premonition
was perceived as positive and natural. Unnatural was the sudden death
(mors repentina), that would deprive the man of the rites of passage.
In various parts of the country, people believe that the man who is
long tormented by earthly diseases or trials until he dies has committed
serious sins, or that he has been cursed by someone or has cursed himself.
A violent or painful death indicates some fault and is seen as punishment.
Instead, the good death is always serene and, if it happens to still have a
long struggle, it is because of the sins of relatives. From the Christian
perspective, these categorizations are unsubstantiated or even false, because
the judgments on others never belong to people, but are God’s decision.
An extraordinary world is revealed in the ethnographic account of
traditional mortuary practices. The traditions, situated at the confluence of
the religious point of view on death and the folkloric perspective, are
relatively more folkloric, although the ideas descend from the religious
arena. Our approach would be incomplete without an analysis that is based
on popular piety and the role that Christian tradition has had in shaping the
collective mind.
“The key to mental preparation for death,” notes I. Ghinoiu, “is the
three legacy systems: biological (birth of children), material (fortune left
behind) and spiritual (cultural). Of these, the most valuable heritage that
one can leave is the extending of his genealogy by children, grandchildren,
and great-grandchildren.”7 Perpetuation of genealogical lineage was
tantamount to the defeat of death. In Wallachian iconography, we can find
scenes of Samson's fight with the lion8 and the motif of the stork (a symbol
of the regeneration of life), interpreted by A. Paleologu as defeats of death:
“The exterior painting of the monuments of Wallachia proposes a
comprehensive program of philosophizing, not so much on the
precariousness of existence, but on the theme of life and the value of
hope.”9
Another interesting scene is the meeting between the Old Man and
Death, according to an Aesop's fable, which narrates the return of an old
man from the forest with a heavy load of firewood in his back. Exhausted,
he calls for his Death, but when Death comes, the old man says he called it
out just to settle the wood better on his back. The amusing character of the
old man’s reply sent to the motif of the tricked Death, frequently
encountered in folklore and processed by Ion Creanga in the tale “Ivan
6 Hugo Tristram Engelhardt Jr, Ana Smith Iltis, “End-of-Life: the
Traditional Christian View,” in Lancet, 366 (2005), p. 1046.
7 Ion Ghinoiu, Lumea de aici, lumea de dincolo : ipostaze româneşti ale
nemuririi (Cluj-Napoca: Casa Cărţii de Ştiinţă, 1999), p. 182.
8 Maria Golescu, “Prea puternicul Samson” in Buletinul Comisiunii
Monumentelor Istorice, XXXIII (1940), fasc. 104, pp. 86-87.
9 Andrei Paleolog, Pictura exterioară în Ţara Românească (sec. XVIII-
XIX) (Bucureşti: Meridiane, 1984), p. 59.
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Turbincă.”10 Not incidentally, in the center of the scene depicting the wheel
of life at the Păpuşa hermitage (county of Vâlcea), one can read the words:
“I was born to live,”11 a reflection of a vehement denial of death.
Through his offspring, one that passes away feels that somehow he
stays here, the children being not just followers of the family’s name and
fate, but also a guarantee for the deceased that they will fulfill all the rituals
required by tradition.
The man was early in preparing for death, living with the thought of
passing away, preparing the grave or coffin, the funeral clothes, the drink
for the funeral ceremony, the alms or even giving alms during his lifetime.
The will – written or verbal – usually included the wishes of the dying man
regarding his own funeral and on religious duties of almsgiving. These
customs – also currently certified in the world of the Romanian village, but
naturalized in the city – are due to the human desire to lessen the burden on
survivors and the wish to be sure that traditions will be scrupulously
fulfilled after his death.12
“Passing into forgetfulness” was more painful than death itself, a fact
proven by the existence of documents from princes or boyars expressing the
desire to be remembered, along with their entire family, in exchange for
donations to the Church.13 Also, in the secular context, there was the desire
of perpetuating the name of a hero through his acts of bravery, his fame
proving stronger than death. The effect of perpetuating the memory beyond
the threshold of death may create good deeds, as the saying “The horse dies,
its saddle remains, man dies, his name remains” emphasizes. Such
phraseological sayings, which refer to “good death,” might reflect the
former reality of Romanian traditional community, preserving archaic
extra-linguistic information.
Connection with the generations, both the preceding and the
following, is an important element of a good death. This way of perceiving
death, specific to the traditional-folkloric model, shows that death does not
cause a gap in the relationship with life, but it is a part of life in the natural
order of things and is also a form of affirmation of the group’s continuity
and community. Death is also seen in terms of solidarity with predecessors,
of continuity in relation to ancestors, as in the expression “to add to his
ancestors” in the Old Testament (Genesis 25: 7, 35, 29). Burial is often
described as “going to the ancestors” or being “gathered to his people.” The
common way to be related to one’s ancestors is the criterion of kinship,
10 C. Dobre-Bogdan, Imago mortis în cultura română veche (sec. XVII-
XIX), p. 56.
11 A. Paleolog, Pictura exterioară în Ţara Românească (sec. XVIII-XIX),
p. 58.
12 I. Ghinoiu, Lumea de aici, lumea de dincolo: ipostaze româneşti ale
nemuririi, pp. 212–214, 216.
13 Iolanda Ţighiliu, Societate şi mentalitate în Ţara Românească şi
Moldova. Secolele XV-XVII (Bucureşti: Paideia, 1997), p. 264.
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strongly affirmed by the village cemeteries organization. It reveals that
between the two worlds there is a certain social homology, established by
continuous relationship.14
I. Ghinoiu underlines the difference between the Medieval Western
world and Romanian society regarding the right of inheritance. While in the
West the house was inherited by the firstborn, which assumed the military
duties of the deceased, in the Romanian territory the house was inherited by
the last born, so the worship of ancestors will be perpetuated for longer.15
The firm establishment of Christianity in Romanian society has made
its impact on the experience of good and bad death. The assessment of
death quality can be made using the varied inventories of preaching or
painted images, which can be viewed as the creuset of the mentality of an
era.16 For the Romanian peasant, who was a regular churchgoer, a good
death is seen as a natural consequence of a Christian life, in accordance
with the liturgical litany: “For a Christian end to our life, painless,
blameless, peaceful, and for a good defense at the dread judgment-seat of
Christ, let us ask the Lord.”17
This soothing definition of a good death may be applied only to
persons whose life is in accordance with the rules and rigors of Christian
thought. Perception of death – as an instrument with an ethical function,
involving the rules of a life without excesses – can be found in
iconographic representations, where the images of Death are part of the
paradigm of “monstrous” with hermeneutical function. The unseen things
are “coded” by the visible ones, tending through their symbolism to make
tangible the idea of a good death, especially for the vast number of
illiterates. The church tried to make man conscious of the devouring nature
of Time and of the hour when the balance of Judgment will show the new,
and that this new time, the eternal ontological status, is acquired following a
way of living on earth. The idea of the facts of future rewards depending on
the positive or negative register in which they were framed is reflected in
14 Corina Mihaela Bejenariu, Moartea şi murirea – de la paradigme
tradiţionale la forme contemporane adaptate (Death and dying – from the
traditional paradigms to adapted contemporary forms), Abstract of the Ph.D.
Thesis, scientific coordinator Professor University Dr. Ion Cuceu, Faculty of
European Studies, “Babeş-Bolyai” University (Cluj-Napoca, 2010), p. 9. Full
text available for download at
http://doctorat.ibbcluj.ro/sustinerea_publica/rezumate
/rezumate/2010/filologie/BEJINARIU_CORINA_ RO.pdf> [accessed on
May 30, 2011].
15 I. Ghinoiu, Lumea de aici, lumea de dincolo : ipostaze româneşti ale
nemuririi (Cluj-Napoca: Casa Cărţii de Ştiinţă, 1999), pp. 214–215.
16 Al. Duţu, Literatura comparată şi istoria mentalităţilor (Bucureşti:
Univers, 1982), p. 11.
17 “Dumnezeiasca Liturghie a Sf. Ioan Gură de Aur” (The Divine
Liturgy). In: Liturghier (The Liturgikon) (Bucureşti: Editura Institutului Biblic
şi de Misiune a Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, 2007), p. 131.
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the painting of the Last Judgment Scene, where the death of the righteous
versus the sinner’s death are represented. The image of these antithetical
deaths was alive in the mind of the viewers, becoming an instrument to tune
the behavioral code. Providing antithetical models of existential paths at the
end of which someone can find salvation, or, conversely, damnation, it is
also commonplace for the Romanian funeral oratory.
Knowledge of one’s imminent death provides a final chance to
become reconciled with those whom one has harmed, to ask for God’s
forgiveness, or to call the priest to fulfill the last Christian duties by
performing the Sacraments. These are the rites of passage, involving
separation rituals from this world, and rites of aggregation at the world
beyond, of which the most important, in Christian thought, is the final
communion.18 Some families are reluctant to call the priest because they
think the sick might be frightened by the closeness of death.
Seriously ill persons, especially the rich, often demanded the
administration of the Unction, believing that this service helps for a speedy
death or healing.19 S. Fl. Marian stresses an important financial issue in
Transylvania: money for the Unction was traditionally gathered at the
church or in the community (even if the sacrament was administered to a
rich man), with the conviction that this contribution is pleasing to God.
However, people should not be allowed to believe in an automatism of this
gesture, nor encouraged to ask for it superstitiously, with the conviction that
it will provide the recovery or easy death. In such a case, the belief related
to the effects of prayers or the effect of Unction is distorted. Again, any
charitable gesture of the Christian community is encouraged, but not when
it has in view a determined result.
Another practice was the gesture of forgiveness to those near and
known, especially in circumstances where there had been conflicts. This
sequence was highly valued as the last expression of emotional ties with the
deceased, the last form of honoring, but also as a form of separation through
forgiveness. The people are confident that one who fulfills this gesture dies
easily, while one who refuses dies struggling. The gesture is compatible
with the Christian principle regarding the need for reconciliation between
people or the repair of evil committed.
Traditionally, when a man was about to die, the family took care to
light a candle at the bedside or in the hands of the dying. The Christian
meaning of the gesture – the light is the symbol of Jesus Christ, Light of the
world – alternates with the belief that darkness reigns in the other world,
and therefore the dead need light so as not to “lose the soul.” For those
18 H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr, Ana Smith Iltis, “End-of-Life: The
Traditional Christian View”, p. 1047.
19 Simion Florea Marian, Înmormântarea la români. Studiu etnografic
(Bucharest: « Grai şi suflet – Cultura Naţională » Pubishing, 1995), pp. 7–11; I.
Ghinoiu, Lumea de aici, lumea de dincolo, pp. 198–204.
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whose death was not accompanied by light, the offspring provided a big
candle burning for them during the church services.
Death was good, or at least acceptable, after a long life. In the case of
a young person’s death, when it happened before his or her being wed, the
funeral ritual was designed as a marriage ritual.20 This symbolic wedding is
illustrated by the ritual of the fir tree accompanying unmarried young
people’s funerals in Bukovine.21
Another aspect of peacefulness is to die in a place which holds the
highest degree of peace: home. Dying at home implies being surrounded by
relatives and family. “The time of death is highly valued, contributing to
strengthening social ties, to solidarity between generations, and between
earthly life and the world beyond.”22 Dying in loneliness, away from home,
away from relatives and dear ones, is by definition “bad,” and can only be
partially repaired by bringing the dead body home.
“Life is nothing else than separation from the bowels of the earth;
death is reduced to a return home...so frequent desire to be buried in the soil
of the homeland is only a secular form of the mystical autochthonism, the
need to return to his own house,” writes Eliade, marking, in the symbolism
of privacy, the isomorphism of return, of death, and of housing.23 Being
properly buried in one’s own land makes death good, or at least acceptable,
as a funeral ritual sequence that occurs during the removal of the dead body
from a dwelling suggests: breaking a cup or a pot. The gesture refers to the
biblical verse: “You are dust and to dust you shall return.” (Genesis 3: 19)
In traditional Romanian society, death was a private affair. Funerals
are public events, but the sickbed and death occur in the seclusion of the
house. Death remains “confidential” until it is announced and preparations
can start for the funeral. Death, indeed, is eclipsed by the funerals in many
ways. Sometimes, people may not know about someone’s poor physical
condition and sickness until it is all over.
Summing up, the definition of good death, (and bad – a sudden and
unprovided death) does not imply that it is a fixed category. People in
Romania regard a peaceful death as a good death. “Peaceful” refers to the
dying person having finished all business and made peace with others
before his/her death, and implies being at peace with his/her own death. It
further refers to the manner of dying: not by violence, an accident, or a
fearsome disease, and without much pain. A good and peaceful death comes
naturally after a long and well-spent life. Such a death preferably takes
20 Petru Caraman, “Alegoria morţii în poezia populară, la polonişi la
români”, Studii de folclor, 2nd vol. (Bucureşti: Minerva, 1988), pp. 69-75.
21 S. Fl. Marian, Înmormântarea la români. Studiu etnografic, p. 68.
22 Lucian Boia, Mitul longevităţii. Cum să trăim 200 de ani, transl. Walter
Fotescu (Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1999), p. 146.
23 Gilbert Durand, Structurile antropologice ale imaginarului. Introducere
în arhetipologia generală, transl. Marcel Aderca (Bucureşti: Univers
Enciclopedic, 1998), p. 231.
302 Gabriel Roman
place at home, surrounded by children and grandchildren. Finally, a good
death is a death which is accepted by the relatives. To summarize, we may
categorize five features accompanying the event of a good death:
- a social character (being at peace with others, mutually),
- a psychological character (being at peace with one’s own life and
soul),
- a spiritual character (being at peace with God, being prepared for the
world beyond)
- a chronological aspect (dying in the fullness of time), and
- a spatial aspect (dying at home, surrounded by relatives).
The determination of a good death has historically been based on
community criteria. The enormous influence exerted by this traditional
model of the statement of the quality of a death can be found also in the
present. The mental universe of the archaic world has been preserved, and
persists in Romanian society; nowadays, it can still be identified in rural
locations, where the memory and the connection with ancestors is still
alive.
PHYSICAL COMFORT AND EMOTIONAL SUPPORT FOR A
GOOD ENOUGH DEATH
Palliative care is a disciplinary area where contested ideas focus on a
principally moral question – what is the best way to die? The multivocality
of responses shows that the focus has shifted from the question of dying
well to the problem of living well, even until death. Not only should
patients live well while dying, they should also be given reign to choose or
refuse certain treatments and therapies that may improve their lives and,
ultimately, their deaths. An ideological framework is constructed to
maintain the value of a good enough death. Just as members of
contemporary society are expected to age well with the aid of medical
technology and a youthful spirit, dying people are expected to live well
until they die and make their own choices in this process.
Palliative care operates with the philosophy of a “good enough” death
and a hierarchy of care which prioritizes the physical management of
symptoms for alleviating the patients’ pain and physical discomfort.24
Despite the good intentions of practitioners, good death for patients is often
not achievable, so many practitioners now accept a good enough ethic. This
ethic may be thought of as patient-centered and empowering.25 It brings us
24 Beverley McNamara, “Good Enough Death: Autonomy and Choice in
Australian Palliative Care” in Social Science & Medicine 58 (2004), p. 929.
25 Cristina Gavrilovici, Beatrice Ioan, Vasile Astărăstoae, “Paternalism şi
autonomie în practica medicală a unei societăţi în tranziţie. Modele temporale şi
geografice ale relaţiei medic-pacient.” in: Bogdan Olaru (ed.), Controverse
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firmly into the world of advanced directives, participatory medical
decision-making, and civic law. There is a shifting of responsibility from
the social collective to the individual who is dying, bringing a tension
between individual choice and communal tradition.
What makes death a psychologically appropriate phenomenon?26
Trying to operationalize this concept and to determine a precise definition
of a good death can be challenging for the ill persons, family, friends, and
health care providers. Steinhauser et al.27 identified six major components
of a good death:
1. Pain and Symptom Management;
2. Clear Decision Making (to participate in decisions about treatment
options or plans);
3. Preparation for Death (to plan the events that follow their deaths);
4. Completion (finding meaningfulness at the end of life);
5. Contribution to others (discovering that personal relationships are
more important than professional or monetary gains, and wanting to share
these significant insights about life with others);
6. Affirmation of the Whole Person (being recognized as a unique,
whole, and complete person, considered in the context of his/her life,
his/her values and personal preferences, and not just as a disease or a case).
These six themes add to the overall knowledge about what people
believe to be a good death, helping healthcare professionals in this
challenging area of medicine.
In the study “Good Death Inventory,” Mitsunori Miyashita et al.28
identify some core domains: environmental comfort (living in calm
circumstances); life completion (having no regrets, feeling that one’s life
was fulfilling); dying in a favorite place; maintaining hope and pleasure
(having some pleasure in daily life); independence (in moving or waking
up, with excretion); physical and psychological comfort (being free from
pain, free from emotional distress); good relationships with medical staff
(trusting the physician, having people who listen); not being a burden to
etice în epoca biotehnologiilor (Iaşi: University “Al. I. Cuza” Publishing,
2008), p. 56.
26 Donald Lester, “Psychological Issues in Euthanasia, Suicide and
Assisted Suicide,” in Journal of Social Issues, 52 (1996), 2, pp. 51-62.
27 Karen E. Steinhauser, Elizabeth C. Clipp, Maya McNeilly et. al., “In
Search of a Good Death: Observations of Patients, Families, and Providers,” in
Annals of Internal Medicine. 132 (2000), 10: 825-832. Retrieved May 29, 2011,
from <http://www.annals.org/cgi/reprint/132/10/825.pdf>.
28 Mitsunori Miyashita, Tatsuya Morita, Kazuki Sato et al., “Good Death
Inventory: A Measure for Evaluating Good Death from the Bereaved Family
Member’s Perspective” in Journal of Pain and Symptom Management, 35
(2008), 5, pp. 486-498.
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others (having no financial worries); good relationships with family (having
family to whom one can express one’s feelings); being respected as an
individual (not being treated as an object or a child); religious and spiritual
comfort (having faith and feeling that one is protected by a higher power
beyond oneself); receiving enough treatment (fighting against disease until
one’s last moment); control over the future (knowing what to expect about
one’s condition in the future and participating in decisions about treatment
strategy); feeling that one’s life is worth living (maintaining one’s role in
family or occupation); unawareness of death (living as usual without
thinking about death); pride and beauty (not exposing one’s physical and
mental weakness to family, not receiving pity from others); natural death
(not receiving excessive treatment, not being connected to medical
instruments or tubes); and preparation for death (seeing people whom one
wants to see, saying what one wants to say to dear people).29
The World Health Organization defines a good death as occurring in
the absence of stress and unnecessary suffering for the patient, family, and
for those providing them with care; considering and applying the wishes of
the patient and his/her family; and presenting the consensus in a reasonable
degree of clinical, cultural, and ethical standards.30
In Romania, palliative care is a relatively new and developing
speciality. Usually, terminally ill patients are discharged into the care of
family members at home with little support, so the care is usually provided
by the family.31 Moșoiu, Andrews, and Perolls typified some of the 
cultural and ethical issues which must be taken into account in the
assessment of palliative care in Romania: “Romanian society has
traditionally been one in which family ties are very strong. The extended
family often lives in close proximity. For this reason, home care seems to
be more appropriate. Approximately 80% of Romanians belong to the
Romanian Orthodox Church. In the Orthodox tradition, there are special
rituals surrounding death and bereavement that are concerned with the
outward show of grief and remembering the dead. In rural areas, where
death is seen as a natural process and communities are stronger, these
traditions are better preserved. Conversely, in urban society, the subject of
death is seen as somewhat taboo. It continues to be common practice for
health care professionals to inform the family of the diagnosis and
prognosis before discussing this with the patient, and in some cases the
patient is not even told of his or her condition. However, experience has
29 Ibid., pp. 491-492.
30 Harvey Max Chochinov, “Psychiatry and Terminal Illness” in Canadian
Journal of Psychiatry, 45 (2000), pp. 143-150.
31 Luminiţa Dumitrescu, Wim J. A.van den Heuvel, Marinela van den
Heuvel-Olaroiu, “Experiences, Knowledge, and Opinions on Palliative Care
among Romanian General Practitioners” in Croatian Medical Journal, 47
(2006), p. 144.
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suggested that many patients suspect their diagnoses and welcome the
opportunity to discuss it.”32
Both poor education and the bias of health-care professionals against
opioids and analgesics in Romania are reflected in statistics that show
Romania's annual medical consumption of morphine as being among the
lowest in Eastern Europe.33 The country has a very complicated, restrictive,
and burdensome system for prescribing opioids that makes it difficult and
sometimes impossible for outpatients to receive pain medication. Because
the administering of morphine is very often postponed until the last days,
the result is unnecessary suffering.
Lack of pain control has not challenged the desire to hasten death or
the contemplation of assisted suicide. However, in June 2005, the Orthodox
Church in Romania expressed its stance on euthanasia: “Human life is an
unrepeatable reality, so it must be defended and cared for every moment
and in whatever situation a person finds him or herself.”34
Because life comes from God, it is intrinsically good, for it is the
relationship with the Divinity and with other people that give a human
being the status of “person,” not only of an “individual.” In this way, the
person's life has a value in itself and the person, even in suffering, is
invaluable.35 “The person does not empty himself or herself during the
biological life, nor does he or she achieve fullness of life solely in the
earthly condition, but life in the biological sense of the word is the
fundamental condition to prepare the human person for the Kingdom of
God.”
The same conciliar act states: “Our task, in particular for doctors, is to
serve life until its end. The man lives even when he is in the terminal stage
of physical life.” In an era when the emphasis is on the biological and the
material, it is desirable to understand and experience suffering through the
filter of faith.
From another perspective, discussing suffering brings the necessity of
love and compassion to those who are lonely and dying. The same act
provides: “For this, the patient should be guaranteed freedom to decide on
the treatment of terminal stage disease, to be shown solidarity and
compassion by others (family, friends, medical staff), and to be given
32 Daniela Moşoiu, C. Andrews, Graham Perolls, “Palliative care in
Romania” in Palliative Medicine 14 (2000), 1, p. 65.
33 Daniela Moşoiu, Kevin M. Ryan, David E. Joranson et al. “Reform of
Drug Control Policy for Palliative Care in Romania” in Lancet 367 (2006),
9528, p. 2114.
34 Resolution elaborated by the National Bioethics Commission of the
Romanian Orthodox Church, http://www.patriarhia.ro/ro/opera_social_filantro
pica/bioetica_2.html [accessed May 30, 2011].
35
Ştefan Iloaie, “Morală şi viaţă. Documentele Bisericii Ortodoxe
Române referitoare la bioetică” in Revista Română de Bioetică, 7 (2009), 2, p.
24.
306 Gabriel Roman
appropriate medication to alleviate physical and emotional pain, which may
become unbearable and even “dehumanizing,” as the patient dies with a
maximum of conscience and a minimum of pain.”
So what can be done to ease the distress of the patient confronting
death? The quality of death depends on a deep understanding of patients’
distress in facing death. Death and grief are normal life experiences,36
although there are periods often filled with fear and anger in the framework
of the stages so eloquently defined by Elisabeth Kübler-Ross (denial, anger,
bargaining, depression, and acceptance).37 By truly understanding these
stages, someone could look for the opportunity to understand the terminal
patient’s needs during this frightening and vulnerable period.
Based on data from the literature, Pool38 summarizes three
characteristics of good death: to die easily, (painless, quiet, dignified,
quickly); family involvement in patient care; and good interpersonal
relationships, with appropriate communication and conflict resolution. The
author noted that all these involve the patient's ability to participate actively
in social interactions as evidence of the dying person’s control and
autonomy in the process of death.
The same author believes that we can admit to a consensus on good
death as a peaceful end, which occurs at the end of a long and fulfilled life,
while death due to accidents, violence, or disease affecting a young person
is considered to be unnatural. Ultimately, only the individual in question
can determine whether death is good or not. A good death seems to be a
death that one would choose if he or she could do so.
Dying can also be viewed as a social relationship.39 A person is not
simply a “being,” but “personhood” is a quality attributed to someone by
others. Identity is created in the minds of others by a perceived history of
social reciprocity, a history of relationships. People become attached to
others because of their social relationship to those persons. Many of the
recent views from medicine, bioethics, and philosophy in general have
emerged because of the desire to engage in discussions with the social and
medical sciences about the social nature of dying.
Most people who discover they have an incurable disease live with a
certain degree of social isolation, whose main cause must be found in
discomfort, fear, and the threat felt by healthy individuals in contact with
36 Julia Neuberger, Dying Well: A Guide to Enabling a Good Death, 2nd
edition (Oxford: Radcliffe Medical Press, 2004), p. 176.
37 Elisabeth Kübler-Ross, Despre moarte şi a muri [On Death and Dying],
transl. Mihail Piruşcă (Bucureşti, Elena Francisc Publishing, 2008).
38 Robert Pool, “You’re Not Going to Dehydrate Mom, Are You?
Euthanasia, Versterving, and Good Death in the Netherlands,” in Social Science
and Medicine 58 (2004), 5, pp. 955-966.
39 Allan Kellehear, “Dying as a Social Relationship: A Sociological
Review of Debates on the Determination of Death,” in Social Science &
Medicine 66 (2008), p. 1533.
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them.40 The consequence is an early mourning and a withdrawing into
themselves.
“Living a life received as a gift, waiting for pointless visits, with
visitors longing, looking out the window, hoping for the emergence of a
nurse who would have little time for a discussion...this is how they spend
their time, most incurable patients,”41 in a world that believes that the good
death is the sudden one, as much as possible unconscious, but in any case
quiet.42
Dying people’s positive reaction to the chance of communication is
due to man's need to leave behind something of himself, maybe to have the
illusion of immortality.43 Before death, everybody tries to share something
about the essence of his own person to those who are with him in his last
days or hours. McCoy et al. talk about the concept of immortality as a
positive illusion44 and Becker shows that one of the possible ways to
mitigate the anxiety of death is leaving behind some cultural good that
transcends the individual, promising him a symbolic immortality.45
After the death, relationships continue to evolve in memorial practices
in the home or during traditional graveyard visits, where “talking” with
one’s dead is historically and sociologically widespread. Furthermore,
contemporary people widely report “interactions” with their dead relatives
in dreams.46 Such interactions with the dead are believed to be reciprocal,
and are seen as evidence of this broader human context of dying and death
as ongoing social relationships.
Therefore, in the assessment of death, the emphasis should be on the
inseparable relationship between biology and culture. In other words, any
criteria for good death must draw on or consult with cultural sources and
ideas wider than merely those from the professions. Ignoring this fact about
dying will indeed bring physicians, inevitably, predictably, and
unnecessarily into conflict with families of terminally patients.
40 Janice R. Ellis, Elisabeth Ann Nowlis, “Psychosocial Needs of The
Person” in Nursing. A Human Needs Approach (Boston: Houghton Miffin
Company, 1989), p. 408.
41 E. Kubler-Ross, Despre moarte şi a muri, p. 41.
42 Eniko Skolka, Aspecte ale asistenţei bolnavului aflat în stadiul terminal
: posibilităţi, limite şi dileme (Cluj-Napoca: Casa Cărţii de Ştiinţă, 2004), p.
206.
43 Ibid., p. 190.
44 Shannon K. McCoy, Tom Pyszczynski, Sheldon Solomon, Jeff
Greenberg, “Transcending the Self: A Terror Management Perspective on
Successful Aging” in Adrian Tomer (ed.), Death Attitudes and the Older Adult:
Theories, Concepts, and Applications (Philadelphia: Routledge, 2001), p. 39,
availible at http://books.google. com, accessed May 30, 2011.
45 Ernest Becker. The Denial of Death (New York: Free Press, 1973), p.
69, says that the dynamic behind the creation and maintenance of civilization is
the repression of our awareness of death.
46 Corina Mihaela Bejenariu, op. cit., pp. 12-13.
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TOWARD A DEATH-DENYING SOCIETY
We found it extremely useful to attempt an extension of our approach
in contemporary society, in order to capture any changes in attitude,
perception, and representation to a problem that seems obsolete in a world
where aspiring to eternal youth is the main goal.
The eighteenth century brought a change of mentality, with the
relationship between the individual and death gradually emerging from the
religious influence, adding secular (philosophical, scientific, or civic)
connotations.47 In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as medical
progress allowed an extension of life, the rhythms of life, especially in large
cities, favored an increasing censorship over death. From the beginning of
Modernism, death and the dying have been pushed from the center of the
family and community to the edges of society.
In the industrial world of Europe and North America, death was
“gerontologized,” becoming distant and distanced.48 People avoid this
subject and certainly do not discuss it in public. Changes in religious beliefs
and practices have turned society into a “death-denying” one.49 The public
display of mourning is seen as a form of weakness and indecency, though
the public mourning and posthumous deification of celebrities (e.g. Michael
Jackson), seems to have taken the place of privacy. Mourning in these cases
has became a public spectacle, accessible to all via TV or Youtube.
The increasingly technological society potentiates the feeling of
isolation and non-comunication, making the patient become more
vulnerable when facing death, more alone and helpless. Even medical
technology pushes the moment of death ever further away; when ill people
die, it is likely this will occur in the company of more machinery than
people.50 Hospitals and morgues have replaced the intimacy of the house.
According to Kubler-Ross, “nowadays, agony is more terrible from several
points of view, more lonely, more mechanical, and devoid of humanity”
than during the times when medicine had no actual knowledge and
resources. Patients may cry for rest, peace, and dignity, but they get
infusions, transfusions, and life-support devices to assist the body’s vital
functions. They get invasive interventions, especially from some specialists
47 Michel Vovelle, La mort et l’Occident, de 1300 à nos jours (Paris:
Gallimard, 1983), p. 421.
48 Carol Komaromy, Jenny Hockey, “Naturalizing Death Among Older
Adults in Residential Care” in Jenny Hockey (ed.), Grief, Mourning, and Death
Ritual (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2001), pp. 73–74.
49 Allan Kellehear, “Are We a ‘Death-Denying’ Society? A Sociological
Review” in Social Science & Medicine, 18 (1984), 9, p. 713.
50 Robert L. Rubinstein, “Narratives of Elder Parental Death. A Structural
and Cultural Analysis” in Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 9 (1995), 2, pp.
257-276, emphasizes that the narratives of middle-aged American women about
the death of one of their parents interfere with medical reports.
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who are concerned about their heart rhythm, their pulse, their
electrocardiogram, their secretions, but not about their person, their
humanity. Unfortunately, dying alone is becoming more common as people
grow older and “social death” makes its entry before physical death.
How great is the fear of death! So great is the fear that the dying are
not allowed to die.51 The dependence on their own body is prolonged by the
dependence on apparatus, and also by the dependence on specialists who
can decide whether or not to accept the request for ending the prolonging of
one’s life under such conditions. Medical apparatus now allows us to keep
a body alive and prolong physical existence even after the brain has died –
but what then does it mean to be human, and how can someone die in a
human way? The medicalization of death means that the pre-twentieth
century notion of a good death – surrounded by family, comforted by
familiar voices – now belongs to the nostalgic past.
The place of death is often considered as an indicator of quality of the
end of life.52 If the patient is allowed to spend the last period of life in a
beloved and familiar place, then he needs less adaptation efforts.53 Hospital
death, although preferred by a few patients and sometimes clinically
inevitable, is often considered as suboptimal,54 compared with home care
and home death, because the latter are more in accordance with the wishes
of the patients, their caregivers, and their health professionals.55
Although most people in Western societies prefer to die at home,56 a
study in six European countries showed that of all deaths, from 33.9% (in
the Netherlands) to 62.8% (in Wales) occurred in a hospital. The
phenomenon is explained by the weakening of religious faith that has led to
51 Alaine Polcz, Ideje a meghalásnak (Budapest: Pont Publishing, 1998),
quoted by Eniko Skolka, Aspecte ale asistenţei bolnavului aflat în stadiul
terminal, p. 205.
52 David Clark, “Between Hope and Acceptance: the Medicalisation of
Dying” in British Medical Journal 324 (2002), p. 907. Karen E. Steinhauser,
Nicholas A. Christakis, Elisabeth C. Clipp et al., “Factors Considered
Important at the End of Life by Patients, Family, Physicians, and Other Care
Providers” in The Journal of the American Medical Association, 284 (2000),
pp. 2476-2482.
53 E. Kubler-Ross, Despre moarte şi a muri, p. 128.
54 Lisa Barbera, Lawrence Paszat, Carole Chartier, “eath in Hospital for
Cancer Patients: an Indicator of Quality of End-of-Life Care,” in Palliative
Medicine 19 (2005), pp. 435-436.
55 Joan M. Teno, Brian R. Clarridge, Virginia Casey et al., “Family
Perspectives on End-of-Life Care at the Last Place of Care” in The Journal of
the American Medical Association 291 (2004), pp. 88-93.
56 Siew Tzuh Tang, “When Death is Imminent Where Terminally Ill
Patients with Cancer Prefer to Die and Why,” in Cancer Nursing 26 (2003):
249; Siew Tzuh Tang, Ruth McCorkle, “Determinants of Congruence Between
the Preferred and Actual Place of Death for Terminally Ill Cancer Patients,” in
Journal of Palliative Care 19 (2003), p. 236.
310 Gabriel Roman
an increased anxiety about death, contributing to the banishment of the
death event from the family to within the walls of institutions.57
Progress in medical science has led to an increase in life expectancy in
Western society, accompanied by the desire for discovering a remedy
against forthcoming death. Some findings can increase the quality of life
and help those in distress. There are also intentions and promises that go
beyond this medical intervention aspect: eradication of old age, prolonged
youth, or eliminating death. Moreover, the offers promise/exhibit,
inevitably, economic potential and a guaranteed market success. And, as
expected, there emerges a specific vision of life, which increasingly
emphasizes the right to a life free of aging, which can be extended as much
as the opportunities offered by medicine will allow. The so-called
“transhumanist current” foresees radical changes in human life. These
achievements will help people to have improved capacity, intelligence,
health, beauty, and life span, as they earn the label of the “posthuman
species.” Transhumanism has developed in recent years, with several
arguments supporting the fight against aging and suffering, claiming
priority of youth and the indefinite extension of life.
Ray Kurzveil, for example, identifies the next major step in achieving
biological immortality, offered by nanotechnologies and artificial
intelligence. He foresees within twenty years the creation of nanobots to be
placed in the human body, in order to locate and restore the areas affected
by disease.58 In developed countries, antiageing advances would increase
life expectancy by a year for each year of the decades from 2010 to 2030.
Life spans are going to be so long that people will have no real idea how to
plan it. The result would be a huge explosion in older people and vast
changes in how people live their lives. “Current institutions are really not
equipped at the moment to deal with such long lives.”59
Aubrey de Grey, a leader in gerontological engineering, proposed
arguments to support the ethics of an indefinite extension of life using
medical technology. He argues that refusing to prolong life and its quality
by considering and using the remarkable progress achieved so far by
science is equivalent to taking action for shortening human life. Nowadays,
he says, medicine is obligated to extend the right to life: everyone’s right to
live as long as he or she wants is guaranteed by the existing technology.60
Ethical considerations concerning these aspects make us suspect the
morality that supports these projects. Current scientific knowledge for
57 Joachim Cohen, Johan Bilsen, Julia Addington-Hall et al., “Population-
Based Study of Dying in Hospital in Six European countries,” in Palliative
Medicine, 22 (2008), 6, pp. 702-710.
58 Thomas D. Kenedy, “Anti-Aging, Rights and Human Nature,” in Ethics
& Medicine, 25 (2009), 1, pp. 21-22.
59 Leslie M. Thompson, “The Future of Death: Death in the Hands of
Science,” in Nursing Outlook, 42 (1994), 4, pp. 175-180.
60 Thomas D. Kennedy, “Anti-Aging, Rights and Human nature”, p. 23.
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abolishing death leads to some social and psychological implications that
the hysterical search for eternal life presents.61 How could we ensure
people's right to live as they wish by the achievements of science as long as
billions of our fellow men cannot even survive?
CONCLUSION
This paper has focused on making several observations about past and
recent biomedical, spiritual, psychological, sociological, and
anthropological features of the quality of death. We may more clearly speak
about the syncretism of a few good death peculiarities in our society when
both older and newer concepts of death coexist in the minds of people.
Is the survey of traditional Romanian society about death relevant to
our understanding of modern approaches to this subject? One may note that
Romanian peasants seem to react to death in a “modern” way, especially in
their sober acceptance of death as a reality. Characteristic of the traditional
view is that death is the door to a life after death, and that the quality of life
before death is decisive for seeing death as good or bad. The determination
of death quality is not simply a technical problem, but it depends on the
experiences of mortality, mediated by the social understanding of death and
dying. This means understanding death and dying at the place where
biology and biography meet at their intersections with society and history.
Nowadays, a lack of control and a lack of language to talk about
making deaths good is evident, not just in the palliative care community,
but in broader modern society. Prominence is given to the physical care of
patients and to medical responses to suffering and death. The dying
person’s uncertainty does not need a routinized response to symptom
management, but psychological, social, and spiritual counselling to help
facilitate a good death.
As dying patients are increasingly encouraged to make their own
choices, palliative care practitioners find fewer opportunities to lead their
patients through a journey toward a good death. The element of individual
choice is a reflection of a broader “postmodern condition,” and within this
context, “postmodern deaths.” But, “as society becomes ‘postmodern,’ it
also becomes vulnerable to the attenuation or loss of beliefs, values, and
communication patterns that tradtionally provided its sense of identity and
continuity.”62
The palliative care philosophy, giving credence to the multiplicity of
beliefs and communication patterns evident in the collective of dying
61 Basil W. McDermott, “On the Uncertain Future of Death” in Futures,
19 (1987), 6, pp. 686-701.
62 Robert Kastenbaum, “Reconstructing Death in Postmodern Society,” in
Omega, 27 (1993), 1, p. 76, quoted by Beverley McNamara, “Good Enough
Death: Autonomy and Choice in Australian Palliative Care” in Social Science
& Medicine 58 (2004), p. 936.
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patients, is seen in the articulation of a “good enough” ethic. Health-care
providers are often unprepared to assist patients and families during the
dying process. And not only them – members of contemporary Western
societies do not know what to say to people who are dying. In
postmodernizing society, persistent change has dislodged people from the
past while the decline in faith, in rationality, and its promise of continual
progress toward a brighter future threatens their ability to link themselves
with that future. This suggests that individuals in the postmodern era view
themselves only as part of the present. In addition, with the absence of the
ability to draw on the overarching, transcendant meanings of death
traditionally provided by religion, individuals have only their immediate
environment in which to find meaning for death.
From the Christian perspective, other spiritual meanings emerge
simultaneously with the pragmatic intentions of using the concept of good
death. At the core of the consumerist era, when technology favors progress
and welfare, the earth is, for many citizens of developed countries, a place
of abundance, meant to forget the “Abraham's side.” From this perspective,
utopian projects, aimed at complete eradication of illness and senescence,
could be understood as the intention of introducing a human realm of
eternity on earth, a victory over death through science, a kind of salvation
through technology.
Focusing on the notions of good and bad death in Romania, dying
after a long and well-spent life, in the company of dear ones, without pain,
while at peace with one’s one death, are all features which, in Romanian
culture, would contribute to a good death. However, extension of this
research could produce useful policy prescriptions. For future policy
development, it will be important to include the communities that are
directly affected by this concept.
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PART III
CULTURAL AND SPIRITUAL PERSONALITIES:
POSSIBLE ANSWERS TO OUR
CONTEMPORARY CHANGES

CHAPTER XXIV
ROUSSEAU’S “CIVIL RELIGION”
RECONSIDERED
JOHN FARINA
Abstract: Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s understanding of religion and civil
society was perhaps more nuanced than many of his liberal disciples
acknowledge. In its complexities may lay hints for the reformulation of
theories of citizenship and religious identity for the twenty-first century.
Keywords: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, civil society, civil religion, theory
of citizenship, religious identity.
In this paper I shall consider the role religion might play in post-
secular liberal Western societies. Each of those identifiers requires some
clarification. By “post-secular” I mean that society has not followed the
projection of secularist theorists in any kind of simplistic way. More likely,
religion has differentiated itself in multiple forms. Or perhaps modernity
itself was not as monolithic as was once thought. The sacred abided
alongside the modern in many societies, not only in the much-publicized
case of the United States. By “liberal,” I mean that which is generally
understood as a society in which the government is limited, often by written
constitutions, the rights of the individual are maximized, and the role of the
church or other religious institutions is structurally separated from the
governing power of the state. By “Western,” I mean nothing uncommon,
but even that distinction is perhaps too simple. This dynamic of religion in
the twenty-first century shows amazing resilience across cultures. Religion,
like globality, has long had a transnational quality, especially with the
religions of what Eliade called “the sky gods.”1
My contention is that to understand the role of religion in the post-
secular twenty-first century, one must reevaluate its place in the history of
liberal society. Starting at the time of the liberal revolutions of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there grew up in Europe a tendency to
write religion out of the story, that is, to embrace a model of liberalism that
banished religion to the margins of life, or at least of public life.
Paradoxically, at the same time many European societies retained a culture
deeply influenced most predominantly by Christianity. But the public
rhetoric was stripped of references to religion, especially as seen in the
narrative of the anticlerical, often anti-religious left. That narrative was a
tendentious one that simplified the role of religion in culture. At no time has
1 Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: the Nature of Religion,
trans. from French by Willard Trask (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1959).
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Europe been post-Christian, unless by that we mean simply that the church
has been removed from a privileged place in the political structure. But at
no time have even the most secular communist states been without the
powerful influence of religion on their cultures.
Remarkably, the secularist narrative defied the ways that seminal
liberal thinkers actually talked about religion. I will illustrate this by
looking at the thought of Jean Jacques Rousseau, whose ideas undoubtedly
had a major impact in shaping liberal Europe. He insisted that religion play
a crucial role in the new societies they heralded. It was not precisely the
religion of the day, however, but a new religion he saw coming along with
the new liberal societies. Perhaps for that reason, some of his followers took
only the negative part of what he said about religion and forgot about the
positive part. This is an important observation, because the place of religion
in society today may necessitate a rethinking of the assumptions of the past.
We might well ask whether an accommodation of religion is essential for
the health of liberal societies in the new Europe and indeed in the global
twenty-first century, and what Rousseau’s insights might contribute to such
a new accommodation.
Contemporary critics of Rousseau have called attention to his egotism,
his criminal neglect of his five children, his misanthropic behavior toward
women, his betrayal of friends like Hume, Grimm, and hosts like Madame
de Warens, and his paranoia over an international conspiracy to silence
him.2 Yet his brilliance as a writer and the massive impact of his thought on
the modern mind are undeniable. His influence is perhaps greatest on
political philosophy with his Social Contract and Second Discourse. His
widely read Emile not only shaped educational theory but played a role in
the development of Romanticism.
When it comes to religion and Rousseau, his thought is hard to sort
out. On one hand, he is bitterly critical of the Church, of priests, of dogma.
On the other, he shows a great religious sensibility when speaking of a kind
of fundamental religious sentiment basic to human nature, which he calls by
different names: at times, “the religion of nature;” at other times, “true
religion” or “the religion of man.” He defends religion against its naturalist
critics, the skeptics, and the atheists like Voltaire. Most importantly for our
purposes, he insists on the role of religion in civil society.
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
“Man is born free yet everywhere he is in chains.”3 So Rousseau
2 See for example, Paul Johnson, Intellectuals (New York: Harper & Row,
1988), pp. 1-27; J.H. Huizinga, The Making of a Saint: The Tragi-Comedy of
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (London: Harnish Hamilton, 1976).
3 The Social Contract, Book 1, Ch. 1. , p. 1 in Cress, English translation
by Donald Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987) based on Oeuvres Completes de
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, vol. III (Paris: Pleiade, 1964).
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began his most famous work on politics, The Social Contract. Men are in
chains, for they have alienated their freedom. Such a renunciation is
incompatible with man's nature. How could persons form associations for
their defense in which the individual remained free? By putting themselves
under the supreme direction of the general will. In our corporate capacity,
each member is an indivisible part of the whole. This corporation is the
city, the republic, the body politic, the state, the sovereign, the power.
Those associated with it are the people, citizens, subjects.
What role does religion play in all of this? Rousseau deals with this in
Book 4 of The Social Contract with his own version of the history of
religions, reflecting the encyclopedist bent of his age and, indeed, the
method to which Rousseau returned repeatedly in his writings. Throughout
his life, Rousseau was a storyteller, a lyrical composer of opera and poetry,
a novelist, and only then a political writer. Unlike a Guissepe Mazzini, who
lived for political struggle and intrigue, Rousseau said he was not cut out
for such strife and claimed with some sincerity that he was only thrust into
politics after his essay that became his First Discourse won a prize and
gained him the public eye. One is tempted to think that if he were alive
today, he would be living in Hollywood making movies. Like any good
storyteller, he begins his stories, “Once upon a time….” That “time” is a
mythical past he imagines. Although his works contain references to current
scientific discoveries, he is most interested in stories about first peoples,
like the Carib Indians, who opened a window into pre-historic life. His
Savage is indeed a Noble Savage, one who shares many traits with other
animals save one: humans contain an irrepressible urge to improve:
“perfectibility.” That urge can lead to the development of good things like
language, agriculture, and the family. But it also can subject humans to the
risk of going astray and of losing the original freedom and equalities given
them by nature and subjecting themselves, often unwittingly, to bondage.
In his Second Discourse, entitled Discourse on the Origin and the
Foundations of Inequality among Men, he tells the tale of how inequality
came to be. As a bard setting the scene for the first act, he begins with an
invocation:
Oh man, whatever land you may be from, whatever may be your
opinions, listen. Here is your history such as I believe I read, not
in the books by your kind, who are liars, but in nature, which
never lies. Everything that will come from it will be true. Nothing
will be false but what I will unintentionally have introduced of
my own. The times of which I speak are very remote. How much
you have changed from what you were! It is, so to speak, the life
of your species that I've described to you in the terms of the
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quality you received, which your education and your habits can
deprave, but which they could not destroy.4
This is a mythical age of innocence now lost, a pure source, nature,
which has tragically been lost. Rousseau’s language evokes the
fundamental creation myth of the West, shared by all the Abrahamic faiths.
The prophetic quality of his work is sustained throughout as he talks of
innocence lost with hints that a pure, perfectible nature, not thoroughly
effaced by civil society, still exists in each of us. Rousseau, the former
seminarian who left his native Geneva and for a time converted to
Catholicism while living in Turino, never denounces religion. Rather, his
work consistently shows a spiritual sensitivity that blends easily with his
artistic and moralizing bent.
The Fall, according to Rousseau, occurred when, after man had
developed language and had begun to cluster in communities, someone one
day claimed that part of the land was his. This birth of private property was
the root of inequality: “How many crimes, wars, murders; how much
misery and horror mankind would have been spared if someone had pulled
up the stakes and filled in the ditch and cried out to his fellows: “Beware of
listening to this imposter; you are lost if you forget that the fruits of the
earth are everyone's and the Earth itself is no one's.”5
“Lost,” because people had become enervated by the conveniences of
civil society and had given themselves over to leisure. The things they once
welcomed as improvements came to be required as necessities. Not having
them produced more unhappiness than having them produced pleasure.
People became aware of what others possessed and this necessitated that
they control their amour propre. But most persons could not do so. To
acquire more things, some relied on violence or deceit. The bourgeoisie
became increasingly identified by what they had, not by what they were.
Civility became an obligation and brought with it numerous occasions for
offense. In their alienation and weakness, men ran to the protection of civil
society and gladly gave their masters more power over them in the mistaken
belief that it would advance their peace and security.
The final phase of this decline is the complete distortion of the social
order. “The times preceding this last change would be times of troubles and
calamities. But in the end everything would be swallowed up by the
4 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Second Discourse. Discourse on the Origin and
the Foundations of Inequality among Men (1754). In Rousseau: The Discourses
and Other Early Political Writings, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political
Thought, Victor Gourevitch, ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1997), 133:7, p. 133. All quotations to the Second Discourse are from this
edition.
5 Par. 164, p. 161.
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monster, and peoples would no longer have chiefs or laws but only
tyrants.”6
RELIGION IN CIVIL SOCIETY
What role did religion play in the society brought about by amour
proper? To explain this, Rousseau crafts another mythical history, this time
of religion.
At first, men had no kings save the gods. There were as many gods as
peoples. But after a long time, men made other men their masters. National
divisions led to polytheism. And this in turn gave rise to theological and
civil intolerance, which Rousseau thinks were the same. When each state
had its own cult, there were no wars of religion, because there was no
distinction between its gods and its laws. The provinces of the gods were,
so to speak, fixed by the boundaries of the nations. The gods of the pagans
were not jealous gods; they shared the dominion of the world.7
In those times, there were no proselytizing or converting peoples. You
had to conquer them. The Romans allowed the vanquished their gods, but
required they worship Roman gods as well. Polytheism and paganism thus
became a universal religion. However, the Jews refused to recognize the
gods of their conquerors. This principle was the origin of religious war.
Then Jesus changed things. He set up a spiritual kingdom separating
temporal and spiritual powers. This made the state no longer sovereign. As
a result, Rome never fully trusted Christians, regarding them as rebels
whose obedience was feigned. Christians then took power, and everything
changed. “The humble Christians changed their language and saw the so-
called Kingdom of the other world turned, under a visible leader, into the
most violent of earthly despotisms.”8 The result was a conflict whether to
obey the priest or Caesar. That made all good polity impossible in Christian
states.
Several people tried to restore the old system. The Kings of England
tried to remedy this by becoming heads of the church. But the title made
them more the conservatives of Christianity than its rulers.
Thomas Hobbes tried to remedy this problem but, Rousseau thought,
should have seen that Christian insistence on sovereign spiritual power is
incompatible with his system. Christianity does more harm by weakening
than good by strengthening the state.
There are three types of religions for Rousseau: the Religion of Man;
the Religion of Citizens, and the Religion of the Priest.9
6 Par. 191, p. 185.
7 The Social Contract, Book IV, Ch. VIII, p. 96 in Cress.
8 Ibid., p.98 in Cress.
9 Ibid., pp. 98-103 in Cress.
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The Religion of Man
Here there are no temples or altars. Its truth is the religion of the
Gospel pure and simple. It is nature. It is the divine right of law.
The Religion of Citizens
This religion is a codified system. It is a national entity, with a visible
cultic head. It treats all outsiders as infidels and barbarians, which, for
Rousseau, amount to the same thing.
The Religion of the Priest
This system gives persons two loyalties. It is premised on the idea that
there exist two societies, one heavenly, the other earthly. It creates in its
followers contradictory obligations and, as such, is an antisocial concept.
The best examples are Roman Catholicism and Buddhism.
The Religion of the Priest is worthless and bad for society. The
Religion of the Citizens is good, in that it unites civil law and cult as a form
of theocracy. But it is bad, because it is founded on lies, error, and
superstitions.
The Religion of Man, however, is good both for the society and the
individual. It teaches the individual virtue, an indispensible trait for citizens
in free societies. It is compatible both with individual freedom and with the
claims of society.
What is the Religion of Man? For Rousseau, it is what he calls
“Christianity,” but by this he means not the Christianity of his day, but that
of the Gospels. At times he uses “Christianity” to refer to the Religion of
the Priest, but most often he reserves the term for the pure teachings of
Jesus, before his followers perverted them into a repressive system. This
“Christianity” is the “holy, sublime, real religion of all men.” It recognizes
we are all the children of God and members of the common society that
endures even beyond death.
But this religion has no relation to a civil law that takes men's minds
off of earthly things. It is not contrary to the social spirit. Rousseau
contrasts this with a society of Christians following the Religion of the
Priest. The society of such Christians would be other-worldly and would
disregard temporal welfare. Rousseau disliked this “Christianity” and saw it
as too susceptible to manipulation and to usurpation of freedom in the name
of God. It preached “only servitude and attendance.” “True Christians are
made to be slaves and they know it and do not mind much.”10
Rousseau goes on to justify the dominion of the state over religion.
Citizens owe their sovereign an account of their actions only to the extent
that those actions matter to the community. But religion matters very much
10 Ibid., p. 101 in Cress.
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to the community, insofar as its dogmas teach morality and social duties.
Therefore, the sovereign is justified in fixing the articles of a purely civil
profession of faith without which a man cannot be a good citizen. The
sovereign cannot compel belief in those articles, but can punish anyone who
publically endorses antisocial behavior and impiety. “If anyone, after
publicly recognizing these dogmas, behaves as if he does not believe them,
let them be punished by death.”11
The dogmas of civil religion ought to be few, simple, and exactly
worded:
The existence of a mighty, intelligent divinity.
The life to come.
The happiness of the just.
The punishment of the wicked.
The social contract of the law.
The proscription of intolerance of religious difference. “Tolerance
should be given to all religions that tolerate others, so long as their
doctrines contain nothing contrary to the duties of citizenship.” 12 This
toleration did not extend to atheists, however, who had no right to
publically practice their atheism.13
Rousseau's denunciation of the Religion of the Priest was used by
some liberals to justify destroying the church and ignoring the rights of
religious people. While sometimes difficult, it is necessary to distinguish
Rousseau's vehement denunciations from his positive affirmations about the
Religion of Man. One might criticize Rousseau's Religion of Man as the
creation of the state, one that is nothing more than an archetype of the
social. Rousseau’s insistence that religious citizens should not be able to
call upon a higher power is crucial and argues for the triumph of the state,
through the mechanism of the general will, over religious freedom. A
religion thus restricted is a civil religion, stripped of its appeal to
transcendence, unless that transcendence is purely a horizontal
transcendence that represents society as a whole, rather than a vertical
transcendence that implies the existence of an order outside of the control
of the state.
Yet the vertical transcendence in Rousseau's Religion of Man may be
supplied by his conception of nature and the liberty that comes from nature.
The state's ability to dominate the Religion of Man may be limited by that
transcendence. The Religion of Man may be re-examined and Rousseau’s
conception of the place of religion in society modified by seeing it in the
11 Ibid. p. 102 in Cress.
12 Ibid.
13 Rousseau’s distrust of atheists as immoral and hence not due the
solicitude of the state was shared by the author of the famous Letter on
Toleration,” John Locke.
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context of his broader discussion of religion. A key to this is Rousseau’s
“Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar” in Emile, published in 1762,
the same year as The Social Contract.
By way of illustrating how to educate the young Emile, Rousseau tells
the story of how, some thirty years in the past, a “young expatriate” found
himself in an Italian city, reduced to poverty. After several pages, Rousseau
reveals that he is speaking autobiographically about his days in Torino,
where he sought asylum in a Catholic house and converted to Catholicism,
only to soon flee and question his conversion. He then met a simple priest,
whom he calls the Vicar of Savoyard, who took him into his home and
looked after him with great solicitude and gentleness. After many days
observing the priest’s sincerity and holiness, the young lad asks him the
secret to his happiness. The response is a long discourse by the Vicar on his
faith, which outlines what the Vicar calls “natural religion.” Natural
religion is a rejection of skepticism, for it can be known by man, and in fact
is known to man by way of his reason and his experience of the world and
of himself. There is no question about God’s existence; in fact, God is “the
only absolute being, the only one that is truly active, sensing, thinking,
willing by itself, and from which we get thought, sentiment, activity, will,
freedom, and being.”14 Freedom has its ultimate source in God, for we are
free only because God wills it.
Some contemporary scholars have argued that Rousseau himself was
more the skeptic than the Savoyard Vicar.15 The problem with such
comments is that they interpret “skepticism” differently than Rousseau does
in the “Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar.” The Vicar says
specifically he is not a skeptic, by which he means that the existence of God
can be known by reason, without the aid of supernatural revelation. He
praises English theologian Samuel Clarke’s 1732 edition of Being and
Attributes of God, and the Obligations of Natural Reason, and the Truth
and Certainty of the Christian Revelation, in Opposition to Hobbes,
Spinoza, and the Author of the Oracles of Reason, and Other Deniers of
Natural and Revealed Religion. Clarke’s book is a specific refutation of
skepticism and naturalism. It adds the standard Christian claim that
revelation provides what reason cannot; in Thomistic language, grace
supposes and perfects nature and makes known to us the verities of the
Christian faith. Rousseau’s Vicar stops short of this, and that was one of the
reasons Emile was condemned by both Catholics in Paris and Protestants in
Geneva. The Vicar and Rousseau are “skeptical” about some peculiar
doctrines of Christianity that seem to confound reason, but not skeptical
14 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile: Or On Education, in The Collected
Writings of Rousseau, vol. 13, trans. and ed. by Christopher Kelly and Allan
Bloom (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2010), p. 447. All
quotations from Emile are from this volume.
15 See, for example, Christopher Kelly’s “Introduction,” where he claims
Rousseau himself was more the skeptic than the Savoyard Vicar, Ibid. xv-xxxi.
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about the essential elements of Christianity, nor of the spiritual nature of
God and the soul. Rousseau makes this even more specific in his response
to Beaumont, published in 1763. The profession of faith of the Vicar, he
says, has two parts: the first and most important is “intended to combat
modern materialism, to establish the existence of God and natural Religion
with all the force of which the Author is capable.”16
The second part, less important by Rousseau’s account, “raises doubts
and difficulties about revelations in general.”17 The skepticism of the Vicar
is involuntary, because it stems from the limits of reason. With regard to
those doctrines that defy reason, the Vicar “respects them in silence without
either understanding or rejecting them, and humbles himself before the
great Being who alone knows the truth.”18 The practical effect of this is not
apostasy, but “to make each more circumspect from within his own
Religion about accusing others of bad faith from theirs.”19
The nature-grace issue and its implications for his ideas about religion
and civil society are further elucidated in the exchange with the Archbishop
of Paris, Christophe de Beaumont, which we have been sampling. In his
1762 condemnation of Emile, Beaumont cast Rousseau as a false prophet,
just the kind against which St. Paul warned. The “frivolous” style of
Rousseau is a guise behind which hides a confused mix of “great truth with
great errors.” None of this is innocent or sincere in the Archbishop’s eyes,
but sinister and typical of an age of growing disbelief and sensuality. When
Beaumont leaves aside the ad hominems, he focuses on the issue of nature
and grace, which indeed is at the heart of Rousseau’s novel view of
education. Beaumont takes issue with Rousseau’s claim that “there is no
original perversity in the human heart.”20
Rousseau’s long response to Beaumont illustrates just what he thought
about this claim that he was a naturalist and an enemy of Christianity. For
Rousseau and many of the Christian Romantics he inspired, the rethinking
of traditional notions of original sin did not represent an apostasy but an
embrace of a more progressive view of human nature’s perfectibility.
He is genuinely disturbed that Beaumont questions his faith and even
suggests that were Beaumont a peer, he would take him to court and accuse
him of slander. All the histrionics aside, he is particularly disturbed because
he sees himself as a defender of faith in the face of the naturalists and
16 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Citizen of Geneva, to Christophe de Beaumont,
Archbishop of Paris, Duke of St. Cloud, Peer of France, Commander of the
Order of the Holy Spirit, Patron of the Sorbonne, etc. (Amsterdam: Marc
Michael Ray, 1763) in Christophe Kelly and Eve Grace, eds. The Collected
Writings of Rousseau, Vol. 9 (Hanover: University Press of New England,
2001), p. 75.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., p. 74.
19 Ibid., p. 75.
20 Ibid, p. 4.
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atheists like Spinoza, who deny the existence of the soul and of God.
Rousseau then turns to his main critique of Beaumont's indictment of his
educational philosophy on the basis of original sin. 21
Rousseau admits that he substitutes a doctrine of original goodness for
Augustine's concept of original sin. But he rejects Beaumont's assertions
that this is unquestionably outside the pale of Christian theology. As he
shows in his Second Discourse and in his Social Contract, man
undoubtedly becomes evil. On that much he and Beaumont agree. Rousseau
questions just how useful the doctrine of original sin is, if it does not
explain how persons become bad, once they are cleansed of the taint of
original sin through Baptism. Even if the effects of original sin linger, that
does not explain the psychological and social mechanisms by which
persons become inclined to vice. It merely states that persons sin because
they are sinners; and they are sinners because they are persons. That is just
not satisfying to Rousseau. He has a much more detailed and, he thinks,
compelling account of how this happens.
In the state of nature before men come into close contact through civil
society, the pure nature of persons remains unsullied. But as soon as they
enter into society, they begin to observe one another and compare
themselves to one another. The society soon develops preferences for
certain traits. Persons experience the growth of amour proper, the vanity
and self-consciousness that breeds envy, competition, and even violence.22
In Emile, Rousseau speaks of how to educate a child. Beaumont
accuses him of a philosophy that allows the child to indulge his evil
propensities. But for Rousseau, there is distinction between positive
education and negative education. Positive education attempts to inculcate
adult virtues in children. The problem is, however, that children are not
ready for them. As a result, the virtues remain external, distorted, or
embraced in less than authentic ways. The result is that the child learns vice
rather than virtue. Negative education, by contrast, attempts only to prevent
the child from being spoiled, rather than to inculcate particular virtues. It
stresses developing a child's natural propensities, which, Rousseau believes,
can then at a later age be used to embrace virtue. Negative education is far
from idle. It protects against vice and prepares a child for everything that
can lead him to the truth when he is capable of understanding it.23
Rousseau plainly considers himself a Christian and assumes Christian
virtues as the basis for all good morality. He even suggests that he intended
Emile to apply primarily to persons living in a state of grace after having
received the sacrament of Baptism. His rejection of a certain understanding
of the doctrine of original sin he describes this way: “seeking to nourish my
heart with the spirit of the Gospel without torturing my reason with what
appears to me obscure in it: persuaded, finally, that whoever loves God
21 Ibid., p. 28.
22 Ibid., pp. 28-29.
23 Ibid., p. 35.
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above all things and his neighbor as himself is a true Christian. I shall strive
to be one, leaving aside all these doctrinal subtleties, all this important
gibberish with which the Pharisees muddle our duties and obfuscate our
faith; along with St. Paul placing faith itself beneath charity.”24
By the time of the Letter to Beaumont, Rousseau had long since
renounced Catholicism and returned to his native Calvinism in which he
rejoiced, even though many of his fellow Genevans had their own troubles
with Emile. He tells Beaumont that he was most fortunate to be born a
Calvinist who takes Scripture and reason as the unique rules of faith. Like
them, he challenges the authority of men and agrees to submit to them only
to the extent he perceives their truth.
It is very hard to see in Rousseau’s language anything but the
confessions of a person who struggles with faith, but who clearly embraces
Christianity and strives to live according to its precepts. “I join in my heart
with the true servants of Jesus Christ and the true adorers of God, to offer
him the homages of his Church in the communion of the faithful.”25 These
are not the words of one who denies the existence of God and the soul, not
the words of a naturalist, but the words of a Christian humanist, intent on
the perfectibility of human nature and on his own right to proclaim his
understanding of faith in an original way. In that regard, Rousseau is a
prototype for the faith of millions today who reject premodern
understandings of religious authority that stifle inquiry in the name of
orthodoxy. He does not reduce religion to his own sentiments, does not
reject Scripture or tradition, does not shun Christian communion, does not
question the existence of God or any of the essential doctrines of the faith.
He simply cannot be seen as the model of an educational system that leaves
out God or a civil society that rejects the role of religion.
Nature, then, for Rousseau is a nature bathed in the divine and
containing within itself God-given potential. Within it is a transcendent
element that relativizes the secular. With regard to civil society, it functions
as a check against the tyranny of the general will. That transcendent
element prevents the general will from becoming, in the old joke about
Rousseau’s political theory, the General’s will, a reference to Napoleon’s
distortion of the Rousseau-inspired French revolutionaries.
Another way to speak about this is in terms of natural rights. Here we
recall Leo Strauss’ discussion of the importance of natural rights as a
bulwark against tyranny. According to Strauss, modern democracies have
rejected natural law, which is tantamount to saying that all life is positive
right. This means that what is right is determined exclusively by the
legislators and the courts. Only the will to power and ultimately nihilism
remain in such a regime.
Liberals sometimes welcome this abandonment of natural right as an
expansion of individual freedom and toleration, because the society cannot
24 Ibid. p. 47.
25 Ibid.
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determine what is intrinsically right or wrong. There is a tension between
respect for diversity and recognition of natural right.
Strauss insists that the basis for natural right must be non-teleological,
rejecting the Catholic tradition of natural law that sees natural law as the
subject’s participation by reason in the divine law. On this point, Rousseau
would differ, claiming that God is the basis of natural right.26
Although there remains a problem reconciling Rousseau’s rhapsodic
praises of the Religion of Man and nature with his insistence that the
Religion of the Priest creates an untenable duality that society cannot allow,
his thought, nevertheless, opens the possibility for seeing religion as vital to
civil society. The “Religion of Man,” “true religion,” or “natural religion,”
he thinks, should be acknowledged by society, because it provides the pre-
political basis of the values on which the legitimacy of the regime depends.
God is the source of human freedom. As such, that freedom is never
entirely subjugated to the general will in civil society. Despite the warrants
some of Rousseau’s famous disciples, like Marx and Pol Pot, found in his
thinking to suppress religion in their societies, it appears that Rousseau
himself offered a more nuanced view of the role of religion in civil society.
Rousseau knew the power of religion to form solidarity and to shape social
identity as well as personal identity. Religion shapes a deep personal
identity that is by definition transcendent and social.
Traditional notions of citizenship are based on exclusion. In some
liberal states the Religion of Citizens has become the official religion of the
state, what people like Robert Bellah call “civil religion.”27 All outsiders are
in one sense nonbelievers, barbarians, the Other that must be excluded in
some way. But as Levinas has shown us, the Other creates in us a
responsibility to acknowledge the limits of our power over the Other.28 It
challenges our act of exclusion. While Rousseau’s Religion of the Priest
and his Religion of Citizens define both the act of transcendence in their
prescriptions and insistence on the experience of solidarity in their
embodiment of public order, the face of the Other denies both claims.
Rousseau’s Religion of Man, by contrast, provides a basis for
acknowledging in the Other what we experience in ourselves.
George Mason University
Washington DC, U.S.A
jfarina@gmu.edu
26 Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 2-7.
27 Robert Bellah, The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in a
Time of Trial (New York: Seabury Press, 1975).
28 Emmanuel Levinas, Totalité et infini: essai sur l’extériorité (La Hayne:
M. Nijhoff, 1961).
CHAPTER XXV
THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE HUMAN BEING
IN CHRISTIAN EXISTENTIALISM AND
PHENOMENOLOGY:
S. KIERKEGAARD AND J. TISCHNER
MAREK JAN PYTKO
Abstract: What does it mean to be an authentic human being in the sense of
S. Kierkegaard and J. Tischner? How do those ideas refer to the
contemporary human condition, to the challenges one has to face in today’s
civilization? Why is it worthwhile to be an authentic human being?
This paper addresses the importance and meaning of the problem of
being authentic as a human being. Kierkegaard (a representative of
Christian existentialism) formulates that problem as one of the most
important in his whole work in confrontation with everyday life. He claims
that:
- Man is a dialectical being that is in a concrete existence of eternity
and finitude, time and eternity, possibility and necessity, a synthesis of soul
(the hard nucleus), body and spirit, in short – the synthesis.
- One of the most fundamental, crucial determinants of human
existence is “time.” This element is of key importance for the description of
human existence, of whether a human being lives in an authentic or
inauthentic way. In the horizon of “past,” “present,” and “future,”
especially in the perspective of the future, the human being continuously
transcends himself, becoming himself – or not. This is strictly related to
eternity that encounters man at the moment of “now.”
Every “moment,” every “while,” and their sum, and eventually the
process of their sequence, or of human decision, always happen as related
to eternity. The human being becomes authentic when, in this process of
“time” and “eternity” coming together, he opens up and changes his life,
and develops toward authentic existence. The human synthesis and
dialectical character become more and more a unity, approaching harmony,
completeness, or, in short – authentic existence.
What is it that best determines one’s authentic existence? It is his
“spirit” and the necessity to decide upon choice. The human being must
consciously choose a choice, decide to make decisions, always in the
horizon of the present that is becoming eternity or its negation, which
would be the perspective of inauthentic existence.
Tischner (a phenomenologist) perceives the authenticity problem –
which is one of the basic keys to understanding his philosophy – from a
different angle. He claims that the problem of authenticity of the human
being begins at the moment of encounter with another human being. The
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encounter with another human being is more fundamental and original than
the way man is with objects. The word “face” epitomizes the authenticity of
the encounter and the truth of being – the truth that can be masked at the
cost of hiding the “face.” Dialogue is necessary to discover the difference
between mask and face, that is, between falsehood and the truth, illusion
and authenticity.
Tischner writes: “The choice of one’s own authenticity is the choice to
‘be oneself’ and the choice of everything that this ‘being oneself’ entails. If,
however, ‘being oneself’ is an object of choice, it means that one is not
oneself. A paradoxical situation – something is and is not at the same time.
One can become ‘oneself,’ but one can also lose ‘oneself.’ Freedom is the
possibility of doing either the former or the latter.” The immediate sense of
freedom is authenticity. Nothingness is a characteristic of freedom “in
itself.” Another meaning of freedom, an erroneous meaning, is a
depersonalized non-descriptness of a creature lost in the world. This is also
a meaning, though a tragic one.
We are ready to fight at barricades to expand the limits of our
freedom, yet we have completely lost the sense of what authentic love (the
highest level of authenticity) means. But there is no freedom without love,
just as there is no love without freedom. In order to solve this problem
Tischner compares two characters: Abraham and Adam. What does Adam
do when God calls him by name? – He runs away and hides. What does
Abraham do in an analogous situation? He says: “Here I am, Lord!” They
show two different attitudes: Adam runs away to find a place on earth
where he could hide from God. Abraham meets the challenge and says:
“Here I am.” To a choice, Abraham responds with a choice, revealing the
essence of the Biblical image of love. To love means to choose. Tischner
says: “God chooses, man responds to the choice, choosing God.” What is
the faculty that makes the choice? It is the human will. A bond called
fidelity is also born here. What does it mean to be faithful? It means to
carry within oneself the choice once made. To have decided once and
forever means to make decisions every moment of one’s life. Thus love
means fidelity.
Some conclusions: 1.The fundamental problem of the human being –
which is also the problem of the contemporary person – is that of the human
drama born of inauthentic existence. 2. The drama is particularly enhanced
by mass media (aesthetic existence), which weakens the human ability to
decide, “stealing” the human “now,” and – in consequence – depriving man
of his identity and authenticity. 3. One of the main dramas of our times is
considering love and fidelity as if they were fire and water. The
fundamental schizophrenia of the contemporary person is the schizophrenia
of fidelity. This leads to inauthentic existence and destruction of one’s
identity, to not being oneself. And so on.
Keywords: authenticity, now, choice, man as a dramatic being, fidelity
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Two great philosophers and theologians, living in different times, in a
different epoch: SØren Kierkegaard (1813-1855, born in Copenhagen,
Denmark) and Józef Tischner (1931-2000, born in Krakow, Poland), were
thinkers who placed man and the values that constitute him, surround him,
and define him, at the center of philosophizing. One of the key values in
their philosophy was the authenticity of the human being. What does it
mean to be authentic regardless of the passing time, changing fashions, and
tides of events? What is this harbor that reveals the truth about man despite
the changing times and cultures? What makes it fresh and radiant today, in
the context of contemporary civilization, in the era of mass communication
and globalization? Why is it still worthwhile to be an authentic person and
to look for the essence of authenticity? These are the questions that I would
like to answer by following, in your company, the thought of those two
learned men who, although separated by time (about a century), language,
and culture, were led – through the honesty of their approach to the
questions of value, meaning, and the mystery of man – to the same essential
issue: that of man’s authenticity.
In order to tackle this issue, first of all we have to answer the question:
Who is man, according to Kierkegaard? What are man’s characteristics?
According to the Danish philosopher, man is a dialectical being that is a
concrete existence of eternity and finiteness, time and eternity, possibility
and necessity, a synthesis of soul, body, and spirit – in short, the synthesis.
This definition of man confirms that, according to Kierkegaard, one of the
fundamental and decisive determinants of the human existence is “time.”
For him, as for many other existentialists, this factor is particularly
important, as it constitutes the starting point for the description of the
authentic or inauthentic mode of human existence. When analyzing the
common understanding of “time” (“past,” “present,” and “future”), the
philosopher claims that the future has a greater meaning than the two
others, because existence is always a “going by,” a continuation of the way
and a projection toward the future.1 Existence toward the future is
meaningful for life and brings about its own self-restoration. This
possibility is connected, in a particular way, to the perspective of “eternity.”
Going even further, Kierkegaard observes that if we define time as “infinite
succession,” it seems that in its very essence it contains definitions of
present, past, and future. Actually, it is not so, because “if, in the infinite
succession of time, one could, in fact, find a foothold that would serve as a
dividing point, then this division would be quite correct. But precisely
because every moment, like the sum of the moments, is a process (a going-
by), no moment is present, and in the same sense there is neither past nor
present nor future.”2 What, in fact, does the Danish philosopher say?
Kierkegaard claims that eternity is the present! Eternity and time touch us
1 Cf. S. Kierkegaard, Concetto dell’Angoscia, a cura di C. Fabro (Milano:
Opere, Sansoni Editor, 1993), p. 157.
2 Ibid., p. 154 (translated by MJP).
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every moment and it is exactly in man that they find their privileged
meeting point. Kierkegaard’s is the concept of temporality, where time
constantly cuts through eternity and eternity continually penetrates time.3
We are, however, interested in the question: What has this synthesis of
time and eternity to do with the authenticity of the existence of man as an
individual? The answer is: very much, as every human being is in the center
of the process of the encounter of time and eternity. When man consciously
opens up to this process of the encounter of time with eternity, when in his
spirit he opens up to eternity, he changes his own life, gradually evolving
toward authentic existence. Man as the synthesis and his dialectical
character become a unity, increasing in harmony and fullness, and, in two
words: authentic existence. In this perspective, Kierkegaard would say, the
synthesis of time and eternity is not another synthesis, but an expression,
according to which man is the synthesis of body and soul guided by the
spirit. What is it then that in the existence of this individual determines his
being authentic or inauthentic? Is it his spirit that must decide about
choosing, or choose choosing (choice), and subsequently, along with the
conscious act of choosing the choice, must choose what to choose? An
individual human being, with his psychophysical structure, in the horizon of
time and eternity, faces unlimited possibilities of choice. Theoretically, the
number of possibilities is infinite; in practice, however, facing the decision,
man must give preference to one of them. Each decision to choose contains,
on one hand, a risk, and on the other hand, an opportunity, a chance, and its
cost for man is, and must be, at least the consequence of his choice. The
decisions made by man at every moment of his life may become
increasingly “his decision,” and in this way, every moment of his life, he is
offered the chance to become increasingly himself. In this sense, decision
becomes the first factor of the challenge leading toward the authenticity of
human existence. According to Kierkegaard, this results from the principle
of combining “possibility” with “necessity,” with unceasing actualization of
existence in temporality. Man must choose – but what is his main choice? It
is the choice between good and evil, truth and falsehood. In consequence of
these choices, man enters various stages of existence: aesthetic, ethical,
religious, and Christian. Climbing this ladder, man does not always choose
justly and correctly. It frequently happens that wishing to choose something
better, he actually chooses worse. What are the consequences of such
choices – or of the decision not to choose (typical acts of aesthetic
existence).
A man who flees from the necessity to make conscious and
responsible decisions in his life initially experiences anxiety, next
melancholy (sadness, depression), and in consequence gradually moves
away from the authenticity of his own existence, which leads to degradation
of the spirit and, in time, also of the body. Mozart’s character Don
Giovanni, with all his sexuality, is a typical example of this process.
3 Cf. Ibid., p. 156.
The Human Being in Existentialism and Phenomenology 331
Conversely, man approaches the authenticity of his existence when he
focuses on and takes up his own spiritual development without losing
himself in the limitless drama of possibilities. This direction results from
the process of actualization through which anxiety and melancholy can be
overcome and eliminated. In such a process, and only through a true and
authentic effort of existence, man can form absolutely, if he chooses his
way of existence by rising to the challenge of living an ethical-religious life.
Human life consists in continuously transcending oneself, and it is never
given to man once and for all. This fact results simply from the human
condition, and, in particular, from its temporality. Speaking about the
inauthentic attitude toward oneself, Kierkegaard observes that it would be
just a waste of time to struggle to become what one already is, that is,
oneself; but this is exactly why the task is so very difficult, most difficult of
all, because man (an individual) cannot just be himself as he must be
constantly becoming. The most tragic state, that of despair, consists for
Kierkegaard in the paradox of being unable to flee from oneself and, at the
same time, to possess oneself – this is the extreme consequence of
inauthentic existence. Despair is the destruction of the relationship of man
with himself. In contrast, an authentic man strives to possess himself, or to
become united with himself, never completely reaching this goal in time.
As we have said, in the process of becoming, man actualizes himself at
various stages. In this going-by, man can progress or move backwards, but
making decisions to strive toward the highest dimension of religious
existence, the Christian existence, man is lead to full existence. The
outcomes of this evolution are, for Kierkegaard, closely related to another
factor that strongly affects the authenticity of existence – or the absence of
authenticity – and precipitates it in a particular way: it is repetition. What is
repetition?
Along with decision, it is another fundamental category of existence
that builds up authenticity in a particular way. It is the way of recovering
oneself anew. How, in what way? Repetition is, in a way, a synthesis of the
memory of past experiences with what is potentially coming with a new
existential situation. Repetition recalls in our memory the past, which,
dominated by the fidelity to repetition, determines the sense of continuing
to make appropriate, authentic choices, which unites and unifies man in
himself. The unceasing continuation of repetitions makes fundamental and
auto-affirmative choices complete themselves. Such repetitions, according
to Kierkegaard, lead to living the true and authentic life. Such a person is
not like a boy chasing butterflies, does not imbibe in the glory of the world,
is not like an old woman sitting and spinning memories of the past, but in a
quiet, concrete, and determined way strides toward the future. By repetition,
man is able to collect his past to use it in his present situation. In this way,
time may become a platform for his projects, may create a human
“continuum,” where past actions anticipate actualization of the future. With
repetition, man returns to himself, begins to live, becomes himself again,
possesses himself. Repetition enables him to come back to himself from the
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limitless drama of possibilities that may provoke the mentioned anxiety and
melancholy of existence. With repetition, in Kierkegaard’s vision,
authenticity appears as an act of going-by, as rebirth and return to existence
chosen in a deep way, akin to artistic or religious creation.
Existence and the process of becoming always need something more
than pure reflection on them. The authenticity of existence cannot be
adopted only by thought – on the contrary, by virtue of the very definition
of existence, openness, choice, creating projects, and accepting
responsibility for one’s own life would result in the full existence of the
subject. Therefore, one element is still needed: it is determination, or the
passion of commitment, which – along with reflection, repetition, decision,
and action – is an element of inner completion, the factor that comes from
within the subject.4 Why is it so important for living the fullness of
authentic existence? With passion “man cuts himself off from mere
possibilities and identifies with thought in order to exist in himself.” 5
“Passion is the continuation of the moment that at the same time takes on
movement and is its impulse.” 6 With passion, uniting all his strength and
psychophysical powers, man discovers new energies of life that make it
easier for him to reach various mountaintops, to achieve what he desires.
Passion so understood is the motor of all human existence; it supports
man’s determination and makes the process of his perfection faster and
more precise. Obviously, we do not mean here the world’s passion, by
which an individual engages in an absolute relationship with the relative,
which may lead to vanity, cunning, jealousy, etc. 7 No, that type of passion
does not let the authenticity of human existence grow; on the contrary, it
weakens and belittles it. There is, however, a different type of passion that
leads toward moral and spiritual values. The image of this challenge (this
direction) is Socrates, so often quoted by Kierkegaard. Socrates, with an
admirable passion and being exceptionally honest toward himself and
others, never stopped in his efforts to find the truth and authentic existence.
With an extraordinary passion, knowing no compromise, he preferred more
difficult and risky decisions to becoming unfaithful to what he believed in
and what was the object of his deepest devotion.
There is, however, along with this passion, a passion of a higher nature
– the passion that, according to Kierkegaard, is related to faith and gives the
authenticity of existence an even higher and stronger impulse. Yes, the
existence of a believer is even more passionate and ardent than the Socratic
one. That is so because existence combined with the paradox of faith yields
from itself the maximum passion.8 With the knowledge of God in a
4 Cf. S. Kierkegaard, Postilla conclusiva non scientifica, a cura di C.
Fabro (Milano: Sansoni Editor, 1993), p. 327.
5 Ibid., p. 445 (translated by MJP).
6 Ibid., p. 430 (translated by MJP).
7 Cf. Ibid., p. 492.
8 Cf. Ibid., p. 454.
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personal relationship, this passion can lead man to the highest levels of
existence. In it, man confronts in the deepest way all the elements of tension
and contradictions coming from his nature. Here man, as an individual,
experiences in an extreme way that he really is the embodiment of infinity
and finiteness, a synthesis of soul, body, and spirit. In such a limitless
passion, the subject is ready for the greatest things, including the sacrifice
of himself, because he has a lot to win and a lot to lose. The price is
immense: not only eternal life, but above all, eternal salvation. Therefore,
the passion that refers to eternity strives to be taken on from within, without
jealousy, envy, or the lack of hope. This passion does not want to manifest
itself in a polemic as something important for existence, because it could
lose its intensity.9 Kierkegaard speaks about the necessity of possessing this
passion when he interprets the famous parable of five wise and five foolish
virgins who took their lamps and went out to meet the bridegroom (Mt
25:1-12). The foolish virgins, says Kierkegaard, went to a shop to buy new
oil for their lamps, having previously forgotten about the oil that should
have been an expression of their preparedness and infinite passion in their
desire to meet the Bridegroom any moment.10 To lose oil means, according
to the Danish thinker, to lose the infinite passion, to be unable to see the
truth of authentic existence understood as the time of being in love and as
an attitude of lively enthusiasm for the Bridegroom. This passion is, for
Kierkegaard, the highest and the greatest one.
Thus, in Kierkegaard’s thought, the most important elements of
authenticity, which is the fundamental challenge of human existence, may
betraced back to three: decision, repetition, and passion. From the lowest
level of existence, which would be the stage of aesthetic existence, to its
highest level, which is the Christian existence, man experiences one of the
greatest challenges of his life: the authenticity of his existence. In order to
respond to it, man needs to know himself, to become himself, but along
with this, it is also necessary to open up – with commitment and passion –
toward relationships with others. In particular, man can reach the fullness of
existence thanks to the openness toward and the constant relationship with
eternity, with God-Man. Kierkegaard says that “I” becomes completely
transparent, that is, authentic, only in God.11
Józef Tischner (phenomenologist) – with whom the problem of
authenticity is also one of the main elements necessary to understand his
philosophy – approaches this issue from a slightly different angle. In order
to grasp it, one must ask an analogous question: How does Tischner see
Man? Who is Man? What reveals the authentic, or inauthentic, truth of his
existence? Taking Hegel as his starting point, Tischner says that “the person
is a being ‘for himself.’ Man was given a task for himself. His life is his
9 Cf. Ibid., p. 488.
10 Cf. Ibid., p. 269.
11 Cf. S. Kierkegaard, La malattia mortale, a cura di C. Fabro, (Milano:
Opere, Sansoni Editore, 1993), p. 634.
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becoming. Therefore, like no other being he can be, per se, ‘through
himself.’ Man responds to the call of values, and in this way not only does
he transform the world, but he also creates himself as value in this world. In
Man value has become person.”12 What values in relation to the person has
Tischner in mind here? In order to solve this problem, we must start with
the fundamental claim made by Tischner. He asserts that man is a dramatic
being. What does it mean that man is a dramatic being? It means that he
partakes in a drama. It is in the drama and through the drama that man
reveals who he really is. “To be a dramatic being means to live through a
given time surrounded by other people and with the earth as the stage under
one’s feet. Man would not be in a dramatic existence without those three
factors: openness to the other man, openness to the stage of the drama, and
openness to the passing time.”13
Let us begin with the concept of time, which for Tischner, as for
Kierkegaard, plays an important role, although its meaning is different. For
Tischner, time means dramatic time, different than the objective time
known from natural sciences: the time of physical and chemical processes.
However, “it is the time that is happening between us as participants of one
and the same drama. (…) It is not – strictly speaking – within me or within
you, but just between us. It has its own logic – proper only to itself – that
governs its continuity and irreversibility. (…) Under our feet there is our
world – the stage of the drama. We walk on it, see it and hear it, touch it
with our hands. Representations of the stage may be different. For Aristotle,
the stage is the totality of existing things, of substances; for George
Berkeley, it is a representation common for human beings, a dream induced
in their souls by God himself. But for people involved in living through the
drama, the stage of life is primarily the plane of meetings and partings.”14
The real drama of man begins the very moment a human being meets
another human being, which may lead to their parting. The stage and space
are the background for the drama, the background against which Tischner
distinguishes two relationships: the relationship of man with other man and
the relationship of man with the world that is the stage of his drama. The
relationship with other man is that of mutual responsibility, of the most
profoundly understood dialogue, whereas the relationship of man to the
stage is an intentional relationship – one of objectification. It may happen
that not only does man commit an error, but he may also consciously take
the other for the stage, and the stage for the other. In both cases the person
is reduced to the role of an object. Tischner calls it an ontological illusion.
12 J. Tischner, Etyka wartości i nadziei, in: Wobec wartości, joint work, D.
von Hildebrand, J.A. Kłoczowski, J. Paściak and J. Tischner (Poznań, 1982), p.
86 (translated by MJP).
13 J. Tischner, Filozofia dramatu (Kraków: Znak, 2006), p. 5 (translated
by MJP).
14 Ibid., p. 6 (translated by MJP).
The Human Being in Existentialism and Phenomenology 335
We have said that the problem of the authenticity of man is revealed
with a particular strength at the moment of one human being meeting the
other. Such an encounter is of a fundamental character and it is more
original than an encounter of man with objects. Following the erring ways
of the encounters of man with the other, we can come close to – or move
away from – the proper way that leads toward the authentic choice and
authentic existence of man. In this perspective, man is capable of three
kinds of erring ways:
a) going astray in the element of beauty;
b) going astray in the element of truth;
c) going astray in the element of goodness.
a) Going astray in the element of beauty: The beauty of objects,
landscapes, and particularly of the other person, enchants and deludes.
Beauty transports, elates, enraptures, but may also mislead, tempt, and
deceive. Sometimes beauty may lead to cruelty when the enchanted is
driven to insanity.15 Beauty is lyrical and musical – that is why it is so easy
to surrender to it, let oneself be taken to heaven, and sometimes go
seriously astray. It is so fragile, and this very fragility forebodes tragedy,
the more so that it is not bound to fidelity.16 Tischner says that beauty – like
in Kierkegaard – “is not a dead appearance of an object, but the light that
gives life and takes life, the flame that gives warmth but also burns, and it is
the value with which the drama of man starts. The point of this drama is not
‘to be enraptured or not to be enraptured,’ but to save oneself or to
perish.”17 Thus the end may be tragic; beauty may be substituted for
goodness.
b) Going astray in the element of truth: Two examples show the
relationship of man to truth and its twofold consequences. The first is the
apology of Socrates, who defends himself from mendacious accusations,
the second – the defense of Raskolnikov, from Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Crime
and Punishment, who commits murder, is detained, and is interrogated. For
the former, truth is the way of saving life, for the latter – the way of saving
life is the lie. The former tells the truth, although he is accused of lies, the
latter tells lies presenting falsehood as truth. “Presenting falsehood as truth,
the liar strives for consolidating falsehood in the thus created system of
illusions. It is not illusion that stands at the origin of the falsehood of
speech, but the falsehood of speech stands at the origin of illusion.”18 Who
is the true killer and who perishes, who is the ultimate victim? The liar! As
the consequence of killing the truth that previously lived in him, he kills
himself spiritually, from within. As a result, his existence becomes
particularly inauthentic.
15 Cf. Ibid., p. 91.
16 Cf. Ibid., p. 95.
17 Ibid., p. 94 (translated by MJP).
18 Ibid., p. 105 (translated by MJP).
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c) Going astray in the element of goodness: The central interest of the
philosophy of drama is the experience of the other human being which, as
Emanuel Levinas will say (Tischner observes), is originally given through
the experience of his face. Objects are given to us through their appearance,
while man is given through the face. A revelation of the face is always a
revelation of the truth of the other person. The experience of the face has an
ethical character. The face of the other is the face of a foreigner, a widow,
or an orphan, says Tischner, referring to the Bible. The face is given to us
with this person’s misery – that of a foreigner who, in a country that is not
his own, asks the way; of a widow who has lost her husband; of an orphan
who has lost his parents. They all feel that in some way they are strangers in
this world. Like them, every man, claims Tischner, is constantly exposed to
the danger of humiliation, contempt, death. Therefore, the face – that is
naked – continually says: You will not kill, you will not commit murder!
You will not kill me physically or spiritually; you will not make me
physically lose my freedom; you will not betray me! Therefore, the
fundamental experience of man is agathological19. In the word “face,” the
authenticity of the encounter with the other and with the truth of one’s own
being is established. This truth may be masked at the cost of hiding the
“face.” Man is man not only because he builds cities, roads, and creates
technology and metaphysics, but because he is a creature capable of
understanding the good and of experiencing the good, in relation to other
men. If he becomes being-for-others, in consequence he also becomes
being-for-himself, becomes himself. He needs to open to others, to enter a
dialogue with them in order to discover the difference between the mask
and the face, falsehood and truth, illusion and the authenticity of his own
face. And here man is a dynamic being, not in the biological, but in the
spiritual sense. Therefore, man constitutes himself in the horizon of good
and evil, values and anti-values, becoming an authentic or inauthentic
being. Man himself plays the most important role in this drama, at its very
foundation, building up or degrading himself. In all three kinds of going
astray, the human being becomes himself only when he has first been a man
of dialogue and becomes a responsible actor in his own drama – this is
exactly the moment when he becomes authentic. For Tischner, as for
Kierkegaard, one cannot say that man “is,” but that he is constantly
becoming – man is process. Freedom is a particular value for Tischner in
the perspective of the authenticity of the human being. Tischner analyzes it
under two classical aspects of the Hegelian theory of contraries: “freedom
from” and “freedom to.” “Freedom from” is the human capacity and power
to say “no,” it is human rebellion against the past or the future. A protester
always protests in the name of a hope, which is also related to a risk.
“Freedom to” is directed toward something, toward a value. But “freedom
to” is also a form of creativity, inner freedom, and ability of self-
determination, thanks to which man creates himself from within. Man
19 Greek word “AGATHON” means goodness.
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creates himself even when he is unable to create anything in the external
world.
Following Hegel, Tischner explains “external freedom” and “internal
freedom” by describing the condition of a slave who has two ways out of
his slavery: either to kill his master and free himself from oppression, or to
accept slavery. None of these choices is really an act of freedom.20 The
slave – that is, the man deprived of freedom – not only does not do what he
wants, but he also is not the person he can and should be – actually, he IS
NOT. Tischner says that the loss of freedom means falling into what
Heidegger calls an inauthentic way of being. What act then would be the act
of freedom? According to Hegel, the act of freedom is assuming the third
attitude – rising above the contraries. Freedom does not consist in going to
either to the right or to the left, but upward.21 True freedom consists in
creating oneself anew, in surpassing the contraries in the dramatic situation.
This way upward is an inner creation, a constitution of the “thinking I.”
This Hegelian aspect of freedom as a value would determine Tischner’s
philosophical thought in this aspect. The essence of liberation lies in the
experience contributed by Stoicism and Christianity. Both Stoics and
Christians rose above the situations where slavery could exist – and actually
did exist. As a matter of fact, without this inner experience, without this
step upward, it is impossible, claims Tischner, to speak about authentic
freedom. In sum, the proper expression of freedom is no longer man’s
choice of values that are in front of him, but also – and perhaps even in the
first place – making the chosen values “his own.” Tischner writes: “The
choice of one’s own authenticity is the choice to ‘be oneself’ and the choice
of everything that this ‘being oneself’ entails. If, however, ‘being oneself’ is
an object of choice, it means that one is not oneself. A paradoxical situation
– something is and is not at the same time. One can become ‘oneself,’ but
one can also lose ‘oneself.’ Freedom is the possibility of doing either the
former or the latter.” The immediate sense of freedom is authenticity.
Nothingness is a characteristic of freedom “in itself.” Another meaning of
freedom, though a tragic one, is a depersonalized nondescriptness of a
creature lost in the world.
There is still one more step to make. Along with beauty, goodness, and
freedom, love is a value of particular importance for Tischner. In this
context, it can be observed that we are ready to fight at barricades to expand
the limits of our freedom, yet we have completely lost the sense of what
authentic love (the highest level of authenticity) means. But there is no
freedom without love, just as there is no love without freedom. In order to
solve this problem, Tischner compares two characters: Abraham and Adam.
What does Adam do when God calls him by name? He runs away and
hides. What does Abraham do in an analogous situation? He says: “Here I
am, Lord!” They show two different attitudes: Adam runs away to find a
20 Cf. J. Tischner, Filozofia dramatu, p. 154.
21 Cf. Ibid., p. 159.
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place on earth where he could hide from God. Abraham meets the challenge
and says: “Here I am.” To a choice, Abraham responds with a choice,
revealing the essence of the Biblical image of love. To love means to
choose. Tischner says: “God chooses, man responds to the choice, choosing
God.” 22 What is the faculty that makes the choice? It is the human will. A
bond called fidelity is also born here. What does it mean to be faithful? It
means to carry within oneself the choice once made. A poet says: “To have
decided once and forever means to make decisions every moment of one’s
life.”23 Thus love would mean fidelity, and fidelity is at the same time a
condition of authenticity. To love truly means first of all to be truly
authentic.
CONCLUSION
Why have I chosen these two philosophers for this study entitled
“Values of the Human Person|: Contemporary Challenges”? I believe that
the fundamental problem in contemporary culture, civilization, and
mentality is the problem of man’s being lost as an individual in the mass.
This concerns not only man but also society; being lost, we suffer from the
sickness of inauthentic existence. In mass pop-culture and the global sale of
ideas, services, and products, we are given – as though on a plate (for
breakfast, lunch, and dinner) – an ideal of life that usually leads to aesthetic
existence – a chain of sensual pleasures, intellectual pride, power, the cult
of money. Mass media, because it is, at the moment, the main channel
through which we are provided with an infinite number of offers, does not
teach what and how to choose in order to live deeply, consciously, and with
passion. Instead, it involves man in a virtual existence, steals his “now,”
softens his capacity for decision-making, and turns him into an object in the
name of wrongly understood freedom. Then, man has no strength to
change, to make Kierkegaard’s “repetition,” and even if he succeeds in it,
given four to five hours of watching television a day (not to mention other
media), those “repetitions” often lead toward dehumanization, addictions,
and the breaking up of one’s identity, to the lack of being oneself. The
chance to exit this loop is to come back to the roots, to what man is, where
he comes from, where he is going, and what the meaning is of his being.
Yet in order to change this, one must choose the choice, must want to be an
authentic person – in the encounter with himself, others, and God.
John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin
Lublin, Poland
mpytko@o2.pl
22 J. Tischner, Wiara ze słuchania (Kraków: Znak, 2009), p. 97 (translated
by MJP).
23 Ibid., p. 97 (translated by MJP).
CHAPTER XXVI
THE VALUE OF THE HUMAN PERSON:
RABINDRANATH TAGORE’S RELEVANCE TO
THE CHALLENGES OF TODAY’S WORLD
SEEMA BOSE
Abstract: Rabindranath Tagore was a Bengali poet, and the first Asian to
receive the Nobel Prize for Literature. ‘Man’ occupies a vital position in
Tagore’s thinking. Creation through art, poetry, music, dance, and
philosophy all stem from what he calls “the surplus in man.” Creativity
elevates man from a mere physical being to a complete man. In his capacity
for creativity, man realizes the divine within himself. Tagore’s love of
nature and for natural beauty, cannot be overlooked. According to him,
human personality cannot develop if there is a division between the human
individual and nature or the world in general. In the human person nature
becomes articulated, articulated in living. Love is the root of all
relationships. Love is superior to knowledge. Fulfillment is achieved within
interpersonal relationships in spite of pain, suffering, and death. At a time
when violence plagues our world and when human beings are so often
treated as tools in a world of objects, it is good to be reminded by Tagore
that in reality our being is concrete, that is, not to be reduced to any kind of
abstraction. Though people belong to different cultures, no one should be
exploited at the cost of another. Tagore’s great emphasis on the dignity of
the human person needs to be remembered in the midst of our tendency to
think in terms of globalizing powers, in relation to which we usually feel
that we are helpless pawns.
Keywords: Rabindranath Tagore, creativity, “the surplus in man,”
humanism, multicultural education.
Rabindranath Tagore was a Bengali poet, the first Asian to receive the
Nobel Prize for Literature. The year 2011 being the one hundred fiftieth
birth anniversary of Tagore, it is an appropriate time to pay tribute to the
ideas of this great man and reassess their validity in the contemporary
situation. Tagore was influenced by Chandidas, a Medieval poet. Chandidas
said that there is nothing above man. “…The truth of man is the highest
truth, there is no other truth above it.”1 Tagore writes, “Man has a fund of
emotional energy that is not all occupied with his self-preservation. This
surplus seeks its outlet in the creation of Art, for man’s civilization is built
Diacritical marks have not been used.
1 Rabindranath Tagore, The Religion of Man (London: George Allen and
Unwin Ltd., 1958), p. 113.
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upon this surplus.”2 Creation through art, poetry, music, dance, and
philosophy all stem from what he calls “the surplus in man.” Creativity and
self-expression elevate man from a mere physical being to a complete man.
In his capacity for creativity man realizes the divinity within himself.
Personal development depends upon the realization of the innate
potentiality of the self. Our endeavors should be directed toward the
actualization of this potential. Art enriches our lives. Not only are music,
painting, and drama sources of relaxation and enjoyment, they are equally
important as academic disciplines. Keeping this in mind, Tagore included
arts in the curriculum of Visva-Bharati in Santiniketan. Tagore encouraged
teachers and pupils to have direct contact with the community around them,
and emphasized community singing and community service. He believed
that this would help in developing social sensibility.
Tagore’s ideas were based on his lived experience. In this connection,
the Baul singers of his village had a great impact on him. Bauls did not
follow any formality. Wandering from village to village they sang, danced,
and rejoiced in everyday life. In tune with this spirit, Tagore discarded
conventional religious beliefs and practices, believing that rigid religious
beliefs and practices are obstacles to progress. For example, he found
nothing wrong in a Brahmin girl marrying a Muslim boy. “Eternal religion
of heart is greater truth than society.”3 Tagore said, “I do not put my faith in
institutions, but in the individuals all over the world who think clearly, feel
nobly, and act rightly. They are the channel of moral truth.”4 God is
immanent in man and each individual man is sacred. This is perhaps the
most important of the messages Tagore has for us.
Tagore’s love of nature and natural beauty must be stressed. Tagore
once wrote, “Don’t arrange a meeting, if you want to remember me after
my death, but come under the shades of the shal trees.”5 Men and women
are the creations of nature. In this connection, Tagore appreciated the work
of Dadu. Like Dadu, he held the same idea of the formless seeking form
and form seeking the formless. We have come from the infinite and we
2 Rabindranath Tagore, Personality (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd.,
1959), p. 11.
3As referred to in S.A. Masud, “Tagore on Human Values,” in Bhudeb
Chaudhuri and K.G. Subramanyam (eds.), Rabindranath Tagore and the
Challenges of Today (Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1988), pp.
74-75.
4As referred to in Andrew Robinson, “Introduction,” in Rabindranath
Tagore, My Reminiscences PAPERMAC (London and Basingstoke: a division
of Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 1991), p. 11.
5As referred to in Sisir Kumar Das , “Keynote Address,” in Bhudeb
Chaudhuri and K.G. Subramanyam (eds.), Rabindranath Tagore and the
Challenges of Today (Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1988), p. 14.
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must return to the infinite.6 Human personality cannot develop if there is a
division between the human individual and nature or the world in general.
“If this world were taken away, our personality would lose all its content.”7
In the human person, nature becomes articulate, articulate in living. Man, in
knowing the world, knows himself. “We should have the gift to be natural
with nature and human with human society.”8 Tagore was a close observer
of nature and his surroundings. He always rejoiced in the rising of the sun,
the chirping of the birds, the blossoming of flowers, the fall of leaves, the
deep blue sky, and dark grey clouds. Using the metaphor of a tree, which
draws food from its surroundings, Tagore felt that for healthy growth, a
child should first study and love nature. He felt that a child must have
personal experience of trees before he studied botany as a science. Science
is, no doubt, useful, but scientific laws are man’s creations.
According to Tagore, love is the root of all relationships, binding us
all. Love is superior to knowledge. Human existence is being-with-others.
We are essential to one another. As Tagore puts it, “that I become more in
my union with others is not a simple fact of arithmetic. We have known that
when different personalities combine in love, which is the complete union,
then it is not like adding to the horse power of efficiency, but it is that what
was imperfect finds its perfection in truth, and therefore in joy.”9 “Human
society is the best expression of man, and that expression, according to its
perfection, leads him to the full realization of the divine in humanity.”10
Fulfillment is achieved in interpersonal relationships in spite of pain,
suffering, and death.
Tagore’s own experience combined knowledge and action, work and
joy. He wrote plays and acted in them, composing songs, which he sang,
and danced with his students. In their enjoyment he experienced joy
himself.
Tagore emphasized that mankind must realize unity in diversity and
established Visva-Bharati in Santiniketan with the hope that this University
would help in achieving this goal. Tagore’s Jana Gana Mana (Mind of the
People, 1912), which became India’s national anthem, emphasized India’s
6As referred to in Margaret Chatterjee, “Closing Remarks,” in Bhudeb
Chaudhuri and K.G. Subramanyam (eds.), Rabindranath Tagore and the
Challenges of Today (Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1988), p.
338.
7 Rabindranath Tagore, Personality (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd.,
1959), p. 14.
8 Rabindranath Tagore, “A Poet’s School,” in Visva –Bharati and Its
Institutions (Calcutta, 1961), p. 8.
9 Rabindranath Tagore, Personality (London: Macmillan, Pocket Tagore
Edition, 1985), p. 83.
10 Rabindranath Tagore, Creative Unity (London: Macmillan, Pocket
Tagore Edition, 1980), p. 23.
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achievement in maintaining unity amid diversity. The true meaning of
education lay in the discovery of the self.
“The first step toward that realization is revealing the different peoples
to one another…. We must find some meeting ground where there can be
no question of conflicting interest….. One such place is the university,
where we can work together in a common pursuit of truth, share together
our common heritage, and realize that artists in all parts of the world have
created forms of beauty; scientists have discovered secrets of the universe;
philosophers the problems of existence; saints made the truth of the
spiritual organic in their own lives, not merely for some particular race to
which they belonged but for all mankind.”11
“The spirit of democracy, of humanism, is Tagore’s greatest
contribution to multicultural education.”12 He emphasized the need for
harmony among all human races. Though people belong to different
cultures, no one should be exploited at the cost of another. No one should
be a victim of fear, oppression, exploitation, slavery, or superstition. Tagore
wrote strongly against these evils in his poem Questions. Tagore stood for
freedom and social justice as supreme human values. He even renounced
Knighthood as a protest against the Jallianwalla Bagh massacre in 1919.
Expressing himself as a humanist, he considered this as an insult to
mankind. In his novel Gora, written in 1907, he emphasized universal
humanism as above nationalism.
At a time when violence plagues our world, and when human beings
are so often regarded as tools in the objective world, it is good to be
reminded by Tagore that our being is concrete, that is, not to be reduced to
any kind of abstraction in a world of objects. In Sadhana, written in 1913,
Tagore reiterated the philosophy of the wholeness of existence. Tagore
observes, “in modern society, the ideal of wholeness has lost its force.”13
Tagore wrote to Andrews from New York, “The complete man must never
be sacrificed to the patriotic man, or even to the merely moral man. To me,
humanity is rich and large and many-sided.”14 “What Tagore loved and
11 As referred to in David Kopf, ”The Bengali Prophet of Mass Genocide :
Rabindranath Tagore and the Menace of Twentieth Century Nationalism,” in
Mary Lago and Ronald Warwick (eds.), Rabindranath Tagore : Perspectives in
Time (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, London: The Macmillan Press
Ltd., 1989), p. 61.
12 As referred to in Ranjana Ash, ”Introducing Tagore in Multicultural
Education in Britain,” in Mary Lago and Ronald Warwick (eds.), Rabindranath
Tagore: Perspectives in Time (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, London:
The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1989), p. 155.
13 As referred to in Sisir Kumar Das, ”Keynote Address,” in Bhudeb
Chaudhuri and K.G.Subramanyam (eds.), Rabindranath Tagore and the
Challenges of Today (Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1988), p. 21.
14 As referred to in Krishna Kripalani, Tagore – A Life, published by the
author (New Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay, Madras: Orient Longman Ltd. As sole
distributors, 1971), p. 168.
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admired was the man in man, irrespective of his status in society, be the
status common or uncommon, low or high.”15 Realization of the
“mahamanav,” or “the superman,” in every individual is an important facet
of his philosophy in his book The Religion of Man. He was a man who
loved human beings. He himself said: “My heart is with the menders on the
roadside, with the breakers of stone, with those who lay the bricks, and with
those who fetch the water and the mud….”16
Tagore’s great emphasis on the dignity of the human person needs to
be remembered in the midst of our tendency to think in terms of globalizing
powers, in relation to which we tend to feel that we are helpless pawns.
Bengali novels Nashtanir (The Broken Nest) and Chitrangada highlight the
quality of self-determination in Tagore’s female protagonists. Tagore
noticed that the treatment meted out to women in the traditional Hindu
household left a lot to be desired. While he conceded the fact that as
mothers and wives, women achieved a high degree of satisfaction, this did
not prevent him from realizing the loneliness that they so often experience.
He felt its impact when his sister-in-law committed suicide. He was
sensitive to the crisis of feminine identity. The heroine of Tagore’s Strir
Patra (A Wife’s Letter, 1914) went on to say: “In your joint family, I am
known as the second daughter-in-law. All these years, as I stand alone by
the sea, I know that I have another identity, which is my relationship with
the universe and its creator. That gives me the courage to write this letter as
myself, not as the second daughter-in-law of your family… I am not one to
die easily. That is what I want to say in this letter.” Tagore was no doubt a
poet who championed the cause of women, insisting that men must restore
the dignity and honor of women, both within and outside the home.
Department of Philosophy
University of New Delhi
New Delhi, India
seemabose2005@yahoo.co.in
15 Ibid., p. 250.
16 As referred to in Mulk Raj Anand, Tagore’s Religion of Man: An Essay
on Rabindranath Tagore’s Humanism, in Bhudeb Chaudhuri and K.G.
Subramanyam (eds.), Rabindranath Tagore and the Challenges of Today
(Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1988), p. 92.

CHAPTER XXVII
THE ACTING PERSON AND THE EXPERIENCE
OF VERTICAL TRANSCENDENCE IN KAROL
WOJTYLA’S WRITINGS
WILHELM DANCĂ
Abstract: This presentation is a critical consideration of the merits and
limitations of the phenomenological analysis of the acting person, based on
philosopher Karol Wojtyla’s chief oeuvre, The Acting Person. Following a
short introduction to Karol Wojtyla’s methodology and anthropology, I will
point out the peculiarity of his philosophical endeavor which, as it is well
known, starts not from the ontological structure of person, but from human
action as such, based on the intuition that the person is revealed in and
through action. I will also show that, to be understood and explained
adequately, the phenomenology of the experience of human acts requires a
perspective capable of taking it beyond simple morphological description.
Such a perspective may well manifest itself at the level of conscience,
which The Acting Person examines from more than one viewpoint. In this
presentation, I only examine the free acts of man, his decisions and choices,
as related to the analysis of the fundamental experience of the “I can, but
am not constrained to do this,” and to the presentation of the person as the
effective cause of its own actions.
Following Karol Wojtyla, I will attempt to bring together
phenomenology and metaphysics, and to this end I will address the
experience of the vertical transcendence of person, with a focus on the
spiritual nature of person. In the end, the unity of the person’s being relies
on the spiritual being. As suppositum metaphysicum, the spirit constitutes
the person’s wealth and that of its acts.
Keywords: Karol Wojtyla, acting person, vertical experience,
transcendence, phenomenology of human action
One of the reasons I decided to address this conference is the recent
beatification of Pope John Paul II. The ensuing discussions and debates
have brought to the fore the multiple facets of his personality, including the
personalist character of his thinking, as evidenced by an analysis of a
number of studies with a marked anthropological character, which he
authored when he was the Bishop of Krakow and a professor of
Philosophical Ethics. He wrote Love and Responsibility1 and The Acting
1 Cf. Karol Wojtyła, “Amore e responsabilità. Morale sessuale e vita
interpersonale” in: Karol Wojtyła, Metafisica della persona. Tutte le opere
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Person,2 as well his writings as Pope, particularly his encyclicals. I would
like to draw special attention to the encyclicals Redemptor hominis,
Veritatis splendor, and Fides et ratio. All of these studies show that Karol
Wojtyla’s personalism is deeply theocentric or theological; a fact which
should not cause raised eyebrows among philosophers, because in the
history of ideas, the understanding of man as person first appeared in
Christianity, as a result of Conciliar and Patristic debates on the divine
persons of the Holy Trinity.
The approach and methodology of my presentation, as well as the
meaning of the concept of person, lie at the confluence of faith and reason,
or philosophy and theology. My presentation consists of (1) a synthesis of
the roots of Wojtyla’s personalism, followed by (2) a presentation of
several dimensions of the person as revealed by the phenomenological
analysis of the person in action, and finally, (3) a reading of one of these
dimensions of the person in the framework of contemporary cultural
challenges.
THE ROOTS OF KAROL WOJTYLA’S PERSONALISM
The foreword of the English Edition of The Acting Person, Wojtyla’s
chief philosophical oeuvre, contains a philosophical confession concerning
his debt to Thomism and phenomenology: “The author of the present study
owes everything to the systems of metaphysics, of anthropology, and of
Aristotelian-Thomistic ethics on one hand, and through Max Scheler’s
critique, also to Kant, on the other hand.”3 The influence of Thomistic
thinking first appeared in Wojtyla’s reflections when he was an
undergraduate pursuing a degree in theology in Krakow, only to become
established later, during his doctoral studies in Rome, at the Angelicum
University, where, on June 19, 1948, under the guidance of the Dominican
Father Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, the most influential Catholic
theologian of the first half of the twentieth century, he defended his doctoral
thesis on “Faith According to Saint John of the Cross.” From a
philosophical viewpoint, Garrigou-Lagrange criticized the immanence of
modern philosophy while upholding the perceived truth of gnoseological
realism, arguing in favor of the intentional character and objectivity of
human knowledge. According to Garrigou-Lagrange, when human
intelligence steps out of itself, it does not encounter ideas, but things, or
rather the things’ existence. In supreme acts, humans have absolute pre-
eminence, as argued by Saint Thomas Aquinas, for whom existence is an
filosofiche e saggi integrativi (a cura di Giovanni Reale e Tadeusz Styczeń)
(Milano: Editrice Bompiani, 2003), pp. 461-778.
2 Cf. Cardinal Karol Wojtyła, The Acting Person (translated from the
Polish by Andrezej Potocki), (Dordrecht, Holland; Boston, U.S.A.; London,
England: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979).
3 Cardinal Karol Wojtyła, The Acting Person, p. xiv.
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act, formal in the highest degree, absolute perfection, or maximal actuality.
Wojtyla adopted such philosophical viewpoints in his doctoral thesis
from his mentor; nevertheless, the starting point for his research was neither
intelligence nor understanding, but the experience of faith. In a 1979 article,
Wojtyla synthesized the humanism of Saint John of the Cross while
emphasizing the empirical character of man’s subjective supernaturalism.
Here is the conclusion of this study: “the supernatural sphere of man
manifests itself as a super-subjective and, at the same time, super-
psychological fact. With Saint John of the Cross, what we find compelling
are not so much those reasonings which rely on an abstract view of man and
his nature, but the concrete itself, which pulsates with supernatural life in its
empirical development and becomes self-conscious in the context of
experience.”4
Therefore, it was from Saint John of the Cross and the Roman school
of philosophy (Garrigou-Lagrange) in general that Wojtyla adopted a
number of key philosophical notions, and he then returned to Poland with
the conviction that the phenomenology of experience can shed light on the
divine roots of man’s mystery, and that the experience of faith with its
accompanying mystical experience of the “night” and its emotional void,
make the human person an unobjectifiable subject that can only find
fulfillment in the transformation resulting from the interpersonal love of the
communion with God as Person. By adopting this interpretation of man
from Saint John of the Cross, Wojtyla saw humans as persons, that is,
beings created in the image and likeness of God, intelligent beings endowed
with spirituality, freedom, and subjective feelings – an “imago Dei.” In
other words, both God and humans are persons. However, Saint Thomas
Aquinas does not provide an adequate account of the way in which humans
are persons. Such an account is made possible by the fact that humans are
the only beings of which we have internal knowledge.
The influence of Scheler on Wojtyla’s thinking is debatable, for
several reasons.5 First, Wojtyla’s encounter with phenomenology was
mediated by one of Edmund Husserl’s disciples, Roman Ingarden, who
failed to share the idealist predisposition of his mentor’s philosophy, but
argued in favor of a realist phenomenology. Back then, despite Ingarden’s
distancing himself from religion, he was nevertheless an influence not only
on Wojtyla, but also on many of Wojtla’s disciples in terms of a realist
approach to phenomenology. It can be argued that through Ingarden,
Scheler came to be known in Poland as it was invaded by Marxist ideology.
Wojtyla dealt with Scheler’s writings, though not all of them, in his
habilitation thesis that he defended in Krakow in 1954, entitled An
4 Apud Alfred Wierzbicki, “La barca interiore. Affinità spirituale del
pensiero di Karol Wojyła con il pensiero di San Giovanni della Croce” in:
Karol Wojtyła, Metafisica della persona, pp. 10-11.
5 Cf. Rocco Buttiglione, Il pensiero di Karol Wojtyła (Milano: Editrice
Jaca Book, 1982), pp. 69-78.
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Evaluation of the Possibility of Devising a Christian Ethic Based on Max
Scheler’s System.6 Of Scheler’s works, he took particular interest in Der
Formalismus in der Ethik und die material Wertethik, a discussion of
Immanuel Kant’s views on ethics. In the conclusion to this thesis, Wojtyla
rejects Scheler’s system because of its emotional suppositions and the
elimination of the normative moment from moral experience (as against
Kant), while preserving the phenomenological approach, thus sharing
Scheler’s idea that ethics should rely on experience.
Several key notions of personal philosophy from his best-known and
most philosophical book, The Acting Person, can actually be identified in
his habilitation thesis. The first of these is the concept of act, which, for
Wojtyla, becomes a sort of window to the person’s inner person: indeed, it
can be argued that through his/her act, a person shows who he/she is, while
at the same time finding fulfillment. Secondly, Wojtyla held the conviction
that the phenomenological method can be employed to adequately reveal
precisely how humans are persons, an aspect neglected in Saint Thomas’
metaphysics. This is how Wojtyla’s postulate of uniting metaphysics and
phenomenology first appeared, to be later developed in The Acting Person.
THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PERSON IN
ACTION
The Acting Person was authored for a better understanding of man as
person, Wojtyla’s avowed aim. However, the study fails to prove that man
is a person and that his actions are acts as such elements appear in the
context of experience; consequently, it is not so much an instance of
speculative, but rather empirical and existential exposition. In other words,
what this book examines in the context of man’s totality of experience is
the moment when his personal character is revealed, that is, the moment
when his action is transformed into that act by which man becomes good or
bad in accordance with the values implicated in his action.
From a methodological perspective, phenomenological analysis
involves the following stages: 1. Identification of the common element, the
basis or determiner of the action from among the dynamic components
present in a particular domain of human activity; 2. once identified, the
element is not to be examined in itself, but rather in the recurrences where it
initially belonged and where its presence can be attested. Thus, experience
serves two functions, as it is both the starting point of the analysis and
verification instance for the reasoning. After reporting the data of
experience, the author concludes that “the act reveals the person, by means
of the experience which verifies it.”
6 Karol Wojtyła, “Valutazioni sulla possibilità di costruire l’etica cristiana
sulle basi del sistema di Max Schele” in: Karol Wojtyła, Metafisica della
persona, pp. 263-449.
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From the beginning, the book points to knowledge and experience in a
close relationship. Knowledge relies on experience, but experience
transcends all knowledge, and by this, it establishes itself as the first
constant appeal that reality makes to man’s cognitive faculties. Indeed,
experience is the only place where reality reveals itself to our cognitive
faculties; thus the ensuing question is: of what, exactly, am I meant to have
direct knowledge? Starting from this question, Wojtyla’s phenomenological
analysis reaches the level of conscience only to revert to experience, which
reflects and internalizes the data of the conscience. This in turn leads to
another question: what is the relationship between outer and inner
experience? By means of experience, man experiences himself as “I”; thus
man is meant for himself, and in this relationship lays a singular
unrepeatable cognitive relationship. No external relationship with another
human being can replace the inner relationship the “I” has with self. Inner
experience is so profound that it cannot be entirely communicated to others.
Man as “I” stands alone and is thus irreplaceable.
After an analysis of man’s original loneliness, viewed in the
framework of inner experience, Wojtyla goes on to consider outer
experience where, by means of knowledge, only “man” is experienced.
Such experience involves two subjects: the former is represented by the
others who look at me and get to know me through experience, from the
outside; the latter is my “I” who, even for me, is an external somebody, an
object of self-knowledge. Outer experience involves discovering the other
as an inner somebody, and in this way the two sides of experience come
together.
The concept of evidence is closely allied to that of experience. The
reference of the concept of evidence lies within the confines of lived
experience, where understanding of man as person takes place as well. As a
starting point in the phenomenological analysis of person, lived experience
disproves the old dictum operari sequitur esse, as action and act are meant
to approach the human being in order to reveal and understand it. Thus
Wojtyla’s understanding of the concept of person is a gnoseological but
nevertheless dynamic one,7 since it makes sense of the acting person. In this
way, Wojtyla argued that the person includes an irreducible something,
which sets it apart from other entities, which for us are something, whereas
a person is someone. The human person’s specific character, as expressed
by the semantic epitome “someone,” conditions and determines all of its
activity and action, while distinguishing the person not only from things,
but also from the other animates, which likewise act. Moreover, it should be
noted that the distinction between “something” and “someone” is
epitomized by the adjective “rational,” which specifies the nature of the
human person.
7 Cf. Giovanni Reale, “Saggio introduttivo” in: Karol Wojtyła, Metafisica
della persona, pp. LIII-LV.
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The analysis of the human act leads Wojtyla to argue that the human
person’s rationality manifests itself mainly as the faculty of understanding
the truth about good, to which human will is naturally predisposed.
Evaluation of the truth about good as presented to the intelligence by the
will allows man to be in constant touch with knowable reality, which, on
one hand, remains with the human subject intentionally, and, on the other,
allows man to distance himself from all things.
CONTEMPORARY CULTURAL CHALLENGES
Globalization and other forms of ideological or commercial
dictatorship result in the cancelation of the distinctions between things, and
even between persons and things, paving the way for the impoverishment of
world cultures and local traditions.
In view of Wojtyla’s argument concerning man as person, I would
argue in turn that by means of reason, human beings are capable of
transcending the limits of the reality of which they are a part, and indeed the
impending one. Such transcendence is of two kinds: a horizontal one, as
when, by means of will and intelligence, the knowledgeable subject directs
his attention toward the object and intentionally assimilates it and so
transcends it, and a vertical one, as when the human person transcends
itself. This latter type of transcendence is the result of self-determination,
and implies the human person transcends itself not so much in the direction
of truth as inside truth.
Also, the concept of self-determination is related to the idea of
freedom. Thus, if the person manifests itself through its will, that person’s
every act will confirm and instate the will as the person’s property, while
the person as a dynamic reality is constituted by its will. Consequently, as
conscious action, which exists in lived experience, and is different from that
peculiar dynamic termed “something taking place in the man,” a person’s
roots lie in his will, which, in turn, manifests itself in freedom, as when a
man says, “Yes, I can do this, because I am not constrained.”
Wojtyla’s phenomenological analysis of the acting person includes a
remarkable insight: the volitive aspect, or the moment of freedom, reveals
the human person, because it is the basis of its self-determination.
To conclude, if the human person reveals itself as such in human
action, that is, in acts of free will, then man increasingly becomes person to
the extent that he chooses the good. Nevertheless, choosing the good is
never an improvisation; rather, it takes time to prepare, patiently and
gradually, so that the will, as educated freedom, which specifies the human
person, implies not only the absence of constraint, but also the option for
values.
The Roman-Catholic Theological Institute of Iaşi
Iaşi, Romania,
wilhelmdanca@yahoo.co
CHAPTER XXVIII
DEFINING HUMAN DIGNITY: LANDMARKS IN
THE THOUGHT OF POPE BENEDICT XVI
TARCIZIU ŞERBAN
Abstract: It is well known that the Catholic Church has constantly declared
its interest in man, in his dignity and fulfillment. In the midst of the
mutations that have been taking place in the post-modern era, in the field of
gnoseology as well as in that of ethics, concerning man and his dignity, the
Catholic Church has brought its contribution, appreciating the positive
aspects and denouncing what it considers to be factors of degradation. Pope
Benedict XVI had several major interventions in this respect in his
encyclicals or in books such as The Salt of the Earth (1996) and The Light
of the World (2010). I am proposing hereby a synthesis of this vision of
Pope Benedict XVI, which I want to offer as a set of guide rules for
Romanian society, which appears to be more and more influenced by post-
modernism.
Keywords: human dignity, Pope Benedict XVI’s thought,
philosophical perspective, theological meanings.
INTRODUCTION
The theme of this symposium is an invitation for us to reflect on the
value of the human person in the context of our world. To state the obvious,
today’s world context is, in many ways, defined by globalization. Despite
the many undeniable advantages globalization has brought to mankind, the
process is not without its shortcomings, such as those which manifest
themselves in the form of numerous convulsions and crises. Such instances
have been predominantly visible in the political order of things, mostly in
the abrupt changes that took place at the end of the twentieth century in
Eastern Europe, or those currently happening in the Arab world with
explosions of violence. On one hand, the limits and dysfunctions of today’s
economic order are visible in the current crisis of the world economy. Such
limits and crises appear to demand a forceful tackling of the very basis of
the world economy in the context of globalization. These drawbacks are
patent in many of the facets of the world’s social order, where institutions
meant to serve the common good and the human person seem more inclined
to use the human person as an instrument, instead of serving its basic needs
in keeping with the human person’s God-given dignity. Last but not least,
this trend is mostly visible in the globalization of culture. Romania being
part of this global process, our symposium is a most welcome contribution
to the process of pondering the state of the matter, defining concepts,
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assessing hierarchies of values, comparing and challenging various fronts of
ideas and practical experiences. All of these come from a variety of spheres
of reflection, including those that pertain to the domain of philosophical and
theological thought. To this end, it is particularly important that structural
values be identified and defined: indeed, it is based on such foundations
that any project of life can be built. It is obvious that one of these structural
values is the value of human dignity. Notwithstanding the sometimes
diverging positions at the heart of the matter under discussion, our debate is
ultimately centered on ourselves as persons, as persons and human beings:
all of us concrete people, flesh and bone human beings, each with one’s
unique unrepeatable destiny.
My purpose here is to briefly touch on some of the ways in which
human dignity is being assessed from a contemporary philosophical
perspective, and then to focus as faithfully as I possibly can on the Catholic
Church’s understanding and vision of the subject, and on ways in which its
teachings take part in this current process of reflection. In this respect, the
most authoritative voice, of course, is the voice and pronouncements of
Pope Benedict XVI.
ASSESSING AND DEFINING HUMAN DIGNITY FROM A
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE
The issue of human dignity is at the very heart of all philosophical
reflection, because it is naturally in its own area of exploration, in which the
foundations of morals and ethics are generally defined. But how is one to
define human dignity today, given the fact that at the dawn of this new
century we have to deal with a situation in which “the blurring of the truths
proposed by various systems of contemporary thought demand a minimal,
universally valid, and unique agreement centered on a principle common to
the whole of mankind, while on the other hand, the recognition of the
plurality of creeds and the respect due to all cultures seem to create an
inescapable challenge”? Moreover, the horrors of totalitarianism keep
reminding us of the fact that “the conditions of co-habitation are never to be
taken as a definitive given.” That was the grave question posed, among
others, by Thomas De Koninck and Gilbert Larochelle in the opening
thoughts of their book Human Dignity – Philosophy, Law, Politics,
Economy, Medical Practice.1
In the chapter dealing with the “Archeology of the Notion of Human
Dignity,” De Koninck gives a very suggestive bird’s eye view on the
subject. The author underscores the fact that the very term “dignity” suffers
from a kind of semantic inflation, which in certain cases either obliterates or
1 Thomas De Koninck & Gilbert Larochelle, La Dignité humaine –
Philosophie, droit, politique, économie, médicine (Paris: PUF, 2005).
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emphasizes a certain ambiguity already visible in its etymon.2 There
appears to be also a slight problem of interpretation in fitting the concept of
human dignity into the context and wording of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. The latter declares that the unanimity of nations recognize
the fact that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights.” However, where does the unanimity of the signatory countries
come from, given the fact that there are so many divergences amongst
them? The best answer may be the one given by Paul Ricoeur, who
observes that, despite all differences, in all cultures, no matter how far back
in time we go, the same exigency exists: that “something is due to all
human beings for the simple reason of their being human.” De Konninck
goes on to underscore the fact that in all civilizations, an increasingly
central place has been given across time to the dignity of the weak and
underprivileged. Such a particular notion is to be found both in the thought
of Confucius and in the Quran, just as in the writings of the Ancient Greeks.
Gleaning from acknowledgments made by more recent authors –
Emmanuel Levinas, George Steiner, and Schopenhauer, among others – De
Konninck emphasizes the fact that the dignity of the person is a human
attribute that applies regardless of rank, most revealingly to those less
endowed with power. Confirmation of this defining feature can also be
found in the thinking of such great precursors as Sophocles, Aristotle, Plato,
the Aquinate, Pico della Mirandola, and Pascal, all of whose interpretations
boil down to the basic truth that “all our dignity resides in the fact that man
alone is a thinking being”; and, by way of consequence, that man alone is
endowed with the conscience of individual death. To the same sphere of the
human capacity to think belongs the person’s capacity to decide, as there is
no action without its counterpart: to act or not to act. Hence the link
between dignity on one hand and the liberty to choose between different
courses of action on the other, both rooted in the faculty to ponder and
think. De Konninck also mentions Immanuel Kant, with possibly the best
definition given to dignity in the modern era: the human person is infinitely
priceless, superior to all other possible values in the world, as he said it.
The value of the person, according to Kant’s definition, is absolute. The
logical consequence of this premise points to the absolute respect due to
each and every human being; and, by way of consequence, the same leads
to a new and essential conceptual link: the human person’s natural
aspiration for due recognition.
Paradoxically, despite such positive premises, as we all know, the
twentieth century has been one of rationally organized unspeakable
atrocities, which should lead us to acknowledge the reverse concept: that of
human indignity. Taking a look back at the historical development of
2 Dignus is connected to decet, i.e., “should”, “must”, “it is proper”, “it
behooves”, another root-connection sends us to decus, which suggests such
kindred notions as “decency” and “dignity”; and last but not least, decor, akin
to the notions of “honor” and “beauty”.
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mankind, one can see that, as a rule, barbarity and savagery begins when
man makes bold choices to ignore the dignity of his own person, the age-
old commandment – know thyself – and thus to end up ignoring the dignity
of his own fellow beings. It begins the moment one forgets that doing harm
to someone else also means doing harm to oneself. This is the position
where a fundamental solidarity concept usually comes into play: Do to
others as you would have them do to you; or, to put it another way: What
you don't like, don't do to your fellow beings.
Unfortunately, as we all too frequently have occasion to notice, such
tenets are more often than not distorted; they are either turned into
moralizing assumptions or else into secular ideologies which blatantly turn
their back on the gist of what such sayings predicate. Such positions throw
into ever bolder relief the huge gap between certain statements that have
been integrated into a Universal Declaration and “the social realities of the
violence to which many of our fellow beings are being exposed.”
The book I have been quoting from examines a number of areas in
which human dignity is being denied or trampled on nowadays. Here are
the relevant chapter titles: La dignité de mourir: un défi pour le droit
(Dignity in Dying: a Challenge to Law); Le défi politique (Political
Challenge); Repenser l’économie (Rethinking the Economy), and
Fragments sur la médecine (Fragments on Medical Practice).
DEFINING HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE PRONOUNCEMENTS OF
VATICAN II
The Second Vatican Council was the occasion when the Catholic
Church expressed with full lucidity and responsibility its position in
adapting itself to the new challenges posed in our era to the human person,
to human society, and to the direction in which the world is evolving. The
most important pronouncements in this sense are those contained in the
pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes.
According to the almost unanimous opinion of believers and unbelievers
alike, all things on earth should be related to man as their center and crown.
But what is man? About himself he has expressed, and continues to
express, many divergent and even contradictory opinions. In these he often
exalts himself as the absolute measure of all things or debases himself to
the point of despair. The result is doubt and anxiety. The Church certainly
understands these problems. Endowed with light from God, she can offer
solutions to them, so that man's true situation can be portrayed and his
defects explained, while at the same time his dignity and destiny are justly
acknowledged.
For Sacred Scripture teaches that man was created “to the image of
God,” is capable of knowing and loving his Creator, and was appointed by
Him as master of all earthly creatures that he might subdue them and use
them to God's glory… man abused his liberty… set himself against God
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and sought to attain his goal apart from God… What divine revelation
makes known to us agrees with experience. Examining his heart, man finds
that he has inclinations toward evil too… Indeed, man finds that by himself
he is incapable of battling the assaults of evil successfully… (GS 12.13)
The truth is that only in the mystery of the incarnate Word does the
mystery of man take on light… Christ, the final Adam, by the revelation of
the mystery of the Father and His love, fully reveals man to man himself
and makes his supreme calling clear… He Who is “the image of the
invisible God” (Col 1:15), is Himself the perfect man. To the sons of Adam
He restores the divine likeness which had been disfigured from the first sin
onward…
The Christian man, conformed to the likeness of that Son Who is the
firstborn of many brothers, received “the first-fruits of the Spirit” (Rm 8:23)
by which he becomes capable of discharging the new law of love. Through
this Spirit, who is “the pledge of our inheritance” (Eph 1:14), the whole
man is renewed from within, even to the achievement of “the redemption of
the body.” All this holds true not only for Christians, but for all men of
good will in whose hearts grace works in an unseen way. (GS 22)
FROM THEORETICAL PRONOUNCEMENT TO CONCRETE
ACTION
Pope Benedict XVI wholly embraced the vision of Vatican II on
human dignity, a vision which one can see transposed in many of his own
pronouncements, especially in those dealing with situations in which human
dignity has been at stake because of infringements. Such pronouncements
have taken shape either in the form of ample documents, such as three
Encyclical letters – Deus caritas est, Spe salvi, and Caritas in veritate, or in
messages broadcast on various occasions. In the following, I would like to
offer some quotes gleaned from these documents. They might be taken as
landmarks to be taken into account in philosophical reflections on the
current situation of human dignity in the age of globalization, and also in
the context of the world challenges posed to human dignity by current
socio-political and economy-related developments.
Speaking to the Council of the Europe Parliamentary Assembly, the
Pope had the following to say on the occasion of the 60-year Anniversary
of The European Convention on Human Rights:3
Keeping in mind the context of today’s society in which different peoples
and cultures come together, it is imperative to develop the universal validity
of these rights as well as their inviolability, inalienability, and indivisibility.
On different occasions, I have pointed out the risks associated with
relativism in the area of values, rights, and duties. If these were to lack an
objective rational foundation, common to all peoples, and were based
3 Vatican, September 8th, 2010.
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exclusively on particular cultures, legislative decisions, or court judgments,
how could they offer a solid and long-lasting ground for supranational
institutions such as the Council of Europe, and for your own task within
that prestigious institution? How could a fruitful dialogue among cultures
take place without common values, rights, and stable, universal principles
understood in the same way by all Member States of the Council of
Europe? These values, rights, and duties are rooted in the natural dignity of
each person, something which is accessible to human reasoning. The
Christian faith does not impede, but favors this search, and is an invitation
to seek a supernatural basis for this dignity.
His Holiness the Pope’s remarks concluded laying special stress on the
importance of specific situations in which these principles bear on the
essentials of human life – from the moment of conception to death, with
special emphasis on marriage, seen as an exclusive reciprocal gift of life
between man and woman; last but not least on religious freedom and
education. All of these are seen as compulsory conditions to be respected if
one is to respond in a correct, responsible manner to the circumstances and
challenges of history.
On another occasion, addressing the participants to a Seminar on
European Higher Education,4 Pope Benedict XVI had the following to say:
With a quick glance at the “old” Continent, it is easy to see the
cultural challenges that Europe faces today, since it is committed
to rediscovering its own identity, which is not exclusively
economic or political. The basic question today, as in the past,
remains the anthropological question: What is man? Where does
he come from? Where must he go? How must he go?
In other words, it is a matter of clarifying the conception of
the human being on which new projects are based. And you are
rightly asking yourselves which human being, which image of
man, does the university intend to serve: an individual withdrawn
into the defense of his own interests, a single perspective of
interests, a materialistic perspective, or a person who is open to
solidarity with others in the search for the true meaning of
existence, which must be a common meaning that transcends the
individual?
We also wonder what the relationship between the human
person, science, and technology is. If in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, technology made amazing progress, at the
beginning of the twenty-first century, further steps were taken:
technology also took charge, thanks to computer science, of part
of our mental processes, with consequences that involve our way
of thinking and can condition our very freedom.
4 Vatican, April 1th, 2006.
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It must be forcefully stated that the human being cannot and
must not ever be sacrificed to the success of science and
technology: this is why the so-called “anthropological question”
assumes its full importance.
For us, the heirs of the humanist tradition founded on
Christian values, this question should be faced in the light of the
inspiring principles of our civilization, to be found in European
universities: authentic laboratories for research and for deepening
knowledge.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, I would like to quote from some particularly well-
focused remarks made by Pope Benedict in response to a speech of
Romania’s new Ambassador to the Holy See, Tătaru-Cazaban, in October
last year, at the time of the presentation of his credential letters. It is true
that the weight and tone of the Pope’s remarks seem to carry a mostly
political connotation. However, I find them pertinent in that they bear on
the whole idea of reform in this country in the context of globalization. I
find them also to be apposite and relevant in the context of the challenges
the participants to this symposium are facing in their own constructive
endeavors, as they try to respond the best they can to the great challenges
posed by globalization to the society of today’s Romania. Here is the Pope
speaking to Romania:
Twenty years ago, Romania decided to write a new page of its history.
However, so many years lived under the yoke of a totalitarian ideology
have deeply affected the attitude of individuals in political and economic
life. After the period of the euphoria of freedom, your nation undertook
with determination a process of rebuilding and healing…
To pursue this renewal in depth, a number of new challenges need to
be met in order… Dealing with the heritage left by Communism is difficult
because of the disintegration of society and of the individual that it fostered.
The authentic values, in fact, were overshadowed to the advantage of false
theories that were idolized for reasons of State…
Today, therefore, it is a question of engaging in the difficult task of the
just ordering of human affairs by making good use of freedom. True
freedom implies the search for truth and goodness, and it is achieved,
precisely, by knowing and doing what is appropriate and right.
Roman-Catholic Theological Institute “St. Joseph”
Iaşi, Romania
starciziu@yahoo.fr

CHAPTER XXIX
ANTHONY DE MELLO’S LIFELONG SPIRITUAL
PEDAGOGY: AWAKENING AND AWARENESS
MAGDALENA DUMITRANA
Abstract: Anthony de Mello was one of the most known and appreciated,
but also controversial, personalities of the Catholic world. Courageous and
motivated by a profound and genuine belief, by the honest aspiration for
helping people, and acting in a way that could not have been met by a
positive reaction from the common people, he broke the patterns of
fundamental theology, exclusively addressing his words to the spiritual
zone that exists in any human being. Unlike other theologians and
philosophers, one could say that de Mello’s life and writings constitute one
single body of expression.
Lacking the calling for dogma and of a fanatical narration, de Mello
directly enters the subject of daily living which, in his eyes, loses the
banality of the common place. Daily life constitutes the space and time
within which every human being meets every moment, the most profound
spirituality. The understanding of this reality is obstructed by a barrier that
is insurmountable for the great majority of people- it is the barrier of the
‘sleep.’ The object of de Mello’s discourse is precisely to awaken man from
the obnubilation of his consciousness and to prepare and guide him
psychologically and spiritually, in order to make him willing to assume his
own genuine identity.
The central concept in de Mello’s writings and conferences is,
therefore, that of awareness. The emphasis on this awakening state has its
source in Indian spirituality, which de Mello has known well. At the same
time, the Christian ground furnishes another important source in what
concerns the essence of the message. The nucleus of the two types of
spirituality is the same: awareness and self-awareness, which is the same
thing as understanding – an understanding that transcends both the
cognition and the feeling, both the philosophy and theology, reinstalling
man in his own nature. On this basis, de Mello sketches his “program of
life,” which is, in fact, a pedagogical way of helping people to discover and
develop their own spirituality. As a spiritual teacher, de Mello explains
what Reality is and indicates in his discourse the path and the instruments
for reaching it.
Keywords: delusion, spirituality, consciousness, freedom, truth.
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THE LIFE PURPOSE
A man found an eagle’s egg and put it in a nest of a barnyard hen. The
eaglet hatched with a brood of chicks and grew up with them. All his life,
the eagle did what the barnyard chicks did, thinking that he was a barnyard
chicken. He scratched the earth for worms and insects. He clucked and
cackled. And he would thrash his wings and fly a few feet into the air.
Years passed and the eagle grew very old. One day he saw a
magnificent bird above him in the cloudless sky. It glided in graceful
majesty among the powerful wind currents, with scarcely a beat of its
strong golden wings.
The old eagle looked up in awe. “Who’s that?” he asked.
“That’s the eagle, the king of the birds,” said his neighbor. “He
belongs to the sky. We belong to the earth-we’re chickens.” So the eagle
lived and died a chicken, for that’s what he thought he was. (Song of the
Bird)
Out of Anthony de Mello’s little stories, perhaps this is the most
known. It summarizes in its content the entire tragedy of humanity – a blind
and unconscious humanity, of which members live, each of them, a life-
illusion. It is a story full of humor, a strong and real story; but also a tragic
story. More than that, one can find in this little story another meaning, too.
In it can be seen the huge task undertaken by de Mello: to “force” human
individuals to know their real nature and live according to it. De Mello
attempts to force, to break the barriers of the spiritual sleep, compelling
people to understand, together with their own essence, the source of evil in
everybody’s life and also, the way of changing the sleep slavery. In short,
de Mello was, and still is, by his writings, an Awakener, par excellence.
Very well known within the Catholic world, de Mello is almost
completely ignored by the Orthodox part of Christianity. There, where his
name is familiar, his spirit has remained hidden.1
De Mello is perhaps one of the rare cases of the modern world where
philosophy, belief, and the life-style constitute a single entity, impossible to
be fragmentized. As a priest, following Thomas d’Aquino in his
affirmations toward the end of his life, he understood the lack of substance
of dogmatism. As a philosopher, he kept himself far from theoretical
constructions, considering them as being mostly devoid of reality. As a
human being, however, he could not but live in full authenticity, within
which belief, philosophy and breathing cannot exist separately, not even in
a theoretical framework.
One might say that de Mello is the answer to the question: “What is
the usefulness of philosophy?” or to the similar one: “What is the utility of
belief?” The answer is simple: to know how to live in full consciousness.
1 In Romania, only few years ago, some of his volumes of stories were
translated. Unfortunately, in the public conscience, they were perceived as
being so called “therapeutical stories”.
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And de Mello presents also the technique by which the human individual
can awaken to life.
ATTACHMENTS
The fundamental feature of life, as lived by the most people, is the
lack of freedom – an accepted, consentual, and normalized lack of freedom.
This lack of freedom is the principle that governs social life; it is the insurer
of happiness. Relationships, the observance of regulations of any kind; the
trust that what is said by the “professionals” of any category is right and
good; the appreciation of one’s own value through external confirmations;
to no longer speak of the importance of financial and social status; all these
ingredients fill the jar of human happiness. What de Mello does is to take
this jar and he breaks it down to the ground. Once the illusions are
dispelled, only the truth remains.
Life as Sleep
“Life is a dream” – here is a statement which is familiar to the
Occidentals.2 It seems to belong to the arts, to aesthetics, and therefore, it
finds the emotional gate open. Dreams belong to sleep; therefore it can be
pleasant to sleep – to take a rest, to feel comfortable, enter another reality,
becoming somebody else in some other place, where the conflicts and
discontents are extinguished or solved, places where one feels safe. A safe
dream – this is the rule for the majority of people, even a definition of
happiness.
But for someone adept in Oriental wisdom, the affirmation that people
live a sleeping life does not contain anything aesthetic, anything
philosophical or pleasure provoking. It is only a realistic, palpable
description of human existence. This second meaning is the one in which de
Mello places his discourse, a natural thing, since his native country is India
(a fact that he never ceases to mention). The theme of ‘life as sleep’ is
typical for Indian spirituality, but the way de Mello approaches this topic is
actually appropriate to the Western spirit: direct, often with hardness,
apparently with cynicism. Let us not be deceived by this language that, in
fact, expresses a profound concern. What would happen if, reading this
passage, we suspected the speaker of cruelty: “And if thy hand offends thee,
cut it off…”? (Mark, 9: 43-47). Cutting off illusion is the specialty of de
Mello’s “humorous” philosophy: “Most people, even though they don’t
know it, are asleep. They’re born asleep, they live asleep, they marry in
2 “La vida es sueño” (Life is a dream), a play by Pedro Calderón de la
Barca (sec. XVII).
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their sleep, they breed children in their sleep, they die in their sleep, without
ever waking up.”3
The state of life-sleep has many advantages: firstly, it is claimed that
this state is the way of obtaining happiness. Are not all people chasing after
happiness? Do not all the philosophies proclaim that human nature’s
essence is the pursuit of happiness? But what does happiness mean in this
case? In short – the lack of worries and nice, warm feelings. It means to
sleep/live cozy; to sleep safely through all the socially institutionalized
illusions; it means to react “rightly” as an obedient organism, waiting for its
gratification. “Normally, the way it goes, I press a button and you’re up; I
press another button and you’re down. And you like that. How many people
do you know who are unaffected by praise or blame? That isn’t human, we
say. Human means that you have to be a little monkey, so everybody can
twist your tail and you do whatever you ought to be doing…We are so
mechanical, so controlled. We write books about being controlled, and how
wonderful it is to be controlled, and how necessary it is that people tell you
you’re okay. Then, you’ll have a good feeling about yourself.”4 In this state,
everything a man thinks that is real, that belongs to that reality, that he
wants to have because it is worthy, is nothing in fact but the effect of mist
characterizing this unconscious condition.
At the basis of this life-sleep lies an element that we used to consider
as normal-selfishness. Selfishness in its pure state is easy to identify, as it is
defined by the possessive pronoun: my wish, my object, my family, my
misery, my happiness. The second kind of selfishness, however, is more
difficult to seize, on account of its renouncing of external attributes and
specific verbal expressions. The label utilized is “devotion.” This is the self-
love called “charity.” But human egoisms do not stop here: “There are three
types of selfishness. The first type is the one where I give myself the
pleasure of pleasing myself. That’s what we generally call self-
centeredness. The second is when I give myself the pleasure of pleasing
others. That would be a more refined kind of selfishness… Then you’ve got
the third type, which is the worst: when you do something good so that you
won’t get a bad feeling… We don’t want to do the hurting ourselves
because we’ll get hurt! Ah, there it is. If we do the hurting, others will have
a bad opinion of us. They won’t like us, they’ll talk against us, and we don’t
like that.”5
Self-enteredness as a need to seek the well-being condition for oneself
is built on a series of ideas – illusions which consider the comfortable state
as a criterion of evaluation for social and individual progress. In fact, these
ideas are simple dependencies that do not reach in any way the essence of
3 Anthony de Mello, Awareness. A. de Mello Spirituality Conference in
His Own Words, Edited by J. Francis Stroud, S.J. (London: Fount Paperbacks,
1990), p. 5.
4 Ibid., p. 40.
5 Ibid., pp.19; 24; 26.
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human existence, but which actually prevent human beings from grasping
it.
Beside egoism, one of the important features of the life-sleep is the
wish for happiness. But happiness, in the way the common man
understands it, is one of his many illusions, says de Mello. At the level of
common understanding, happiness is a conditioned state. It is conditioned
by another being, thing, or situation. Happiness is a conditioned reflex, in
which the reinforcing stimulus is social comfort. Man cannot be simply
happy; he must be connected to something.
In another words, although he wishes and acts for the acquisition of
his own happiness, man is convinced that happiness can be obtained only
by his attachment to something else, outside of his Self. So, he thinks that
happiness can be obtained only by renouncing his own freedom.
Consequently, it can be asserted in this flow of thinking that slavery is the
bearer of happiness or at least, the most accessible form of happiness.
Attachment in the adult life is not the same principle that helps (or
hinders) a child to develop a balanced personality. In adulthood, this bond
appears as a weakness of slavery. The unconditioned, uncritical obedience
to norms, to the structures of ideas, to ideologies, becomes the positive
principle of social behavior, the criterion of good and evil. External
regulation is the cognitive and moral norm which destroys the faintest
attempt at thinking. In this respect, there is a little story by de Mello about a
“…fellow in London after the war. He’s sitting with a parcel wrapped in
brown paper in his lap. It’s a big, heavy object. The bus conductor comes
up to him and says, ‘What do you have on your lap there?’ And the man
says, ‘This is an unexploded bomb. We dug it out of the garden and I’m
taking it to the police station.’ The conductor says, ‘You don’t want to carry
that on your lap. Put it under the seat.’”6 Obviously, the driver is not
interested in the content of the message, but only in behavior regulation.
But the rules are expressed by words and from here, a new slavery.
The words are carriers of personal experiences; therefore, here there is a
new link in the chain of attachments. Through the instrumentality of words
are expressed all the cultural conditionings. These attachments are not
necessarily negative. They become, however, a burden when an individual
defines himself by these word attachments, and when blinded by what he
believes, is no more able to see the real phenomena: “I need to talk about
words and concepts because I must explain to you why it is, when we look
at a tree, we really don’t see. We think we do, but we don’t. When we look
at a person, we really don’t see that person, we only think we do. What
we’re seeing is something that we fixed in our mind. We get an impression
and we hold on to that impression, and we keep looking at the person
through that impression. And we do this with almost everything.”7 Let us
listen to another story, shocking by the simplicity of its truth. The man just
6 Ibid., pp. 41-42.
7 Ibid., p. 103.
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does not want to change his ideas, even if reality slaps him in the face:
“Henry, how you’ve changed! You were so tall and you’ve grown so short.
You were so well built and you’ve grown so thin. You were so fair and
you’ve become so dark. What happened to you, Henry?” Henry says, “I’m
not Henry. I’m John.” “Oh, you changed your name too!”8
Indiscriminate attachment to norms determines also an urgent need for
reward. One is able to appreciate his life as ‘normal’ and ‘good’ only
through external signals: it is important to be respectable, to be loved and
appreciated; otherwise, you are not “recognized” as a worthy human being.
But all of these are only illusion, says the Indian Catholic priest, illusion
and self-imprisonment. The life composed by different social dependencies
is a life impregnated with fear and anger.
There is only one evil in the world, affirms de Mello, and this is fear:
the fear of failure, the fear of not getting, the fear of not loosing, the fear of
not being appreciated. The fear of not seeing fulfilled your own desires
makes you aggressive: “It’s only when you are afraid that you become
angry. Think of the last time you were angry and search for the fear behind
it. What were you afraid of seeing? What were you afraid of losing? What
were you afraid would be taken from you? That’s where the anger comes
from.”9
None of these attachments is real. But we must understand what reality
actually means for de Mello. What is real is perceived and understood in the
full wakeful state, with a full consciousness; real is only the truth. Neither
the external norms nor the external appreciation, neither fear nor anger are
real; they do not belong to the human essence. They are only delusions born
by the sleepy-life, by the system of dependencies that an individual
considers as being the basic condition for a normal life. This conditioning
serves as a substitute for reality, distorting it and enclaving it in the ghetto
of counterfeit ideas.
RELIGION
As long as the psychologist and philosopher de Mello focuses on the
discussion about social and moral regulations and on the knowledge and
self-knowledge of the psychological mechanisms determining human
behavior, things seem to develop in a regular way. But Father de Mello
does not stop there; he provokes agitation and indignation when he
approaches the delicate subject of religion. It seems, by its affirmations, that
he overturns the entire scaffolding of religious ideology – of all religions,
equally. Thus, he says:
- Spirituality is a reality much broader than one religion or another;
there is no equivalence between these two: “…I want you to understand
8 Ibid., p. 28.
9 Ibid., p. 62.
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something right at the beginning, that religion is not – I repeat: not –
necessarily connected with spirituality.”10
- The excess of ritualism and the obligation of observing church
regulations darken the Reality on which faith and spiritual truth is based:
“You know that there are times…when the Blessed Sacrament becomes
more important than Jesus Christ, when worship becomes more important
than love, when the Church becomes more important than life, when God
becomes more important than the neighbor. And so it goes on. That’s the
danger. To my mind this is what Jesus was evidently calling us to – first
things first! The human being is much more important than the Sabbath.”11
- Excessive regulations divide and separate people from spiritual
reality, leading to phenomena similar to idolatry. For example: “There was
a group of a thousand people who went on a pilgrimage to Mexico City to
venerate the shrine of Our Lady of Guadelupe. They sat down before the
statue in protest because the Bishop of the Diocese had declared Our Lady
of Lourdes patroness of the diocese! They were sure that Our Lady of
Guadalupe felt this very much, so they were doing the protest in reparation
for the offense.”12
- Religion is not only a conglomerate of dogmas, but also one of
vanities; any religion that considers it knows everything about God raises a
barrier between individuals and God, forcing its believers to an
unconditional trust in a doctrine. Instead of a spiritual reality, religion
presents a bag of words: “The fact is that you’re surrounded by God and
you don’t see God, because you “know” about God. The final barrier to the
vision of God is your God concept. You miss God because you think you
know. That’s the terrible thing about religion. That’s what the gospels were
saying, that religious people ‘knew,’ so they got rid of Jesus. The highest
knowledge of God is to know God as unknowable. There is far too much
God talk; the world is sick of it… All revelations, however divine, are
never any more than a finger pointing to the moon. As we say in the East,
when the sage points to the moon, all the idiot sees is the finger.”13
De Mello’s assertions about religion could appear to a superficial mind
as attacks on Christianity and further, at Catholicism. Nothing is more false.
A more attentive mind or rather, a detached mind, to use one of de Mello’s
dear words, understands that, in fact, it is not about religion in itself. De
Mello, a Catholic priest, has not disowned his vocation; not for a second.
What he criticizes in this context is the people’s illusions, their opinions
toward the unseen reality, the hubris of a limited mind to explain what is
limitless. De Mello’s intention is only to shake the structure of the cognitive
illusions that form religious dogmas; from (any) Church point of view,
these dogmas constitute the required glasses for any follower, glasses
10 Ibid., p. 21.
11 Ibid., pp. 66-67.
12 Ibid., pp. 52-53.
13 Ibid., p. 102.
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without which his belief cannot be “right.” The thick sieve of religious
dogmatism is the target of de Mello’s attack in his striving to free people
from ideological slavery. The corseting in rituals of belief, the consideration
of events only on the basis of religious ideology, leads people in precisely
the opposite direction than that of the one declared.
The result of this fight has a double aspect: one is the echo in people’s
consciousness and the other is the echo in the Church, as the administrator
of religion. The first aspect is related to each person’s individuality and
cannot actually be evaluated. The second is easy to assess, as being
represented by a dogmatic document presented by the Congregation for the
Doctrine of the Faith.14 Obviously, there is a strong desynchronizing
14 Here is the “Notification,” very well known by Catholics but still
unknown by the Orthodox Christians:
Congregation For The Doctrine Of The Faith. Notification
Concerning. The Writings Of Father Anthony De Mello, S.J. The
Indian Jesuit priest, Father Anthony de Mello, (1931-1987) is well
known due to his numerous publications which, translated into
various languages, have been widely circulated in many countries of
the world, though not all of these texts were authorized by him for
publication. His works, which almost always take the form of brief
stories, contain some valid elements of Oriental wisdom. These can
be helpful in achieving self-mastery, in breaking the bonds and
feelings that keep us from being free, and in approaching with
serenity the various vicissitudes of life. Especially in his early
writings, Father de Mello, while revealing the influence of Buddhist
and Taoist spiritual currents, remained within the lines of Christian
spirituality. In these books, he treats the different kinds of prayer:
petition, intercession, and praise, as well as contemplation of the
mysteries of the life of Christ, etc. But already in certain passages in
these early works and to a greater degree in his later publications,
one notices a progressive distancing from the essential contents of
the Christian faith. In place of the revelation which has come in the
person of Jesus Christ, he substitutes an intuition of God without
form or image, to the point of speaking of God as a pure void. To see
God it is enough to look directly at the world. Nothing can be said
about God; the only knowing is unknowing. To pose the question of
his existence is already nonsense. This radical apophaticism leads
even to a denial that the Bible contains valid statements about God.
The words of Scripture are indications which serve only to lead a
person to silence. In other passages, the judgment on sacred religious
texts, not excluding the Bible, becomes even more severe: they are
said to prevent people from following their own common sense and
cause them to become obtuse and cruel. Religions, including
Christianity, are one of the major obstacles to the discovery of truth.
This truth, however, is never defined by the author in its precise
contents. For him, to think that the God of one's own religion as the
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between the levels of the discussion, which are determined by completely
different objectives. While Father de Mello refers to the criterion of Truth,
the Notification of the Congregation refers to the doctrine. Interesting to
note, the “verdict” was pronounced only eleven years after de Mello’s
death, and was signed by one Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger. And even more
interesting, the act was signed on the day of the commemoration of St. John
the Baptizer celebration, a great spiritual revolutionary, in whose footsteps
followed Anthony de Mello.
only one is simply fanaticism. "God" is considered as a cosmic
reality, vague and omnipresent; the personal nature of God is
ignored and in practice denied. Father de Mello demonstrates an
appreciation for Jesus, of whom he declares himself to be a
"disciple." But he considers Jesus as a master alongside others. The
only difference from other men is that Jesus is "awake" and fully
free, while others are not. Jesus is not recognized as the Son of God,
but simply as the one who teaches us that all people are children of
God. In addition, the author's statements on the final destiny of man
give rise to perplexity. At one point, he speaks of a "dissolving" into
the impersonal God, as salt dissolves in water. On various occasions,
the question of destiny after death is declared to be irrelevant; only
the present life should be of interest. With respect to this life, since
evil is simply ignorance, there are no objective rules of morality.
Good and evil are simply mental evaluations imposed upon reality.
Consistent with what has been presented, one can understand how,
according to the author, any belief or profession of faith whether in
God or in Christ cannot but impede one's personal access to truth.
The Church, making the word of God in Holy Scripture into an idol,
has ended up banishing God from the temple. She has consequently
lost the authority to teach in the name of Christ. With the present
Notification, in order to protect the good of the Christian faithful,
this Congregation declares that the above-mentioned positions are
incompatible with the Catholic faith and can cause grave harm. The
Sovereign Pontiff John Paul II, at the Audience granted to the
undersigned Cardinal Prefect, approved the present Notification,
adopted in the Ordinary Session of this Congregation, and ordered
its publication. Rome, from the offices of the Congregation for the
Doctrine of the Faith, June 24, 1998.
The Solemnity of the Birth of John the Baptist. + Joseph Card. Ratzinger
Prefect + Tarcisio Bertone, S.D.B. Archbishop Emeritus of Vercelli
Secretary www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/demello; http://
www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfai
th_doc_19980624_demello_en.html
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AWARENESS – AWAKENING – AWARENESS
Father de Mello’s message is difficult to understand, as in fact, are all
spiritual messages, though, paradoxically, the linguistic form is more than
accessible. The same for the literary form: stories, personal memories,
others’ memories, direct and shocking words suddenly sweetened by a good
laugh, after which, again, the thunder startles the audience. A series of
dramatic ingredients gives flavor to the common man’s daily life: routines,
regulations, necessary obediences, are all approached both with irony and
gravity. But none of these is too serious from the point of view of spiritual
reality except one: the offense of mental routine. The uncritical acceptance
imposed by institutionalized constructions; the acceptance of thinking
coming from outside; the thought of being proved “good” by the immediate
effects of comfort; the voluntary renunciation of any attempt at personal
judgment; self-repudiation in the case of any weak sign of courage of
asking “why?”; the unquestioning obedience of the external control of one’s
feelings, thoughts, and attitudes; the acceptance with gratitude of small
rewards for good behavior, the right opinion, the right emotions – all of
these constitute, beyond all kinds of ideologies, the greatest sin of the
human being: the sin of abandoning one’s own essence, one’s own genuine
nature, the dignity of one’s spiritual species. And for what? For a
comfortable life in a fake psychological and social construction.
So what about this message of Anthony de Mello? Being firmly
rejected by religious dogma, it does not belong, for sure, to any kind of
institutionalized religion, though its spirit is surely fitted to Christianity.
Some people accept the existence of this message only because it is
introduced in a literary shape; however, this literature aims farther than it
appears at first sight. But could one call this message of de Mello a
philosophy? No doubt, one could rightly affirm that: a special kind of
philosophy, which shakes, breaks, destroys the dreams of death, dissipates
the delusions that do not mean anything else but a despairing flight from
reality and an accepted incapability to face the social tornados – tornados
which twist relationships, ideologies, survival; ideological manipulations
having as a main goal keeping the individual from understanding reality
and living in it.
What Father de Mello’s effort is in the first place is to stimulate this
awareness of the state of the somnolence, of the collective hypnosis
inducing in people the illusion of an existence outside of the Existence,
together with the negation of any other non-dreamy reality. What is
absolutely special in his message is that, though he speaks about general
phenomena of society, he aims at each and every individual, and each
person equally perceives the message as addressed directly and exclusively
to him. This is, one can say, an action of a spiritual pedagogy, where the
Professor can be identified as the Master from de Mello’s stories, a spiritual
master, who is not recruited by any ideology; he indicates to his disciple, by
the touch of his awakening word, a scintilla of truth. This touch is the
Anthony de Mello’s Lifelong Spiritual Pedagogy 369
impulse that any spiritual master gives to his followers to show them the
path.
In receiving this gift, somehow, outside his own decision, the common
individual finds himself on the first step of consciousness, which brings out
the understanding of his own condition and also, an attempt to look at it
with detachment. Here, one can make a comparison with some night-
dreams, when the dreamer becomes conscious, not letting himself be
dragged any more by the unreal action of the dream.
Evidently, a simple consciousness of a dream state does not lead too
far. Again, the spiritual philosophy or, let us say, the spiritual pedagogy of
Anthony de Mello intervenes almost with brutality, saying, “Wake up!” It is
a resonant shake, but de Mello’s voice, far from being one of religious
revolt, as interpreted by dogmatic minds, does nothing more than to remind
the sleepy one, using the call addressed by the Lord to his disciples, through
all the world’s holy texts and religious traditions.
The awakening is the fundamental act of simultaneous understanding
of the present condition and the atemporal human nature. Here, indeed, is
situated the anteroom of the will and action toward Awareness, the leap
from the artificial sleepy world to Reality. In other words, the condition
asserted by the “world is a dream” is killed together with the dreamer
inside: “I’ve often said to people that the way to really live is to die.”15 But
what is so scandalous in this affirmation? Why should we not agree with it
when we accept the same affirmation from the eremites of Philokalia? As a
matter of fact, it is the same message, common to both Oriental and
Occidental mystics – to be dead to the world. The only difference is that
they were somewhere, sometime, far away and a long time ago, and this
allows us refer to them with detachment and no obligation on our part,
while de Mello lives here and now, forcing the truth to spring out in the
light of the conscience, a painful process for which no one else is
responsible but oneself, whether in fulfillment or failure. The principle of
the life-dream is precisely this one: to not have obligations, to not feel any
guilt for anything, to not have the responsibility of one’s own life –
somebody else lives me, lives my life, with the declared aim to make me
feel well. A mass of somnolent people – this is the triumph toward which
all ideologies aspire.
Returning to a previous assertion, we notice that de Mello speaks
about two kinds of death, two totally different essences being hidden under
the same name. The first type, common among people, refers to the spiritual
beggar, fearing for his petite wealth: “If I can’t get you to peep out of your
narrow beliefs and convictions and look at another world, you’re dead;
you’re completely dead; life has passed by you. You’re sitting in your little
prison, where you’re frightened; you’re going to lose your God, your
15Anthony de Mello, Awareness. A. de Mello Spirituality Conference in
His Own Words, edited by J. Francis Stroud, S.J. (London: Fount Paperbacks,
1990), p. 169.
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religion, your friends, all kinds of things. Life is for the gambler, it really is.
That’s what Jesus was saying.”16 But what does this risk mean, after all? De
Mello tells us: it is the courage to wake up, to get out from comfort, to
come out from hypnosis, to come out from fear. Awakening is the only way
to freedom – and freedom means, “to see at last with a vision that is clear
and unclouded by fear or desire…You will see, you will know beyond
concepts and conditioning, addictions and attachments.”17
De Mello stops here with the outline of his program for life. His
objective is not to “redeem” people, but to convince people – Western ones
– to undertake a transformation, to become aware of their condition of
death-sleep, and to change themselves by Awakening. He cannot ask more
from the common man. His mission is to indicate the way and to tell
something about what is going to happen afterward. Once awakened, man
becomes able to understand his own free nature and, therefore, to choose in
full consciousness. But “when you awaken, when you understand, when
you see, the world becomes right”18 – in other words, inside the new
condition, to think about a choice is useless, because the choice
presupposes duality, conflict, tension. Paradoxically, the state of liberty
obtained by awakening reduces the possibility and the desire to choose,
because when “you finally awake, you don’t try to make good things
happen; they just happen. You understand suddenly that everything that
happens to you is good.”19 It is the affirmation of a man who knows, who
does not need any argument for the evidence, nor the proof of what exists.
We are used to considering philosophy as something addressed
exclusively to the intellect, to the mind, to the reason; only the language, in
its quality of the cognitive process is allowed in this closed kingdom. The
effects of these regulations are seen in modern times – philosophy is a
product of the limitations of the conceited human mind pretending to
explain the inexplicable. Now, philosophy is just another ideological
category.
To avoid this effect and also in a new awareness of its mission,
philosophy directed its preoccupations to “generally more specific” fields,
approaching particular sectors of human life. Therefore, one could situate
Anthony de Mello’s philosophy, as well as his spiritual pedagogy, within
this field of specific interest. On the other side, Father de Mello cannot be
assimilated to any present philosophical trend, not by the language used and
even less by his objectives. Interestingly enough, however, one can find an
affiliation with a certain pedagogical ray still functional today. In the
seventeenth century, Jan Amos Comenius, was building a theological
conception from which a philosophical conception was derived; in its turn,
its philosophy supported an educational theory and practice which has
16 Ibid., p. 170.
17 Ibid., p. 734.
18 Ibid., p. 84.
19 Ibid., p. 88.
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changed the world in the field of pedagogy. This spirit was continued by
some European pedagogues; in India, Sri Aurobindo has delineated a type
of integral education aiming to facilitate spiritual growth.
But Anthony de Mello is not a pedagogue in the ideological sense of
the word. First of all, he is a mystic; a mystic who teaches, not preaches; a
mystic hard to recognize in a modern world that places this kind of person
between the pages of old books, rather than in a real life. A mystic has,
necessarily, a philosophical conception and also an educational one – a
starting point and a way of becoming. But these conceptions have no
correspondence with what we know about these activities, and an analogy
would not present interest or clarifying effects.
The third phase of de Mello’s spiritual pedagogy is not clearly
expressed or even sketched in his speeches or writings. It can be realized
only by the efforts of awakening as a process of striving for change.
Awareness, in its highest form, can be explained only in the way de Mello
explains love: “…love is not something that you have; love is something
that has you!”20 or perhaps by one of his little stories scattering the road of
knowledge:
“- Help us to discover God./- Nobody can help you with this./- Why
not?/- For the same reason that nobody can help the fish to discover the
ocean.”21
A VERY SHORT CONCLUSION
At first sight, Anthony de Mello’s spiritual philosophy is based on
negative truths. In Hinduism, in Jnana Yoga this cognitive attitude could be
called a “neti, neti” search (neither this, nor that); it is no wonder, if taking
into consideration not only de Mello’s native country but even more, his
vocation for truth. But for the Occidental man, to whom it is addressed, de
Mello’s discourse is much simplified. The aspects approached are one by
one negated – as reality, as authenticity. It seems that this method is the
most appropriate for human understanding. A mind judging with partiality
could stop here in its comprehension; this mind is, usually, a rational mind,
looking for palpable evidence. But there is a difference in knowing as a
process and direct knowledge as such. The logical mind is in a continuous
movement in its desire for knowing. This mind knows “in part.” De Mello’s
discourse is related to the second acceptation. He does not need anymore to
look to discover something, for he has already discovered it; and in this
way, he is much closer to the whole than reasoning can be. That is why his
words are addressed to intuition rather than to logic.
The ideological fanatic, however, cannot appeal either to logic or
intuition, so, his handy instrument is the “anathema,” an effect foreseen by
20 Ibid., p. 176.
21 Id., Înţelepciune la minut, (One Minute Wisdom) (Braşov: Editura Mix,
2004), p. 91
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Father de Mello, who sees himself surrounded by: “…dead people running
governments, dead people running big business, dead people educating
others.”22
Still, his philosophy – his life program, as he likes to say – is
addressed precisely to these sleepers in their sleep of death. The
metaphysical “why” has no purport here; it has no meaning either as
question or as answer. It is just one among many other mental illusions. The
only method is to wake up, to live aware of what is happening to you, to
understand reality as it is. The only state of non-illusion is the
consciousness which in its higher plane, the plane of Awareness, is
identical with freedom, truth, and ultimately with God.
By his program of awakening and awareness, Anthony de Mello does
not establish a philosophical construct, but delineates a philosophical
experience, indicating also a method for reaching it. Undoubtedly, this
ought to be the meaning of philosophy today.
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22 Anthony de Mello, Awareness. A. de Mello Spirituality Conference in
His Own Words, edited by J. Francis Stroud, S.J. (London: Fount Paperbacks,
1990), p. 177.
CHAPTER XXX
THE HUMAN PERSON BETWEEN
TRANSCENDENCE AND FAULT:
A PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE1
CĂTĂLIN BOBB
Abstract: “What would we know about contrivance, hatred, or deception,
were it not for the confession of novels and stories?” Paul Ricoeur asks
himself. Although the present question, within the context in which it is
stated, has a profoundly rhetorical character, it can be stated directly by
shifting the emphasis. What would we know about the human being were it
not for contrivance, hatred, and deception? In other words, my task is to
search within this text, in the footsteps of Paul Ricoeur, for what might be
called a philosophical anthropology of the negative; a philosophy centered
on elements excluded by default from an axiological theory but which, as
we shall see, are fundamental to any axiological theory. Freedom and
Nature, Paul Ricoeur’s doctoral thesis, begins with a sentence that will
never be explicitly closed and which Paul Ricoeur will exploit in all of his
subsequent works, but never directly. It is about two fundamental concepts
which offer the totality of human subjectivity: fault and transcendence.
More explicitly, in Ricoeur’s own words, fault as the absolute deficiency of
the human being and transcendence as the absolute origin of subjectivity.
Thus, I suggest, following Ricoeur, that a philosophy that forces itself to
analyze the fundamental deficiencies of the human being fails, as long as it
remains within the strict boundaries of philosophy, as long as it refuses to
open toward a mythological, theological, or religious form. The reasoning
is this: pure will tells us nothing of morality; understanding morality and
fundamentally human values stems from within human passions;
understanding passions and a possible solution regarding them surpasses
the possibilities of philosophy.
Keywords: Paul Ricoeur, transcendence, fault, will, epoché, poetics of
the will
THE LIMITS OF WILL: TRANSCENDENCE AND FAULT
The project of Philosophy of the Will,2 opened by the hinge volume
1 This paper was written within The Knowledge Based Society Project
supported by the Sectorial Operational Programme Human Resources
Development (SOP HRD), financed from the European Social Fund and by the
Romanian Government under the contract number POSDRU ID 56815.
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The Voluntary and the Involuntary, lets us know from the start that what is
outside phenomenological analysis should not be of interest to us, because
the core of the analyses will be a “pure description and a pure
understanding of the voluntary and the involuntary”3 as fundamental
structures of will. To be able to reach these fundamental structures, we have
to operate from the beginning with an abstraction, a bracketing, an epoché
of fault and transcendence. This means that The Voluntary and the
Involuntary opens with a closure. More explicitly, there is no
phenomenology of transcendence and fault4 just to be able to later state that
the ultimate purpose of this work will be the direct analysis of fault and
transcendence. When we speak of the ultimate purpose of Philosophy of the
Will, we must necessarily bear in mind all three volumes. The impossibility
of building a phenomenology of transcendence and fault is, in the first
volume, relative to the condition of being human, however prosaic this may
be. The two concepts are denied a phenomenological analysis because they
are the absolute marginal points: in the case of the fault, “which profoundly
alters man’s intelligibility,” and respectively, in the case of transcendence,
“which hides within it the ultimate origin of subjectivity.”5 Denying from
the start the access of phenomenology to the “ultimate origin of
subjectivity,” as well as to the “specific something” that “profoundly alters
man’s intelligibility,” it would seem that phenomenology is condemned to
discuss everything but the “things in themselves.”
It is truly important to understand well what Ricoeur means by
abstracting fault and transcendence. The French philosopher openly states:
“The fundamental structures of the voluntary and the involuntary which we
shall seek to describe and understand acquire their full significance only
when the abstraction which enables us to elaborate them is removed.”6 In
fact, we cannot fully understand the fundamental structures of will (the
voluntary and the involuntary) nor the fundamental structures of the
voluntary and involuntary in a pure description, because we will only be
able to analyze their true significance when description and pure
understanding are dissolved, thus, only when abstraction, which gives us
the possibility to purely describe and purely understand the voluntary and
the involuntary, will be suppressed. This game where we use abstraction in
a phenomenological paradigm, abandoning it and then moving to another
2 Philosophy of the Will is composed of three volumes: Freedom and
Nature (1950), Fallible Man (1960) and The Symbolism of Evil (1960). French
originals: Philosophie de la volonté 1. Le volontaire et l’involontaire (Paris:
Aubier, 1950), Philosophie de la volonté 2. Finitude et culpabilité. Livre I.
L’homme faillible. Livre II. La symbolique du mal (Paris: Aubier, 1960).
3 Paul Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature, translated by Erazim V. Kohak
(Ilionois: Northwestern University Press, 2007), p. 3.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid. (my emphasis).
6 Ibid.
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paradigm we do not yet know, produces real difficulties to an adequate
understanding of the role of this concept. This is why it is inevitable to go
back to Husserl through Ricoeur.
EPOCHÉ
Beyond the differences marked by the entire Ricoeurian exegesis,
there are differences that Ricoeur himself points out, and they are easy to
notice. Ricoeur transforms and remodels, with honesty and without any
excessively destructive demands, purely Husserlian concepts, to give them
a new meaning, one that no longer complies with the initial trajectory it is
supposed to have. Ricoeur operates such a turning (to avoid using
distortion) at the level of the concept of abstraction, or, even better, over
the very debated concept of “phenomenological reduction.” Ricoeur tells us
that abstraction helps us to bracket fault and transcendence. Although things
are clear, that transcendence and fault must be eliminated from the horizon
of intentionality when we are attempting a pure description of the voluntary
and involuntary as fundamental structures of will. Ricoeur almost
completely misappropriates the epoché’s initial meaning.
This evacuation is justified for more than one reason, and we will try
to discern them at the level of fault and transcendence, but it must be stated
now that the Ricoeurian epoché functions, or is supposed to function, as a
method completely under Husserlian protection: “This abstraction is in
some respects akin to what Husserl calls eidetic reduction, that is,
bracketing of the fact and elaborating on the idea of meaning.”7 Thus, it is
inevitably mandatory to inquire as to which regard is the abstraction similar
to Husserl’s and to which it isn’t, so we must inquire in regard to the
differences between the Husserlian epoché8 and the Ricoeurian epoché. The
difficulties of such an approach are relative to the obvious ambiguities
Ricoeur’s text manifests. Ricoeur is not completely clear when he tells us
how the abstraction is similar to what Husserl calls “eidetic reduction.” It is
up to us to grasp what Ricoeur wishes to suggest through the abstraction of
fault and transcendence. Nonetheless, to approach a central problem of
Husserl’s phenomenology, only to distinguish a similar, but not central,
problem of Ricoeur’s phenomenology seems a risky task; risky because
abstraction in Ricoeur functions just as an intermediary momentum, a
methodological precaution, and in the end as forbearance, maybe even an
7 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
8 We are relatively aware of the major difficulties that we open with this
attempt, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “the most famous phenomenologist,” as
Ricoeur calls him, only confirms this fact: “...no doubt that there hasn’t existed
a problem to which Husserl dedicated more time to understand himself, no
other problem to which he returned more often.” Fenomenologia Percepţiei,
translated by Ilieş Câmpeanu and Georgiana Vătăjelu (Oradea: Aion, 1999), p.
9.
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impossibility to directly analyze the concepts it suspends. At the same time,
some similarities between the two concepts cannot be doubted. If
Husserlian reduction primarily aims at suspending the natural attitude of
naivete, where our knowledge lives with us, then we may state that
Ricoeurian reduction functions as suspending the naive attitude that our
knowledge has regarding the concepts of fault and transcendence. But what
kind of naivete are we talking about in regard to Ricoeur? Should we
understand that there is a natural knowledge, a psychological naivete that
speaks of fault and transcendence? What kind of knowledge is this about,
the theological one, the philosophical one, or both? We cannot know;
Ricoeur does not mention anything in relation to this. Another step: for
Husserl, the eidetic reduction offers the beginning philosopher access to the
origin of pure, transcendental subjectivity,9 and, on the contrary, this
functions for Ricoeur the opposite way, in the very precise sense that access
to the ultimate origin of subjectivity is suspended, bracketed, and
inaccessible. That which is fundamental for Husserl is marginal for
Ricoeur, although both philosophers only aim to understand and describe
human subjectivity. It is obvious that for Husserl this is not the ultimate
aim, but transcendental subjectivity functions as an indispensable pendant
of a radically scientific philosophy. For Ricoeur, to understand and describe
human subjectivity is the key to understanding the human person as such.
An explanation must be provided immediately. The separation from Husserl
is completely visible by now. Phenomenology does not provide the key to
adequately understand subjectivity, but it does offer the key to adequately
understand the fundamental structures of subjectivity: the voluntary and the
involuntary. But of what kind of pure, transcendental description may we
talk when the sublayer that supports this description is by no means pure
and transcendental? More specifically, if the voluntary and the involuntary
are the ultimate/primary structures of human will, and human will defines,
however imperfectly, human subjectivity, then pure description should
totally function over all the elements that compound human subjectivity, as
well as over subjectivity as such. This does not happen in the case of
Ricoeurian philosophy, and the reasons for such a “deliberate failure” of
phenomenology still require explaining.
The radicalism of the Husserlian task that we merely state here
actually supposes a kind of absolute radicalism of the cogitant subject; that
is, specifically, a subject that constitutes itself through itself in itself in the
9 “Pure and/or transcendental phenomenology [...]; this science refers to a
new field of experience, one belonging only to it, and that is transcendental
subjectivity. [...] transcendental experience is possible only in a radical change
[...] a change of attitude, which, as method of access to the transcendental-
phenomenological scheme is called ‘phenomenological reduction,’” Edmund
Husserl, Postfaţa la Idei pentru o fenomenologie pură şi o filosofie
fenomenologică (1930) in Criza umanităţii europene şi filosofia, translated by
Alexandru Boboc (Bucureşti: Paideia, 2003), p. 110.
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world, so that “the objective world that exists for me, that has existed and
will exist for me, this world together with all the objects within it, creates
[…] its entire meaning and the whole validity of existence that it has in
every moment for me from my very self, from myself as a transcendental
ego that appears for the first time together with the transcendental
phenomenological epoché.”10 We are not interested in the incrimination
regarding Husserlian solipsism, – in the end, even Husserl reacts11 rather
brutally against his critics – but our interest exclusively regards the
similarities between this constitutive reduction of the phenomenological
transcendental subject and Ricoeur’s reduction applied to transcendence
and fault. It is useless to mark here Ricoeur’s drama, that is, the obvious
excluding of transcendence and fault in applying the Husserlian epoché,
which never makes room for his central philosophical concepts. What
Ricoeur produces by excluding from the beginning transcendence and fault
is a bracketing, not of transcendence and fault, but of the ultimate origin of
subjectivity as well as that particular something that profoundly alters
subjectivity. Once more, Ricoeur does not exclude from the field of
phenomenological analysis transcendence and fault, but excludes, in the
end, human subjectivity with its two extremes: origin and alteration. The
reasons for this exclusion are not in the least unclear; they are not even
philosophical, but pertain to what the Christian Ricoeur feels “inside his
heart.” We should not misunderstand this – Ricoeur does not confess to
this, for it would be a philosophical disaster – but it is the only way we can
understand the motives of the true excluding of fault and transcendence
from the field of phenomenological analysis. But this does not mean that
Ricoeur would have been completely aware that by giving up
phenomenology, he would open up hermeneutics. The dangers that a purely
phenomenological analysis would pose to the philosopher are much more
important than the necessity of a new method.
Thus, we may ask ourselves, without seeming to lack understanding,
why is Ricoeur weary of phenomenologically attacking transcendence and
fault? Why must we, from the beginning, bracket, eliminate, or abstract
transcendence and fault? Can all this be about a methodological necessity,
or, more likely, that the method produces harmful side effects to the
concepts it wishes to analyze? Phenomenology, in its primary intention,
wants nothing more than to scientifically substantiate sciences,12 that is, to
humanly objectify – using a little word game – the objective. Such a wish
must not be easily overlooked. We can find nothing more beneficial than
10 Edmund Husserl, Meditaţii carteziente, translated by Aurelian Crăiuţu
(Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1994), p. 57.
11 Edmund Husserl, Postfaţa la Idei pentru o fenomenologie pură şi o
filosofie fenomenologică, p. 108.
12 Let us listen to Husserl here: “The idea that guides our meditations is
that of a science that must be founded in a radical authenticity and, in the end,
the idea of a universal science,” Meditaţii carteziene, p. 37.
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objectifying fault and transcendence. Let us imagine we have at hand a
method through which we can objectify “the ultimate origin of subjectivity”
as well as that particular something “which profoundly alters man’s
intelligibility.” Could this be an unexpected chance that philosophy
receives? No, on the contrary, Ricoeur tells us this exactly the place of the
necessity to bracket, especially because of the fact that phenomenology has
as its justifying pretension the objectivization. We are not talking about the
shortcomings of Husserlian phenomenology (intersubjectivity, ontology,
etc.) and the whole post-Husserlian tradition as Ricoeur understands it, but
the fact that the fundamental intention of phenomenology must not be taken
into consideration. We should not endlessly speculate in regard to Ricoeur's
decision that phenomenology cannot work its primary intention, and this we
must understand as such. But there are precautions again, and we may ask
ourselves why. What are the phenomenological motives, causes, and
reasoning that impose such a decision? Unfortunately, Ricoeur does not
offer answers for these questions, and our own interpretation cannot be
presently put into application. We shall cautiously wait for the second part
of this paper.
FAULT
Erazim V. Kohak, famous Czech phenomenologist and the translator
of Freedom and Nature into English, writes an introduction entitled The
Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. And truly, we are faced with more than a
simple introduction; it is an almost exhaustive explanation of the
mechanisms (as an index) that build the philosophy of will (Kohak does not
stop here; he also integrates Fallible Man and The Symbolism of Evil). For
Kohak, transcendence and fault remain central concepts in Freedom and
Nature. Nonetheless, it seems odd to state that the central concepts of a
work are concepts that are not discussed much at all. In fact, they occupy a
central role through their marginality, not in the sense that they are being
evacuated, which actually happens, but that they are the extreme margins
that frame the entire philosophy of will; between transcendence and fault,
will is manifesting. The multiple versants that human will must pass over
are framed, limited as ultimate margins by transcendence and fault. Will
remains entrapped in a perpetual road that cannot surpass its own limits,
within a phenomenological analysis, given by transcendence and fault. To
go beyond, to aim a beyond intentionality, means to go outside of
phenomenology to be able to bring into discussion exactly what
phenomenology cannot talk about. It means, in lesser and much simpler
words, telling phenomenology that it fails exactly where things are
essential,13 slightly forcing things, we might say, exactly where things are
13 We offer here Merleau-Ponty’s answer to his own question: “What is
phenomenology? […] Phenomenology is the study of essences and, according
to it, the entire problem pertains to defining essences; the essence of perception,
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eidetic. It may seem absurd to bring into debate the central concepts of
Freedom and Nature, as long as they are central through their absence. But
what stops us from seeing them working where they are not? This is not a
word game. If the index of will (the fundamental structures) may be
analyzed only by disregarding transcendence and fault, it means that the
movements within will, either voluntary or involuntary, are movements
determined exactly by the limits that transcendence and fault impose.
When Kohak speaks of fault, he insists on telling us that “this term
reflects Ricoeur’s basic intuition of a world out of kilter, of basic disruption
marking all existence. In conversation, Ricoeur has stated that he had
sought the most neutral term which would express this sense of radical
disruption.”14 The process of translation, Kohak confesses, obligates him to
remove from the concept of fault “any theological connotation” that may be
there. Here we encounter a delicate problem of Ricoeur’s philosophy:
where do philosophy and theology meet, and where do they separate? If we
are to take into account the version Kohak unveils for us, we will say that
“the theological connotation of ‘fall’ proves unsupportable.”15 Fault here is
not imbued with any theological fragrance. Thus, Kohak tells us, we may
use the concepts of fall, disruption, corruption, and rupture, and all of
them, in different ways, would be synonymous to the concept of fault. The
exacerbated care that Kohak shows while trying to convince us of the
theological impossibility of the concept of fault makes us think. The text
itself (Freedom and Nature) is not as convincing as Kohak! There are
enough elements that would disagree with Kohak when listening (in
conversation!) – over-piously, we may add – to Ricoeur. Of course, as in
the case of any philosophical work, it is to be avoided by any means to be
engaged in any theologically-favorable discussion, but, under the principle
of textual honesty, we have to admit that things are not really as clear as
Kohak sees them.
POETICS OF THE WILL
Eliminating passions from the phenomenological description of will
actually acts as a recoil. The abstraction (elimination) of fault and
transcendence functions only as a procedure chosen by Ricoeur for reasons
unclear. In fact, the limit of analysis suggested by Ricoeur encounters
passions (fault) exactly at the heart, if we may call it that, of an ontological
project. The main reason Ricoeur asks for ontology of will is human
existence as “meaning.” The meaning to which we refer is represented by
the human subject, which, through its fundamental acts (I want, decide, and
the essence of conscience for example,” in Merleau-Ponty, Fenomenologia
Percepţiei, p. 5.
14 Erazim V. Kohak, “The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur” in Paul Ricoeur,
Freedom and Nature, xxxix.
15 Ibid.
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consent) constitutes itself. Unfortunately, the distortions that constantly
attack the consistency of a transcendental self are always up and ready to
dissolve the radicalism of the self. Ricoeur calls these distortions passions
(ambition, gluttony, hatred, vanity, etc). An ontological project that would
therefore start in reverse – not from the fundamental structures of the self,
but from the fundamental passions – is a pat answer that seems at least
promising. In the end, Ricoeur gives up his attempt to place his analysis in
nobody’s will and attempts to create, on the basis of an empirical will, an
ontology.
At this point, Ricoeur’s project becomes at least unnatural. In Freedom
and Nature, Ricoeur warns us from the very beginning that his research on
will shall not include a study of ambition or hatred. This is not because
these are not part of the mechanism through which, for example, we hate,
but precisely because these entities are “ordinary,” “concrete,” and “real.”
The relentless reality of hatred, the fact that it exists in everyone’s daily life
precisely through its objectivity, dismisses the possibility of an eidetic
analysis. In fact, these passions, as Ricoeur calls them, cannot be analyzed
because they corrupt the neutral (pure) mode of the existence of the
voluntary and the involuntary aspects of our freedom.16 Moreover, the
necessity to ignore these passions is required by the fundamental structures
of the human will (to act, choose, and consent). Of course, this is about a
philosophy of the yes against the originary and obscure negativity that
dwells within us. It is an ontology lacking the elementary deficiencies of
our nature. Against these barbaric negativities (hatred, ambition, etc.) that
are inscribed in the reality of our existence, a philosophy of originary
affirmation eidetically described is required. Such a task seems to be
against existentialist philosophy, which found negativity to be the
distinctive marker of our existence. Against the existentialist no – the
Ricoeurian yes. The problem is that this “yes” is placed outside of
experience, outside the concrete possibilities of human action. How is that?
Ricoeur tells us that the possibility of a discussion on will outside the
law-morality scheme exists. “The will is, fundamentally, the ability to
receive and approve values. But the willing-value nexus remains an
abstraction and does not introduce us to concrete moral reality (…) it
provides only a basis for the possibility of a principle of morality in general.
Real, concrete understanding of morality begins with passions.”17 The
elimination of passions as founding events of concrete morality in a
phenomenological description of will does nothing more than subscribe to
the same logic of the abstraction of fault. Will, in this scheme, belongs to
nobody, but it is a significant, essential, fundamental nobody.
16 Paul Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature, p. 20.
17 Ibid., p. 21.
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Paradoxically, a while later, Ricoeur changes the registry: “Secondary
reflection18 assures passage from a transcendental phenomenology to a
ontological phenomenology.19 In this case, our problem is to show the mere
possibilities of a phenomenology of a will which transforms itself into an
ontology of will…thru passions.”20 Introducing these passions as elements
that open a possible ontological phenomenology cannot at this time do
anything more than amaze. Of course, it won’t be long until he publishes
Fallible Man (1960), but this article produces not only the stupefaction of
contradiction, but also the path to a new method. If eliminating passions
(ambition, hatred, gluttony, etc.) seemed the ultimate condition to open the
path toward an ontology of will, because these elements corrupt the pure
mode of being of will, the total inversion of the analysis seems unnatural.
But the area where freedom moved even prior to history, as Ricoeur
describes it in Freedom and Nature, is ineffable; ineffable in the sense of
action, not utterableness, which means an action that has no equivalent in
reality. Of course, the necessity to create fundamental structures of the
human will requires such ineffability. But this retrieving ontology situated
at the edge of reality must open up toward a phenomenology of passions to
be able to function. But, as a principle, a phenomenology of passions that
excludes fault is impossible.
In spite of this, Ricoeur tells us that a phenomenology of passions can
exist as a “philosophical reflection on culpability.”21 Let us see how
ambition, gluttony, hatred, etc., can work as openers for a
phenomenological ontology. Proximity with the elements excluded from a
phenomenological description is produced precisely by the reality of our
existence, “the human ethos in its whole,” expressed through literature and
history: “do passions not represent the ordinary figure of will, regarding
which the functions of the voluntary and the involuntary are nothing more
than abstractions, like a skeleton, a bone structure without meat?” Ricoeur
rhetorically asks. That is, of course, true, but the multiplicity of figures that
ambition, gluttony, hatred, etc., presents annihilates the possibility of a
unifying principle so dear to a phenomenological description. The only way
to talk about these elements of nonentity, or existential precariousness, as
Ricoeur calls them, is the myth. It is true that the engine of literature and
history may function fueled by ambition, gluttony, and hatred, but only
18 Secondary reflection walks in the shadow of secondary naivete. If there
is a naive philosophy completely tributary to natural sciences that Husserl was
trying to overcome, there is a second naivete of Husserlian philosophy against
which Ricoeur builds his task. Paul Ricoeur, La şcoala fenomenologiei ,
translated by Paul Marinescu (Bucureşti: Humanitas, 2007), p. 190.
19At the moment Ricoeur speaks about a phenomenological ontology
against transcendental phenomenology, he has in mind overcoming Husserl’s
egology with what he calls an ontology of will.
20 Paul Ricoeur, La şcoala fenomenologiei, p. 90.
21 Ibid.
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myth can account for their unity in the rational explanation that
philosophical thought requires. This is how the myth is in game – the
exponential myth, the unifying of passion is the myth of the Fall. The
transition from the impossibility of unification to a structure of signification
of passions such as ambition, gluttony, and hatred from a phenomenological
description to a mythical description due to the lack of a unifying principle
that only the myth of the Fall possesses makes us think.
For Ricoeur, “passion” is formed around an “intentional nothing” that
can be also found in “suspicion,” “reproach,” “insult,” “wrath,” etc. The
name of this “particular nothing” is represented in the myth by the images
of “darkness,” “profound abyss,” “perversion,” “and enslavement.” It is
about an intentional nothing that phenomenology cannot comprehend, so
this task is exclusively assigned to the myth. The problem appears when
Ricoeur admits that this particular nothing “revives the movement of
history, projecting man toward welfare and power, setting the basis of
economy and politics.” Thus, the task of phenomenology, as a description
of the ultimate structures of the human, is seriously threatened: threatened
to describe something lacking reality, lacking, in Ricoeur’s words, “meat.”
The requirement is the simultaneous elaboration of an empirical theory and
a mythical theory of will. But before we get to an empirical description, and
respectively to a mythical description, let us remain enwrapped in the
intention that moves phenomenological ontology.
The elimination of passions produces an advantage as well as a
disadvantage: advantage, “because it emphasizes will and human existence
in general as that which gives meaning;22 disadvantage, because there is “an
ontological loss” provided by the negative access to the being of will
through passion. So there is a reverse way, a way that should bracket “the
fundamental structures” of will, a negative way which, through its
negativity, would discover the ontological structure of will. The passion
that Ricoeur offers as an example is vanity: vanity as an accessway, while,
at the same time, as a distortion. “The omission of being seems connected
to the dissimulation that enslaved freedom oozes; the ego’s vanity is spread
like a veil over the very being of its existence.”23 Is it an enslaved, subdued
freedom? Why would that be? Because pure freedom does not exist;
freedom is completely the creation of passions. Once the path to freedom is
opened by vanity, we can access the being of freedom (of will).
But the question remains, how can we access the “being of will,” the
“being of man,” through vanity? The answer is: through a “poetic of the
will.” More specifically, the answer through and against ambition, gluttony,
vanity, etc., is in the power of a poetic of the will. What such a poetic
means and how it can be described remains without answer. Ricoeur will
never return to this topic.
Romanian Academy, Iaşi, Romania, catalinbobb@yahoo.com
22 Ibid, p. 94.
23 Ibid., p. 97.
CHAPTER XXXI
FOUCAULT’S CASE AGAINST HUMANISM
MARIA GIOGA
Abstract: Like many of the “–ism” words, humanism is a concept which is
as widely used as it is indeterminate. In the English-speaking world, it is
often associated with an optimistic and secular view of the world, and
asserts the privilege of human beings over non-organic (or organic but
nonhuman) entities, defending the rights of human beings to happiness and
to the development of their individual potential. Yet in France and
Germany, at the time of the “death of man,” humanism was seen by many
as a dirty word, partly because of its implied anthropocentrism, and partly
due to some dubious political associations. Although you can’t find much
uniformity in the anti-humanist camp (such as Foucault, Levi-Strauss,
Althusser, and Lacan), they all denied the primacy of man, be it as an
epistemological starting point (the subject as the foundation of all possible
knowledge, as in Husserlian phenomenology) or as a practical agent (as in
Hegelian history). Correlatively, they emphasized the part played by
unconscious structures in the determination of thought and behavior. For
example, the “author” was redefined by Foucault as a function of texts
rather than their source; Althusser redescribed human agents as bearers of
historical determination, not as the actors of history, etc.
Throughout this paper I will focus on Michel Foucault’s understanding
and use of the term. We can distinguish (as Alexander Fraser does) between
three possible grounds for Foucault’s rejection of humanism: 1) conceptual
or philosophical (humanism as too entangled in Western subject-focused
metaphysics); 2) strategic (the appeal to humanist values as covering up
strategies of domination); or 3) normative (humanism as being intrinsically
objectionable, on the grounds that subjection is per se a form of
subjugation). These three possibilities are supposed to correspond to three
main stages of Foucault’s philosophical development (archaeology, genealogy,
and the history of subjectivity). The strongest point in Foucault’s rejection of
humanism is conceptual: it was motivated by his philosophical analyses of
the aporia of the anthropological turn and the analytic of finitude. But if
Foucault entails that there is no human essence which is ahistorical and
universal, does that mean that he rejects the possibility of human rights?
In this paper, I will summarize Foucault’s arguments against
humanism, and I will try to place them into the contemporary debate about
the human essence. The purpose of my paper is to show that Foucault
doesn’t advocate against human rights as some critics have argued. No,
Foucault’s anti-humanism is entirely consistent with an orientation to human
rights that does not tend to supply them a metaphysical ground. I think that
Foucault has a pragmatic approach to the human rights problem. He does
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not deny them and does not reject the necessity of them, but says that
human rights need to be historically and pragmatically determined. In other
words, Foucault is saying that we can not supply a metaphysical ground for
human rights, because there is no human essence; but they are good, for
those human values help us fight the power of governments, so let us use
them. In this way, we should read a remark he made in an interview: “There
exists today an international citizenship that has its rights and duties.” So
we should see Foucault's anti-humanism as undercutting only the modernist
notion of the subject, but much of the core of humanist values can be
retained.
Keywords: human rights, Foucault, humanism, Kant, biopower.
We can distinguish (as Alexander Fraser does) three possible grounds
for Michel Foucault’s rejection of humanism:
1) conceptual or philosophical (humanism as too entagled in Western
subject-focused metaphysics);
2) strategic (the appeal to humanist values as covering up strategies of
domination);
3) normative (humanism as being intrinsically objectionable, on the
grounds that subjection is per se a form of subjugation).
These three possibilities are supposed to correspond to three main
stages of Foucault’s philosophical development (archaeology, genealogy,
and the history of subjectivity). The strongest point in Foucault’s rejection
of humanism is conceptual: it was motivated by his philosophical analyses
of the aporia of the anthropological turn and the analytic of finitude.
Humanism is strictly linked to the birth of man, which appeared at the
start of modernity. The birth of man is due to the Copernican turn, whereby
the focus shifted from representations to the representing subject. In
Immanuel Kant’s work, “man appeared as an object of possible
knowledge…and at the same time as the being through which all
knowledge is possible.”1 The possibility of anthropology (the study of man)
was brought up by Kant, who, in his Anthropology, focused on finitude,
rather than on the the infinite. “From Kant onward there is nothing but
finitude, and it is in this sense that Kantian critique carried with it the
possibility of anthropology.”2 Foucault points out that during the Classical
Age, the notion of the infinite was both central and primary; thus, for René
Descartes, one can prove the existence of God by the presence of the idea of
the infinite in the finite. The underlying assumption is that the infinite has
ontological preeminence over the finite. So, during the Classical Age, the
finite stands in a relationship of ontological subordination to and logical
1 M. Foucault, Introduction to Kant's Anthropology (Los Angeles, CA.:
Semiotext, 2008), p. 110.
2 Ibid., p. 100.
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derivation from the infinite. By contrast, for Foucault, the hallmark of the
anthropological turn is that human finitude, instead being subordinated to
God’s infinity, becomes self-foundational: “Modern culture can conceive of
man because it conceives of the finite on the basis of itself.”3
But, although Kant's “analytic of finitude” made possible the sciences
of man as well as humanism, man was placed in an unstable position as
both the subject and object of knowledge. Hence, man emerges in the
“analytic of finitude” introduced by Kant as a “strange empirico-
transcendental doublet,”4 because he is both the object of knowledge (that
about which knowledge seeks to know) and the subject of knowledge (that
which strives after such knowledge). Such a humanism introduces radical
instabilities into the human sciences. This is leading Foucault to think that
there are fundamental incompatibilities in the concepts of what man is and
in the nature of modernist knowledge. Humanism, as Foucault understood
it, exhausts itself in an endless back and forth from one side to the other of
man and his doubles: from man as the condition for the possibility of
knowledge to man as himself an object in the empirical field; from man's
attempt to become intelligible to himself by making accessible the
unthought that always eludes him because it is that which makes thought
possible; from man's curious relationship with his history as historical and
what makes history possible in which his origin always retreats. Humanism,
or the analytic of finitude, then, is “warped and twisted forms of reflection,”
and all those forms of reflection that take man as the starting point, that talk
of man's liberation, and that attempt to reach the truth about man are caught
in the futility of the doubles.
Humanism claims that man exists at the center of the universe as a
finite being who can reason within limits, and beyond which limits he
cannot go. Such a notion generates insoluble contradictions for the human
sciences because it is based on incompatible conceptions of what man, his
history, and mind are. Foucault5 traces the play of these contradictions as
they have emerged alongside the empirical human sciences. Hence on one
hand, our knowledge must be limited, as man knows himself as a finite
being, as an objective of nature; on the other hand, that finitude which
establishes the limits of human understanding is claimed to be the condition
that makes knowledge of this finitude possible. Hence the possibility of
knowledge is established on limits to reason which deny it.
This is not the only problem that Foucault sees in the humanist
conception. Humanism refers to the philosophical centrality or priority of
the subject whose rational capacities, which are asocial and ahistorical,
serve as a foundation anchoring objectivity and truth. As Alexander Fraser
states, humanism “is the project of making the subject pole triumph over
3 Ibid., p. 85.
4 Ibid., p. 90.
5 M. Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human
Sciences (London: Tavistock Publications, 1970), pp. 216-230.
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the object pole,”6 representing man as constitutor, as free, as all-knowing,
and as master of his fate and destiny. Foucault's conception of the subject,
influenced by Friedrich Nietzsche, sees it as having no unity, essence, or
integral identity. For Foucault, the unresolved tension of Kant's
philosophical project is that he fails to appreciate the contingent and
historically contextualized character of all truth-claims, (that is, to advocate
a notion of critique which claims to transcend specific historical conditions
through the exercise of cognitive faculties – of understanding, reason, and
judgment – deduced a priori as timeless structures). The transcendental
character of Kant's argument resides in positing a priori categories, which
are deduced to constitute the consciousness of the human subject as that
which organizes perception as a timeless and universal structure. In this
sense, Foucault rejects Kant's claims to have established the universal
grounds for the conditions of possibility of human knowledge, and Kant's
claims for transcendental reason are replaced for Foucault by a principle of
permanent contingency. By extension, Foucault disputes Kant's claim to
have established a secure foundation by which to differentiate different
types of knowledge claims, relating to science, practical reason, or
aesthetics. The objective is to switch from a conception of critique as being
transcendentally grounded to a conception of critique which conceives of
itself as practical and historically specific. Thus Foucault says: “Criticism is
no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal structures with
universal value, but rather as an historical investigation into the events that
have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of
what we are doing, thinking, and saying.”7
Next, Foucault adapts Kant to support his socio-historical concept,
through which individuals are constituted in relation to a world of already-
given practices of a determinate historical terrain. This is one of Foucault’s
central points: the human being has nothing which is essential or
ahistorical, but everything is produced in the limits of a episteme (the total
set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that
give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized
systems of knowledge). For example, man is a central figure only in our
episteme, which is no more than two centuries old, so we can say that he is
only a recent invention. We tend to see man as originary to all things
because the structures of our episteme are entailing this view, but that does
not mean that he is fundamental; being a mere concept derivated from the
structures of our episteme, man will disappear together with our episteme.
This can be seen already with the dissolution of subject, which
characterizes the present.
6 N. Fraser, Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and
Normative Confusions, Cambridge Companion to Foucault (Cambridge:
Cambridge Press, 2005), p. 191.
7 M. Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human
Sciences (London: Tavistock Publications, 1970), p. 302.
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The third argument and final against humanism is that it represents a
mode of indirect domination. This point is based on Foucault’s theory about
power. The slogan of humanism is: “Even though you do not exercise
power, you can still be a ruler.” In the humanist view, the more you deny
yourself the exercise of power, the more you submit to those in power, and
then the more this increases your sovereignty. Humanism invented a whole
series of subjected sovereignties: the soul (ruling the body, but subjected to
God), consciousness (sovereign in a contest of judgment, but subjected to
the necessities of truth), the individual (a titular control of personal rights
subjected to the laws of nature and society), basic freedom (sovereign
within, but accepting the demands of an outside world and “aligned with
destiny”). In short, humanism is everything in Western civilization that
restricts the desire for power: it prohibits the desire for power and excludes
the possibility of power being seized. This view makes possible autocratic
governments and tyranny in the Western world. Instead of this
diminishment of human being, Foucault proposes a thoroughly contingent
human, one which is always open to reinterpretation: “Men have never
ceased to construct themselves...to continually displace their subjectivity, to
constitute themselves in an infinite, multiple series of different
subjectivities that will never have an end and will never bring us into the
presence of something that would be “man.”8
But, if Foucault entails that there is no human essence which is
ahistorical and universal, does that mean that he rejects the possibility of
human rights? No, Foucault’s anti-humanism is entirely consistent with an
orientation to human rights that does not tend to provide them with a
metaphysical ground. I think that Foucault has a pragmatic approach to the
human rights problem. He does not deny them and does not reject their
necessity, but says that human rights need to be historically and
pragmatically determined. In other words, Foucault is saying that we can
not supply a metaphysical ground to human rights because there is no
human essence; but they are good, and those human values help us fight the
power of governments, so let us use them. In this way, we should read a
remark he made in an interview: “There exists today an international
citizenship that has its rights and duties.”9 So, we should see Foucault's
anti-humanism as undercutting only the modernist notion of the subject,
while much of the core of humanist values can be retained.
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8 Foucault, M., Power: Essential works of Foucault 1954-1984 (NY: The
New Press, 2000), p. 274.
9 Ibid., p. 405.
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THE COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH
IN VALUES AND PHILOSOPHY
PURPOSE
Today there is urgent need to attend to the nature and dignity of the
person, to the quality of human life, to the purpose and goal of the physical
transformation of our environment, and to the relation of all this to the
development of social and political life. This, in turn, requires philosophic
clarification of the base upon which freedom is exercised, that is, of the
values which provide stability and guidance to one’s decisions.
Such studies must be able to reach deeply into one’s culture and that
of other parts of the world as mutually reinforcing and enriching in order to
uncover the roots of the dignity of persons and of their societies. They must
be able to identify the conceptual forms in terms of which modern industrial
and technological developments are structured and how these impact upon
human self-understanding. Above all, they must be able to bring these ele-
ments together in the creative understanding essential for setting our goals
and determining our modes of interaction. In the present complex global
circumstances this is a condition for growing together with trust and justice,
honest dedication and mutual concern.
The Council for Studies in Values and Philosophy (RVP) unites
scholars who share these concerns and are interested in the application
thereto of existing capabilities in the field of philosophy and other dis-
ciplines. Its work is to identify areas in which study is needed, the intellec-
tual resources which can be brought to bear thereupon, and the means for
publication and interchange of the work from the various regions of the
world. In bringing these together its goal is scientific discovery and publica-
tion which contributes to the present promotion of humankind.
In sum, our times present both the need and the opportunity for deep-
er and ever more progressive understanding of the person and of the foun-
dations of social life. The development of such understanding is the goal of
the RVP.
PROJECTS
A set of related research efforts is currently in process:
1. Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change: Philosophical
Foundations for Social Life. Focused, mutually coordinated research teams
in university centers prepare volumes as part of an integrated philosophic
search for self-understanding differentiated by culture and civilization.
These evolve more adequate understandings of the person in society and
look to the cultural heritage of each for the resources to respond to the chal-
lenges of its own specific contemporary transformation.
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2. Seminars on Culture and Contemporary Issues. This series of 10
week crosscultural and interdisciplinary seminars is coordinated by the
RVP in Washington.
3. Joint-Colloquia with Institutes of Philosophy of the National
Academies of Science, university philosophy departments, and societies.
Underway since 1976 in Eastern Europe and, since 1987, in China, these
concern the person in contemporary society.
4. Foundations of Moral Education and Character Development. A
study in values and education which unites philosophers, psychologists,
social scientists and scholars in education in the elaboration of ways of
enriching the moral content of education and character development. This
work has been underway since 1980.
The personnel for these projects consists of established scholars will-
ing to contribute their time and research as part of their professional com-
mitment to life in contemporary society. For resources to implement this
work the Council, as 501 C3 a non-profit organization incorporated in the
District of Colombia, looks to various private foundations, public programs
and enterprises.
PUBLICATIONS ON CULTURAL HERITAGE AND CONTEMPO-
RARY CHANGE
Series I. Culture and Values
Series II. African Philosophical Studies
Series IIA. Islamic Philosophical Studies
Series III. Asian Philosophical Studies
Series IV. Western European Philosophical Studies
Series IVA. Central and Eastern European Philosophical Studies
Series V. Latin American Philosophical Studies
Series VI. Foundations of Moral Education
Series VII. Seminars: Culture and Values
Series VIII. Christian Philosophical Studies
************************************************************
CULTURAL HERITAGE AND CONTEMPORARY CHANGE
Series I. Culture and Values
I.1 Research on Culture and Values: Intersection of Universities, Churches
and Nations. George F. McLean, ed. ISBN 0819173533 (paper);
081917352-5 (cloth).
I.2 The Knowledge of Values: A Methodological Introduction to the Study
of Values; A. Lopez Quintas, ed. ISBN 081917419x (paper);
0819174181 (cloth).
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I.3 Reading Philosophy for the XXIst Century. George F. McLean, ed.
ISBN 0819174157 (paper); 0819174149 (cloth).
I.4 Relations between Cultures. John A. Kromkowski, ed. ISBN
1565180089 (paper); 1565180097 (cloth).
I.5 Urbanization and Values. John A. Kromkowski, ed. ISBN 1565180100
(paper); 1565180119 (cloth).
I.6 The Place of the Person in Social Life. Paul Peachey and John A. Krom-
kowski, eds. ISBN 1565180127 (paper); 156518013-5 (cloth).
I.7 Abrahamic Faiths, Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflicts. Paul Peachey, George
F. McLean and John A. Kromkowski, eds. ISBN 1565181042
(paper).
I.8 Ancient Western Philosophy: The Hellenic Emergence. George F.
McLean and Patrick J. Aspell, eds. ISBN 156518100X (paper).
I.9 Medieval Western Philosophy: The European Emergence. Patrick J.
Aspell, ed. ISBN 1565180941 (paper).
I.10 The Ethical Implications of Unity and the Divine in Nicholas of Cusa.
David L. De Leonardis. ISBN 1565181123 (paper).
I.11 Ethics at the Crossroads: 1.Normative Ethics and Objective Reason.
George F. McLean, ed. ISBN 1565180224 (paper).
I.12 Ethics at the Crossroads: 2. Personalist Ethics and Human
Subjectivity. George F. McLean, ed. ISBN 1565180240 (paper).
I.13 The Emancipative Theory of Jürgen Habermas and Metaphysics.
Robert Badillo. ISBN 1565180429 (paper); 1565180437 (cloth).
I.14 The Deficient Cause of Moral Evil According to Thomas Aquinas.
Edward Cook. ISBN 1565180704 (paper).
I.15 Human Love: Its Meaning and Scope, a Phenomenology of Gift and
Encounter. Alfonso Lopez Quintas. ISBN 1565180747 (paper).
I.16 Civil Society and Social Reconstruction. George F. McLean, ed. ISBN
1565180860 (paper).
I.17 Ways to God, Personal and Social at the Turn of Millennia: The Iqbal
Lecture, Lahore. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181239 (paper).
I.18 The Role of the Sublime in Kant’s Moral Metaphysics. John R.
Goodreau. ISBN 1565181247 (paper).
I.19 Philosophical Challenges and Opportunities of Globalization. Oliva
Blanchette, Tomonobu Imamichi and George F. McLean, eds. ISBN
1565181298 (paper).
I.20 Faith, Reason and Philosophy: Lectures at The al-Azhar, Qom,
Tehran, Lahore and Beijing; Appendix: The Encyclical Letter: Fides
et Ratio. George F. McLean. ISBN 156518130 (paper).
I.21 Religion and the Relation between Civilizations: Lectures on
Cooperation between Islamic and Christian Cultures in a Global
Horizon. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181522 (paper).
I.22 Freedom, Cultural Traditions and Progress: Philosophy in Civil
Society and Nation Building, Tashkent Lectures, 1999. George F.
McLean. ISBN 1565181514 (paper).
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I.23 Ecology of Knowledge. Jerzy A. Wojciechowski. ISBN 1565181581
(paper).
I.24 God and the Challenge of Evil: A Critical Examination of Some
Serious Objections to the Good and Omnipotent God. John L.
Yardan. ISBN 1565181603 (paper).
I.25 Reason, Rationality and Reasonableness, Vietnamese Philosophical
Studies, I. Tran Van Doan. ISBN 1565181662 (paper).
I.26 The Culture of Citizenship: Inventing Postmodern Civic Culture.
Thomas Bridges. ISBN 1565181689 (paper).
I.27 The Historicity of Understanding and the Problem of Relativism in
Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics. Osman Bilen. ISBN
1565181670 (paper).
I.28 Speaking of God. Carlo Huber. ISBN 1565181697 (paper).
I.29 Persons, Peoples and Cultures in a Global Age: Metaphysical Bases
for Peace between Civilizations. George F. McLean. ISBN
1565181875 (paper).
I.30 Hermeneutics, Tradition and Contemporary Change: Lectures in
Chennai/Madras, India. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181883
(paper).
I.31 Husserl and Stein. Richard Feist and William Sweet, eds. ISBN
1565181948 (paper).
I.32 Paul Hanly Furfey’s Quest for a Good Society. Bronislaw Misztal,
Francesco Villa, and Eric Sean Williams, eds. ISBN 1565182278
(paper).
I.33 Three Theories of Society. Paul Hanly Furfey. ISBN 9781565182288
(paper).
I.34 Building Peace in Civil Society: An Autobiographical Report from a
Believers’ Church. Paul Peachey. ISBN 9781565182325 (paper).
I.35 Karol Wojtyla's Philosophical Legacy. Agnes B. Curry, Nancy Mardas
and George F. McLean ,eds. ISBN 9781565182479 (paper).
I.36 Kantian Form and Phenomenological Force: Kant’s Imperatives and
the Directives of Contemporary Phenomenology. Randolph C.
Wheeler. ISBN 9781565182547 (paper).
I.37 Beyond Modernity: The Recovery of Person and Community in Global
Times: Lectures in China and Vietnam. George F. McLean. ISBN
9781565182578 (paper)
I. 38 Religion and Culture. George F. McLean. ISBN 9781565182561
(paper).
I.39 The Dialogue of Cultural Traditions: Global Perspective. William
Sweet, George F. McLean, Tomonobu Imamichi, Safak Ural, O.
Faruk Akyol, eds. ISBN 9781565182585 (paper).
I.40 Unity and Harmony, Love and Compassion in Global Times. George F.
McLean. ISBN 9781565182592 (paper).
I.41 Intercultural Dialogue and Human Rights. Luigi Bonanate, Roberto
Papini and William Sweet, eds. ISBN 9781565182714 (paper).
Council for Research in Values and Philosophy 401
I.42 Philosophy Emerging from Culture. William Sweet, George F.
McLean, Oliva Blanchette, Wonbin Park, eds. ISBN 9781565182851
(paper).
I.43 Whence Intelligibility? Louis Perron, ed. ISBN 9781565182905
(paper).
Series II. African Philosophical Studies
II.1 Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies: I. Kwasi
Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye, eds. ISBN 1565180046 (paper);
1565180054 (cloth).
II.2 The Foundations of Social Life: Ugandan Philosophical Studies: I.
A.T. Dalfovo, ed. ISBN 1565180062 (paper); 156518007-0 (cloth).
II.3 Identity and Change in Nigeria: Nigerian Philosophical Studies, I.
Theophilus Okere, ed. ISBN 1565180682 (paper).
II.4 Social Reconstruction in Africa: Ugandan Philosophical studies, II. E.
Wamala, A.R. Byaruhanga, A.T. Dalfovo, J.K. Kigongo, S.A.
Mwanahewa and G. Tusabe, eds. ISBN 1565181182 (paper).
II.5 Ghana: Changing Values/Changing Technologies: Ghanaian
Philosophical Studies, II. Helen Lauer, ed. ISBN 1565181441
(paper).
II.6 Sameness and Difference: Problems and Potentials in South African
Civil Society: South African Philosophical Studies, I. James
R.Cochrane and Bastienne Klein, eds. ISBN 1565181557 (paper).
II.7 Protest and Engagement: Philosophy after Apartheid at an Historically
Black South African University: South African Philosophical Studies,
II. Patrick Giddy, ed. ISBN 1565181638 (paper).
II.8 Ethics, Human Rights and Development in Africa: Ugandan
Philosophical Studies, III. A.T. Dalfovo, J.K. Kigongo, J. Kisekka,
G. Tusabe, E. Wamala, R. Munyonyo, A.B. Rukooko, A.B.T.
Byaruhanga-akiiki, and M. Mawa, eds. ISBN 1565181727 (paper).
II.9 Beyond Cultures: Perceiving a Common Humanity: Ghanaian
Philosophical Studies, III. Kwame Gyekye. ISBN 156518193X
(paper).
II.10 Social and Religious Concerns of East African: A Wajibu Anthology:
Kenyan Philosophical Studies, I. Gerald J. Wanjohi and G. Wakuraya
Wanjohi, eds. ISBN 1565182219 (paper).
II.11 The Idea of an African University: The Nigerian Experience: Nigerian
Philosophical Studies, II. Joseph Kenny, ed. ISBN 9781565182301
(paper).
II.12 The Struggles after the Struggle: Zimbabwean Philosophical Study, I.
David Kaulemu, ed. ISBN 9781565182318 (paper).
II.13 Indigenous and Modern Environmental Ethics: A Study of the
Indigenous Oromo Environmental Ethic and Modern Issues of
Environment and Development: Ethiopian Philosophical Studies, I.
Workineh Kelbessa. ISBN 9781565182530 (paper).
402 Publications
II.14 African Philosophy and the Future of Africa: South African
Philosophical Studies, III. Gerard Walmsley, ed. ISMB
9781565182707 (paper).
II.15 Philosophy in Ethiopia: African Philosophy Today, I: Ethiopian
Philosophical Studies, II. Bekele Gutema and Charles C. Verharen,
eds. ISBN 9781565182790 (paper).
II.16 The Idea of a Nigerian University: A Revisited: Nigerian
Philosophical Studies, III. Olatunji Oyeshile and Joseph Kenny, eds.
ISBN 9781565182776 (paper).
Series IIA. Islamic Philosophical Studies
IIA.1 Islam and the Political Order. Muhammad Saïd al-Ashmawy. ISBN
ISBN 156518047X (paper); 156518046-1 (cloth).
IIA.2 Al-Ghazali Deliverance from Error and Mystical Union with the
Almighty: Al-munqidh Min al-Dadāl. Critical Arabic edition and
English translation by Muhammad Abulaylah and Nurshif Abdul-
Rahim Rifat; Introduction and notes by George F. McLean. ISBN
1565181530 (Arabic-English edition, paper), ISBN 1565180828
(Arabic edition, paper), ISBN 156518081X (English edition, paper)
IIA.3 Philosophy in Pakistan. Naeem Ahmad, ed. ISBN 1565181085
(paper).
IIA.4 The Authenticity of the Text in Hermeneutics. Seyed Musa Dibadj.
ISBN 1565181174 (paper).
IIA.5 Interpretation and the Problem of the Intention of the Author: H.-G.
Gadamer vs E.D. Hirsch. Burhanettin Tatar. ISBN 156518121
(paper).
IIA.6 Ways to God, Personal and Social at the Turn of Millennia: The Iqbal
Lectures, Lahore. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181239 (paper).
IIA.7 Faith, Reason and Philosophy: Lectures at Al-Azhar University,
Qom, Tehran, Lahore and Beijing; Appendix: The Encyclical Letter:
Fides et Ratio. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181301 (paper).
IIA.8 Islamic and Christian Cultures: Conflict or Dialogue: Bulgarian
Philosophical Studies, III. Plament Makariev, ed. ISBN 156518162X
(paper).
IIA.9 Values of Islamic Culture and the Experience of History, Russian
Philosophical Studies, I. Nur Kirabaev, Yuriy Pochta, eds. ISBN
1565181336 (paper).
IIA.10 Christian-Islamic Preambles of Faith. Joseph Kenny. ISBN
1565181387 (paper).
IIA.11 The Historicity of Understanding and the Problem of Relativism in
Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics. Osman Bilen. ISBN
1565181670 (paper).
IIA.12 Religion and the Relation between Civilizations: Lectures on
Cooperation between Islamic and Christian Cultures in a Global
Horizon. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181522 (paper).
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IIA.13 Modern Western Christian Theological Understandings of Muslims
since the Second Vatican Council. Mahmut Aydin. ISBN
1565181719 (paper).
IIA.14 Philosophy of the Muslim World; Authors and Principal Themes.
Joseph Kenny. ISBN 1565181794 (paper).
IIA.15 Islam and Its Quest for Peace: Jihad, Justice and Education.
Mustafa Köylü. ISBN 1565181808 (paper).
IIA.16 Islamic Thought on the Existence of God: Contributions and
Contrasts with Contemporary Western Philosophy of Religion. Cafer
S. Yaran. ISBN 1565181921 (paper).
IIA.17 Hermeneutics, Faith, and Relations between Cultures: Lectures in
Qom, Iran. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181913 (paper).
IIA.18 Change and Essence: Dialectical Relations between Change and
Continuity in the Turkish Intellectual Tradition. Sinasi Gunduz and
Cafer S. Yaran, eds. ISBN 1565182227 (paper).
IIA. 19 Understanding Other Religions: Al-Biruni and Gadamer’s “Fusion
of Horizons”. Kemal Ataman. ISBN 9781565182523 (paper).
Series III. Asian Philosophical Studies
III.1 Man and Nature: Chinese Philosophical Studies, I. Tang Yi-jie and Li
Zhen, eds. ISBN 0819174130 (paper); 0819174122 (cloth).
III.2 Chinese Foundations for Moral Education and Character Develop-
ment: Chinese Philosophical Studies, II. Tran van Doan, ed. ISBN
1565180321 (paper); 156518033X (cloth).
III.3 Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, Christianity and Chinese Culture:
Chinese Philosophical Studies, III. Tang Yijie. ISBN 1565180348
(paper); 156518035-6 (cloth).
III.4 Morality, Metaphysics and Chinese Culture (Metaphysics, Culture and
Morality, I). Vincent Shen and Tran van Doan, eds. ISBN
1565180275 (paper); 156518026-7 (cloth).
III.5 Tradition, Harmony and Transcendence. George F. McLean. ISBN
1565180313 (paper); 156518030-5 (cloth).
III.6 Psychology, Phenomenology and Chinese Philosophy: Chinese
Philosophical Studies, VI. Vincent Shen, Richard Knowles and Tran
Van Doan, eds. ISBN 1565180453 (paper); 1565180445 (cloth).
III.7 Values in Philippine Culture and Education: Philippine Philosophical
Studies, I. Manuel B. Dy, Jr., ed. ISBN 1565180412 (paper);
156518040-2 (cloth).
III.7A The Human Person and Society: Chinese Philosophical Studies,
VIIA. Zhu Dasheng, Jin Xiping and George F. McLean, eds. ISBN
1565180887.
III.8 The Filipino Mind: Philippine Philosophical Studies II. Leonardo N.
Mercado. ISBN 156518064X (paper); 156518063-1 (cloth).
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III.9 Philosophy of Science and Education: Chinese Philosophical Studies
IX. Vincent Shen and Tran Van Doan, eds. ISBN 1565180763
(paper); 156518075-5 (cloth).
III.10 Chinese Cultural Traditions and Modernization: Chinese
Philosophical Studies, X. Wang Miaoyang, Yu Xuanmeng and
George F. McLean, eds. ISBN 1565180682 (paper).
III.11 The Humanization of Technology and Chinese Culture: Chinese
Philosophical Studies XI. Tomonobu Imamichi, Wang Miaoyang and
Liu Fangtong, eds. ISBN 1565181166 (paper).
III.12 Beyond Modernization: Chinese Roots of Global Awareness: Chinese
Philosophical Studies, XII. Wang Miaoyang, Yu Xuanmeng and
George F. McLean, eds. ISBN 1565180909 (paper).
III.13 Philosophy and Modernization in China: Chinese Philosophical
Studies XIII. Liu Fangtong, Huang Songjie and George F. McLean,
eds. ISBN 1565180666 (paper).
III.14 Economic Ethics and Chinese Culture: Chinese Philosophical
Studies, XIV. Yu Xuanmeng, Lu Xiaohe, Liu Fangtong, Zhang Rulun
and Georges Enderle, eds. ISBN 1565180925 (paper).
III.15 Civil Society in a Chinese Context: Chinese Philosophical Studies
XV. Wang Miaoyang, Yu Xuanmeng and Manuel B. Dy, eds. ISBN
1565180844 (paper).
III.16 The Bases of Values in a Time of Change: Chinese and Western:
Chinese Philosophical Studies, XVI. Kirti Bunchua, Liu Fangtong,
Yu Xuanmeng, Yu Wujin, eds. ISBN l56518114X (paper).
III.17 Dialogue between Christian Philosophy and Chinese Culture:
Philosophical Perspectives for the Third Millennium: Chinese
Philosophical Studies, XVII. Paschal Ting, Marian Kao and Bernard
Li, eds. ISBN 1565181735 (paper).
III.18 The Poverty of Ideological Education: Chinese Philosophical
Studies, XVIII. Tran Van Doan. ISBN 1565181646 (paper).
III.19 God and the Discovery of Man: Classical and Contemporary
Approaches: Lectures in Wuhan, China. George F. McLean. ISBN
1565181891 (paper).
III.20 Cultural Impact on International Relations: Chinese Philosophical
Studies, XX. Yu Xintian, ed. ISBN 156518176X (paper).
III.21 Cultural Factors in International Relations: Chinese Philosophical
Studies, XXI. Yu Xintian, ed. ISBN 1565182049 (paper).
III.22 Wisdom in China and the West: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXII.
Vincent Shen and Willard Oxtoby †. ISBN 1565182057 (paper)
III.23 China’s Contemporary Philosophical Journey: Western Philosophy
and Marxism: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXIII. Liu Fangtong.
ISBN 1565182065 (paper).
III.24 Shanghai: Its Urbanization and Culture: Chinese Philosophical
Studies, XXIV. Yu Xuanmeng and He Xirong, eds. ISBN
1565182073 (paper).
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III.25 Dialogue of Philosophies, Religions and Civilizations in the Era of
Globalization: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXV. Zhao Dunhua,
ed. ISBN 9781565182431 (paper).
III.26 Rethinking Marx: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXVI. Zou Shipeng
and Yang Xuegong, eds. ISBN 9781565182448 (paper).
III.27 Confucian Ethics in Retrospect and Prospect: Chinese Philosophical
Studies XXVII. Vincent Shen and Kwong-loi Shun, eds. ISBN
9781565182455 (paper).
III.28 Cultural Tradition and Social Progress, Chinese Philosophical
Studies, XXVIII. He Xirong, Yu Xuanmeng, Yu Xintian, Yu Wujing,
Yang Junyi, eds. ISBN 9781565182660 (Paper).
IIIB.1 Authentic Human Destiny: The Paths of Shankara and Heidegger:
Indian Philosophical Studies, I. Vensus A. George. ISBN
1565181190 (paper).
IIIB.2 The Experience of Being as Goal of Human Existence: The
Heideggerian Approach: Indian Philosophical Studies, II. Vensus A.
George. ISBN 156518145X (paper).
IIIB.3 Religious Dialogue as Hermeneutics: Bede Griffiths’s Advaitic
Approach: Indian Philosophical Studies, III. Kuruvilla Pandikattu.
ISBN 1565181395 (paper).
IIIB.4 Self-Realization [Brahmaanubhava]: The Advaitic Perspective of
Shankara: Indian Philosophical Studies, IV. Vensus A. George.
ISBN 1565181549 (paper).
IIIB.5 Gandhi: The Meaning of Mahatma for the Millennium: Indian
Philosophical Studies, V. Kuruvilla Pandikattu, ed. ISBN
1565181565 (paper).
IIIB.6 Civil Society in Indian Cultures: Indian Philosophical Studies, VI.
Asha Mukherjee, Sabujkali Sen (Mitra) and K. Bagchi, eds. ISBN
1565181573 (paper).
IIIB.7 Hermeneutics, Tradition and Contemporary Change: Lectures in
Chennai/Madras, India. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181883
(paper).
IIIB.8 Plenitude and Participation: The Life of God in Man: Lectures in
Chennai/Madras, India. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181999
(paper).
IIIB.9 Sufism and Bhakti, a Comparative Study: Indian Philosophical
Studies, VII. Md. Sirajul Islam. ISBN 1565181980 (paper).
IIIB.10 Reasons for Hope: Its Nature, Role and Future: Indian
Philosophical Studies, VIII. Kuruvilla Pandikattu, ed. ISBN 156518
2162 (paper).
IIIB.11 Lifeworlds and Ethics: Studies in Several Keys: Indian
Philosophical Studies, IX. Margaret Chatterjee. ISBN
9781565182332 (paper).
IIIB.12 Paths to the Divine: Ancient and Indian: Indian Philosophical
Studies, X. Vensus A. George. ISBN 9781565182486. (paper).
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IIB.13 Faith, Reason, Science: Philosophical Reflections with Special
Reference to Fides et Ratio: Indian Philosophical Studies, XIII.
Varghese Manimala, ed. IBSN 9781565182554 (paper).
IIIB.14 Identity, Creativity and Modernization: Perspectives on Indian
Cultural Tradition: Indian Philosophical Studies, XIV. Sebastian
Velassery and Vensus A. George, eds. ISBN 9781565182783
(paper).
IIIC.1 Spiritual Values and Social Progress: Uzbekistan Philosophical
Studies, I. Said Shermukhamedov and Victoriya Levinskaya, eds.
ISBN 1565181433 (paper).
IIIC.2 Kazakhstan: Cultural Inheritance and Social Transformation:
Kazakh Philosophical Studies, I. Abdumalik Nysanbayev. ISBN
1565182022 (paper).
IIIC.3 Social Memory and Contemporaneity: Kyrgyz Philosophical Studies,
I. Gulnara A. Bakieva. ISBN 9781565182349 (paper).
IIID.1 Reason, Rationality and Reasonableness: Vietnamese Philosophical
Studies, I. Tran Van Doan. ISBN 1565181662 (paper).
IIID.2 Hermeneutics for a Global Age: Lectures in Shanghai and Hanoi.
George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181905 (paper).
IIID.3 Cultural Traditions and Contemporary Challenges in Southeast
Asia. Warayuth Sriwarakuel, Manuel B. Dy, J. Haryatmoko, Nguyen
Trong Chuan, and Chhay Yiheang, eds. ISBN 1565182138 (paper).
IIID.4 Filipino Cultural Traits: Claro R. Ceniza Lectures. Rolando M.
Gripaldo, ed. ISBN 1565182251 (paper).
IIID.5 The History of Buddhism in Vietnam. Chief editor: Nguyen Tai Thu;
Authors: Dinh Minh Chi, Ly Kim Hoa, Ha thuc Minh, Ha Van Tan,
Nguyen Tai Thu. ISBN 1565180984 (paper).
IIID.6 Relations between Religions and Cultures in Southeast Asia. Gadis
Arivia and Donny Gahral Adian, eds. ISBN 9781565182509 (paper).
Series IV. Western European Philosophical Studies
IV.1 Italy in Transition: The Long Road from the First to the Second
Republic: The Edmund D. Pellegrino Lectures. Paolo Janni, ed.
ISBN 1565181204 (paper).
IV.2 Italy and the European Monetary Union: The Edmund D. Pellegrino
Lectures. Paolo Janni, ed. ISBN 156518128X (paper).
IV.3 Italy at the Millennium: Economy, Politics, Literature and Journalism:
The Edmund D. Pellegrino Lectures. Paolo Janni, ed. ISBN
1565181581 (paper).
IV.4 Speaking of God. Carlo Huber. ISBN 1565181697 (paper).
IV.5 The Essence of Italian Culture and the Challenge of a Global Age.
Paulo Janni and George F. McLean, eds. ISBB 1565181778 (paper).
IV.6 Italic Identity in Pluralistic Contexts: Toward the Development of
Intercultural Competencies. Piero Bassetti and Paolo Janni, eds.
ISBN 1565181441 (paper).
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I.7 Phenomenon of Affectivity: Phenomenological-Anthropological
Perspectives. Ghislaine Florival. ISBN 9781565182899 (paper).
Series IVA. Central and Eastern European Philosophical Studies
IVA.1 The Philosophy of Person: Solidarity and Cultural Creativity: Polish
Philosophical Studies, I. A. Tischner, J.M. Zycinski, eds. ISBN
1565180496 (paper); 156518048-8 (cloth).
IVA.2 Public and Private Social Inventions in Modern Societies: Polish
Philosophical Studies, II. L. Dyczewski, P. Peachey, J.A.
Kromkowski, eds. ISBN. 1565180518 (paper); 156518050X (cloth).
IVA.3 Traditions and Present Problems of Czech Political Culture:
Czechoslovak Philosophical Studies, I. M. Bednár and M. Vejraka,
eds. ISBN 1565180577 (paper); 156518056-9 (cloth).
IVA.4 Czech Philosophy in the XXth Century: Czech Philosophical Studies,
II. Lubomír Nový and Jirí Gabriel, eds. ISBN 1565180291 (paper);
156518028-3 (cloth).
IVA.5 Language, Values and the Slovak Nation: Slovak Philosophical
Studies, I. Tibor Pichler and Jana Gašparí-ková, eds. ISBN
1565180372 (paper); 156518036-4 (cloth).
IVA.6 Morality and Public Life in a Time of Change: Bulgarian Philosoph-
ical Studies, I. V. Prodanov and A. Davidov, eds. ISBN 1565180550
(paper); 1565180542 (cloth).
IVA.7 Knowledge and Morality: Georgian Philosophical Studies, 1. N.V.
Chavchavadze, G. Nodia and P. Peachey, eds. ISBN 1565180534
(paper); 1565180526 (cloth).
IVA.8 Cultural Heritage and Social Change: Lithuanian Philosophical
Studies, I. Bronius Kuzmickas and Aleksandr Dobrynin, eds. ISBN
1565180399 (paper); 1565180380 (cloth).
IVA.9 National, Cultural and Ethnic Identities: Harmony beyond Conflict:
Czech Philosophical Studies, IV. Jaroslav Hroch, David Hollan,
George F. McLean, eds. ISBN 1565181131 (paper).
IVA.10 Models of Identities in Postcommunist Societies: Yugoslav
Philosophical Studies, I. Zagorka Golubovic and George F. McLean,
eds. ISBN 1565181211 (paper).
IVA.11 Interests and Values: The Spirit of Venture in a Time of Change:
Slovak Philosophical Studies, II. Tibor Pichler and Jana Gasparikova,
eds. ISBN 1565181255 (paper).
IVA.12 Creating Democratic Societies: Values and Norms: Bulgarian
Philosophical Studies, II. Plamen Makariev, Andrew M. Blasko and
Asen Davidov, eds. ISBN 156518131X (paper).
IVA.13 Values of Islamic Culture and the Experience of History: Russian
Philosophical Studies, I. Nur Kirabaev and Yuriy Pochta, eds. ISBN
1565181336 (paper).
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IVA.14 Values and Education in Romania Today: Romanian Philosophical
Studies, I. Marin Calin and Magdalena Dumitrana, eds. ISBN
1565181344 (paper).
IVA.15 Between Words and Reality, Studies on the Politics of Recognition
and the Changes of Regime in Contemporary Romania: Romanian
Philosophical Studies, II. Victor Neumann. ISBN 1565181611
(paper).
IVA.16 Culture and Freedom: Romanian Philosophical Studies, III. Marin
Aiftinca, ed. ISBN 1565181360 (paper).
IVA.17 Lithuanian Philosophy: Persons and Ideas: Lithuanian
Philosophical Studies, II. Jurate Baranova, ed. ISBN 1565181379
(paper).
IVA.18 Human Dignity: Values and Justice: Czech Philosophical Studies,
III. Miloslav Bednar, ed. ISBN 1565181409 (paper).
IVA.19 Values in the Polish Cultural Tradition: Polish Philosophical
Studies, III. Leon Dyczewski, ed. ISBN 1565181425 (paper).
IVA.20 Liberalization and Transformation of Morality in Post-communist
Countries: Polish Philosophical Studies, IV. Tadeusz Buksinski.
ISBN 1565181786 (paper).
IVA.21 Islamic and Christian Cultures: Conflict or Dialogue: Bulgarian
Philosophical Studies, III. Plament Makariev, ed. ISBN 156518162X
(paper).
IVA.22 Moral, Legal and Political Values in Romanian Culture: Romanian
Philosophical Studies, IV. Mihaela Czobor-Lupp and J. Stefan Lupp,
eds. ISBN 1565181700 (paper).
IVA.23 Social Philosophy: Paradigm of Contemporary Thinking:
Lithuanian Philosophical Studies, III. Jurate Morkuniene. ISBN
1565182030 (paper).
IVA.24 Romania: Cultural Identity and Education for Civil Society:
Romanian Philosophical Studies, V. Magdalena Dumitrana, ed. ISBN
156518209X (paper).
IVA.25 Polish Axiology: the 20th Century and Beyond: Polish
Philosophical Studies, V. Stanislaw Jedynak, ed. ISBN 1565181417
(paper).
IVA.26 Contemporary Philosophical Discourse in Lithuania: Lithuanian
Philosophical Studies, IV. Jurate Baranova, ed. ISBN 156518-2154
(paper).
IVA.27 Eastern Europe and the Challenges of Globalization: Polish
Philosophical Studies, VI. Tadeusz Buksinski and Dariusz
Dobrzanski, ed. ISBN 1565182189 (paper).
IVA.28 Church, State, and Society in Eastern Europe: Hungarian
Philosophical Studies, I. Miklós Tomka. ISBN 156518226X (paper).
IVA.29 Politics, Ethics, and the Challenges to Democracy in ‘New
Independent States’: Georgian Philosophical Studies, II. Tinatin
Bochorishvili, William Sweet, Daniel Ahern, eds. ISBN
9781565182240 (paper).
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IVA.30 Comparative Ethics in a Global Age: Russian Philosophical
Studies II. Marietta T. Stepanyants, eds. ISBN 9781565182356
(paper).
IVA.31 Identity and Values of Lithuanians: Lithuanian Philosophical
Studies, V. Aida Savicka, eds. ISBN 9781565182367 (paper).
IVA.32 The Challenge of Our Hope: Christian Faith in Dialogue: Polish
Philosophical Studies, VII. Waclaw Hryniewicz. ISBN
9781565182370 (paper).
IVA.33 Diversity and Dialogue: Culture and Values in the Age of
Globalization. Andrew Blasko and Plamen Makariev, eds. ISBN
9781565182387 (paper).
IVA. 34 Civil Society, Pluralism and Universalism: Polish Philosophical
Studies, VIII. Eugeniusz Gorski. ISBN 9781565182417 (paper).
IVA.35 Romanian Philosophical Culture, Globalization, and Education:
Romanian Philosophical Studies VI. Stefan Popenici and Alin Tat
and, eds. ISBN 9781565182424 (paper).
IVA.36 Political Transformation and Changing Identities in Central and
Eastern Europe: Lithuanian Philosophical Studies, VI. Andrew
Blasko and Diana Janušauskienė, eds. ISBN 9781565182462
(paper).
IVA.37 Truth and Morality: The Role of Truth in Public Life: Romanian
Philosophical Studies, VII. Wilhelm Dancă, ed. ISBN
9781565182493 (paper).
IVA.38 Globalization and Culture: Outlines of Contemporary Social
Cognition: Lithuanian Philosophical Studies, VII. Jurate
Morkuniene, ed. ISBN 9781565182516 (paper).
IVA.39 Knowledge and Belief in the Dialogue of Cultures, Russian
Philosophical Studies, III. Marietta Stepanyants, ed. ISBN
9781565182622 (paper).
IVA.40 God and the Post-Modern Thought: Philosophical Issues in the
Contemporary Critique of Modernity, Polish Philosophical Studies,
IX. Józef Życiński. ISBN 9781565182677 (paper).
IVA.41 Dialogue among Civilizations, Russian Philosophical Studies, IV.
Nur Kirabaev and Yuriy Pochta, eds. ISBN 9781565182653 (paper).
IVA.42 The Idea of Solidarity: Philosophical and Social Contexts, Polish
Philosophical Studies, X. Dariusz Dobrzanski, ed. ISBN
9781565182961 (paper).
IVA.43 God’s Spirit in the World: Ecumenical and Cultural Essays, Polish
Philosophical Studies, XI. Waclaw Hryniewicz. ISBN
9781565182738 (paper).
IVA.44 Philosophical Theology and the Christian Traditions: Russian and
Western Perspectives, Russian Philosophical Studies, V. David
Bradshaw, ed. ISBN 9781565182752 (paper).
IVA.45 Ethics and the Challenge of Secularism: Russian Philosophical
Studies, VI. David Bradshaw, ed. ISBN 9781565182806 (paper).
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IVA.46 Philosophy and Spirituality across Cultures and Civilizations:
Russian Philosophical Studies, VII. Nur Kirabaev, Yuriy Pochta and
Ruzana Pskhu, eds. ISBN 9781565182820 (paper).
IVA.47 Values of the Human Person Contemporary Challenges: Romanian
Philosophical Studies, VIII. Mihaela Pop, ed. ISBN 9781565182844
(paper).
Series V. Latin American Philosophical Studies
V.1 The Social Context and Values: Perspectives of the Americas. O.
Pegoraro, ed. ISBN 081917355X (paper); 0819173541 (cloth).
V.2 Culture, Human Rights and Peace in Central America. Raul Molina
and Timothy Ready, eds. ISBN 0819173576 (paper); 0819173568
(cloth).
V.3 El Cristianismo Aymara: Inculturacion o Culturizacion? Luis
Jolicoeur. ISBN 1565181042 (paper).
V.4 Love as the Foundation of Moral Education and Character
Development. Luis Ugalde, Nicolas Barros and George F. McLean,
eds. ISBN 1565180801 (paper).
V.5 Human Rights, Solidarity and Subsidiarity: Essays towards a Social
Ontology. Carlos E.A. Maldonado. ISBN 1565181107 (paper).
V.6 A New World: A Perspective from Ibero America. H. Daniel Dei, ed.
ISBN 9781565182639 (paper).
Series VI. Foundations of Moral Education
VI.1 Philosophical Foundations for Moral Education and Character Devel-
opment: Act and Agent. G. McLean and F. Ellrod, eds. ISBN
156518001-1 (paper); ISBN 1565180003 (cloth).
VI.2 Psychological Foundations for Moral Education and Character
Development: An Integrated Theory of Moral Development. R.
Knowles, ed. ISBN 156518002X (paper); 156518003-8 (cloth).
VI.3 Character Development in Schools and Beyond. Kevin Ryan and
Thomas Lickona, eds. ISBN 1565180593 (paper); 156518058-5
(cloth).
VI.4 The Social Context and Values: Perspectives of the Americas. O.
Pegoraro, ed. ISBN 081917355X (paper); 0819173541 (cloth).
VI.5 Chinese Foundations for Moral Education and Character Develop-
ment. Tran van Doan, ed. ISBN 1565180321 (paper); 156518033
(cloth).
VI.6 Love as the Foundation of Moral Education and Character
Development. Luis Ugalde, Nicolas Barros and George F. McLean,
eds. ISBN 1565180801 (paper).
Council for Research in Values and Philosophy 411
Series VII. Seminars on Culture and Values
VII.1 The Social Context and Values: Perspectives of the Americas. O.
Pegoraro, ed. ISBN 081917355X (paper); 0819173541 (cloth).
VII.2 Culture, Human Rights and Peace in Central America. Raul Molina
and Timothy Ready, eds. ISBN 0819173576 (paper); 0819173568
(cloth).
VII.3 Relations between Cultures. John A. Kromkowski, ed. ISBN
1565180089 (paper); 1565180097 (cloth).
VII.4 Moral Imagination and Character Development: Volume I, The
Imagination. George F. McLean and John A. Kromkowski, eds.
ISBN 1565181743 (paper).
VII.5 Moral Imagination and Character Development: Volume II, Moral
Imagination in Personal Formation and Character Development.
George F. McLean and Richard Knowles, eds. ISBN 1565181816
(paper).
VII.6 Moral Imagination and Character Development: Volume III,
Imagination in Religion and Social Life. George F. McLean and John
K. White, eds. ISBN 1565181824 (paper).
VII.7 Hermeneutics and Inculturation. George F. McLean, Antonio Gallo,
Robert Magliola, eds. ISBN 1565181840 (paper).
VII.8 Culture, Evangelization, and Dialogue. Antonio Gallo and Robert
Magliola, eds. ISBN 1565181832 (paper).
VII.9 The Place of the Person in Social Life. Paul Peachey and John A.
Kromkowski, eds. ISBN 1565180127 (paper); 156518013-5 (cloth).
VII.10 Urbanization and Values. John A. Kromkowski, ed. ISBN
1565180100 (paper); 1565180119 (cloth).
VII.11 Freedom and Choice in a Democracy, Volume I: Meanings of
Freedom. Robert Magliola and John Farrelly, eds. ISBN 1565181867
(paper).
VII.12 Freedom and Choice in a Democracy, Volume II: The Difficult
Passage to Freedom. Robert Magliola and Richard Khuri, eds. ISBN
1565181859 (paper).
VII 13 Cultural Identity, Pluralism and Globalization (2 volumes). John P.
Hogan, ed. ISBN 1565182170 (paper).
VII.14 Democracy: In the Throes of Liberalism and Totalitarianism.
George F. McLean, Robert Magliola, William Fox, eds. ISBN
1565181956 (paper).
VII.15 Democracy and Values in Global Times: With Nigeria as a Case
Study. George F. McLean, Robert Magliola, Joseph Abah, eds. ISBN
1565181956 (paper).
VII.16 Civil Society and Social Reconstruction. George F. McLean, ed.
ISBN 1565180860 (paper).
VII.17 Civil Society: Who Belongs? William A.Barbieri, Robert Magliola,
Rosemary Winslow, eds. ISBN 1565181972 (paper).
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VII.18 The Humanization of Social Life: Theory and Challenges.
Christopher Wheatley, Robert P. Badillo, Rose B. Calabretta, Robert
Magliola, eds. ISBN 1565182006 (paper).
VII.19 The Humanization of Social Life: Cultural Resources and Historical
Responses. Ronald S. Calinger, Robert P. Badillo, Rose B.
Calabretta, Robert Magliola, eds. ISBN 1565182006 (paper).
VII.20 Religious Inspiration for Public Life: Religion in Public Life,
Volume I. George F. McLean, John A. Kromkowski and Robert
Magliola, eds. ISBN 1565182103 (paper).
VII.21 Religion and Political Structures from Fundamentalism to Public
Service: Religion in Public Life, Volume II. John T. Ford, Robert A.
Destro and Charles R. Dechert, eds. ISBN 1565182111 (paper).
VII.22 Civil Society as Democratic Practice. Antonio F. Perez, Semou
Pathé Gueye, Yang Fenggang, eds. ISBN 1565182146 (paper).
VII.23 Ecumenism and Nostra Aetate in the 21st Century. George F.
McLean and John P. Hogan, eds. ISBN 1565182197 (paper).
VII.24 Multiple Paths to God: Nostra Aetate: 40 years Later. John P.
Hogan, George F. McLean & John A. Kromkowski, eds. ISBN
1565182200 (paper).
VII.25 Globalization and Identity. Andrew Blasko, Taras Dobko, Pham
Van Duc and George Pattery, eds. ISBN 1565182200 (paper).
VII.26 Communication across Cultures: The Hermeneutics of Cultures and
Religions in a Global Age. Chibueze C. Udeani, Veerachart
Nimanong, Zou Shipeng, Mustafa Malik, eds. ISBN:
9781565182400 (paper).
VII.27 Symbols, Cultures and Identities in a Time of Global Interaction.
Paata Chkheidze, Hoang Thi Tho and Yaroslav Pasko, eds. ISBN
9781565182608 (paper).
VII. 28 Restorying the 'Polis':Civil Society as Narrative Reconstruction.
Yuriy Pochta, Rosemary Winslow, eds. ISNB 978156518 (paper).
VII.29 History and Cultural Identity: Retrieving the Past, Shaping the
Future. John P. Hogan, ed. ISBN 9781565182684 (paper).
VII.30 Human Nature: Stable and/or Changing? John P. Hogan, ed. ISBN
9781565182431 (paper).
VII.31 Reasoning in Faith: Cultural Foundations for Civil Society and
Globalization. Octave Kamwiziku Wozol, Sebastian Velassery and
Jurate Baranova, eds. ISBN 9781565182868 (paper).
VII.32 Building Community in a Mobile/Global Age:Migration and
Hospitality. John P. Hogan, Vensus A. George and Corazon T.
Toralba, eds. ISBN 9781565182875 (paper).
Series VIII. Christian Philosophical Studies
VIII.1 Church and People: Disjunctions in a Secular Age, Christian
Philosophical Studies, I. Charles Taylor, José Casanova and George
F. McLean, eds. ISBN9781565182745 (paper).
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VIII.2 God’s Spirit in the World: Ecumenical and Cultural Essays,
Christian Philosophical Studies, II. Waclaw Hryniewicz. ISBN
9781565182738 (paper).
VIII.3 Philosophical Theology and the Christian Traditions: Russian and
Western Perspectives, Christian Philosophical Studies, III. David
Bradshaw, ed. ISBN 9781565182752 (paper).
VIII.4 Ethics and the Challenge of Secularism: Christian Philosophical
Studies, IV. David Bradshaw, ed. ISBN 9781565182806 (paper).
VIII.5 Freedom for Faith: Theological Hermeneutics of Discovery based on
George F. McLean’s Philosophy of Culture: Christian Philosophical
Studies, V. John M. Staak. ISBN 9781565182837 (paper).
VIII.6 Humanity on the Threshold: Religious Perspective on
Transhumanism: Christian Philosophical Studies, VI. John C.
Haughey and Ilia Delio, eds. ISBN 9781565182882 (paper).
The International Society for Metaphysics
ISM.1 Person and Nature. George F. McLean and Hugo Meynell, eds.
ISBN 0819170267 (paper); 0819170259 (cloth).
ISM.2 Person and Society. George F. McLean and Hugo Meynell, eds.
ISBN 0819169250 (paper); 0819169242 (cloth).
ISM.3 Person and God. George F. McLean and Hugo Meynell, eds. ISBN
0819169382 (paper); 0819169374 (cloth).
ISM.4 The Nature of Metaphysical Knowledge. George F. McLean and
Hugo Meynell, eds. ISBN 0819169277 (paper); 0819169269 (cloth).
ISM.5 Philosophhical Challenges and Opportunities of Globalization.
Oliva Blanchette, Tomonobu Imamichi and George F. McLean, eds.
ISBN 1565181298 (paper).
ISM.6 The Dialogue of Cultural Traditions: Global Perspective. William
Sweet, George F. McLean, Tomonobu Imamichi, Safak Ural, O.
Faruk Akyol, eds. ISBN 9781565182585 (paper).
ISM. 7 Philosophy Emerging from Culture. William Sweet, George F.
McLean, Oliva Blanchette, Wonbin Park, eds. ISBN 9781565182851
(paper).
The series is published by: The Council for Research in Values and
Philosophy, Gibbons Hall B-20, 620 Michigan Avenue, NE, Washington,
D.C. 20064; Telephone and Fax: 202/319-6089; e-mail: cua-rvp@cua.edu;
website: http://www.crvp.org. All titles are available in paper except as
noted.
The series is distributed by: The Council for Research on Values
and Philosophy – OST, 285 Oblate Drive, San Antonio, T.X., 78216;
Telephone: (210)341-1366 x205; Email: mmartin@ost.edu.
